Artykuł prezentuje w ujęciu historycznoliterackim powieść szpiegowską okresu PRL. Analiza książek z serii „Labirynt” wskazuje, że funkcja propagandowa dominuje w nich nad rozrywkową, co jest charakterystyczne dla różnych obszarów kultury popularnej w PRL. Serię „Labirynt” wydawało w latach 1957–1991 Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. Ukazywały się w niej „zwykłe” powieści milicyjne, ale przede wszystkim powieści szpiegowskie. Podobnie jak powieść milicyjna, również powieść szpiegowska w PRL obok funkcji rozrywkowej musiała spełniać funkcję propagandową. Przejawia się to m.in. nawiązaniem do konwencji wczesnych powieści szpiegowskich (...) w literaturze europejskiej z przełomu XIX i XX wieku, czyli przedstawianiem PRL jako kraju, który tylko broni się przed szpiegami, sam natomiast nie wykrada tajemnic innych państw. Równie daleki od rzeczywistości i wyłącznie propagandowy był obraz Polski jako kraju wytwarzającego liczne wynalazki i technologie, na które polują szpiedzy z Zachodu. Propagandowy charakter ma też obraz wroga i skontrastowany z nim wizerunek własnych agentów. Szpiedzy z BND czy CIA nie cofają się przed morderstwami, są bezwzględni także dla swoich współpracowników i ogólnie reprezentują bardzo niski poziom moralny. Często są byłymi nazistami, a zależy im tylko na zarobku. Z kolei funkcjonariusze kontrwywiadu PRL to ludzie ideowi, z oddaniem służący ojczyźnie, przewyższający pod każdym względem swych przeciwników, także na płaszczyźnie życia prywatnego. Każda z tych historii kończy się oczywiście zwycięstwem „naszych” i – podobnie jak powieść milicyjna – nie pozostawia czytelnikowi żadnych wątpliwości co do tego, po czyjej stronie są w tym konflikcie wszystkie racje – zarówno polityczne, jak i moralne. (shrink)

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...) of its rational etiology. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

This paper presents Michael Heller’s notion of “philosophy in science” and re-introduces Michael Heller’s classical text that first presented this concept of philosophy entitled How is “philosophy in science” possible?. The paper discusses the historical context of Heller’s idea as it emerged from the discussions and works of the Krakow philosophical scene and discusses the basic tenants of this philosophy, its analytic character, the role of intellectual tradition in the development of this philosophy, and the critical role played by an (...) interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, science, and theology. Despite the idea of philosophy in science having emerged about 40 years ago, this concept still inspires and fuels innovative research. The notion of “philosophy in science” lies at the foundations of the philosophy published in two journals: Philosophical Problems in Science and Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

[K. Marciniak, Pro Cicerone poeta. Poezja Marka Tulliusza Cycerona na przestrzeni stuleci, Warszawa 2008].

The aim of this paper is to provide a logically accurate and technologically sound taxonomy of artifact functions. To this end, I review one of the recent proposals of such taxonomy: the Reconciled Functional Basis. Since it turns out that this taxonomy involves some serious shortcomings, I attempt to refine it with the help of the conceptual framework of DOLCE, which is a foundational ontology in Knowledge Representation research.

ABSTRACTThe present study examined relationships between attention to negative words and daily rumination and daily adjustment in a sample of clinically depressed individuals. We recorded eye movements of 43 individuals diagnosed with major depression while they were freely viewing dysphoric, threat-related, neutral, and positive words. Then, each day for one week, participants provided measures of their daily rumination and psychological adjustment. Multilevel analyses found that attention to dysphoric and threat-related words was positively related to daily rumination and attention to threat-related (...) words was negatively related to daily adjustment. These findings suggest that the impaired ability to disengage from negative words is positively related to rumination in daily life and is negatively related to well-being, as defined in terms of Beck’s Triad. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...) I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. (shrink)

Modernity and What Has Been Lost comes out of a conference held at the Jagiellonian University in Krakw̤, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009 that sought to identify Leo Strauss's intellectual background in re: the repudiation of a modern idea of homogenous, universal state (considered as an illegitimate synthesis of Jerusalem and Athens, i.e., the claims of Reason and Revelation). The world we live in, molded by science and historical relativism, may be described as hostile to human dignity or perfection, or (...) abhorrent to those who love the search for wisdom. Straussian teaching consisted in the steady effort to reopen "the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," and refers to the esoteric way of writing practiced by the most profound thinkers of the past which has been apparently forgotten in the last three centuries. Strauss binds the concept of natural right with the question of maintenance of conditions for philosophizing, and it probably seems to him that such defense of philosophy is the highest task in our times. However, one must be well aware that philosophizing always means a perilous way of life. Indeed, it may be destructive of the city (polis) itself as far as the city exists due to some crucial beliefs the philosopher might put in doubt. Reflecting on those issues, Strauss engaged in several highly important debates with his contemporaries, in an open way with, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Karl Lw̲ith and Alexandre Kojv̈e, and more tacitly with Martin Heidegger"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...) turned into a wine of consciousness” is now among the mainstream problems of cognitive science. (shrink)

The paper contains an attempt at formulating the project of logic comprised in Jan Łukasiewicz's article „On determinism” and a construction of a logic which would realise this project. Such a logic consists of three consequence-operations build upon a four-element algebra. The values of the algebra have been defined by means of the following set of sentences: true and true today, true but not true today, false but not false today and false and false today. It turns out that only (...) one of the consequences is different from the classical consequence and all of them are logically two-valued. It is proved moreover, that the assumption that tautologies consists of sentences-forms which are „always” true today, results in the non-existence of such tautologies. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the arguments against the existence of artefacts, which were propounded by Mariusz Grygianiec in his book Identyczność i trwanie. I show that all of these arguments are inconclusive or are in the need of further elaboration. Therefore, I conclude that the the metaphysical thesis to the effect that artefacts do not exist remains unsupported.

TRADITION AS A COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH A context of my paper is the debate on reason, tradition and traditional communities, in which this moral and epistemological issues were discussed as a part of general socio-philosophical theory of modernity. In particular I intend to locate my considerations in the context of formal-pragmatic theory of modern communicative rationality developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. I will provide a competitive model of the rationality of tradition by applying a conceptual toolkit (...) of pragmatically oriented analysis to explain practices connected with vocabulary of tradition. I argue that tradition as a communication system has a fully rational structure. My main claim is that communicative structure of tradition has a rational structure of language game. This structure includes defined principles of communication for members of closed tradition-grounded community and rule of inclusion for potential new members. Firstly I consider closely internal principles of communication within the framework of tradition contrasting them shortly with normative-deontic rules of the postenlightenment idea of pragmatic communication discussed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Brandom. After that I examine the rule of inclusion — the rule, which mediates between closed system of tradition-based community and his environment. (shrink)

This volume - the first project of its kind in the field - collates c. 1200 biographical entries on Greek sophists and rhetors who flourished in the Roman Empire from the first to the seventh century AD. Ancient Greek sophists, the masters of speech and teachers of rhetoric, constituted one of the most important and interesting intellectual circles of the ancient world. The prosopography provides comprehensive information on sophists and their activities, using abundant and varied source material such as literary (...) texts (including those of the rhetors themselves) and papyrological, epigraphic, and numismatic evidence. Each entry provides data (where available) on sources in which the person is attested, biographical details, career, and rhetorical activity. This book constitutes a basis and a tool for subsequent in-depth studies on the Greek Sophistic movement, as well as a useful reference book for students and all those interested in the culture of the ancient world. (shrink)

Semen Frank (1877–1950) was one of the first and most ardent advocates of the ontological argument in the twentieth century. He proposed an original interpretation of the ontological argument based on its analogy to Descartes’ Cogito. Frank believed that it is possible to develop Cogito ergo sum into Cogito ergo est ens absolutum. In this paper, I analyze his version of the ontological argument. First, I propose a simple reconstruction of his reasoning, paying attention to its hidden premise. Second, departing (...) from the classical logical interpretations of Descartes’ argument, I show that for Frank the claim that God exists had the same logical properties as Cogito. As a result, it seems that his argument was formally correct, though based on a premise which could hardly be convincing for a non-believer. This should not be surprising, however, since Frank, as most Russian religious philosophers, was not interested in the project of philosophical theology. His main concern was rather the development of philosophy based on religious premises, which might be called “theological philosophy”. (shrink)

Analogicity in computer science is understood in two, not mutually exclusive ways: 1) with regard to the continuity feature (of data or computations), 2) with regard to the analogousness feature (i.e. similarity between certain natural processes and computations). Continuous computations are the subject of three methodological questions considered in the paper: 1a) to what extent do their theoretical models go beyond the model of the universal Turing machine (defining digital computations), 1b) is their computational power greater than that of the (...) universal Turing machine, 1c) under what conditions are continuous computations realizable in practice? The analogue-analogical computations lead to two other issues: 2a) in what sense and to what extent their accuracy depends on the adequacy of certain theories of empirical sciences, 2b) are there analogue-analogical computations in nature that are also continuous? The above issues are an important element of the philosophical discussion on the limitations of contemporary computer science. (shrink)

Thought style and thought collective are two well-known concepts from Ludwik Fleck’s theory of science, which he originally formulated in Polish and German. This paper contends that these two concepts cannot be fully understood without a third—Stimmung/nastrój, which is one of the musical metaphors that play an important role in Fleck’s thinking. Because it is most often translated into English as “mood”, Fleck’s musical metaphors are mostly lost in translation, appearing as mere rhetoric. Only if and when we understand Stimmung/nastrój (...) in the musical meaning of attunement, we can fully understand thought collectives, for which Stimmung/nastrój is sine qua non, and thought style, which appears if and when a collective turns out to be an enduring and not a momentary one. (shrink)

The responsibility that rests with the current generation, which has a duty of preserving the ecosystem for the next generations, has become not only the responsibility of governments of the particular states and politicians, but also managers and companies managed by them since the most serious contamination is a result of the industrial activity. Not negating a need of industrial activities’ development; still, one must consider a change of management’s style itself, which would; apart from the economic growth, take ethics (...) and ecology under consideration. The managers as a organizational and social leaders must learn how to make decisions with the extremely higher caution than it has been done so far. The possibilities that they have, cause that the burden of changes leading to create, propagate, and realize the outlook that allows responsibility for the future is also on their shoulders. Therefore, we need the changes that consist in revaluing the previous anthropocentric stance in ethics into the ethics based on responsibility principle, in which the biosphere might be perceived not only as an object of man’s industrial activity, but first of all as a subject of his responsibility. (shrink)

In his book Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argues against the view that the concept of mental representation employed by cognitive scientists should be based on the folk-psychological concept of mental representation as propositional attitudes. The author of the present article will attempt to show that, contrary to what Ramsey himself claims, the fact that the folk concept of mental representation will most likely not be a part of the conceptual repository of cognitive science does not imply that beliefs, desires or (...) the rationality of human cognition should be eliminated from the naturalistic outlook on the nature of mind and cognitive processes. The key to see that this is the case lies in understanding cognitive systems as multi-level, hierarchically organized mechanisms. (shrink)

Migration and refugeeism have become widespread phenomena in the contemporary world. They affect both the migrants’ countries of origin, as well as transit and target countries. The contemporary migrant crisis is becoming a challenge not only for politicians, diplomats and economists, but also for sociologists, demographers and philosophers. It is also a challenge for the Catholic Church because it affects millions of Christians to whose countries migrants and refugees are coming. The purpose of this article is to explain the social (...) teaching of the Church in this regard. It contains examples of statements made by the Second Vatican Council and the Popes: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis. (shrink)

The article is an analysis of the different types of rationality forming the basis of “rational dialogue”. It presents the positions of Plato and the sophists as well as modern attempts to revive this tradition. The Platonic model (ideal) of philosophy as that which is objectively confronted with the strategies of a rational debate taking place within conditions of uncertainty (probable knowledge) and risk.

This book revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. It is claimed to set up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. While the book is addressed to both professionals and students of philosophical logic, probability, epistemology, and philosophy of science, it also (...) surveys ideas central to the development of philosophy in the 20th century. It will be a valuable companion to multifarious graduate and postgraduate courses. (shrink)

Originally published by Doubleday in 1969, this topical volume delineates the French position on thermonuclear weapons, as well as outlines the theories of deterrence and graduated retaliation that have guided U.S. nuclear policy formation.

The aim of tis article is to present the selected Marian Smoluchowski's manuscripts to be published in this volume. At the beginning, a history and current state of research of his manusript legacy was showed. Next there were characterized a philosophical significance of his unpublished manuscripts and a short analysis of the manuscripts published in this volume. At the end of the article the details about the current edition of Smoluchowski's manuscripts were described.