En este documento, debato ampliamente sobre la fenomenología de la intersubjetividad presentada por Husserl y por Sartre, centrándome en los conceptos de empatía y ser-para-otros. Contrariamente a la opinión más común, rechazo la objeción de solipsista dirigida a Husserl y sostengo que es la descripción de Sartre la que da lugar a esa objeción, en la medida en que él describe la conciencia de otro sujeto como una forma de autoconocimiento como un "objeto" (para "otros"). Termino señalando algunas directrices para (...) convertir el análisis de Husserl de la aprehensión de otros sujetos en una fenomenología de la comunicación del más alto nivel. (shrink)

A secondary analysis was performed on preliminary data from an ongoing cross-cultural study on assortative pairing. Independently sampled pairs of opposite-sex romantic partners and of same-sex friends rated themselves and each other on Life History (LH) strategy and mate value. Data were collected in local bars, clubs, coffeehouses, and other public places from three different cultures: Tucson, Arizona; Hermosillo, Sonora; and San José, Costa Rica. The present analysis found that slow LH individuals assortatively pair with both sexual and social partners (...) more strongly than fast LH individuals. We interpret this phenomenon as representing (1) an adaptation for preserving coadapted genomes in slow LH strategists to maintain high copying fidelity genetic replication while producing a lower number of offspring in stable, predictable, and controllable environments and (2) a bet-hedging adaptation in fast LH strategists, favoring the genetic diversification of a higher number of offspring in unstable, unpredictable, and uncontrollable environments. (shrink)

This paper reviews the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Ernst Tugendhat around the problem of the foundation of morality. In addition to the main criticisms developed by Tugendhat to the ethics of discourse and Habermas’s reply, some of the contributions to this subject by Javier Muguerza are reviewed who, together with Tugendhat, has contributed to developing what I call the new philosophies of the subject.

IntroductionTranscranial magnetic stimulation is a consolidated procedure for the treatment of depression, with several meta-analyses demonstrating its efficacy. Theta-burst stimulation is a modification of TMS with similar efficacy and shorter session duration. The geriatric population has many comorbidities and a high prevalence of depression, but few clinical trials are conducted specifically for this age group. TBS could be an option in this population, offering the advantages of few side effects and no pharmacological interactions. Therefore, our aim is to investigate the (...) efficacy of TBS in geriatric depression.Clinical trial registration[https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/], identifier [NCT04842929]. (shrink)

The Continuous Parameter Estimation Model is applied to develop individual genomic-level heritabilities for the latent hierarchical structure and developmental dynamics of Life History (LH) strategy LH strategies relate to the allocations of bioenergetic resources into different domains of fitness. LH has moderate to high population-level heritability in humans, both at the level of the high-order Super-K Factor and the lower-order factors, the K-Factor, Covitality Factor, and General Factor of Personality (GFP). Several important questions remain unexplored. We developed measures of genome-level (...) heritabilities employing an American sample of 316 monozygotic (MZ) and 274 dizygotic (DZ) twin dyads and a Swedish sample of 863 MZ and 475 DZ twin dyads. This novel heritability index measures individual genetic transmissibility, therefore opening new avenues for analyzing complex interactions among heritable traits inaccessible to standard structural equations methods. For these samples: (1) moderate to high heritability of factor loadings of Super-K on its lower-order factors is demonstrated, evidencing biological preparedness, genetic accommodation, and the gene-culture coevolution of biased epigenetic rules of development; (2) moderate to high heritability of the magnitudes of the effect of the higher-order factors upon their loadings on their constituent factors, evidencing genetic constraints upon phenotypic plasticity; and (3) that heritability of the LH factors, of factor loadings, and of the magnitudes of the correlations among factors are weaker among those with slower LH speeds, demonstrating that inter-individual variation in transmissibility is a function of individual socioecological selection pressures. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of Ideen. The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an a priori knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of a priori knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how the theory (...) of essential insight presented in Ideen gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight. (shrink)

In this paper I address some philosophical questions regarding the impact quantum mechanics has in the classical conceptions about reality and knowledge. I stress that onto-gnosiological realism still is an option to the issues regarding the relationship between knowledge and reality. Rejecting some radical aspects of Copenhagen interpretation of quantum formalism, I emphasize the advantages of de Broglie’s realistic and causal model. To finish with, I discuss the limits of the Cartesian concept of matter and the split between matter and (...) mind. (shrink)

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of the content of perceptions, natural science. I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows (...) in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification. (shrink)

En partant des derniers paragraphes de la cinquième parti du Discours de la Méthode, on a reconstitué la formulation cartésienne de la perception d’un autre moi. Les critères de l’usage du langage et de la plasticité du comportement ont été analysés à la lumière de l’idée d’une machine universelle et du test de Turing. On conclut de la faiblesse de l’argument cartésien sur l’irréductibilité de la pensée à un dispositif machinal. En tant qu’issue de la difficulté, on propose une révision (...) de la façon cartésienne de caractérisation de la pensée à partir du concept d’expérience, tout en abandonnant le thème d’une perception interne incommunicable et intémoignable. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family:CalistoMT;} This paper presents two views regarding democracy and its relationship with liberal thought. Specifically it shows the main features of radical democracy and how this one can make a proper contact between individual and social aspects and respects the minimum guarantees that must be given to all individuals (...) in order to carry out its own conception of good. It fosters adequate conditions of participation and control over public affairs. So, the paper shows the visions of Hayek and Nozick confronted to the conception of radical democracy proposed by other authors. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the main traits of the phenomenological thinking of Abranches de Soveral. I start with the work of his master Miranda Barbosa explaining the criticisms he address to the Husserlian phenomenology. I show Soveral’s approach to phenomenology is framed by the conceptions of Barbosa and the problems that, for him, phenomenology cannot answer in an accurate way. In this context, I present the fundamental tenets of Soveral’s rejoinder to his master, showing how phenomenology can be rearranged (...) in order to formulate and to answer “the fundamental problem of knowledge”. (shrink)

In this paper I try to show how transcendental logic can be interpreted in light of the distinction between apophantics and formal ontology. Despite the non-Kantian origin of these concepts, my contention is that they can reveal the scope of Kant’s argument regarding the distinction between formal and transcendental logic and the thesis that transcendental logic has a pure a priori content. While common approaches interpret this a priori content of transcendental logic as the content pure forms of aesthetics give, (...) we stress that this content is the a priori concepts of object which are embedded in the logical form of judgments. (shrink)

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in (...) the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis. (shrink)

I discuss Husserl’s concept of norm, and its relevance for a phenomenology of practical reason. I confront Husserl with Wilhelm Wundt, Hans Kelsen, and Carl Schmitt about, respectively, what a norm is, about the relation between theoretical and normative sciences, and, finally, about the creation of political concepts within European culture. In the last section, I develop some theoretical insights about the constitutive character of normative consciousness, abandoning Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. I stress also the importance of (...) a phenomenology of plural and collective subjectivity in order to develop a phenomenological theory of state and normative experience. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence (...) against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone. (shrink)

While not a phenomenologist, Fernando Gil was highly interested in some aspects of Husserl’s work. One of these aspects was Husserl’s theory of evidence. ln a notable book entitled Traité de l’évidence, he developed a throughout theory of evidence, paying close attention to the most important insights Husserl exposed his works. Gil’s theory of evidence is at the same time rooted in Phenomenology and extended beyond it in as much as he locates the first dimension of evidence ma primitive stratum (...) hallucinating aesthesia from desire. Accounting for evidence as threefold process, going from aesthesia to presence, and then to the intellectual grasping of an individual object, the most interesting feature of his theory is the of evidence as a hallucinating process, encompassing all strata of sensitive, perceptive, and conceptual life. (shrink)

The chapter has two parts. In the first part, I introduce a more fine-grained analysis of evaluative sentences. I distinguish between evaluations proper and directions for action with several degrees of constraint: commands, pieces of advice, suggestions, and so on. I call the latter “ductive-statements.” Thus, I affirm that the realm of morals has two branches: one relative to evaluations, which are is-sentences ranging from the several degrees between good and bad to the indifferent ; the other relative to sentences (...) having a “ductive” force that impose, with different degrees of coercion, a course of action. In the second part of the chapter, I address Searle’s famous argument concerning the derivation of ought-sentences from is-sentences. Relying on my previous distinctions, I argue that Searle’s derivation is flawed in two main points, which I present and discuss at length. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put (...) London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine phenomenologically the structure of the normative noema, which I call the “nomothetic noema.” I distinguish the meaning content, its normative characters, which I call “ductive forces”, and its modes of givenness. Next, I introduce the traditional difference between modalities de re and de dicto. I argue that the current tendency, in deontic logic, to treat deontic expressions as operators over sentences induces, at least on the syntactic surface, a de dicto reading. I then discuss some (...) of the theoretical decisions that underlie deontic logic, starting from two basic asymmetries between modal alethic logic and deontic logic. The decisive point is to recover a strong sense of permission that I equate with the factor of free agency, which is difficult to formalize. Finally, I return to the analysis of the nomothetic noema and try to show how a de re reading is better suited to account for normative intentionality. I simultaneously introduce the concept of status-imposing norms, which must be formulated with a normative use of the copulas “is” and “has.” I conclude that the treatment of normative expressions is more appropriate when they are understood as complex copulas, irreducible to assertive sentences, rather than as operators over whole sentences. I emphasize on this occasion that, from a phenomenological point of view and within the framework of genetic analysis, the primitive basic datum is the freedom of agency, on which the normative domain of assigning statuses to agents, obligations, and prohibitions is built. (shrink)

In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting (...) from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time. (shrink)

This article deals with the conscious and unconscious dimensions of mental life. I distinguish the transitive sense of consciousness, being conscious of something, intentionality, from the adjectival or adverbial sense, being conscious or consciously directed towards something. I show that an intentional act can be conscious or unconscious in the second sense and argue that, from this position, we can ask good questions about what consciousness is and its function in mental life. To achieve this result, I begin by framing (...) the topic in the tradition of psychology before Husserl, namely Lipps, and Brentano, and then describe the unconscious dimension from the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology. (shrink)

Gustavo de Fraga was one of the most influential Portuguese phenomenologists. He had a deep understanding of the Husserlian as well as of the Heideggerian phenomenology. One of his major concerns was the connection between these thinkers, and the resettlement of metaphysical questions some step beyond the works of both. In so doing, Gustavo de Fraga took an original stance in the field of Phenomenology, combining conceptual and poetic experiences of thought.

El presente trabajo hace un acercamiento al concepto de praxis en Ignacio Ellacuría, relacionando la praxis con los principales conceptos que Ellacuría presenta en su obra. La praxis, ejercicio fundamental a la hora de abordar el tema de la realidad histórica, objeto último y absoluto de la filosofía, requiere ser sustentada en una serie de elementos que se rescatan en el presente ensayo. Por ello, haremos referencia a algunos componentes propios de la praxis, las condiciones y el lugar para ella.

In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and consciousness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed (...) by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states. (shrink)

In this article, I start with an analysis of Husserl’s description of the intentional structure of communicative intentions in the Logical Investigations, pointing to some obvious shortcomings of it. Then, I stress some important criticisms of Husserl’s approach, namely by Pfänder, and I endeavor to show that Husserl was very close to a full-fledged theory of communicative intentions in the years around 1910. I then turn to Reinach’s theory of social acts, without deciding whether Reinach’s approach was dependent or not (...) on Husserl’s new views concerning the intentionality of communicative acts. Regarding Reinach’s theory of the Vernehmung, I criticize a widespread trend to construe it as something like a perception, showing that it expresses what I call the “vocative element” of the communicative acts. Then, I point to some complements that Reinach’s description is in need, and I finish with an outline of a phenomenologically oriented concept of communication, based on Husserl’s and Reinach’s insights. (shrink)

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that (...) the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of ‘ductive force’. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified witb simple coercion. [ show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world. (shrink)

The main goals of this study were, to test the motivational determinants of athletes perceived effort in football considering the four-stage motivational sequence at the contextual level proposed by Hierarchical Model of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation: task-involving, basic psychological needs, self-determined motivation and perceived effort. The multi-group analysis across different age-groups (U15, U17, U19, U21 years) and mediation role of basic psychological needs and self-determined motivation on the task-involving climate and the perceived effort were also analysed. Two independent samples of (...) male football athletes (N= 403, N= 403), aged 13-20 were enrolled in this study. The results demonstrated that structural model provided a good fit to data for all samples under analysis, and was invariant across U17, U19, and U21. However, it was not invariant across U15 and U17, U19 and U21. Additionally, in the results from the mediation analysis, there were significant indirect effects in all samples, supporting theoretical by self-determination theory assumptions, reinforcing the importance of basic psychological needs satisfaction and behavioral regulation in the relation in analysis. The results allow concluding that when coaches promote a task-involving climate, the basic psychological needs satisfaction of athletes improves. This climate will facilitate the regulation of their behaviors towards more autonomous forms of motivation, with positive results in the perceived effort of the athletes. (shrink)