This note discusses P. Oppenheimer and E. Zalta's ?A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument? [this journal, 2011]. I try to explain why the simplification presented there was successful and comment on the technical aspects of the method they applied.

This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that the theory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can deliver a new (...) solution to the problem of defining linguistic meaning and that the theory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presents meaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTM meaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of the theory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

Author: Bytniewski Paweł Title: “WHAT IS AN AUTHOR?” ON FOUCAULT’S CONSCIOUSNESS OF AN AUTHORSHIP („Kim jest Autor?” O krytycznej świadomości autorstwa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2010, vol:.10, number: 2010/1, pages: 73-106 Keywords: FOUCAULT, AUTHOR, LITERATURE, LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:One of the major obstacles to reconstructing Foucault’s attitude towards an authorship issue is multiplicity of his own roles which as an author he fulfilled. An Authorship as a (...) theme of his texts, as a prefiguration of nonexistent “Man” and his own authorship as a problem, as a way of “detaching myself from myself” – all these are the forms of Foucauldian ideas about an authorship and, at the same time, forms of his consciousness of his own authorship. Foucault historicizes and dissipates an authorship: an author is a function rather than the originator of texts. Writing, in this perspective, is a kind of conversion, decomposition of subjectivity into something else and even explosion. To say “I” doesn’t prove to be an ego. Additionally, Foucault notoriously suggests that his books are fiction. To be an author in this way is a way of being within the discourse and, as a consequence of it, to be trapped in its power. Foucault’s own rewriting of his theoretical biography includes turns and returns: as he repeatedly claims, he wrote in order to transform himself. He uses the processes of writing to simulate production of his subjective identity and, at the same time, to summarize, recapitulate his own oeuvre from current position. To cope with this suggestive and bizarre claims one should employ Roland Barthes distinction: écrivains (authors) et écrivants (writers). When Foucault-écrivain decomposes his ego, his own mode of existence by the use of writing, Foucault-écrivant, in an act of writing, writes himself, as an author. When Foucault-écrivain “writes fictions”, Foucault écrivant, in an act of “self-writing” (l’écriture de soi), establishes the object of a critique – Foucault. (shrink)

In September 1999 "Nature" magazine announced that atomic orbitals were di-rectly observed. Opposing it, Eric Scerri, editor-in-chief of "Foundations of Chemistry", claimed that what could be observed in the experiment was electron density, not orbitals. The main purpose of this paper is to consider philosophical and methodological aspects of the above controversy. Especially, the problems of direct observability and reality of theoretical entities are taken under detailed discussion. From the point of view of quantum mechanics there are not any reasons (...) to believe that orbitals exist. However, realistically treated orbitals are very effective tools in the laboratory practice of chemistry. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an (...) interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is immersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss (...) presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications. (shrink)

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it’s a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual’s brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there’s no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they don’t instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and can’t be easily fixed. (...) Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations don’t guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they don’t meet Phillips’ conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips isn’t in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips’ conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...) they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directival theory and later theories of meaning. In the third section I argue that using the directival theory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories of meaning employ. (shrink)

_The dynamic development of medical technologies, i.e. the use of medicinal products and medical procedures, requires reflection on the ways to ensure the safety of patients and people using such methods of treatment (medical professionals) in legal and ethical terms. This applies in particular to the currently observed influence of the media on the actions taken in the health care system in Poland as well as individual decisions of patients on the use of the offered drugs and other medical procedures._ (...) _The article presents selected legal provisions defining the conditions for the use of medicinal products (drugs) and experimental medical procedures. The basic element of the considerations is to indicate the legal conditions for this type of use of medical technologies understood in this way, also in a broader context – with the characteristics of ethical conditions for „the media message”, including ensuring its proper quality for the protection of public health._. (shrink)

The paper is focused on some aspects of experimental realism of Ian Hacking, and especially on his manipulability criterion of existence. The problem is here related to chemical molecules, the objects of interest in chemical research. The authors consider whether and to what extent this criterion has been applied in experimental practice of chemistry. They argue that experimentation on is a fundamental criterion of existence of entities in chemistry rather than experimentation with. Some examples regarding studies of structures of complex (...) compounds, taken from organic chemistry, are presented to support the authors' considerations. Chemists' laboratory practice depends strongly on the way that representations of entities on (or with) the experiments are used. The authors show that this point has not been given sufficient attention by the new experimentalists. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to outline the idea of the anarchistic egoism included in Max Stirner's "Ego and His Own". I tried to represent Stirner as an original philosopher who visibly distinguished himself among other thinkers of his days. My aim was also defend him from various attacks of his critics and adversaries who reproached him for being inconsistent or perplexed in the very vulnerable spots of his work. In my opinion 'being awkward' which Camus accuses Stirner (...) of, is nothing else than a tough consequence of the egoistic philosophy which forced the author of "Ego and His Own" to stop his deduction in some point. By referring to Nietzsche and existentialists I endeavoured to show Stirner's Egoist as a precursor of the Nietzsche's Superman and the Camus's Stranger. In the evolution of an idea this two directions were two different ways of extending the construction which foundations were laid down by Stirner. That is why I find Max Stirner one of the most influential thinker of the 10th century who had a great impact on formation of the new look on man and his world. This article is about solitude, alienation, egoism, strength and power which born every time when the conscious and sovereign human being is faced with the indifferent, trivial and inert world. (shrink)

Although considerable research has been devoted to cognitive functions deteriorating due to diseases of cardiovascular system, rather less attention has been paid to their theoretical background. Progressive vascular disorders as hypertension, atherosclerosis and carotid artery stenosis generate most of all pathological changes in the white matter, that cause specific cognitive disorder: disconnection syndromes, and disturbances in the dynamic aspect of information processing. These features made neuropsychological disorders secondary to cardiovascular diseases different than the effects of cerebral cortex damage, which may (...) be interpreted modularly. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe present study examined relationships between attention to negative words and daily rumination and daily adjustment in a sample of clinically depressed individuals. We recorded eye movements of 43 individuals diagnosed with major depression while they were freely viewing dysphoric, threat-related, neutral, and positive words. Then, each day for one week, participants provided measures of their daily rumination and psychological adjustment. Multilevel analyses found that attention to dysphoric and threat-related words was positively related to daily rumination and attention to threat-related (...) words was negatively related to daily adjustment. These findings suggest that the impaired ability to disengage from negative words is positively related to rumination in daily life and is negatively related to well-being, as defined in terms of Beck’s Triad. (shrink)

Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...) approximate Bayesian inference to show how representations of ordinary objects can be extracted from sensory input in a rational and truth-tracking manner. Drawing an analogy between perception construed as Bayesian hypothesis testing and scientific inquiry, I sketch out how some of the intuitions that traditionally inspired arguments for scientific realism also find application with regards to proverbial tables and chairs. (shrink)

Within the context of the debate between ontological monists and pluralists the paper discusses a number of argumentative strategies that the latter can apply to answer the “there can be only one” argument. I show here that the reply to this argument suggested by J. Turner has its disadvantages and suggest a number of adjustments thereof. In particular, I develop a concept of domain-specific quantifiers that allow the pluralist to elaborate his or her ontological position.

The IVF ET method is a scientifically recognized infertility treat- ment method. The problem, however, is this method’s unsatisfactory efficiency. This calls for a more thorough analysis of the information available in the treat- ment process, in order to detect the factors that have an effect on the results, as well as to effectively predict result of treatment. Classical statistical methods have proven to be inadequate in this issue. Only the use of modern methods of data mining gives hope for (...) a more effective analysis of the collected data. This work provides an overview of the new methods used for the analysis of data on infertility treatment, and formulates a proposal for further directions for research into increasing the efficiency of the predicted result of the treatment process. (shrink)

Paweł Gładziejewski, Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons., Diametros 27 This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind (...) of social perception and empathy as compassion. The argument attempts show to that neither of these can be identified with a mental simulation process understood as a sub-personal process. Nevertheless mental simulation may play a limited explanatory role with respect to these two types of empathy. (shrink)

The text presents a transhumanist point of view on evolution. It focuses on the lack of clear and obvious evolutionary solutions to the issue of involuntary suffering. It poses difficult questions about the possibility of enhencement of human nature and respecting the laws of evolution. It reflects on the positive role of pain for the development of individual people and the entire human species. It considers the thesis that perhaps evolution “needs” pain for proper human development. It asks whether the (...) transition to a higher than evolutionary stage of human development, as proposed by transhumanists, will not lead to the extinction of our species? After all, it relates all this mosaic of thoughts and theories to God, who can be the answer to many posed questions. (shrink)

In this paper I take a closer look at Fr. Georges Florovsky’s original view on the relation between philosophy and theology. I argue that he tried to formulate an approach based on patristic experience and opposed to the dominating secular paradigm of philosophy. In some sense he wanted to reverse the traditional account. As Teresa Obolevitch aptly suggested, he wanted to replace the principle fides quaerens intellectum by the rule intellectus quaerens fidem. In that first default case the faith needs (...) to be justified or proved by the reason, in the second, unobvious one, the faith has an absolute priority and illuminates itself the natural thought. According to Florovsky, philosophy should not attempt to ground the theology, formulating arguments for the existence of God or proving the coherence of theism, but rather should accept theology as a fundamental premise and then develop a new, non-secular account for the old philosophical topics. (shrink)

Pavel Florensky (1882–1937), a Russian theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, argued that the religious discourse is essentially contradictory and put forward the idea of the logical theory of antinomies. Recently his views raised interesting discussions among logicians who consider him a forerunner of many non-classical logics. In this paper I discuss four interpretations of Florensky’s views: paraconsistent, L-contradictory, non-monotonic and rhetorical. In conclusion I argue for the integral interpretation which unites these four approaches.

Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and (...) determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals. (shrink)

Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of naturalism. Can chemically induced, radically altered states of consciousness provide reasons for or play some positive epistemic role with respect to metaphysical beliefs? In this paper, (...) I discuss a view that has been underexplored in recent literature. I argue that psychedelic states can be rationally integrated into one’s epistemic life. Consequently, updating one’s metaphysical beliefs based on altered states of consciousness does not have to constitute an instance of epistemic irrationality. (shrink)

The discussion paper synthesises the insights shared during a keynote panel at the 26th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference, themed “Reimagining a nursing ecosystem in an uncertain world.” It delves into the substantial impact uncertainty has on nursing, offering innovative strategies for reconceptualization. Through a critical examination of evidence‐based practice, the tendency to homogenise nursing is discussed, prompting advocacy for a Nietzschean political framework as a form of resistance and emancipation. Drawing inspiration from Donna Haraway, a transition from individualistic to (...) relational approaches is needed, especially amidst social and economic instability. Furthermore, the integration of caritas and Indigenous epistemologies underscore the significance of cultural sensitivity in nursing. Meanwhile, Ubuntu philosophy champions empathy and collective values, while a convergence of Eastern and Western philosophical traditions promises to enrich nursing practice. Ultimately, the panellists advocate for overcoming rigid ideologies in favour of a pluralistic approaches, ontologies, epistemologies and ethics to address contemporary challenges, and signal for a philosophical reorientation to engage uncertainty and reshape nursing roles in an ever‐evolving and world. (shrink)