How can there be rights in law? We learn from moral philosophy that rights protect persons in a special way because they have peremptory force. But how can this aspect of practical reason be captured by the law? For many leading legal philosophers the legal order is constructed on the foundations of factual sources and with materials provided by technical argument. For this 'legal positivist' school of jurisprudence, the law endorses rights by some official act suitably communicated. But how can (...) any such legal enactment recreate the proper force of rights? Rights take their meaning and importance from moral reflection, which only expresses itself in practical reasoning. This puzzle about rights invites a reconsideration of the nature and methods of legal doctrine and of jurisprudence itself. Legal Rights argues that the theory of law and legal concepts is a project of moral and political philosophy, the best account of which is to be found in the social contract tradition. It outlines an argument according to which legal rights can be justified before equal citizens under the constraints of public reason. The place of rights in law is explained by the unique position of law as an essential component of the civil condition and a necessary condition for freedom.

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Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union and believe its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law, and thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book proposes a rival theory: that the substance of EU law is not constitutional, but international, and provides a close examination of the treaties and the precedents of the European courts to explore this concept further. -/- Just like international law, EU law applies primarily to the (...) relations between member states, who have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. -/- According to this 'internationalist' view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, freely organizing their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness. -/- Presenting an 'internationalist' reading, this book proposes that the EU is a creation of the law of nations, and argues for a dualist account of its legal architecture, with EU law and domestic law allocated different institutional roles. (shrink)

This book offers a new account of Aristotle's practical philosophy. Pavlos Kontos argues that Aristotle does not restrict practical reason to its action-guiding and motivational role; rather, practical reason remains practical in the full sense of the term even when its exercise does not immediately concern the guidance of our present actions. To elucidate why this wider scope of practical reason is important, Kontos brings into the foreground five protagonists that have long been overlooked: spectators or judges who make non-motivational (...) judgments about practical matters that do not interact with their present deliberations and actions; legislators who exercise practical reason to establish constitutions and laws; hopes as an active engagement with moral luck and its impact on our individual lives; prayers as legislators' way to deal with the moral luck hovering around the birth of constitutions and the prospect of a utopia; and people who are outsiders or marginal cases of the responsibility community because they are totally deprived of practical reason. Building on a wide range of interpretations of Aristotle's practical philosophy, Kontos offers new insights about Aristotle's philosophical contribution to the current debates about radical evil, moral luck, hope, utopia, internalism and externalism, and the philosophy of law. Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason will appeal to researchers and advanced students interested in Aristotle's ethics, ancient philosophy, and the history of practical philosophy. (shrink)

Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson have developed and investigated a set of rationality postulates which appear to capture much of what is required of any rational system of theory revision. This set of postulates describes a class of revision functions, however it does not provide a constructive way of defining such a function. There are two principal constructions of revision functions, namely an epistemic entrenchment and a system of spheres. We refer to their approach as the AGM paradigm. We provide a (...) new constructive modeling for a revision function based on a nice preorder on models, and furthermore we give explicit conditions under which a nice preorder on models, an epistemic entrenchment, and a system of spheres yield the same revision function. Moreover, we provide an identity which captures the relationship between revision functions and update operators (as defined by Katsuno and Mendelzon). (shrink)

Interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gaining momentum in academic and managerial circles. However, prior work in the area has paid little attention to how CSR initiatives should be implemented inside the organization. Against this backdrop, this study examines the impact of CSR initiatives on an important stakeholder group—employees. We build and test a comprehensive multilevel framework that focuses on whether employees derive job satisfaction from CSR programs. The proposed model predicts that a manager’s charismatic leadership influences employees’ interpretations (...) about the motives underlying their companies’ engagement in CSR initiatives (intrinsic and extrinsic CSR-induced attributions) which, in turn, influence employee job satisfaction. Hierarchical linear modeling of data from 47 organizational units comprising 438 employees from three world-leading manufacturing organizations shows that when employees think that their manager possesses charismatic leadership qualities, they tend to attribute the organization’s motives for engaging in CSR activities to intrinsic values, which, in turn, are positively associated with job satisfaction. Also, the extent to which managers are perceived as charismatic leaders relates positively to job satisfaction. Interestingly, CSR-induced extrinsic attributions are neither explained by charismatic leadership nor do they predict job satisfaction. Implications for both theory and practice are discussed. (shrink)

For decades, discrete choice modelling was practically dominated by only two models: multinomial probit and logit. This paper presents a novel alternative—harmonic choice model. It is qualitatively similar to multinomial probit and logit: if one choice alternative greatly exceeds all (falls below at least one of) other alternatives in terms of utility then it is chosen with probability close to one (zero). Compared to probit and logit, the new model has relatively flat tails and it is steeper in the neighborhood (...) of zero (when all alternatives yield the same utility and the decision maker chooses among them at random). (shrink)

Professor Walen’s book rejects the familiar argument of “double effect,” namely the doctrine that an action that knowingly causes the death of another person cannot be justified merely by its good consequences but only by its good intentions. Professor Walen offers a rival argument. He proposes that we rethink the killing of non-combatants in war on the basis of a theory of “the mechanics of claims” so that the intentional killing of civilians may be occasionally permissible. Such targeting of civilians (...) may be justified, according to the book’s argument, by the aim of eliminating the threat that these civilians may pose—innocently or not—to other persons. In these circumstances, it will not only be permissible, but it would also be a matter of right to kill civilians, which would be derived from a balancing of “claims.” The argument is impressively made but is ultimately unconvincing. All the decisive questions appear to be matters of a balance of “goodness.” The “mechanics of claims” organizes a structure of welfare values that ultimately work as a proxy for act-utilitarianism. As a result, the argument is open to well-known objections regarding justice and the separateness of persons. (shrink)

Despite the undeniable epistemic progress of developmental biology from the second half of the twentieth century to the present day, there still is widespread disagreement on defining the biological term of ‘development’. This scientific field epistemologically is neither unsuccessful nor immature, thus the persistent lack of agreement on its most central concept raises some important questions: is there any need for an explicit definition of biological development, and if so, what content should the definition have? My central thesis is twofold. (...) First, that current definitions of biological development are conceptually or empirically inadequate. Second, that an explicit definition of biological development is very much needed (a) for the practical purposes of science textbooks, but more importantly is needed (b) epistemically for exposing or overcoming problematic assumptions and for partially guiding scientific research by coding the appropriate assumptions. To support this thesis, initially I will show the deficiencies of the dominant definitions of biological development; and subsequently I will provide two arguments: an Argument from Practical Purposes and an Argument from Epistemic Purposes. Finally, for accommodating practical and epistemic purposes and as a response to the inadequacy of the available definitions of development, I will propose and defend an operational definition of biological development which is aimed to be broader than the received ones, while being more precise and fruitful to conduct empirical research. (shrink)

Do we have a legal and moral right to health care against others? There are international conventions and institutions that say emphatically yes, and they summarize this in the expression of “the right to health,” which is an established part of the international human rights canon. The International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights outlines this as “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” but declarations such as this remain tragically (...) unfulfilled. According to recent figures, roughly two billion people lack access to essential drugs or to primary health care. Millions are afflicted by infections and illnesses that are easily avoidable or treatable. In the developing world many children die or grow stunted and damaged for lack of available treatments. Tropical diseases receive little or no attention by the major pharmaceutical companies’ research departments. Is this a massive violation of the right to health? And if so, why does it attract so little attention? Is it because our supposed commitment to human rights and the rule of law is hypocritical and hollow? Or is it because the right to health is a special case of a right, so that these tragedies are no violation at all? Jennifer Prah Ruger summarized this puzzle when she wrote: “one would be hard pressed to find a more controversial or nebulous human right than the right to health.” In this essay I discuss three different theories of a right to health care. I conclude by offering my own reconstruction of one such theory. (shrink)

How is it possible that the idea of sovereignty still features in legal and political philosophy? Most contemporary political philosophers have little use for the idea of ‘unlimited’ or ‘absolute’ power, which is how sovereignty is normally defined. A closer look at sovereignty identifies two possible accounts: sovereignty as the fact of power or sovereignty as a title to govern. The first option, which was pursued by John Austin’s command theory of law, leads to an unfamiliar view of law and (...) the state, which was justly criticised by H. L. A. Hart. The second option, leads to a paradox, because under this view sovereignty is both limited and unlimited. Hence, this argument shows that law and sovereignty are actually incompatible. Where there is law there is no sovereignty, and where there is sovereignty there is no law. (shrink)

Empirical research often requires a method how to convert a deterministic economic theory into an econometric model. A popular method is to add a random error term on the utility scale. This method, however, ignores stochastic dominance. A modification of this method is proposed to account for stochastic dominance. The modified model compares favorably to other existing models in terms of goodness of fit to experimental data. The modified model can rationalize the preference reversal phenomenon. An intuitive axiomatic characterization of (...) the modified model is provided. Important microeconomic concept of risk aversion is well defined in the modified model. (shrink)

Henri Bergsono gyvybės kilmės hipotezė vengia pateikti šios problemos sprendimą, visgi filosofas pateikia keletą pasiūlymų. Nuodugnus jo tekstų skaitymas netiesiogiai atskleidžia prielaidą, kad gyvybė žemėje atsirado vykstant natūraliems procesams. Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjama élan (polėkio) sąvoka bei akcentuojama šios filosofinės sąvokos evoliucija Bergsono mintyje. Élan argumentuotai atskiriamas nuo jo nuolatinio palydovo vital (gyvybiškasis), kadangi siekiama pabrėžti jo nedvasinį aspektą, kuris taikomas tam, ką Bergsonas apibūdino kaip „fiziologinę gyvybę“. Noriu pabrėžti, kad élan turi savo istoriją ir kad neabejotinai buvo akimirka, kuomet élan (...) prasidėjo. Galiausiai argumentacija perkeliama nuo élan istorijos ir kilmės prie gyvybės istorijos ir kilmės. (shrink)

The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom parliament is often presented as a unique legal arrangement, one without parallel in comparative constitutional law. By giving unconditional power to the Westminster parliament, it appears to rule out any comparison between the Westminster Parliament and the United States Congress or the German Bundestag, whose powers are limited by their respective constitutions. Parliament in the UK appears to determine the law unconditionally and without limit. Nevertheless, a fuller understanding of parliamentary sovereignty (...) as a legal and constitutional doctrine shows that this first impression is false. The nature of the British unwritten constitutional order is entirely similar to the written one prevailing in the United States or Germany. This is because the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, contrary to Dicey’s classic view, does not consist in a single dominant idea but in a number of related and mutually supporting principles that constitute higher law. The way in which these principles interact is parallel to the interaction of the main clauses of the United States Constitution or the German Basic Law. This analysis shows that the constitution, written or unwritten, never requires a ‘pouvoir constituent’. The constitution emerges from the law as the result of moral and political principles that breathe life into our public institutions. (shrink)

Cet article présente les travaux de restauration de murs de bâtiments essentiellement privés de Délos réalisés entre 2013 et 2019 par l’École française d’Athènes et l’Éphorie des Cyclades. Les causes et les conséquences de la dégradation des monuments sont décrites. On trouve un bref historique des travaux de restauration à Délos au xxe siècle, suivi par la présentation des travaux récents et de la méthode employée. Les travaux réalisés sont décrits en détail et la conclusion en dresse un bilan. L’article (...) est accompagné d’une annexe où l’on trouve l’analyse du mortier de terre qui a été utilisé comme liant dans les murs des bâtiments antiques de Délos. Le mortier employé dans les travaux de restauration moderne est issu de cette analyse. (shrink)

Aristotle tries to solve the riddle of future-directedness and luck-awareness by offering an account of what he calls ‘good hope’ or hoping-well. I concede that hope does not hold Aristotle’s attention for long. However, his allusions to hope (in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and the Rhetoric) allow us to articulate a quite detailed, illuminating, and rich phenomenology of hope that will prove to be decisive when inquiring into how hopefulness belongs to the core of practical life, thereby making (...) an important contribution to contemporary discussions of hope. (shrink)

This issue of Jurisprudence features a symposium on Nigel Simmonds's Law as a Moral Idea. There are essays by John Finnis, John Gardner, Timothy Endicott and a Reply by Nigel Simmonds. The papers are based on presentations given at a panel discussion in Oxford in December 2009. In this 'Introduction' Pavlos Eleftheriadis outlines the main themes of the book, namely that the idea of law is intrinsically moral, the distinction between analytical and normative jurisprudence is false and law is not (...) a list of rules or a chain of authorisation, but a system of thought that follows the basic principles of practical reason. (shrink)

Standard axioms of additively separable utility for choice over time and classic axioms of expected utility theory for choice under risk yield a generalized expected additively separable utility representation of risk-time preferences over probability distributions over sure streams of intertemporal outcomes. A dual approach is to use the analogues of the same axioms in a reversed order to obtain a generalized additively separable expected utility representation of time–risk preferences over intertemporal streams of probability distributions over sure outcomes. The paper proposes (...) an additional axiom, which is called risk-time reversal, for obtaining a special case of the two representations—expected discounted utility. The axiom of risk-time reversal postulates that if a risky lottery over streams of sure intertemporal outcomes and an intertemporal stream of risky lotteries yield the same probability distribution of possible outcomes in every point in time then a decision-maker is indifferent between the two. This axiom is similar to assumption 2 “reversal of order in compound lotteries” in Anscombe and Aumann :199–205, 1963, p. 201). (shrink)

У статті здійснено аналіз досвіду античної Греції у напрацюваннях Платона та Арістотеля щодо державної, а спочатку громадянської, цензури щодо виробів мистецтва, а також роль чуттєвого сприйняття, образу, суспільного ідеалу, цілісності оформлення свідомості людини на спосіб її існування у суспільстві. У статті показані дві основні тенденції щодо первинності чи вторинності мистецького виховання в державі. Розглянуто теоретичне осмислення ролі образної чуттєвості в побудові свідомості народу, яке було зроблено Г. Лессінгом в аналізі меж між мистецтвом скульптури та поезії. Як висновок, ми маємо узагальнення (...) у вигляді чуттєвості, образу, мислення відносно індивіда, а також досвіду, мистецтва, науки відносно становлення культури взагалі як суспільних форм діяльності індивідів. У зв’язку з нерівномірністю складу самого суспільства, поглибленням розподілу праці у ньому, ми маємо і розчленованість, різноманітність чуттєвості, образності мислення в різних прошарках суспільства, що і призводить до появи інституцій цензури як зовнішнього закону стосовно громадян. Ця проблематика дає нам змогу виявити суспільну сутність чуттєвості індивіда, а цензуру – як спробу зовнішнього утримання цілісності світобачення індивіда всередині держави. (shrink)

Cet article est une étude synthétique des installations commerciales de la ville de Délos à l'époque hellénistique. On examine les constructions qui appartenaient aussi bien aux installations temporaires qu'aux installations permanentes, on propose une nomenclature et on présente les locaux de production et de vente certainement identifiés. On propose ensuite des critères d'identification des installations commerciales et on tente de retrouver leur mode de fonctionnement. On présente enfin les programmes d'aménagement qui ont conduit à la construction des locaux de commerce (...) et la distribution de ces locaux dans la ville. On constate que le grand nombre et la diversité des installations liées au commerce confirment la réputation de Délos en tant que grand centre commercial à la fin de l'époque hellénistique. (shrink)

Hart said that analytical jurisprudence is descriptive and general but did not draw an explicit distinction between conceptual questions that are in the main theoretical and others that are in the main practical. In Hart’s account, analytical jurisprudence searches for some kind of clarity about the idea of law and the other basic legal ideas as they occur in our ordinary experience. In the Postscript he explains that jurisprudence is the ‘theoretical or scientific study of law as a social phenomenon’, (...) which may, on occasion, but typically does not, rely on moral deliberation. It is to be contrasted to ‘practical’ questions as to how to live one’s life. I shall call this view ‘descriptivism’. It has been a very influential position in analytical jurisprudence and it is being defended by Hart’s followers even today. In this essay I raise some doubts about its coherence. First, I do not think Hart defended this view consistently —even though he did so in the Postscript. Second, I do not think that the position has been adequately defended, either by Hart or by his followers. There is still a great deal of ambiguity as to the precise position of jurisprudence between theoretical and practical reason.Resumen:Hart sostuvo que la jurisprudencia analítica es descriptiva y general pero no elaboró una distinción explícita entre las preguntas conceptuales que son principalmente teóricas y otras que son principalmente prácticas. En la explicación de Hart, la jurisprudencia analítica busca cierto tipo de claridad acerca de la noción de derecho y las demás ideas básicas tal cual ellas ocurren en nuestra experiencia ordinaria. En el Post Scriptum, él explica que la jurisprudencia es el ‘estudio teórico o científico del derecho como un fenómeno social’, el cual puede, en ocasiones, basarse en la deliberación moral, pero típicamente no lo hace. Esto puede contrastarse con las preguntas “prácticas” acerca de como las personas dirigen su propia vida. Llamo esta tesis “descriptivismo”. Esta ha sido una posición muy influyente en la jurisprudencia analítica y ha sido defendida por los seguidores de Hart hasta hoy. En este ensayo despierto dudas sobre su coherencia. Primero, no creo que Hart defendiera esta tesis de forma consistente. Segundo, no creo que la posición haya sido defendida de forma adecuada, ni por Hart ni por sus seguidores. Aún existe una gran ambigüedad acerca de la posición exacta de la jurisprudencia entre la razón teórica y la razón práctica. (shrink)

Discounted utility theory and its generalizations use discount functions for weighting utilities of outcomes received in different time periods. We propose a new simple test of convexity–concavity of discount function. This test can be used with any utility function and any preferences over risky lotteries. The data from a controlled laboratory experiment show that about one third of experimental subjects reveal a concave discount function and another one third of subjects reveal a convex discount function.

This paper presents a new decision theory for modelling choice under risk. The new theory is a two-parameter generalization of expected utility theory. The proposed theory assumes that a decision maker: behaves as if maximizing expected utility; but may experience disappointment when the utility of a lottery’s outcome falls short of the expected utility of the lottery; and may have a preference for gambling. The proposed theory can rationalize the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes; the common ratio effect and the (...) reverse thereof ; the Allais paradox in classical common consequence problems and the reverse Allais paradox—in common consequence problems with an even split of a probability mass; violations of the betweenness axiom; switching behavior in the Samuelson’s example; violations of ordinal, upper and lower cumulative independence ; and preference reversals between valuations and choice. In application to insurance, the theory can rationalize full insurance with an actuarially unfair premium and aversion to probabilistic insurance. In application to optimal portfolio investment, the theory can rationalize the equity premium puzzle. (shrink)

Prospect theory emerged as one of the leading descriptive decision theories that can rationalize a large body of behavioral regularities. The methods for eliciting prospect theory parameters, such as its value function and probability weighting, are invaluable tools in decision analysis. This paper presents a new simple method for eliciting prospect theory’s value function without any auxiliary/simplifying parametric assumptions. The method is applicable both to choice under ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) and risk (when events are characterized by objective probabilities). Our new (...) elicitation method is implemented in a simple paper-and-pencil experiment (via an iterative multiple price list format). This is one of the first experiments that elicits non-parametric prospect theory’s value function with salient rewards. The collected data generally confirm findings in the existing literature: the value function is S-shaped (concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain) though there is a weaker loss aversion on the aggregate level and a substantial heterogeneity in loss aversion on the individual level (41% loss averse, 6% loss neutral and 53% gain seeking). (shrink)

Risk preferences of Australian academics are elicited by analyzing the aggregate distribution of their retirement funds across available investment options. Not more than 10 % of retirement funds are invested as if their owners maximize expected utility under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion with an empirically plausible level of risk aversion. An implausibly high level of risk aversion is required to rationalize any investment into bonds when stocks are available. Not more than 36.54 % of all investments can (...) be rationalized by a model of loss averse preferences. Moreover, the levels of loss aversion typically reported in the experimental studies imply overinvestment in bonds, which is not observed in the data. Up to 67.18 % of all investments can be rationalized by rank-dependent utility or Yaari’s dual model with empirically plausible parameters. A median Australian academic behaves as if maximizing rank-dependent utility with parameter γ∈[0.76,0.79]\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\gamma \in [0.76, 0.79]$$\end{document} in a Tversky and Kahneman probability weighting function. (shrink)

In decision theory, the betweenness axiom postulates that a decision maker who chooses an alternative A over another alternative B must also choose any probability mixture of A and B over B itself and can never choose a probability mixture of A and B over A itself. The betweenness axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Numerous empirical studies documented systematic violations of the betweenness axiom in revealed individual choice under uncertainty. This paper shows (...) that these systematic violations can be linked to another behavioral regularity—choice shifts in a group decision making. Choice shifts are observed if an individual faces the same decision problem but makes a different choice when deciding alone and in a group. (shrink)

Many political philosophers believe that we owe moral obligations to our political communities simply because we are asked. We are, for example to pay taxes, or serve in the army whenever we are demanded to do so by the competent authorities or agencies. Can such moral obligations be created by European Union institutions? This essay discusses the natural duty of justice to support just or nearly just political institutions as defended by John Rawls and Jeremy Waldron. It suggests that European (...) Union institutions can be seen to create similar obligations, only if we adopt a cosmopolitan theory of political legitimacy for both domestic and international institutions. A key distinction proposed is that between a duty of jurisdiction, owed by everyone to every legitimate state, and a duty of civility, owed by citizens to their own states. (shrink)

Cardinal Lubomir Husar stipulates the hiding of the project on the provision of the patriarchate of the UGCC by the fact that even its sounding, not to mention the implementation, provokes a "wave of protests" in the Vatican circles, because it says "the patriarchate of the UGCC will weaken the communion with the Successor of St. Apostle Peter, and hence - weaken the connection with the whole Catholic Church, "" will mean the creation of a nationalist colored Church that will (...) sow hatred against all others, "will become a" major obstacle to the unification of Christians in Ukraine ", will lead to" neglect of the rights of the Moscow the patriarchate, which considers Ukraine to be its canonical territory, "to the preservation of" uniticism ", which in our time was condemned as an inappropriate way to achieve unity among all Christians". (shrink)

Of the main models or projects of globalization, the Vatican Group's project is of particular interest in research, whereby the stake in the world-wide rule is on the "network" the empire "of Catholicism, the" Opus Dei "Order and the Special Service, and the oldest Roman-Germanic aristocratic families. "In the sphere of business," observes A. Yeliseyev, "the Vatican group" puts the main focus on the post-industrial "knowledge economy", unlike the Rockefeller group, which sits on oil and the military-industrial complex, and the (...) "Rothschild group", which deals with noble metals and precious stones and "financial pyramids". It is noteworthy that the Vatican Group has a very winning image of the traditionalist force that affirms the "eternal values ​​of Christianity" in a changing, modern world. In reality, this "pool" offers its own project of globalization, only painted in colors of traditionalism. And this was best confirmed by the Pope of Rome: in his latest encyclical, which contains a direct and unambiguous appeal to the establishment of "world political power.". (shrink)

What is happening now in Ukraine is, in essence, the further implementation of the Stalinist plan to deprive Ukrainians of their historical memory, the continuation of the "Stalinist-Bolshevik" ethnocide. Not surprisingly, monuments began to appear in us as "the leader of the peoples", and the holiday of the Victory Day became a public holiday "the triumph of Stalin's ideas" and the Communist Party ideology "united and indivisible". Instead, dates such as the Day of Unity of Ukraine, the Day of Remembrance (...) of the Victims of Holodomor and political repressions are, to put it mildly, unpopular to the authorities. (shrink)

In a recent article, Zhang and Foo generalized the AGM postulates for contraction to include infinite epistemic input. The new type of belief change is called set contraction. Zhang and Foo also introduced a constructive model for set contraction, called nicely ordered partition, as a generalization of epistemic entrenchment. It was shown however that the functions induced from nicely ordered partitions do not quite match the postulates for set contraction. The mismatch was fixed with the introduction of an extra condition (...) called the limit postulate. The limit postulate establishes a connection between contraction by infinite epistemic input and contraction by finite epistemic input (reducing the former to the latter) and it is appealing both on mathematical and on conceptual grounds. It is debatable however whether the limit postulate can be adopted as a general feature of rationality in set contraction. Instead we propose that the limit postulate is viewed as a condition characterizing an important special case of set contraction functions. With this reading in mind, in this article we introduce an alternative generalization of epistemic entrenchment, based on the notion of comparative possibility. We prove that the functions induced from comparative possibility preorders precisely match those satisfying the postulates for set contraction (without the limit postulate). The relationship between comparative possibility and epistemic entrenchment is also investigated. Finally, we formulate necessary and sufficient conditions under which the functions induced from comparative possibility preorders coincide with the special class of contraction functions characterized by the limit postulate. (shrink)

Z︠H︡yz︠h︡ekiansʹki uroky -- Teoretychne -- Rizne -- Dialoh.

B a c k g r o u n d. According to a common prejudice, especially prevalent among philosophers in the continental tradition, the philosophy of everyday language (sometimes referred to as Oxford philosophy), with its focus on what we usually say and mean, fundamentally expresses a positivist attitude. Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), who significantly contributed to the spread of this view, interprets the appeal to the concept analysis in these philosophers' writings as purely ideological: it fails to recognize the constructed (...) nature of the social and views the social as a domain of brute facts where critical thinking should cease. Therefore, to grasp the essence of the ordinary language philosophy, it is crucial to identify the prerequisites for the emergence of this philosophical style and delve into its historical context. M e t h o d s. In this article, the author employs the method of historical-philosophical reconstruction to clarify the conditions of the formation and genesis of Oxford philosophy. General scientific methods of cognition – such as analysis, synthesis, and generalization – are used to elucidate key ideas and concepts that influenced the development of Oxford philosophy's method. Additionally, methods of systematization and comparison are applied. R e s u l t s. The article identifies the historical prerequisites for the formation of Oxford philosophy, specifying the key ideas and concepts that impacted the development of the ordinary language philosophy. It clarifies the distinctions and interconnections between the concepts of the philosophy of everyday language and Oxford philosophy. C o n c l u s i o n s. For ten years following the end of the Second World War, the University of Oxford became a hub of exceptionally productive philosophical activity. This period laid the groundwork for the emergence of a new and original philosophical movement known as the "Ordinary language philosophy" or "Oxford philosophy". However, equating the ordinary language philosophy entirely with Oxford philosophy is not accurate. The former term pertains specifically to the methodology of analyzing natural language expressions in the post-World War II era. In contrast, Oxford philosophy encompasses a broader historical context, including the pre-war period of philosophical activity at the University of Oxford. Thus, Oxford philosophy should be understood as a historical-philosophical stage that ultimately led to the formation of the philosophy of everyday language. (shrink)