Paul Moser’s creative and significant proposal concerning “personifying evidence of God” is examined in relation to three questions: (1) Given a commitment to robust Christian theism, what would an explicitly Christian account of religious epistemology look like? (2) Why should one accept the claims of Christian theism as true rather than those of atheism? (3) Given our awareness of widespread religious diversity and disagreement why should one accept the claims of Christian theism as true? The essay argues that (...) Moser’s proposal is most plausible with respect to (1) but is more problematic when understood to be addressing (2) and (3). (shrink)

The epistemology of monotheism offered by philosophers has given inadequate attention to the kind of foundational evidence to be expected of a personal God whose moral character is ’agapeic’, or perfectly loving, toward all other agents. This article counters this deficiency with the basis of a theistic epistemology that accommodates the distinctive moral character of a God worthy of worship. It captures the widely neglected ’agonic’, or struggle-oriented, character of a God who seeks, by way of personal witness and (...) intentional action, to realize and manifest ’agape’ among humans who suffer from selfishness. In doing so, the article identifies the overlooked role of personifying evidence of God in human moral character formation. In agreement with some prominent New Testament themes, the new perspective offered ties the epistemology of monotheism to robust ’agapeic’ morality in a way that makes such epistemology ethically challenging for inquirers about God’s existence. Accordingly, s. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * Natural Theology and God * Inadequate Arguments * Natural Theology Undone * God, Agape, and Personifying Evidence * References * Further Reading.

One not infrequently hears rumors that the robust practice of natural theology reeks of epistemic pride. Paul Moser’s is a paradigm of such contempt. In this paper we defend the robust practice of natural theology from the charge of epistemic pride. In taking an essentially Thomistic approach, we argue that the evidence of natural theology should be understood as a species of God’s general self-revelation. Thus, an honest assessment of that evidence need not be prideful, but can be (...) an act of epistemic humility, receiving what God has offered, answering God’s call. Lastly, we provide criticisms of Moser’s alternative approach, advancing a variety of philosophical and theological problems against his conception of personifying evidence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.4 (2001) 533-565 [Access article in PDF] Rome Personified, Rome Epitomized: Representations of Rome in the Poetry of the Early Fifth Century Michael Roberts The last years of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century (the reigns of Theodosius and his sons) mark a crucial stage in the Christianization of Rome. 1 The hold of the city and all it stood for on (...) the imagination of the ruling classes was as strong as ever. But Theodosian legislation had definitively established the dominance of Christianity in the empire, and even in Rome the aristocracy was becoming progressively more Christian. 2 These changing circumstances find expression in the way Rome was represented in contemporary literature. While still indebted to the traditional language of the laudes Romae and to well-established literary traditions, the authors of the period find new ways to inflect the image of Rome that mirror their differing religious and cultural allegiances.Three poets make the largest contributions to that evolution in the representation of Rome. Claudius Claudianus was born in Alexandria (c. 370) but came to Rome in 394. His first Latin poem celebrated the consuls of 395, Probinus and Olybrius, but thereafter most of his poems served the interests of his patron and the emperor Honorius' chief minister, the Vandal general Stilicho. Of particular importance for the representation of Rome are his consular panegyrics, for the consulships of Honorius (396, 398, and 404) and Stilicho (400), and his two historical epics on the campaigns against the African warlord Gildo (De bello Gildonico 398) and against Alaric in 401-402 (De bello Getico 402). Claudian wrote his last dated poem in 404. Nothing is heard of him after that date and it is likely he died soon thereafter.Claudian's Christian contemporary, Aurelius Prudentius Clemens, was born, according to the verse preface he wrote to his collected works, in 348. After a successful career in the imperial administration, he [End Page 533] withdrew from public life to devote his poetic talents to the service of God. Two works are especially relevant to the representation of Rome, the Contra Symmachum, in two books, completed in 402 or early 403, though book 1 may have been written earlier, and the Peristephanon, a collection of poems on the martyrs, including the Roman martyrs Lawrence (Perist. 2), Hippolytus (Perist. 11), Peter and Paul (Perist. 12), and Agnes (Perist. 14). Peristephanon 9 and 11 refer to a journey the poet took to Rome, generally dated to 401/402, but it is quite possible that this was not his first trip to the capital. 3The third poet, Rutilius Namatianus, a traditionally minded pagan, was praefectus urbi in 414. His poem, the De reditu suo, which does not survive in its entirety, describes his return from Rome to his native Gaul in 417. 4 It is haunted by the destruction caused in northern Italy and Gaul by the recent barbarian invasions, but it begins with an extended paean of praise to Rome, the eternal city, which always grows stronger by its reverses. Rutilius' patriotic devotion to the city and the idea of Rome provides an optimistic counterpoint to the evidence of destruction and desolation that runs as a leitmotif through the poem.Rome figures in the three poets in two guises. It may appear personified as a woman, whose attributes index the power and status of the city and empire as well as the contemporary circumstances of the Roman state. 5 As an alternative to this metaphorical representation of Rome, the city may be encapsulated by certain, especially charged details of topography, in an epitome of its urban geography that stands in a metonymic (or synecdochic) relationship to the city as a whole. Thus, to take an example from a later period, when Paulinus of Pella came at an advanced age to write his life story in the Eucharisticos, he mentions a trip that he took to Rome in the company of his parents in a.d. 379. At the time he was not... (shrink)

If God exists, where can we find adequate evidence for God's existence? In this book, Paul Moser offers a new perspective on the evidence for God that centers on a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient. The resulting evidence for God is not speculative, abstract, or casual. Rather, it is morally and existentially challenging to humans, as they themselves responsively and willingly become evidence of God's reality in receiving and reflecting God's moral character (...) for others. Moser calls this 'personifying evidence of God,' because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent - such as a human - and thereby to be inherent evidence of an intentional agent. Contrasting this approach with skepticism, scientific naturalism, fideism, and natural theology, Moser also grapples with the potential problems of divine hiddenness, religious diversity, and vast evil. (shrink)

Unveiled from its latent status of myth, from the dawn of civilization until nowadays mass media culture as a necessary need of power in a world of intrinsic human powerlessness, an existential condition as antithetical to the latter in the very terms of power signifies the grandest possible of human perspectives to inhere within the state of affairs of a Real certainly vast enough to contain it respecting its unfathomable profundity in space and in time. By focusing accordingly on the (...) significance of this term as a leading determination of the Real, and as a most comprehensive category and ontological criterion in respect to which all other possible meanings, both immanent in character and transcendent, are formed and defined, and on its own embodiment in a personified fashion (as until now indistinctly found in Polytheism and in the overhuman myths only), it reveals itself in its dialectically required status of actual ontological human power, and under this form opposes whatever limitation of the hitherto known and considered human. It consequently also redefines the notion of overhuman, which proves to be thus far incomplete ontologically as still bound to an existential context of ontic impotence (Nietzsche). (shrink)

Supernatural beliefs are ubiquitous around the world, and mounting evidence indicates that these beliefs partly rely on intuitive, cross‐culturally recurrent cognitive processes. Specifically, past research has focused on humans' intuitive tendency to perceive minds as part of the cognitive foundations of belief in a personified God—an agentic, morally concerned supernatural entity. However, much less is known about belief in karma—another culturally widespread but ostensibly non‐agentic supernatural entity reflecting ethical causation across reincarnations. In two studies and four high‐powered samples, including (...) mostly Christian Canadians and mostly Hindu Indians (Study 1, N = 2,006) and mostly Christian Americans and Singaporean Buddhists (Study 2, N = 1,752), we provide the first systematic empirical investigation of the cognitive intuitions underlying various forms of belief in karma. We used path analyses to (a) replicate tests of the previously documented cognitive predictors of belief in God, (b) test whether this same network of variables predicts belief in karma, and (c) examine the relative contributions of cognitive and cultural variables to both sets of beliefs. We found that cognitive tendencies toward intuitive thinking, mentalizing, dualism, and teleological thinking predicted a variety of beliefs about karma—including morally laden, non‐agentic, and agentic conceptualizations—above and beyond the variability explained by cultural learning about karma across cultures. These results provide further evidence for an independent role for both culture and cognition in supporting diverse types of supernatural beliefs in distinct cultural contexts. (shrink)

Roderick Nash’s conc1usion in Wilderness and the American Mind that St. Francis “stood alone in a posture of humility and respect before the natural world” is not supported by thorough analysis of monastic literature. Rather St. Francis stands at the end of a thousand-year monastic tradition. Investigation of the “histories” and sayings of the desert fathers produces frequent references to the environment, particularly to wildlife. In stories about lions, wolves, antelopes, and other animals, the monks sometimes exercise spiritual powers over (...) the animals, but frequently the relationship is reciprocal: the monks provide for the animals and the animals provide for the monks. This literature personifies wild animals and portrays them as possessing Christian virtues. The desert monk is portrayed as the “new Adam” living at peace with creation. Some of the literature is anti-urban, with the city treated as a place of sin, the desert a place of purification. The wildemess functions much as a monk’s cell, providing freedom from worldly concems and a solitary place for prayer and contemplation. The monks’ relationship to the desert is evidence of their spiritual progress. (shrink)

Friendship arguably offers itself as the freest of all human associations. A weakness of cultural prescription opens a terrain in which intimacy can be lived in a trust relationship that personifies equality, justice and respect. Friendship’s ‘relational freedom’ enables the mutual development of selves; it is generative. Therein lies ‘the beauty of friendship’, as Agnes Heller has reminded us. But the freedom of intimacy is limited. Embedded in a society that attributes different repertoires of intimacy to women and men and (...) privileges male homosociality, friendship’s freedom is curtailed. Especially cross-sex friendships continue to show evidence of persisting tensions. ‘Erotic friendships’ that seek to realize sexual intimacy but eschew the commitments of coupledom continue to face normative-practical challenges. In this paper, I view central aspects of heterosexual intimacy through the small world of intimate friendship, a prism that refracts gendered tensions in the world at large. (shrink)

The animism that infused antebellum US transcendentalism, and the belief everything in the world was alive, provided an unexpected philosophical foundation for the animism that attributes legal and ontological personhood to the corporation, an imitation of life. The transcendental reification of nature, recently evident in Avatar’s fantasies that one could merge with an impersonally conscious nature, turns out to be coterminous with the reification of corporate personhood, and both with the co-option of (fantasies of) white male individuality. The history of (...) the corporation is also the history of the new world: its colonization was facilitated by joint-stock companies. After native populations were subjugated or exterminated, they took on symbolic roles in the colonizing cultures, and the animistic nature with which they are identified has been personified in ways that are transferred to the corporation. As white men began to feel isolated in society, they imagined they could regain connection with a racialized nature; but they could never have access to their conjectured (and ultimately virtual) aboriginal cultures. Transcendentalism also laid the groundwork for merger with the corporation, the dominant manifestation of contemporary capitalist ontology. (shrink)

The article seeks to show that, contrary to the standard view, the 'Choice of Heracles' preserved at Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-33 is not a summary or paraphrase, but is a very close approximation to the actual wording of Prodicus' epideixis. The language and style are shown to be uncharacteristic of Xenophon, and the fact that Prodicus' original was known to exist in both written and orally performed versions serves to explain why the piece is framed by language that disclaims strict accuracy (...) in reproducing it. It is further shown that the way in which near-synonyms are used in the piece is not necessarily inconsistent with other evidence for Prodicus' practice: it is rather the personified character Vice whose usage conflicts with that of Prodicus himself and with that of the personification of Virtue. Finally, it is proposed that the 'Choice of Heracles' represented the contents, not of Prodicus' advanced teaching, but of the popular, cut-rate lecture intended for a general audience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient WorldMadeleine M. HenryChristopher A. Faraone and Laura K. McClure, eds. Prostitutes and Courtesans in the Ancient World. Wisconsin Studies in Classics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006. x + 360 pp. Cloth, $65; paper, 24.95.This collection stems from a conference at the University of Wisconsin, Madison in April 2002. McClure's introduction situates the essays historically from nineteenth-century assemblages of textual references to (...) sexual practice to the present, when attention to prostitution has grown out of interest in women's history, the history of sexuality, and cultural studies. She notes important modern approaches and the vexed question of terminology and its relationship to behavior. As McClure states, "while prostitutes in the ancient world may have been socially marginal, they were symbolically and even socially central" (6). Most of the essays, organized into three categories, concentrate on written evidence; some may wish that illustrations had been included.Section A: "Prostitution and the Sacred"In "Marriage, Divorce, and the Prostitute in Ancient Mesopotamia," Martha Roth concentrates on the impact, especially on marriage, of unmarried women (harı\mtu in Babylono-Assyrian, kar.kid in Sumerian) who had sexual relations with men. She concludes that the documents assign responsibility to the unmarried woman who has sexual relations with a man and that the law codes attempted to prevent or minimize the economic repercussions of such unions on inheritance. Roth finds no evidence of "ritualized or institutionalized sexual intercourse" (23) in Old Babylonian evidence (nineteenth to seventeenth centuries B.C.E.).In "Prostitution in the Social World and Religious Rhetoric of Ancient Israel," Phyllis Bird mainly provides interpretations of references in the Hebrew Bible to prostitution (e.g., the quest for "oriental sacred prostitution") and surveys elite, male religious biases. The prostitute "type" of the Hebrew Bible resembles that of surrounding cultures (41). Bird disentangles the considerable metaphorical uses of prostitutional language from other more literal references in order to concentrate on the differences between one called a prostitute proper (zonah, one who engages in extramarital sexual relations) versus one called qedes=ah ("consecrated woman"). The verb zanah referred to all extramarital sexual relations except adultery, and Bird dissects the problems involved when no one English word can be used to cover the range of meanings that the Hebrew root ZNH carries: raped women are defined by the same word, as are women who lure men [End Page 419] into adultery. In each instance, "an unmarried woman is involved in a sexual act" (45). The city can be personified as a prostitute or bride, and prostitutes symbolize dishonor in narrative texts. ZNH and its derivatives describe illicit political activity and describe Israel herself as a fornicating woman. Bird finds no evidence that prostitution was illegal in ancient Israel; the abundant references to and metaphorical uses of terms derived from ZNH suggest strongly that prostitutes were a feature of life, without establishing that females might engage in prostitution in order to pay religious fines. Bird notes briefly that male prostitution in ancient Israel was homosexual and had its own terminology (49).In "Heavenly Bodies: Monuments to Prostitutes in Greek Sanctuaries," Catherine Keesling examines literary references to votive monuments erected by or commemorating female prostitutes in Greek sanctuaries in the archaic and classical periods. She concentrates on the degree to which Rhodopis' and Phryne's famous monuments were liminal or transgressive, but she incorporates findings about other votives. Keesling observes that Rhodopis' votive stands midway between those that Snodgrass terms "raw" (everyday objects, e.g., weapons) and "converted" (e.g., statues): Rhodopis dedicated a tithe of ox-spits ("raw") but constructed the offering so that the spits could not be removed (thus becoming "converted"). Keesling also discusses the monument, known only from literary sources, supposedly dedicated to Leaina, who was loyal to the tyrannicides. This tongueless statue, if originally dedicated to her, is the only canting-device animal statue found in a sanctuary (64–65). Phryne's portrait statue in the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi is also singular as the only portrait before the Roman period that was not part of a family group, as one of three pre-Hellenistic gilded bronze portraits, and... (shrink)

A study of the influences which helped to shape the language and the logic of Charles Darwin from 1837 to 1844, the period in which he composed the first drafts of the theory of natural selection. The textual basis of this book is provided by two sets of notebooks which deal with the "transmutation of species" and "metaphysics... morals and speculations on expression." That Darwin preferred metaphors borrowed from ordinary language to the technical idiom of other scientific theories Manier attributes (...) to the influence of both Dugald Stewart’s philosophy of natural language and William Wordsworth’s conviction that nature is of itself expressive. The theme that nature has its own language suggested a continuity between the processes of the inanimate world and the spiritual capacities of man and hence provided a congenial philosophic context for the elaboration of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Darwin’s rhetorical style thus reinforces his own theory, because the highest human activities are explainable in images taken from nature. These metaphors had both a cognitive and an affective dimension, since they enabled his readers to see the evidence of natural history in a new light, and served to soften the shocking theological implications of this new perspective. The idea of nature as an outcome of struggle among random variants obviously clashed with the contemporary religious view of nature as God’s handiwork, but the metaphor of selection personifies nature and suggests the possibility of a divinity immanent in nature. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Darwin was quite impressed by Wordsworth’s version of natural religion. William Paley’s theodicy also intrigued the young Darwin. Paley argued that chance was compatible with divine design, since God’s moral purposes could be represented through the metaphor of a fair lottery where the chances are evenly distributed but the results unforeseeable. Darwin took this concept of chance out of its apologetical context and employed it in the construction of his scientific theory. (shrink)

it is not unusual to interpret Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy, or some of his claims, as a therapeutic thought nowadays.1 Nietzsche’s perspectivism, style, and controversial doctrines are supposed to do something, rather than merely teach or state a theoretical position. The legitimacy of this action and its actual goal are far from self-evident, however. This paper tackles the problem from the perspective of a fundamental tension, which is at work underneath Nietzsche’s project since The Birth of Tragedy: that is, the tension (...) between multiplicity and singularity, respectively personified, in that book, by the figures of Dionysus and Apollo. When it comes to ethics, this dimension of Nietzsche’s thought is... (shrink)

The article offers a fundamental comparison between a passage in the dialogue of Methodius of Olympus calles De libero arbitrio, and one in the Hexaemeron of George of Pisidia. The starting point is represented by a description of the stormy sea, contained in the De libero arbitrio. After a poetical scene full of epical elements , Methodius gives us an original representation of the sea: as the servant can't refuse to obey his master and mumbles by himself, so the sea (...) has to restrain its anger and remain in its limits, even if it wants to be free. According to Job 38.11, it is forced to sacrifice its will, because there is a divine power that governs the universe. This passage may have influenced the composition of George of Pisidia. In fact, in his Hexaemeron the poet has come to personify the sea, first of all, with the image of a fugitive slave, then with a Bacchante who, taken by an impulse, wishes to go beyond the limits, and finally, with a female slave who is dragged away; this is created to support the conception that nature, in spite of natural impulse, is not independent and free, but is governed by God. Even if George of Pisidia inserts in his scene more details, the comparison of the sea with human subjects and the impossibility for it to be free refer to Methodius' passage. That the poet knew Methodius' writings is confirmed by one of his epigrams, in which he praises the bearing of the style of Methodius' works, based on evident lines of reasoning and divine inspiration. (shrink)

Orthodox Bayesianism tells a story about the epistemic trajectory of an ideally rational agent. The agent begins with a ‘prior’ probability function; thereafter, it conditionalizes on its evidence as it comes in. Consider, then, such an agent at the very beginning of its trajectory. It is ideally rational, but completely ignorant of which world is actual. Call this agent ‘Superbaby’.1 Superbaby personifies the Bayesian story. We argue that it must believe ‘Moorish’ propositions of the form.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Intersection of Medicine and ReligionJohn C. DormoisThe practice of medicine offers a host of rewards to the practitioner. Besides the obvious intellectual satisfaction of solving a difficult diagnostic problem or the ability to make a comfortable living, I have found the greatest personal sense of moral gratification when helping [End Page 196] families negotiate the most challenging event in life: making decisions at end of life. Whether the (...) condition was a ruptured intracranial aneurysm with brain death or a patient with far advanced cancer struggling with the choice between experimental chemotherapy or choosing comfort therapy at home surrounded by family for the remaining days of life, the moral courage required to provide the best guidance was considerable. In my early years of practice I didn’t call my actions in these situations “courageous” nor were there moral “guidelines” providing a blueprint. I knew I responded with empathy and compassion and that this ability had a lot to do with being raised in a religious or spiritual home. At the same time, I suspected that some of the lack of empathy and compassion I witnessed in some of my colleagues was related to the very training programs of physicians. This essay traces the origin of my moral and ethical concerns about medical education and my intention to reinvigorate the spiritual or existential voice in medicine.An early life experience had a great deal to do with shaping my moral development. At age seven my family traveled through the West Indies. My father’s amateur radio hobby meant that at every stop we would be greeted by one of his radio contacts. One stop in particular was life changing.Port au Prince, Haiti was an unknown place to this seven year–old, but to say it was a culture shock to a boy from Kansas would be an understatement of epic proportions. It was during this visit that I experienced true poverty in its most blatant form. In downtown Port au Prince I saw limbless beggars and the deformed from polio and malnutrition. But it was the sight of the garbage dump near the center of town that changed my world forever. There, among piles of detritus, I saw children and families making their home in the dump. They had hollowed out a sort of cavern in the piles of trash that served as a place of refuge from both the rain and the sun.This experience in many ways has served as a framework and background for my life. Although seen through the eyes of a seven year–old, the picture can only be adequately understood within the context of being raised by religiously faithful parents, parents free of hypocrisy whose lives personified the best in Christian virtues and practices. These early experiences planted the seeds that would only fully blossom some 60 years later.Medical school was a demanding but exhilarating experience. Each day was a day of discovery … anatomy, physiology, pathology … all subjects opening up a whole new world to explore. Internal medicine suited me best since it was the specialty that most closely integrated all the basic sciences necessary to arrive at a diagnosis. I loved the elegance of endocrinology in particular where a given hormone mediator could cause widely different effects if present in excess or completely absent. But I was in the end drawn to cardiology since it combined complex physiology with my avocation, the love of running.There was, however, a disturbing aspect of medicine education that I observed affecting many of my classmates. Although I can vividly recall the enthusiasm that all of us shared as we donned our white coats for the first time and envisioned a future of caring for our patients, things gradually and insidiously changed over the next four years. The altruism and empathy that was so evident in the early years gradually lessened as graduation approached. I could not help being struck by this change and wondered at the time why that should happen. I had no insight then that what I had observed was a well recognized consequence of the medical school experience. I’m sure that the passage from professional training to practice in... (shrink)

Tom Sorell and Luc Foisneau bring together original essays by the world's leading Hobbes scholars to discuss Hobbes's masterpiece after three and a half centuries. The contributors address three different themes. The first is the place of Leviathan within Hobbes's output as a political philosopher. What does Leviathan add to The Elements of Law (1640) and De Cive (1642; 1647)? What is the relation between the English Leviathan and the Latin version of the book (1668)? Does Leviathan deserve its pre-eminence? (...) The second theme concerns the connections between Hobbes's psychology and Hobbes's politics. The essays discuss Hobbes's curious views on the significance of laughter, evidence that he connected life in the state with passionlessness; the ways in which such things as fear for one's life entitle subjects to rebel; and the question of how the sovereign's personal passions are to be squared with his personifying a multitude. The third theme is Hobbes's views on the Bible and the Church: contributors examine the tensions between any allowance for ecclesiastical and (differently) biblical authority on the one hand, and political authority on the other. This is a book which anyone working on Hobbes or on this period of intellectual history will want to read. (shrink)

Dido's Epicureanism is as complex and problematic as Aeneas' much-discussed Stoicism. This paper argues that Virgil's allusions to Lucretius form a consistent pattern: Dido embodies the ironies inherent in Epicureanism as practiced by Virgil's contemporaries, mouthing apparently Lucretian sentiments even as she comes to personify a Lucretian exemplum malum. Yet her fall is largely due to the pervasive supernatural machinery of the Aeneid-divine intervention which Lucretius declares impossible. In Book 1, Virgil employs Lucretian allusions in distinctly un-Lucretian contexts to suggest (...) in Dido a disjunction between words and actions. There is a Lucretian flavor in the description of her initial equanimity, in her injunction to the Trojans to put away fear and cares, and in the scientific rationalism of the song of Iopas. These passages contrast with the sensualism evident in her lavish court and her growing passion for Aeneas-excesses of luxury and love described in words that Lucretius used to condemn them. In Book 4, Virgil more directly refutes Lucretian doctrine about the mortality of the soul and the indifference of the gods. The sarcastic questions of Anna and Iarbas are implicitly answered in such a way as to refute the Epicurean stance. Dido points to the gods' indifference a few seconds before she invokes their aid, and her final submission to Fate occurs in words that Lucretius used to deny its existence. Finally, the departure of Dido's soul recalls Lucretius' atoms of "heat and wind," in ironic contrast to the immortality of her Shade. (shrink)

It is the contention of this article that Proverbs chs. 1–9 is a literary unity in which wisdom has the denotation of the parental household teaching. Teachings which have other contexts in other parts of the Old Testament have in Pr. 1–9 a parental teaching context. Besides denoting the parental teaching, personified speaking Wisdom has the personal features of a teacher. Both Wisdom’s features and her message serve to reinforce the parental teaching. Personified Wisdom also denotes the teaching of the (...) entire Book of Proverbs. Through the device of personified Wisdom, the wisdom of Solomon enshrined in the Book of Proverbs is re‐located from the royal court to the individual Israelite household. This is evident in the literary design of the book. It also reflects the situation of the book’s redaction in post‐exilic Judaism. (shrink)

I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate (...) to evidence. My view focuses on the possibilities that the evidence makes salient. I argue that this makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief than other accounts. (shrink)

Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can (...) be understood as an underdetermination thesis, and show how this moves the debate forward in fruitful ways: in distinguishing between different types of permissivism, in dispelling classic objections to permissivism, and in shedding light on the relationship between permissivism and evidentialism. (shrink)

Nurses in Ghana believe that training, practise, practitioner and policy reforms are required for total nursing profession reform to be effective. Their views for role reformation in the nursing profession, which is currently needed, are not only academic but also clinically relevant in the pursuit of health equity and quality nursing care. We explored and described nurses’ views on their roles in the profession using data collected from 24 professional nurses in three regional hospitals in Ghana. Using an inductive descriptive (...) qualitative design, data were gathered and analysed using a qualitative content analysis to describe the views of the nurses. Four major themes, namely practise reforms, practitioner reforms, training reforms and policy reforms have emerged in relation to role reformation in the nursing profession. Three strategic areas, practitioner attitudes, new training modalities and policy realignment, must be reviewed and remodelled for better positioning of the nursing profession before its entire role reformation. (shrink)

An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the (...) extent to which, e, if true, confirms h is an empirical, not a priori, fact. (shrink)

It can be demonstrated in a very straightforward way that confirmation and evidence as spelled out by us can vary from one case to the next, that is, a hypothesis may be weakly confirmed and yet the evidence for it can be strong, and conversely, the evidence may be weak and the confirmation strong. At first glance, this seems puzzling; the puzzlement disappears once it is understood that confirmation is of single hypotheses, in which there is an (...) initial degree of belief which is adjusted up or down as data accumulate, whereas evidence always has to do with a comparison of one hypothesis against another with respect to the data and is belief-independent. Confusing them is, we suggest, a plausible source of the so-called “base-rate fallacy” identified by Kahneman and Tversky which leads most of us to make mistaken statistical inferences. It is also in the background, or so we argue in some detail, of the important policy controversies concerning human-induced global warming. (shrink)

Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence—your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for planning to conditionalize on this evidence. This planning‐oriented justification extends to some (...) cases where you do not have transparent evidence, in the sense that your beliefs are not perfectly discriminating with respect to any non‐trivial facts. In other cases, accuracy considerations do not tell you to plan to conditionalize on any information at all, but rather to plan to follow a different updating rule. Even in the absence of evidence, accuracy considerations can guide your doxastic plan. (shrink)

This essay uses a puzzle about assertion and time to explore the pragmatics, semantics, and epistemology of future discourse. The puzzle concerns cases in which a subject is in a position to say, at an initial time t, that it will be that ϕ, but is not in a position to say, at a later time t′, that it is or was that ϕ, despite not losing or gaining any relevant evidence between t and t′. We consider a number (...) of approaches to the puzzle and defend the view that subjects in these cases lose knowledge simply by moving through time. (shrink)

There has been considerable puzzlement over how to respond to higher-order evidence. The existing dilemmas can be defused by adopting a ‘two-dimensional’ representation of doxastic attitudes which incorporates not only substantive uncertainty about which first-order state of affairs obtains but also the degree of conviction with which we hold the attitude. This makes it possible that in cases of higher-order evidence the evidence sometimes impacts primarily on our conviction, rather than our substantive uncertainty. I argue that such (...) a two-dimensional representation is naturally developed by making use of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should impact our beliefs, it is less (...) clear how and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for or against the truth of theirs contents. But higher-order evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the pervasiveness of higher-order evidence in human life. But it has also become clear that higher-order evidence plays a central role in many epistemological debates, spanning from traditional discussions of internalism/externalism about epistemic justification to more recent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. This volume brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a range of issues about higher-order evidence. (shrink)

First-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a proposition is true. Higher-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a person is able to assess her evidence for or against a proposition. A widespread view is that higher-order evidence makes a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In this paper, I consider in what way higher-order evidence might do this. More specifically, I consider whether and (...) how higher-order evidence plays a role in determining what it is rational to believe distinct from that which first-order evidence plays. To do this, I turn to the theory of reasons, and try to situate higher-order evidence within it. The only place I find for it there, distinct from that which first-order evidence already occupies, is as a practical reason, that is, as a reason for desire or action. One might take this to show either that the theory of reasons is inadequate as it stands or that higher-order evidence makes no distinctive difference to what it is rational to believe. I tentatively endorse the second option. (shrink)

Socially responsible human resource management (SR‐HRM) is becoming increasingly important for academics and managers. The interface between HRM and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the subject of analysis in this article. It adopts a contextual perspective to analyze whether the institutional context influences the implementation of socially responsible HRM (SR‐HRM). Considering the differences in the national institutional contexts across Europe, this study explores the different models of SR‐HRM in that region. The research is focused on a sample of 153 companies (...) headquartered in Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The findings evidence the influence exerted by the national institutional context on the implementation of SR‐HRM. Differences among country clusters suggest the existence of different models of SR‐HRM in Europe. However, these models do not correspond to the blocks on HRM or on CSR identified by the literature but instead provide a novel categorization. (shrink)

I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson (...) Case concerns knowledge of nomological necessities. A proposed revision to NA is: (ENA) S knows that P when S’s belief that P is non-accidentally true because (i) it is based on good evidence, and (ii) in and of themselves, beliefs based on good evidence tend to be true. ‘knowledge-as-credit’ accounts have been offered as an alternative way of sharpening NA. I argue that such accounts face serious objections that don’t apply to ENA. Finally, I take up Lackey’s worry that the credit-based approach mishandles knowledge via testimony. ENA faces no difficulty on that score, which counts in its favor. (shrink)

The detection and analysis of misunderstandings are crucial aspects of discourse analysis, and presuppose a twofold investigation of their structure. First, misunderstandings need to be identified and, more importantly, justified. For this reason, a classification of the types and force of evidence of a misunderstanding is needed. Second, misunderstandings reveal differences in the interlocutors’ interpretations of an utterance, which can be examined by considering the presumptions that they use in their interpretation. This paper proposes a functional approach to misunderstandings (...) grounded on presumptive reasoning and types of presumptions, in which incompatible interpretations or interpretative failures are examined as defaults of the underlying interpretative reasoning, caused by overlooked evidence or conflicting presumptions. Moreover, it advances a classification of the types and the probative weights of the evidence that can be used to detect misunderstandings. The proposed methodology and its implications are illustrated through the analysis of doctor–patient communication in diabetes care. (shrink)

The generality problem is one of the most pressing challenges for reliabilism. The problem begins with this question: of all the process types exemplified by a given process token, which types are the relevant ones for determining whether the resultant belief counts as knowledge? As philosophers like Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have argued, extant responses to the generality problem have failed, and it looks as if no solution is forthcoming. In this paper, I present a new response to the (...) generality problem that illuminates the nature of knowledge-enabling reliability. My response builds upon the insights of Juan Comesaña’s well-founded solution to the generality problem, according to which relevant types are content–evidence pairs, i.e., descriptions of both the target belief’s content and the evidence on which the belief was based. While most responses to the generality problem, including Comesaña’s, only posit one relevant type for any given process token, I argue that knowledge-enabling reliability requires a process token to be reliable with respect to multiple content–evidence pairs, each with varying degrees of descriptive specificity. I call this solution multi-type evidential reliabilism. After offering a clear formulation of MTE, I conclude by arguing that MTE is sufficiently informative to rebut Conee and Feldman’s generality problem objection to a reliability condition on knowledge. (shrink)

Case studies of science concerning the interpretation of specific theories and the nature of theory change over time are often presented as evidence for or against forms of selective realism: versions of scientific realism that advocate belief in connection with certain components of theories as opposed to their content as a whole. I consider the question of how probative case studies can be in this sphere, focusing on two prominent examples of selectivity: explanationist realism, which identifies realist commitment with (...) components of theories that are putatively required to explain their empirical success; and entity realism, which identifies realist commitment with certain putatively causally efficacious entities. I argue that while case studies are essential to debates about these positions, they are not compelling in the way that their intended use suggests. Regarding explanationism, concerns about the “neutrality” of historical evidence are ultimately indefeasible. Regarding entity realism, arguments for and against naturally dissolve into disputes about the reference of theoretical terms which are insulated from the details of cases. I conclude by suggesting that the morals of this discussion extend to other forms of selective realism, namely structural realism and semirealism. (shrink)

In a series of five experiments, we demonstrate that moral judgments and folk intuitions are often predictably fragmented. Drawing on the domains of ethics and action theory, we illustrate ways in which judgment tends to be associated with stable individual differences such as personality traits and reflective cognitive styles. We argue that these individual differences pose several unique challenges as well as provide opportunities for further theoretical development in the emerging field of experimental philosophy. Implications are briefly discussed.

Contentless experience involves an absence of mental content such as thought, perception, and mental imagery. In academic work it has been classically treated as including states like those aimed for in Shamatha, Transcendental, and Stillness Meditation. We have used evidence synthesis to select and review 135 expert texts from within the three traditions. In this paper we identify the features of contentless experience referred to in the expert texts and determine whether the experiences are the same or different across (...) the practices with respect to each feature. We identify 65 features reported or implied in one or more practices, with most being reported or implied in all three. While there are broad similarities in the experiences across the traditions, we find that there are differences with respect to four features and possibly many others. The main difference identified is that Shamatha involves substantially greater attentional stability and vividness. Another key finding is that numerous forms of content are present in the experiences, including wakefulness, naturalness, calm, bliss/joy, and freedom. The findings indicate that meditation experiences described as contentless in the academic literature can in fact involve considerable variation, and that in many and perhaps most cases these experiences are not truly contentless. This challenges classical understandings in academic research that in these so-called contentless experiences all content is absent, and that the experiences are therefore an identical state of _pure consciousness_ or consciousness itself. Our assessment is that it remains an open question whether the experiences aimed for in the three practices should be classed as pure consciousness. Implications of our analysis for neuroscientific and clinical studies and for basic understandings of the practices are discussed. (shrink)

Weights of evidence and logistic regression are two loglinear methods for mineral potential mapping. Both models are limited by their respective basic assumptions in application. Ideally, WofE indicator patterns have the property of conditional independence with respect to the point pattern of mineral deposits to be predicted; in LR, there supposedly are no interactions between the point pattern and two or more of the indicator patterns. If the CI assumption is satisfied, estimated LR coefficients become approximately equal to WofE (...) contrasts and the two methods produce similar results; additionally, bias then is avoided in that the sum of all estimated posterior probabilities becomes approximately equal to the number of observed discrete events. WofE allows construction of input layers that have missing data as a separate category in addition to known presence-absence type input, while logistic regression as such is not capable of handling missing data. As an improved WofE model based on LR, modified weights of evidence inherit the advantages of both LR and WofE, i.e., eliminates bias due to lack of CI and can handle missing data as well. Pixel or unit area input for MWofE consists of positive and negative weights for presence and absence of a pattern plus zeros for missing data. MWofE first is illustrated by application to simple examples. Next, it is applied to a study area with 20 known gold occurrences in southwestern Nova Scotia in relation to four input layers based on geological and lake geochemical data. Assuming that geochemical data were missing for the northern part of the study area, MWofE, like WofE but unlike LR, provides posterior probabilities for the entire area. (shrink)

This paper investigates young children's knowledge of scalar implicatures and downward entailment. In previous experimental work, we have shown that young children access the full range of truth-conditions associated with logical words in classical logic, including the disjunction operator, as well as the indefinite article. The present study extends this research in three ways, taking disjunction as a case study. Experiment 1 draws upon the observation that scalar implicatures (SIs) are cancelled (or reversed) in downward entailing (DE) linguistic environments, e.g., (...) in the scope of negation (Chierchia, 2000). Experiment 2 was designed to determine if scalar implicatures are used by children, like adults, to influence the interpretation of disjunction in non-DE contexts, yielding an implicature of exclusivity for disjunction. Whereas adult controls always rejected assertions of the form A or B in positive (non-DE) contexts in which assertions of the form A and B were also true, many children accepted assertions with disjunction in such contexts. To provide an interpretation to the findings from Experiment 2, a new experimental technique was devised and used in Experiment 3. The new technique presents pairs of assertions to children, who are asked to judge which assertion is a ‘better’ description of the context. The findings from Experiment 3 demonstrated children's awareness that A and B is more informative than A or B in positive contexts, where both statements are true. Taken together, the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 are compatible with the view that some children lack the computational resources to apply scalar implicatures when a single assertion is presented alone (see Reinhart, 1999). (shrink)

This paper examines the basic question of how we can come to form accurate beliefs about the world when we do not fully know how good or bad our evidence is. Here, we show, using simulations with otherwise optimal agents, the cost of misjudging the quality of our evidence. We compare different strategies for correctly estimating that quality, such as outcome‐ and expectation‐based updating. We also identify conditions under which misjudgment of evidence quality can nevertheless lead to (...) accurate beliefs, as well as those conditions where no strategy will help. These results indicate both where people will nevertheless succeed and where they will fail when information quality is degraded. (shrink)

To obtain effective fusion results of multi source evidences with different importance, an evidence fusion method with importance discounting factors based on neutrosopic probability analysis in DSmT framework is proposed. First, the reasonable evidence sources are selected out based on the statistical analysis of the pignistic probability functions of single focal elements. Secondly, the neutrosophic probability analysis is conducted based on the similarities of the pignistic probability functions from the prior evidence knowledge of the reasonable evidence (...) sources. Thirdly, the importance discounting factors of the reasonable evidence sources are obtained based on the neutrosophic probability analysis and the reliability discounting factors of the real-time evidences are calculated based on probabilistic-based distances. Fourthly, the real-time evidences are discounted by the importance discounting factors and then the evidences with the mass assignments of neutrosophic empty sets are discounted by the reliability discounting factors. Finally, DSmT+PCR5 of importance discounted evidences is applied. Experimental examples show that the decision results based on the proposed fusion method are different from the results based on the existed fusion methods. Simulation experiments of recognition fusion are performed and the superiority of proposed method is testified well by the simulation results. (shrink)