This article explores the controversial practice of transnational gestational surrogacy and poses a provocative question: Does it have to be exploitative? Various existing models of exploitation are considered and a novel exploitation-evaluation heuristic is introduced to assist in the analysis of the potentially exploitative dimensions/elements of complex health-related practices. On the basis of application of the heuristic, I conclude that transnational gestational surrogacy, as currently practiced in low-income country settings , is exploitative of surrogate women. Arising out of consideration of (...) the heuristic's exploitation conditions, a set of public education and enabled choice, enhanced protections, and empowerment reforms to transnational gestational surrogacy practice is proposed that, if incorporated into a national regulatory framework and actualized within a low income country, could possibly render such practice nonexploitative. (shrink)

This chapter examines Thoreau’s experiences on Mt. Katahdin, vis-à-vis exposure science and wilderness therapy. A close reading of Thoreau’s account suggests the experience had a profound effect on him, emotionally and philosophically, an effect that is relevant to environmental exposure and eco-vulnerability in the contexts of the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. Thoreau’s experience on that mountain presented to him an aspect of wilderness antithetical to the romantic, transcendentalist notions he previously held and ultimately led to more nuanced, therapeutic depictions (...) found in works like “Walking” and Walden. That such a reconciliation was possible for Thoreau suggests a privileged insulation from trauma not afforded to many. It also indicates the value of both philosophical contemplation and wilderness therapy to promote psychological resilience and adaptability. The author argues philosophers should begin to engage conceptually and normatively with exposure, vulnerability, and resilience. (shrink)

The modern practice of organ donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) emerged in the 1990s as a response to the alarmingly wide gap between the number of transplantable organs available through organ donation after neurological death and the urgent organ transplantation needs of persons in end-organ failure. Various important ethical dimensions of DCD have been considered and debated by prominent organ donation/transplantation theorists and clinicians.In this article, consideration of some of these ethical elements provides a foundation for a proposed set of (...) ethically informed, pragmatic conditions that could assist in the development of health policies to guide the practice of organ donation after cardiocirculatory death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 305-325 Hume, Sympathy, and the Theater BRIAN KIRBY Every movement of the theater, by a skillful poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to the spectators; who weep, tremble, resent, rejoice, and are inflamed with all the variety of passions, which actuate the several personages of the drama. (EPM 5.2.26; SBN 221-2) Much has been written recently about (...) the role of sympathy in Hume's moral theory. That may indeed be its most important use. But it seems from a number of illustrations he uses that it has broader applications, in particular, application to a spectator's appreciation of drama. The problem some see with this broader application is that it conflicts with the basic definition of sympathy as a process by means of which impressions are shared. The actors on the stage would not seem to have the same passions which "inflame" the spectators. Worse, the spectators do not believe in their hearts that the passions which inflame them have real correlates. At first blush, "sympathy" might mean any one of several things. In "The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn," for example, Jonathan Bennett says, "As for 'sympathy': I use this term to cover every sort of fellow-feeling, as when one feels pity over someone's loneliness, or horrified compassion over his pain, and when one feels a shrinking reluctance to act in a way which will bring misfortune to someone else."1 However, fellow-feeling is not a sharing of feelings in Hume's sense. Alvin I. Goldman comes closer to Hume's meaning in a narrow description of empathy: "To empathize with someone, in its Brian Kirby, Associate Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at St. Lawrence University, is at 172 Miner Street Road, Canton, NY 13617, USA. e-mail: bkirby2@twcny.rr.com 306 Brian Kirby most frequent sense, is to sympathize or commiserate, which involves shared attitudes, sentiments, or emotions."2 Still, Hume's sympathy is not the commiseration but rather what is involved in the commiseration, the shared attitudes, sentiments, and emotions. "No quality of human nature," says Hume, "is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own" (T 2.1.11.2; SBN 316). The principle of sympathy as he describes it in his technical sense is as follows: When any affection is infus'd by sympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection. However instantaneous this change of the idea into an impression may be, it proceeds from certain views and reflections, which will not escape the strict scrutiny of a philosopher, tho' they may the person himself, who makes them. (T 2.1.11.3; SBN 317) If sympathy has to do with the sharing of impressions, what can one say about possible broader applications in which the correlate impression is absent? One tack to take is to dismiss the illustrative examples as aberrations or at least minor inconsistencies on Hume's part. A second is to argue that the broader applications follow reasonably, given Hume's description of the mechanism of sympathy. I propose, in this paper, to take the second tack. The above description characterizes what one might call sympathy in its normal social context in which the feelings of another are identifiable from his verbal and bodily behavior. Of course, the identification is not infallible. The other person may intend to deceive by lying or mimicking the behavior associated with a feeling. But such occasions are parasitic on normal contexts. But beyond the normal social context, there are other occasions which elicit sympathy, situations in which passions are aroused in the sympathizers for good cause, but which have no correspondent in the objects of sympathy. The case... (shrink)

Since the global financial crisis in 2008, corporations have faced a crisis of trust, with growing sentiment against ‘elites and ‘big business’ and a feeling that ‘something ought to be done’ to re-establish public regard for corporations. Trust and trustworthiness are deeply moral significant. They provide the ‘glue or lubricant’ that begets reciprocity, decreases risk, secures dignity and respect, and safeguards against the subordination of the powerless to the powerful. However, in deciding how to restore trust, it is difficult to (...) determine precisely what should be done, by whom, and who will bear the cost, especially if any action involves a risk to overall market efficiency and corporate profitability. The paper explores whether corporations have a moral duty to be trustworthy, to bear the cost of being so and thus contribute to resolving the current crisis of trust. It also considers where the state and other social actors have strong reason to protect and enforce such moral rights, while acknowledging that other actors have similar obligations to be trustworthy. It outlines five ‘salient factors’ that trigger specific rights to trustworthiness and a concomitant duty on corporations to be trustworthy: market power, subordination (threat and intimidation), the absence of choice, the need to preserve systemic trust, and corporate political power which might undermine a state’s legitimacy. Absent these factors and corporations do not have a general duty to be trustworthy, since a responsible actor in fair market conditions should be able to choose between the costs and benefits of dealing with generally trustworthy corporations. (shrink)

The editorial in the September 1982 issue of this journal and many articles before and since have addressed the problem of informed consent. Is it possible? Is it a useful concept? Is there anything new to be said about it? In this article the basic rationale of the rule (patient autonomy) is explained and the extent of the rule explored. Various exceptions have been offered by the law and an attempt is made to catalogue the chief of these. A number (...) of specially vulnerable groups are then identified, the most important, and vexed, being children. How can informed consent be secured in the case of young patients? Finally, a few problems are mentioned in an attempt to get this subject back to reality. The appeal to the principle primum non nocere may be medical paternalism in disguise. Informed consent is the competing principle that reminds us of the primacy of human autonomy. A pointer is given to the future: even the use of sound recordings to explain medical procedures and to activate informed consent so that it may become a reality and not just a lawyer's myth, should be considered. (shrink)

In this chapter we suggest that the origin of language, specifically the protolinguistic stage, was iconic rather than arbitrary, and fundamentally based on shared cross-modal associations. We provide evidence from natural language in the form of sound symbolism, distinguishing conventional sound symbolism from sensory sound symbolism. Sensory sound symbolism, or the presence of iconicity in natural language, is considered alongside psychological experiments in naming, and other investigations of cross-modal associations specifically involving linguistic sound. This evidence supports the idea that we (...) can directly express a variety of sensory experiences through linguistic sound, and thus that language systems have the capacity to be iconic to a large extent. We outline a theory of sensory protolanguage emergence, considering how and why arbitrariness eventually became the dominant relationship between form and meaning. Finally, we consider the possibility of continuity between cross-modal transfer in other primates and more abstract cross-modal associations among humans, suggesting this may have scaffolded the emergence of symbolic communication. (shrink)

Institutional review boards, tasked with facilitating ethical research, are often pulled in competing directions. In what we call the protection-inclusion dilemma, we acknowledge the tensions IRBs face in aiming to both protect potential research participants from harm and include under-represented populations in research. In this manuscript, we examine the history of protectionism that has dominated research ethics oversight in the United States, as well as two responses to such protectionism: inclusion initiatives and critiques of the term vulnerability. We look at (...) what we know about IRB decision-making in relation to protecting and including “vulnerable” groups in research and examine the lack of regulatory guidance related to this dilemma, which encourages protection over inclusion within IRB practice. Finally, we offer recommendations related to how IRBs might strike a better balance between inclusion and protection in research ethics oversight. (shrink)

This study assesses the impact had by institutional isomorphic pressures in the organisational fields of 185 businesses operating within the United Kingdom. The emphasis throughout is on how external institutions affect the socially and environmentally responsible aspects of an organization’s purchasing practice. Factor analyses and a linear regression model are employed to test the influence of these pressures. Initial findings suggest that what other industry participants are doing in this area is not as important in affecting the procurement practice of (...) the focal organisation as is the managers’ perception of how legitimacy is awarded by stakeholders and, indeed, if competitors with well-developed social and environmental supply chain management programs are perceived favourably in the industry. (shrink)

Overby and colleagues (2015) draw our critical attention to a variety of ethical challenges associated with the practice of controlled donation after circulatory determination of death (cDCDD). Alt...

First Published in 2005. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Historically, the triage of temporarily scarce health resources has served narrow utilitarian ends. The recent H1N1 pandemic experience provided an opportunity for expanding the theoretical foundations/understandings of critical care triage in the context of declared infectious pandemics. This paper briefly explores the ethics-related challenges associated with the development of modern critical care triage protocols and provides descriptions of some ‘enhanced fairness’ features which were developed through the use of an inclusive deliberative engagement process by a Canadian provincial Department of Health.

This essay will examine scholarly attempts at distilling a proto-ethical philosophy from the Daoist classic known as the Zhuangzi. In opposition to interpretations of the text which characterize it as amoralistic, I will identify elements of a natural normativity in the Zhuangzi. My examination features passages from the Zhuangzi – commonly known as the “knack” passages – which are often interpreted through some sort of linguistic, skeptical, or relativistic lens. Contra such readings, I believe the Zhuangzi prescribes an art of (...) living – or shù [術] – which incorporates a few motifs familiar to certain threads of philosophical naturalism. Building on existing scholarship which treats of the praxeology of the text, I argue that the naturalist themes present in the Zhuangzi support an unusual, but robust, view of moral expertise. (shrink)

Over the last eighty years, studies in play have carved out a small, but increasingly significant, niche within the social sciences and a rich repository has been built which underscores the importance of play to social, cultural, and psychological development. The general point running through these works is a philosophical recognition that play should not be separated from the trappings of everyday life, but instead should be seen as one of the more primordial aspects of human existence. Gadamer is one (...) philosopher frequently associated with interest in play. In his magnum opus, Truth and Method (1960), Gadamer insisted the significance of play to human understanding is not merely recreational, but rather it discloses the full context of any given situation by promoting a freedom of possibilities within the horizon of one’s own life-world (i.e. the world directly and immediately experienced). As such, his philosophical analysis of play was essential to his overall project of philosophical hermeneutics as it can explain how meaning is not derived from something essential within a text, but rather considered from a full range of possibilities. There are good reasons to expand on that understanding of play within philosophical studies and we suggest one way to do so is to compare Gadamer’s treatment of play with similar ideas from thinkers often associated with other philosophical schools. Although there are other candidates (e.g. Wittgenstein’s language games) for such an analysis, we limit our comparison here to the notion of transaction, as treated by the American pragmatist John Dewey in his volume Knowing and the Known (co-authored with Arthur Bentley in 1949). Because Dewey tied his conception of transaction to an overarching philosophy of inquiry, we believe comparing it to Gadamer’s use of play can highlight the deep philosophical import of this concept to the understanding of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Those who have considered the connection between Dewey’s theory of inquiry and Greek thought have mostly situated their remarks within larger points, regarding either teaching and learning (Garrison, 1997; Johnston, 2006b; Cahn, 2007) or aesthetics and craft (Alexander, 1987; Hickman, 1990). The fact that this area remains somewhat underexplored could be chalked up to several factors: 1) Dewey was often quite critical of the classical tradition, particularly when it came to theories of knowledge, 2) Dewey was not a trained classicist, (...) with little working knowledge of ancient Greek, and was self-admittedly not a historian of philosophy, and 3) whenever Dewey did turn positive attention toward ancient thought, he tended to speak in generalities, referring most often to “the Greeks” rather than any particular Greek thinker. In spite of this, there remain many compelling reasons to place Dewey’s views on inquiry in meaningful dialogue with the classical tradition. I will suggest that the most compelling of all is the link between Dewey’s view of inquiry and his particular brand of naturalism, which found its fullest expression late in his career. This is an underappreciated connection in Dewey’s work on inquiry, either taking a backseat to the instrumental, experimental themes in his thought or misinterpreted as a form of positivism/scientism. Once acknowledged, however, this connection could help bring Dewey’s normative, socio-political writings in line with his theories on ontology, logic, and the acquisition of knowledge. (shrink)

In "Contextualism and Confusability" I defend Epistemological Contextualism. Contextualists think that the statements "I know that I have hands," "I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat," and "if I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat, I don't know that I have hands," are all true—albeit not simultaneously. The first statement is true when an individual is not cognizant of the hypothesis that he might be a brain in a vat receiving just those (...) sense impressions he is currently receiving. However, once the hypothesis is considered, the standards for knowing become more strict—so strict that the statement "I know that I have hands" is false. People have mistakenly thought that the three statements present a paradox because they have failed to recognize that the skeptical hypothesis really does issue in stricter standards for knowing.The main critic of this approach has been Stephen Schiffer. Schiffer believes that it is implausible that language users would overlook the context sensitivity at work. I begin by explaining and setting out the virtues of accepting the contextualist approach to skepticism. Subsequently, I set out Schiffer's argument and attempt to meet Schiffer's criticism. Specifically, I argue that people can confuse the context of an utterance when that context is relatively unfamiliar. The reason one mistakenly thinks that he knows he has hands, while entertaining the skeptical hypothesis, is that he is overwhelmingly more familiar with the context in which he knows that he has hands. (shrink)

We set out an account of how self-domestication plays a crucial role in the evolution of language. In doing so, we focus on the growing body of work that treats language structure as emerging from the process of cultural transmission. We argue that a full recognition of the importance of cultural transmission fundamentally changes the kind of questions we should be asking regarding the biological basis of language structure. If we think of language structure as reflecting an accumulated set of (...) changes in our genome, then we might ask something like, “What are the genetic bases of language structure and why were they selected?” However, if cultural evolution can account for language structure, then this question no longer applies. Instead, we face the task of accounting for the origin of the traits that enabled that process of structure-creating cultural evolution to get started in the first place. In light of work on cultural evolution, then, the new question for biological evolution becomes, “How did those precursor traits evolve?” We identify two key precursor traits: the transmission of the communication system through learning; and the ability to infer the communicative intent associated with a signal or action. We then describe two comparative case studies—the Bengalese finch and the domestic dog—in which parallel traits can be seen emerging following domestication. Finally, we turn to the role of domestication in human evolution. We argue that the cultural evolution of language structure has its origin in an earlier process of self-domestication. (shrink)

From Greco-Roman antiquity through to European enlightenment, philosophy and religious thought were inseparably interwoven. This book explores intellectual worlds of Abrahamic religious traditions, their approaches to scriptural hermeneutics, and their interaction over many centuries on common ground of inheritance of classical Greek philosophy.

A survey of the isomorphic submodels of Vω, the set of hereditarily finite sets. In the usual language of set theory, Vω has 2ℵ0 isomorphic submodels. But other set-theoretic languages give different systems of submodels. For example, the language of adjunction allows only countably many isomorphic submodels of Vω.

This book explores issues at the core of modern linguistics and cognitive science. Why are all languages similar in some ways and in others utterly different? Why do languages change and change variably? How did the human capacity for language evolve, and how far did it do so as an innate ability? Simon Kirby looks at these questions from a broad perspective, arguing that they can be studied together. The author begins by examining how far the universal properties of (...) language may be explained by examining the way it is used, and how far by the way it is structured. He then considers what insights may be gained by combining functional and formal approaches. In doing so he develops a way of treating language as an adaptive system, in which its communicative and formal roles are both crucial and complementary. In order to test the effectiveness of competing theories and explanations, Simon Kirby develops computational models to show what universals emerge given a particular theory of language use or acquisition. He presents here both the methodology and the results. Function, Selection, and Innateness is important for its argument, its methodology, and its conclusions. It is a powerful demonstration of the value of looking at language as an adaptive system and goes to the heart of current debates on the evolution and nature of language. (shrink)

In language, recombination of a discrete set of meaningless building blocks forms an unlimited set of possible utterances. How such combinatorial structure emerged in the evolution of human language is increasingly being studied. It has been shown that it can emerge when languages culturally evolve and adapt to human cognitive biases. How the emergence of combinatorial structure interacts with the existence of holistic iconic form-meaning mappings in a language is still unknown. The experiment presented in this paper studies the role (...) of iconicity and human cognitive learning biases in the emergence of combinatorial structure in artificial whistled languages. Participants learned and reproduced whistled words for novel objects with the use of a slide whistle. Their reproductions were used as input for the next participant, to create transmission chains and simulate cultural transmission. Two conditions were studied: one in which the persistence of iconic form-meaning mappings was possible and one in which this was experimentally made impossible. In both conditions, cultural transmission caused the whistled languages to become more learnable and more structured, but this process was slightly delayed in the first condition. Our findings help to gain insight into when and how words may lose their iconic origins when they become part of an organized linguistic system. (shrink)

Words refer to objects in the world, but this correspondence is not one-to-one: Each word has a range of referents that share features on some dimensions but differ on others. This property of language is called underspecification. Parts of the lexicon have characteristic patterns of underspecification; for example, artifact nouns tend to specify shape, but not color, whereas substance nouns specify material but not shape. These regularities in the lexicon enable learners to generalize new words appropriately. How does the lexicon (...) come to have these helpful regularities? We test the hypothesis that systematic backgrounding of some dimensions during learning and use causes language to gradually change, over repeated episodes of transmission, to produce a lexicon with strong patterns of underspecification across these less salient dimensions. This offers a cultural evolutionary mechanism linking individual word learning and generalization to the origin of regularities in the lexicon that help learners generalize words appropriately. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of CharacterJohn T. KirbyEugene Garver. Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. xii + 344 pp. Cloth, $53.95; paper, $18.95.The history of Aristotle’s Rhetoric has been one of cyclical obscurity and rediscovery. Arguably the single greatest work of rhetorical theory ever penned, in any time or culture, its popularity and influence seem to wax and wane (...) repeatedly. Why this should be is not clear, but it is undeniable that even when it has not disappeared completely, its stock (so to speak) among theorists and practitioners of discourse has fluctuated.We are in a bull market for rhetorical studies generally, and these days Aristotle’s work (despite some dissenters who demonize him as the epitome of an oppressive ideology) is pretty much blue-chip. Even so, it is not every day that one encounters a book devoted entirely to the Rhetoric, and even less frequently is that book self-consciously written “philosophically.” In fact, in this century, the only other title in English that could be said to fit this description is Father William Grimaldi’s Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Wiesbaden 1972), a book concerned with very different kinds of issues, for example, the unity (or otherwise) of the treatise overall, and its methodological relationship to the rest of the Aristotelian corpus. In a sense, then, Garver is quite justified in his claim that this is the first book-length treatment of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in this century (3). Moreover, it is a philosophical treatment in the sense that it endeavors to orient the Rhetoric (as its subtitle suggests) to issues of ethics, and because it considers the treatise as a work of political theory. Garver proposes that to call Aristotle’s treatise philosophical “is to insist, first of all, that the Rhetoric be read as a piece of philosophic inquiry, and judged by philosophic standards” (3, emphasis added): it is this aspect above all that distinguishes Garver’s approach from those, say, of the teacher of composition, who will be interested most in how the Rhetoric can best be used to teach principles of effective writing; of the historian of rhetoric, who will be interested in the vicissitudes of the Aristotelian system vis-à-vis those of competing schemata (such as, e.g., stasis theory); or of the classical philologist, into whose especial bailiwick fall such problems as those of Quellenforschung and Textgeschichte. Hence Garver’s explicit inattention to historicism in this work (“It contains virtually no examination [End Page 651] of the Rhetoric’s historical context,” 7). Which is not to say that Garver is ignorant of, or uninterested in, history: on the contrary, he reminds us that “The good practical use of reason has a history. The Greek word for the power of practical thinking is phronêsis; its Latin translation was prudentia” (5). And those who are familiar with Garver’s earlier work will know that he is the author of Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison 1987). It is evident, then, that the study under review here is indeed (in a larger sense) a work of historical contextualization: another page in the history of phronêsis, as Aristotle used that term.Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character is one of the most thoughtful studies of that brilliant and difficult treatise to emerge in a long time. Garver takes Aristotle seriously, posing pungent questions and answering them in original and interesting ways. His style is clean and occasionally arresting (“To us, Aristotle might look naive. To Aristotle, we would look not sophisticated but unnatural,” 10). And, in the course of the book, there emerges a portrait of the Rhetoric that quite confirms its philosophic nature—not, however, as a work of disembodied theôria, but one “designed... to present legislators with an understanding of the civic art of rhetoric” (245). While Garver feels that the treatise ‘is not very useful to practitioners of the art’ (245), Aristotle’s project is also described as a ‘civic, practical art of rhetoric’ (18). This brief statement requires a good deal of unpacking, because, on... (shrink)

This paper will compare the concept of nature as it appears in the philosophies of the American pragmatist John Dewey and the Chinese text known as the Zhuangzi, with an aim towards mapping out a heuristic program which might be used to correct various interpretive difficulties in reading each figure. I shall argue that Dewey and Zhuangzi both held more complex and comprehensive philosophies of nature than for which either is typically credited. Such a view of nature turns on the (...) notion of continuity, particularly that between an experiencing organism [Dewey’s “live creature”] and the conditioning environment [Zhuangzi’s “crooked tree”]. Where Dewey’s and Zhuangzi’s ideas about nature converge, one finds similarities in prescriptions made for human action, and in the few places where they differ, one finds mutually complementary insights. (shrink)