Cultures et imaginaires olfactifs : un monde de subtilités « J’ai beaucoup voyagé et créé des parfums pour différents pays, ce qui m’a permis de constater que selon les cultures, les goûts changent. Prenons l’exemple de l’épice de cardamome… En Inde on fait cuire le riz avec la cardamome pour le parfumer ; comme dessert on mélange la cardamome avec du lait concentré sucré. D’ailleurs c’est une épice, fréquemment exploitée. En Hollande, on adore aussi cette épice car ce sont les (...) Néerlandais qu... (shrink)

Marie-Agnès Cathiard stands out for her important contributions to research on the imaginaire. Her commitment to interdisciplinarity has opened the door to rare partnerships with the scientific community. Projects such as “Mondes numériques et spectacle vivant (Digital Worlds and Performing Arts)” have led Marie-Agnès to work at the crossroads of scientific research and artistic creation, exploring the multi-sensory aspects of the work of the electro-video artist Lionel Palun and the director Isis Fahmy. His collaboration with Patrick Pajon, illustrated (...) by a project such as “Tech’sens”, brought together seemingly distant fields of research, with the aim of constructing a typology of new models of perception linked to digital tools. Their work addressed the upheavals underway in the fields of creation and imagination, calling for a reassessment of our relationship with the changing world and technology. (shrink)

Ouvrages Cathiard Marie-Agnès & Rebière Catherine, Lecture labiale pour l’adulte devenu sourd, 1re éd., Paris, De Boeck Supérieur, 2020, 192 p. Cathiard Marie-Agnès, Vivre avec des prothèses auditives ou des implants cochléaires, éditeur Books On Demand, 2022, 192 p. Directions d’ouvrages collectifs – Ouvrages en collaboration Cathiard Marie-Agnès & Pajon Patrick, Les imaginaires du cerveau, Fernelmont, Intercommunications & Éditions Modulaires Européennes, coll. « Transversales philosophique...

The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle has been a matter of longstanding controversy in both semantics and metaphysics. The principle suggests (among other things) that for any coin that isn't flipped, there is a fact of the matter about how it would have landed if it had been flipped: either it would have landed heads, or it would have landed tails. This view has gained support from linguistic evidence indicating that ‘would’ commutes with negation (e.g., ‘not: if A, would C’ (...) is equivalent to ‘if A, would not C’). There is, however, a long list of operators that similarly appear to commute with negation, even though the corresponding excluded middle principles are indefensible. We suggest that the data supporting Conditional Excluded Middle is best explained as a pragmatic effect. (shrink)

Traditional wisdom dictates that statistical model outputs are estimates, not measurements. Despite this, statistical models are employed as measurement instruments in the social sciences. In this article, I scrutinize the use of a specific model—the logit model—for psychological measurement. Given the adoption of a criterion for measurement that I call comparability, I show that the logit model fails to yield measurements due to properties that follow from its fixed residual variance.

We present and defend a Thomistic cosmological argument that runs independently of the principle of sufficient reason, sidestepping perhaps two of the most recurrent objections to cosmological reasoning: (a) the possibility of brute facts (i.e., that not everything needs an adequate explanation of its existence) and (b) the accusation of the composition fallacy. Drawing upon the work of Barry Miller, we show that any contingent entity like Thumper the rabbit, upon metaphysical analysis, is either a contradictory structure and therefore an (...) impossible existent or else points towards an extrinsic cause for the unity of its really distinct metaphysical parts (namely, its essence and its existence). This conclusion enables the inference that only an uncaused cause with no really distinct metaphysical parts can ultimately produce anything with really distinct metaphysical parts. We then suggest it is not implausible that this entity is God. (shrink)

Dynamic semantics violates numerous classical laws, including Non-Contradiction. Proponents of dynamic semantics have offered no explanation for this behavior, and some critics consider this result to be strong evidence against the tenability of the dynamic program. I defend and explain failures of Non-Contradiction by comparing dynamic semantics and classical, truth conditional semantics in terms of their idealizing assumptions. I demonstrate that dynamic semantics rejects context fixity, an idealizing assumption that truth-conditional semantics typically adopts. I then argue that any semantics which (...) rejects context fixity should, by the classical semanticist’s own lights, violate Non-Contradiction under certain circumstances. I then demonstrate that dynamic semantics violates Non-Contradiction in all and only those circumstances. I subsequently appeal to this insight to vindicate some of dynamic semantics’ more controversial predictions. I close by suggesting that discussion of idealizing assumptions, common in the sciences, is similarly crucial to fruitful discussion in natural language semantics. (shrink)

Todd and Rabern (2021) mount an argument that – contra both Thomason’s (1970) supervaluationism and MacFarlane’s (2014) relativism – an “open future” view is incompatible with the principle they call “Retro-closure”, according to which today’s rain implies that yesterday it was true that it would rain a day later. In a recent piece, MacFarlane replies. This paper has two aims. First, I argue that MacFarlane’s response to Todd and Rabern is unsuccessful on its own terms. Second, I attempt to clarify (...) Todd and Rabern’s overall argument, and explain how MacFarlane’s replies should be construed within the overall dialectic. The intended result: if you want an "open future", then one's best option is a modified Peirceanism (Todd 2021); if one wants Retro-closure, one's best option is one on which there is a determinate "Thin Red Line" (a view sometimes called "Ockhamism"). However, one cannot have what supervaluationism and relativism both promise, viz., a view that preserves both. (shrink)

This book launches a sustained defense of a radical interpretation of the doctrine of the open future. Patrick Todd argues that all claims about undetermined aspects of the future are simply false.

Strategies for combating climate change which advocate for human population limitation have recently been understandably criticised on the grounds that they embody a form of 'climate colonialism': a moral wrong that involves disproportionally shifting the burdens of climate change onto developing, historically exploited nations (which have low per capita emissions but high fertility rates) in order to offset burdens in affluent nations (which have high per capita emissions but low fertility rates). This article argues that once the relevance of population (...) growth to climate change has been correctly understood as working in tandem with consumption levels, this objection fails as a general criticism. Moreover, even if population could be ignored as a variable, the climate colonialism charge would re-emerge in a different form, since, at present population sizes, it would be environmentally catastrophic for developing nations to reach production ambitions which see their per capita emissions massively increase. Even if emission reductions in affluent nations are (rightly) prioritised, there are good reasons to prevent enormous growth of emissions in developing nations. Those environmental risks become much greater given those nations' projected population increases in the coming century. The article then explores how the necessary radical environmental policies pertaining to fertility rates might be enacted in non-coercive ways, reducing the sting of the ‘climate colonialism’ charge. The article ends by considering some reasons to be moderately sceptical about such policies. (shrink)

00 Drawing on the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Patrick Heelan concludes that perception is a cognitive, ...

The concept of resistance in nursing has been garnering more interest in the last few years, with emerging focus on working conditions, power differentials in clinical settings, health inequities, and planetary health concerns. As a result, it's important to identify what is being resisted, and what is the purpose of the resistance carried out. In whatever way resistance is referenced in nursing, outright or not, it is our contention that it's in response to the same underlying cause, barring some local (...) and contextual variations, which we refer to as ‘the Beast’, where the real catastrophe is societal, and is ‘existential, affective and metaphysical’. It therefore seems coherent to consider this macro catastrophe from an ontological point of view, that is, from the standpoints of ‘being’ in relation to the world, which necessarily refers to specific ways of apprehending reality. In this article, we therefore present two ontologies ‐ antagonistic in every respect, to better situate resistance in nursing in a larger ecosystem. Using the Invisible Committee's book and call to action To our friends, this is our modest contribution to celebrate resistance, to help equip fellow nurses to better organise and strategize in the face of incessant growth and too often undesirable change in healthcare. (shrink)

What is it to see the world, other people, and imagined situations as making personal moral demands of us? What is it to experience stories as speaking to us personally and directly? Kierkegaard's Mirrors explores Kierkegaard's answers to these questions, with a new phenomenological interpretation of Kierkegaardian 'interest'.

Language agents are AI systems that combine large language models with other elements to facilitate interaction with an environment. They include LLM-based chatbots but can have a wide range of additional features to support learning, reasoning and decision-making. Goldstein and Kirk-Giannini. Citationm.s. [AI wellbeing] argue that some language agents have beliefs and desires, but it is not obvious that they are agents at all, since they select outputs by querying language models. This paper investigates agency and desires in language agents.

Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue that this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant’s various remarks about the essential properties of living things generalize to organisms as such. This, in turn, generates a puzzle. Kant repeatedly claims that the capacity for representation is essential to the nature of a living thing. If he does not distinguish between living things and organisms, then how (...) might the capacity for representation be essential to the latter? Drawing on the writings of Kant and his contemporaries, I reconstruct a framework within which representational capacities might conceivably be thought to play this role. On this view, what distinguishes an organism from mechanically explicable products of nature is its capacity for endogenous behavior that is instinctual and representationally mediated. (shrink)

Schopenhauer is one of the few philosophers in the history of Western ethics to dedicate sustained critical attention to the nature, extent, and phenomenology of malice. Yet while other aspects of Schopenhauer's moral psychology have received significant attention, his nuanced account of malice is under-explored. This paper attempts to remedy this oversight. It argues that Schopenhauer defends a unified and hierarchical account of moral vice in which malice is a sui generis motive, the pinnacle of immorality, and far more pervasive (...) in the human psyche than typically recognized. Moreover, it is argued that part of the significance of Schopenhauer’s account lies in how his idiosyncratic conceptual framework allows him to philosophically capture many widespread beliefs about malicious persons — particularly the view that malice is best explained in terms of the agents own inner-suffering. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer’s views about malice raise a number of interpretive puzzles, which the paper subsequently aims to elucidate and solve. (shrink)

The philosophical thought of John Locke, a physician by profession, was colored by Locke's medical outlook to a much greater degree than had ever been suspected. Patrick Romanell, in John Locke and Medicine, examines Locke's relatively unknown medical writings and asks how Locke's own distinctive conception of human knowledge, traditionally classified under British empiricism, developed. He finds that, of all of Locke's interests, it is medicine that accounts most directly and effectively for his practical ideal of life and for (...) his constant appeal to "profitable knowledge." In his masterpiece An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke attempted, as he stated it, "to describe to others, more particularly than had been done before, what it is their minds do, when they perform that action, which they call knowing." Locke was intent on describing "the natural history of knowledge" and he required an appropriate method of inquiry. Romanell shows that it was Locke's medical thought and his background as a physician that provided the paradigm for his famed "historical, plain method" of inquiry that he applied to his philosophical analysis of human understanding. In addition to the light this sheds on Locke's philosophy, this new information causes us to reconsider several other significant issues: the nature of the debate between the competing schools of Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism; the position of Sydenham the physician in Locke's intellectual development; and the subtle differences of temper within the long tradtition of British Empiricism itself. John Locke and Medicine is the first book to discuss the hitherto neglected relationship between Locke the phycisian and Locke the philosopher. A major contribution to the study of John Locke, it is also a fascinating account of one of the many instances of the meeting of medicine and philosophy in the history of ideas. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In this ground-breaking new text, Patrick Baert analyses the central perspectives in the philosophy of social science, critically investigating the work of Durkheim, Weber, Popper, critical realism, critical theory, and Rorty's neo pragmatism. Places key writers in their social and political contexts, helping to make their ideas meaningful to students. Shows how these authors’ views have practical uses in empirical research. Lively approach that makes complex ideas understandable to upper-level students, as well as having scholarly appeal.

Patrick Gardiner; XII—Error, Faith and Self-Deception, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 70, Issue 1, 1 June 1970, Pages 221–244, https://doi.org/.

This article investigates Husserl’s arguments for the constitutive role of memory in producing the awareness of objective time. Husserl explicitly connects his thoughts on time and memory to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, while developing an original understanding of the syntheses of recognition and reproduction. This offers a novel avenue for considering what is transcendental about Husserl’s phenomenology of memory. I contend that Husserl developed three transcendental functions of memory with a quasi-Kantian cast in writings from 1917 to 1926. These (...) three functions concern the re-identifiability of objects over time, the objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) of moments in time, and the rigidity of the relations between moments. An exposition of these three transcendental functions and a comparison with Kant’s critical philosophy of time establish what sort of legitimacy objective time had for Husserl and how memory served as its subjective condition of possibility. This article also offers an account of the connection between individuation and memory and a novel comparison between Husserl and Kant on the topic of memory in transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article addresses two related questions about belief, inquiry, and persuasion. The first is a question about the nature of epistemic paternalism, which is, roughly, the activity of interfering in other people’s inquiry, for their own epistemic benefit. The second question is about rational persuasion, and whether it can ever be paternalistic, or (better) whether it can be disrespectful and prima facie wrong in the same way that at least some cases of paternalism are disrespectful and prima facie wrong. (...) The article argues that if rational persuasion is paternalistic, it is epistemically paternalistic. It then considers how best to characterize epistemic paternalism and answers a challenge to its justifiability. Finally, the article responds to George Tsai’s view that rational persuasion can be problematically paternalistic, arguing that Tsai’s central case falls short of the ideal of rational persuasion. (shrink)

Certain philosophers have argued in favour of recognising a right to freedom of conscience that includes a defeasible right of individuals to live in accordance with their perceived moral duties. This right requires the government to exempt people from general laws or regulations that prevent them from acting consistently with their perceived moral duties. The importance of protecting individuals’ integrity is sometimes invoked in favour of accommodating conscience. I argue that personal integrity is valuable since autonomy, identity and self-respect are (...) all dependent on the preservation of personal integrity. I respond to two objections, one pressed by Andrew Koppelman and the other by Richard Arneson, to the claim that personal integrity is valuable, and to a further argument by Arneson to the effect that it is unfair to others claiming accommodations to exempt those with conscience-based claims. (shrink)

L’IA révèle quelque chose sur le travail et la condition humaine que ne montraient pas pleinement les techniques antérieures, ce en quoi elle achève d’une certaine manière l’histoire des techniques. Ce qu’elle révèle, c’est la spécificité de l’intelligence humaine dans le travail collectif, qu’elle atteint au plus profond : à savoir la communication humaine et le fait que le travail est une expérience du temps. Il s’agit de formes d’une intelligence vivante ou vécue, dans lesquelles plonge le sens du travail. (...) En voulant les annihiler, l’IA participe de vieilles idées gnostiques. (shrink)

(2013). Will it be me? Identity, concern and perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 206-226.

Care has become an overdetermined word in the medical humanities and beyond, a focus not only of debate around the nature and purpose of the field, but also of the wider issue of the status of medicine in relation to society and the individual. As a symptom of this problematic, this article proposes care as an ‘untranslatable’, in the sense defined by Barbara Cassin. This is pursued via an engagement with the history of the ethics of care and with its (...) translation into francophone contexts as une éthique du care, in tension with the philosophie du soin elaborated in the work of Frédéric Worms, and then with the several translations into French and English of Sorge and its derivations Besorgen and Fürsorge in Martin Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (Being and Time). A genealogy of care is thus established, and what emerges as the principal motif of its untranslatability is the relation between a primary form of relationality and the socio-technical dimension in which we may recognise healthcare. (shrink)

Political theorists have traditionally grappled with laughter by posing a simple, normative question: ‘What role, if any, should laughter play in the polis?’ However, the outsized presence of laughter in contemporary politics has rendered this question increasingly obsolete. What good does determining laughter’s role in the polis do when the polis itself is to a large extent shaped by laughter? The present essay argues that Kant’s aesthetic investigations of laughter in the Critique of Judgment and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point (...) of View offer a much needed alternative to the normative discourse. Kant theorizes laughter as an intensely dialectical experience — at once an aesthetic judgment and an affect. Laughter in Kant enacts dissensus: it disrupts and transforms sensus communis, or the ways subjects see and hear the world in common that organize and structure a political community. The essay illustrates the advantages of a Kantian conception of the politics of laughter over the normative discourse by examining Dave Chappelle’s controversial 2019 stand-up comedy special Sticks & Stones. It concludes that the dissensus enacted by laughter, while not necessarily democratic, provides a privileged opening for democratic politics. (shrink)

Historically, Western philosophy has struggled to accommodate, or has simply denied, the moral value of spontaneous, non-reflective action. One important exception is in the work of K.E. Løgstrup, whose phenomenological ethics involves a claim that the ‘ethical demand’ of care for the other can only be realized through spontaneous assent to ‘sovereign expressions of life’ such as trust and mercy. Løgstrup attacks Kierkegaard for devaluing spontaneous moral action, but as I argue, Kierkegaard too offers an implicit view of spontaneous moral (...) response as a regulative ideal. In attempting to articulate the model of character-formation that such an ethics requires, we can see both Løgstrup and Kierkegaard as engaging with an ancient problematic, running from Classical Daoism to medieval mysticism, of achieving spontaneity through purgation rather than edification—not building the subject up, but demolishing personality in order to become a conduit for a transcendent normativity. (shrink)

This essay theorizes the concept of curiosity from a queer perspective. Examining the intersections between philosophical understandings of curiosity as a passion for knowledge and more everyday understandings of it as a euphemism for incipient homoerotic desire, it argues that queer curiosity emerges at the point where nonnormative sexual and gender practices meet and complicate particular forms of knowledge about the self. To support this line of argument, the article first examines the intellectual history of curiosity, as curiosity has, in (...) different historical moments, been both celebrated as an epistemic virtue and denigrated as an antisocial vice. After examining this history, it analyzes the figure of the queerly curious subject in several gay short stories from the Nifty archive (an online collection of self-published queer erotica founded in 1992) and the Wachowski sisters’ 1996 lesbian (and arguably trans) neo-noir film, Bound. Ultimately, the essay suggests that curiosity’s characteristic openness—its appetite for novelty and experimentation, its refusal to be contained by existing categories of knowledge about gender and sexuality—makes it a useful tool for thinking through the limitations of modern queer identity and the homonormalizing tendencies of gay and lesbian identity politics. (shrink)

In a series of important papers, Galen Strawson has articulated a spectrum of “temporal temperaments,” populated at one end by “Diachronics”, who experience their selves (understood as the “mental entity” they are at this moment) as something that existed in the past and will exist in the future, and at the other end by “Episodics”, who lack any such sense of temporal extension. As a self-declared Episodic, Strawson provides lucid descriptions of what episodicity is like, but cannot furnish a corresponding (...) phenomenology of diachronic self-experience. He further argues that nothing normatively significant depends upon diachronicity, so Episodics can live fully moral (and fully satisfying) lives. I attempt to supply this missing phenomenology of diachronic self-experience using Kierkegaard’s account of “contemporaneity” (samtidighed). Kierkegaard operates with something quite close to Strawson’s “me/me*” (human/self) distinction, yet he nonetheless offers a compelling description of diachronic self-experience that is fully normative in character. I discuss some of the implications of this normativity for Strawson’s claim that there is nothing ethically or psychologically deficient in the Episodic’s self-experience. (shrink)

One of the greatest philosophical disputes in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century concerned the value of life. Following Arthur Schopenhauer, numerous philosophers sought to defend the provocative view that life is not worth living. A persistent objection to pessimism is that it is not really a philosophical theory at all, but rather a psychological state; a mood or disposition which is the product of socio-economic circumstance. A developed and influential version of this view was advanced in (...) the 1870s by the English psychologist James Sully. Yet, as important as Sully's critique was for the pessimism dispute, it has been almost entirely overlooked in the history of philosophy. With some growing recent attention to nineteenth-century pessimism, this paper aims to reconstruct Sully's view, and what I argue is his primary argument for it in terms of the best explanation for an alleged historical correlation between pessimistic belief and social hardship in the form of frustrated ideals. The paper then presents and analyses some challenges to this argument, some of which are argued to have been at least partially anticipated in the nineteenth-century by the likes of Schopenhauer and Olga Plümacher. (shrink)

This article explores the surprisingly decisive role that Kant’s “incongruity theory” of laughter plays in his aesthetic and broader critical philosophy. First, laughter constitutes a highly specific form of aesthetic judgment in Kant. Laughter involves a discordant relation between the cognitive faculties characteristic of the sublime, but this relation obtains between the understanding and the imagination, the two faculties at play in judgments of taste on the beautiful. Second, laughter is the transcendental condition of possibility for both the beautiful and (...) the sublime. While most commentators dismiss laughter as an afterthought of Kant’s aesthetics, laughter in fact constitutes the most basic aesthetic judgment in Kant. Third, an account of aesthetic judgment that begins with laughter transforms how we understand Kant’s argument that judgment unites nature and freedom. Namely, it reveals how an empirical world at odds with the subject’s purposes can nevertheless advance the subject’s rational vocation to think and act beyond the empirical. I conclude by arguing that Kantian critical philosophy is itself a philosophy of laughter. (shrink)

In this book, Patrick G. Stefan argues that the subversive message of resurrection was instrumental in Christianity’s expansion. Using Foucault’s analysis of how material conditions shape and create individual subjects, Stefan shows how the idea of resurrection undermined Caesar’s control over those living in his domain.

The intersectionality of fat black women has been in the cultural spotlight in recent years and a significant amount of them might feel invisible or even ask themselves why to exist. When one feels self-inexistence, an imagined reality reinforced by the world, sadness, depression, and anger install within a person. The imaginary inexistence is induced by the unaware shamelessness that others project in the ignored person, who feels being invisible, and being invisible in a digital world is to not exist. (...) In this paper, we answer why they should exist. We approach the issue with Positive Semiotics on desirability based on Positive Psychology, which focuses on understanding and facilitating well-being. We propose a semiotic framework for the construction of positive meaning paving the way from fatphobia to fat praise, passing by fat appraisal, to promote the well-being of fat black women. The proposed framework is the Positive Semiotics Construction, which is simultaneously an individual and collective construction of meaning for well-being, with a Sign-System Functional Model applicable to the digital world. Furthermore, a semiotic approach to Law and Social Norms may understand norms as the ability to send and receive signals for cooperation, which derives from moral appraisals of and reactions to the behavior of others and ourselves, consequently forming the normative underpinning of Law. Hence, the Positive Semiotics Construction might impact normative values and influence Law affecting the language of a society. (shrink)

George Eliot often uses the language of determinism in her novels, but we do not understand her view very well by treating such phrasing as addressing debates about the freedom of will directly. Instead she uses seemingly deterministic terms, like the ‘law of consequences', to depict and analyse a particular problem in moral psychology: those instances where we ourselves make it impossible to act on our own best judgements. When we fail to act on our best judgement, this has downstream (...) effects, since it can produce a gap between prudential rationality and one's all-things-considered judgement. Surveying depictions of this problem in Silas Marner, Adam Bede, and Romola, I argue that it's a revealing problem for Eliot’s larger view, bringing together her objections to consequentialism, her recognition of the fragility of virtue, and her account of the role of sympathy in practical deliberation. (shrink)

This historiographic survey of extant English translations and interpretations of the renowned Hippocratic first aphorism has demonstrated a concerning acceptance and application of ancient deontological principles that have been used to justify a practice of medicine that has been both paternalistic and heteronomous. Such principles reflect an enduring Hippocratism that has perpetuated an insufficient appreciation of the moral nature of the aphorism’s second sentence in the practice of the art of medicine. That oversight has been constrained by a philological discourse (...) that has centred on the meanings of the aphorism’s first sentence, while little consideration has been given to the more important ethical consideration within the second sentence’s imperatives. (shrink)

For South African communities to achieve substantive progress, the establishment of strategic partnerships is essential for effectively addressing their complex social challenges. Churches, given their profound community presence and moral authority, are urged to join forces with other societal sectors, particularly government and business, to promote comprehensive community development. This article examines the potential for church partnerships with these sectors, investigating how such alliances can foster sustainable and holistic transformation. Central questions driving this inquiry include: What distinct contributions do churches (...) bring to community development partnerships? and how can these partnerships efficiently combine their resources to tackle social, economic, and environmental issues? By assessing the role of the church alongside governmental frameworks and business resources, this study underscores the importance of an integrated approach to development. The church’s involvement not only provides essential support to vulnerable groups but also contributes strategically to the long-term empowerment of communities. This article ultimately underscores the need for combined engagement, demonstrating how a unified approach can amplify the collective impact on social well-being and resilience within South Africa. By highlighting the theological and organisational identities of churches, alongside the distinct capital and power each entity holds, the article seeks to identify common grounds for cooperation, with a particular focus on the church’s capacity to exert positive, morally guided influence within these partnerships.Contribution: The article highlights the significance of a holistic approach that utilises the strengths of churches, businesses and the government to boost social development in South Africa, thereby contributing to community development pathways. (shrink)

La cuestión de la agencia animal aparece como un problema filosófico fundamental en el campo del saber contemporáneo. Este dossier que nos ofrece la Revista de Filosofía es un acontecimiento intelectual porque, con los cinco estudios presentados, disponemos de lo mejor del conocimiento actual sobre la agencia.