Nowadays, the quality standards of higher education institutions pay special attention to the performance and evaluation of the students. Then, having a complete academic record of each student, such as number of attempts, average grade and so on, plays a key role. In this context, the existence of missing data, which can happen for different reasons, leads to affect adversely interesting future analysis. Therefore, the use of imputation techniques is presented as a helpful tool to estimate the value of missing (...) data. This work deals with the academic records of engineering students, in which imputation techniques are applied. More specifically, it is assessed and compared to the performance of the multivariate imputation by chained equations methodology, the adaptive assignation algorithm based on multivariate adaptive regression splines and a hybridization based on self-organisation maps with Mahalanobis distances and AAA algorithm. The results show that proposed methods obtain successfully results regardless the number of missing values, in general terms. (shrink)

The present study aims to explore whether the symptoms associated with fibromyalgia are contextually influenced by the area of residence. Furthermore, it is analyzed whether the effect of the acceptance of the disease on the emotional, cognitive and physical symptoms is moderated by the patients’ place of residence. Using a cross-sectional design, a total of 234 women with fibromyalgia were surveyed, of which 55.13% resided in rural areas and 44.87% in urban areas. Self-reported questionnaires were used to assess pain severity, (...) anxiety and depression, functional limitation, physical and mental fatigue and acceptance of the disease. The results show significant differences in acceptance, pain, and physical and mental fatigue between patients from rural and urban areas. The rural area patients presented higher levels of acceptance and pain and lesser levels of physical and mental fatigue compared to the urban area. The moderation analysis add that, only in patients from the rural area, the variables of physical symptoms were significantly and negatively associated with acceptance. This study addresses for the first time the role of the place of residence in suffering from fibromyalgia, suggesting that the rural or urban environment plays a relevant role in the severity and/or management of symptoms in fibromyalgia women. Limitations and practical implications are also discussed. (shrink)

We investigated the role of honour concerns in mediating the effect of nationality and gender on the reported intensity of anger and shame in reaction to insult vignettes. Spain, an honour culture, and The Netherlands, where honour is of less central significance, were selected for comparison. A total of 260 (125 Dutch, 135 Spanish) persons participated in the research. Participants completed a measure of honour concerns and answered questions about emotional reactions of anger and shame to vignettes depicting insults in (...) which type of threat was manipulated. It was found that Spanish participants responded especially intensely to insults that threaten family honour, and that this effect of nationality on emotional reactions to threats to family honour was mediated by individual differences in concern for family honour. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTwo studies examined anger and shame, and their associated appraisals and behavioral intentions, in response to harm to an in-group's social-image. In Study 1, 37 British Muslims reported incidents in which they were devalued as Muslims. In Study 2, 108 British Muslims were presented with objective evidence of their in-group's devaluation: the controversial cartoons about Prophet Muhammad The appraisal of harm to social-image predicted anger and shame, whereas the appraisal of offense only predicted anger. Anger was a more empowering response (...) than shame, as anger predicted willingness for public confrontation, institutional punishment, and written disapproval. In contrast, shame only predicted written disapproval. Furthermore, independent of individual differences in identification as Muslim, a mediation model showed that individual differences in honor orientation pre... (shrink)

Este artículo tiene el objetivo de reflexionar críticamente sobre la construcción del perfil profesional de los docentes de artes y humanidades en la Educación Superior de Ecuador, con el fin de mejorar su empleabilidad en escuelas, colegios e institutos. Por este motivo, la investigación utiliza una metodología cualitativa, de carácter exploratorio y descriptivo, que promueve una revisión filosófica y antropológica para reconceptualizar los procesos de enseñanza-aprendizaje que se dan en la asignatura ‘Educación Cultural y Artística’ (ECA) del currículo de Educación (...) General Básica (EGB). Como resultado, se muestran las estimaciones estadísticas publicadas por el Ministerio de Educación (2021) sobre la cantidad de instituciones educativas que forman estudiantes en asignaturas relacionadas con las artes tanto en Educación Básica y Bachillerato General Unificado, como en instituciones especializadas y que necesitan docentes-investigadores formados. Desde una visión educativa compleja, transdisciplinar, decolonial e intercultural, la investigación propone ocho principios filosóficos y antropológicos derivados de la cosmovisión indígena quechua del Sumak Kawsay, orientados a construir una filosofía educativa de formación docente que mejore sus competencias pedagógicas y artísticas. Para concluir, se debate sobre las políticas públicas y los planes de estudios de educación superior que orientan el perfil profesional de los estudiantes que ejercerán como docentes. (shrink)

La comunicación de la verdad ética pasa históricamente por modelos, pero sus propuestas se discuten cuando no favorecen la belleza ética en la persona.El estudio refleja un análisis a modelos éticos en la cultura, para proponer la importancia de enfocar la educación ética valorando los paradigmas de una ética integradora y practica en un currículo global.Se infiere por el relativismo, una dialéctica que permanece sobre las certezas éticas; sobre lo justo, lo bueno, lo verdadero; sobre lo legal y lo ético; (...) para continuar divulgándose un discurso ético no de tipo vinculante, sin despertar pasión por la verdad. (shrink)

Research on mental health of non-professional caregivers has focused on caregivers of people with specific diseases, especially dementia. Less is known about caregivers of people with other diseases. The aims of this study were (a) to determine the caregivers’ emotional state in a random sample of caregivers of people in situations of dependency, (b) to analyze the association between each disease of the care-recipient (a variety of 23 diseases included in the International Classification of Diseases) and the emotional state of (...) the caregiver, and (c) based on the theoretical model, to analyze the relationship of the different study variables in the appearance of the emotional distress of the caregiver. A sample of 491 non-professional caregivers was selected randomly (89.0% women, average age 55.3 years). Trained psychologists collected sociodemographic and care-related characteristics and evaluated the global emotional distress, somatic symptoms, anxiety-insomnia, social dysfunction, depression, probable mental disorder case, self-esteem and social support. It was found that (a) the caregivers showed moderate emotional distress, and 33.8% presented a probable mental disorder. (b) Caring for a care-recipient with cat's cry syndrome or epilepsy was related to suffering from social dysfunction, and caring for a care-recipient with autism was related to having a probable mental health case. (c) Social support mediated the relationship between social class, daily hours of care, monthly family income, self-esteem and global emotional distress. There is an important impact on the emotional state of the caregivers. This impact was similar in caregivers of care-recipients with different diseases, except in caregivers caring for a care-recipient with cat's cry syndrome or epilepsy (related to social dysfunction), and in caregivers caring for a care-recipient with autism (related to having a probable mental health case). (shrink)

Legal philosophers share the same phenomenology of legal practice. Yet, they differ in its explanation. For normativists, descriptivists got it wrong and vice versa. This controversy between normativists and descriptivists will be called “the methodological problem” in legal theory. Normativists such as Dworkin and Perry argue that descriptivists need evaluation. By contrast, descriptivists such as Coleman argue that normativists need the methods of descriptivism such as conceptual analysis and therefore might be committed to descriptivism. The paper shows that the responses (...) of Perry and Coleman to the methodological problem are not free from difficulties. The article also advances a reinterpretation of normativism in terms of two tenets: 1. the semantic sting argument, and 2. the ametaphysical thesis argument. If the latter argument is sound, normativism is unavoidable, because if there cannot be an external point of view or Archimedean perspective, then we can only resort to our moral convictions or substantive claims. The first tenet has been criticized in previous work and the paper focuses on a criticism of the second tenet. (shrink)

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ‘intention’ into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ‘ought’. The methodological strategy is the ‘inversion thesis’ which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ‘will’ or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case (...) that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ‘objectifies’ the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ‘will’, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ‘ought’ and therefore the ‘will’. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen’s own notions, I will show that Kelsen’s ‘inversion thesis’ is parasitic on Aristotle–Anscombe’s ‘ought’. (shrink)

This paper analyses and criticizes Joseph Raz's attacks on coherentist theories. It is argued that Raz's characterisation of epistemic coherence theories is too narrow and that his criticism of constitutive coherence theories is based on a conceptual mistake in his own description. The study is an indirect argument to rethink coherence theories of law and adjudication within a more powerful framework than that propounded by Raz.

We studied the relationship between perceived social image and life satisfaction in four different cultural groups. One-hundred nine Indian (63 females, 46 males), 67 Pakistani/Bangladeshi (36 females, 31 males), 76 White British (43 females, 33 males), and 94 European Americans (43 females, 48 males) completed measures on the cultural importance of social image, positive and negative emotions, academic achievement, and perceived social image. Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi participants valued social image more than White British and European-American participants. Consistent with this value (...) difference, a positive perceived social image predicted life satisfaction among Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi participants only. For these participants, perceived social image predicted life satisfaction above and beyond the effects of emotions and academic achievement. Academic achievement only predicted life satisfaction among White British and European Americans. Emotions were significant predictors of life satisfaction for all participants. (shrink)

Colemanand Shapiro have recently advanced a second at- tempt to reconcile Hart’s practice theory of rules and the idea of the normativity of law; i.e., the idea that legal rules qua social rules give reasons for actions and, in some circumstances create and impose duties and obligations. Their argumentative strategy is to resort to elements in Bratman’s work on shared agency and planning, though they introduce important and substantive modifications to Bratman’s own explanation. Bratman describes his own theory as a (...) modest theory of the will where the notion of planning plays a fundamental role. Both Shapiro’s and Coleman’s application of Bratman’s planning theory of agency to an authority structure such as law is impressive, but a number of objections can be levelled, with the intention of grasping both the nature of authority structures and the normativity of law. Although I have referred to Shapiro’s and Coleman’s applica- tions as being similar to one another, the differences are sub- stantive and important. I will scrutinise both Shapiro’s and Coleman’s explanations of ‘shared agency’ and discuss the objections that can be raised against each application. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I discuss the different kinds of objectivity; general and legal objectivity more specifically. In the second part, I endeavour to explain the two main views that have been advanced to answer four core questions on legal objectivity. The first is whether moral and legal values are objective. Second, what is the nature of the relationship between legal and moral values? The third is whether, due to the specific nature of law, we should consider (...) a domainspecific conception of objectivity for legal values. The fourth concerns whether there is a correspondence between legal values and legal facts. What is the explanation of the platitudes about the nature of law such as that law is reasongiving, normative or authoritative in character? In other words, do legal facts have a place in our 'disenchanted' or naturalistic (in the scientific sense) understanding of the world. In the final section of this paper, I evaluate naturalism and nonnaturalism in law and consider the future of the debate and its relevance for understanding the connection between law, morality and legal normativity. (shrink)

Insults elicit intense emotion. This study tests the hypothesis that one's social image, which is especially salient in honour cultures, influences the way in which one reacts to an insult. Seventy-seven honour-oriented and 72 non-honour oriented participants answered questions about a recent insult episode. Participants experienced both anger and shame in reaction to the insult. However, these emotions resulted in different behaviours. Anger led to verbal attack (i.e., criticising, insulting in return) among all participants. This relationship was explained by participants’ (...) motivation to punish the wrongdoer. Shame, on the other hand, was moderated by honour. Shame led to verbal disapproval of the wrongdoers behaviour, but only among the honour-oriented participants. This relationship was explained by these participants’ motivation to protect their social image. By contrast, shame led to withdrawal among non-honour-oriented participants. (shrink)

Well-known for his contribution to the juristic world, Professor Ronald Dworkin was an outstanding legal philosopher of his generation. This volume celebrates the thoughts of Ronald Dworkin on dignity. The contributors have critically engaged with different perspectives of Dworkin's thoughts on dignity. The aim is to shed light on juridical and moral contemporary conundrums such as the role of dignity in constitutional contexts in India, and the understanding of dignity as either a foundation of human rights or as a supra (...) value that illuminates other values and rights. (shrink)

An introduction by Veronica Rodriques-Blanco to A Symposium on the Nature of Legal and Political Authority.

Can Hart's non-cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction-based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non-cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non-cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary (...) model of acceptance explains actions in terms of other actions and in terms of reasons for actions that are both presented as good-making characteristics and transparent to the agent. If Hart's internal point of view is able to work as the key argument to reject predictive and sanction-based explanations of law, it needs to make the outward approach of intentional action basic or primary rather than rely on an inward approach such as the one advanced by non-cognitivism. (shrink)

Se describe una propuesta de intervención comunitaria en convivencia escolar, a partir de los resultados obtenidos en una investigación previa (Rodríguez, Vaca, Hewitt & Martínez, 2009) que buscaba caracterizar las formas de interacción en un contexto escolar. Si bien el punto de partida lo constitu..

In this paper, I discuss Goldberg and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs and argue that there is a tension between their philosophy of action as applied to the law of negligence and the idea that the directive-based relationality thesis is central and, therefore, the action and conduct of the defendant should not be part of the core explanation of the tort of negligence.

Judges and lawyers believe that international law, customary law, and legal systems such as the Third Reich or apartheid law in South Africa are law. But how do we explain the fact that there is one concept of law when there are different conceptions of law with a variety of different features? Finnis, inspired by the Aristotelian notion of central case, adumbrates the idea that the concept of law might be unified by a primary concept which is the concept of (...) “law as practical reason”; that is, law conceived from an ethical perspective. He advances two arguments to defend his methodology: the conceptual and the functional. Contra Finnis, the paper shows that neither the conceptual nor the functional argument can successfully support the view that “law as practical reason” is the central case of the concept of law. The study clarifies the Aristotelian notion of central case and illustrates the mistaken application of this notion to the concept of law. However, we also argue that Finnis's insight–the idea that all the different conceptions of law might be unified for the purposes of theoretical research–is fundamental and appealing. This paper aims to reconstruct Finnis's insight through the model of core resemblance. The result is that the different conceptions of law can be unified by resemblance to the concept of “law as practical reason,” though there is no identity among the different conceptions of law. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra los resultados de un estudio de caso centrado en la puesta en marcha de un programa didáctico en un centro de primaria. El programa constó de dos actuaciones didácticas distintas en dos períodos de prácticum de magisterio. La primera se realizó con 2 grupos de 6º durante 5 sesiones y la segunda con 2 grupos de 5º durante 4 sesiones. Participaron 53 estudiantes. El tema escogido fue la Guerra Civil. Se combinaron conocimientos y emociones. De las observaciones (...) de la docente en prácticas, así como del análisis temático realizado sobre las intervenciones y producciones del alumnado, se evidencia cómo la simbiosis entre una educación patrimonial crítica, asentada sobre la memoria como forma de entender el paisaje, y la realización de salidas contextualizadas al entorno, refuerzan en el alumnado destrezas cívico-sociales. (shrink)

Sport is an emotional experience. Studies have shown that high emotional intelligence (EI) is associated with better sports performance, though different aspects of sports experience and their relationship with EI are still unclear. This study examined the possible relationships between sports experience and EI dimensions of undergraduate athletes. Likewise, according to the differences described in the literature between men and women, the secondary aim was to identify the possible relationship between EI and sports experience in both subgroups. A total of (...) 1784 [712 men (39.9%), 1072 women (60.1%); mean age = 21.3 years, SD = 4.2)] undergraduate athletes completed the Trait Meta Mood Scale and a sports experience questionnaire. Comparisons between groups were performed using Mann–Whitney-Uand H-Kruskal–Wallis tests and correlations between variables were analyzed using Spearman correlation. We found that the number of different sports practiced and the number of years practicing sports were positively associated with emotional repair (ER). However, the number of years practicing sports was negatively associated with emotional attention (EA). Male athletes who trained more and had a higher competitive level were more likely to show higher ER. In any case, it is necessary to take into account that all the associations were weak. Our study suggested that athletes tend to attend to and value their feelings and use positive thinking to repair their negative moods. (shrink)

Recently, organizational identity is being given more attention than ever before in the business world. This notion has grown substantially in importance in the hospitality industry. Facing increased competition, hospitality companies are driven to project a positive image to their stakeholders. Therefore, these organizations have begun to develop new organizational identity programs as part of their strategies to achieve their desired identities. This study analyzes the role of corporate social responsibility in the definition of the Organizational Identity of these organizations, (...) employing a qualitative research methodology based on an illustrative case study. Particularly, the authors analyze the case of Meliá Hotels International, a leading hotel company in Spain with a presence in 27 countries. The findings indicate that the company has formally integrated CSR into its strategy to align its actual identity with its desired and conceived identity in view of the critics in its local community. Moreover, the interest of the firm toward its stakeholders suggests that the company understands its conceived identity as an important link in understanding its organizational identity. This paper demonstrates that firm’s organizational identity is a set of several elements. When analyzing Meliá Hotels International’s identity, we see that the firm defines this concept as that which is most central, enduring, and distinctive about the organization. In this sense, the company appears to follow the vision-driven approach by referring to the organizational mission and vision statements, organizational philosophy, and core values as the basis of organizational identity. (shrink)

Raymond Geuss asserts that there are fragmented views on what human rights are and that there is no unifying principle underlying such notion. I think that this view has its merits. It conveys the particularity of our perspectives, attitudes, desires and selfunderstandings. It rejects abstractness and is committed to a thick, perspectivist, historical understanding of personhood. To understand who we are, is to understand how we arrive at being who we are. By contrast, the notion of human rights deploys abstractness, (...) unification of agency, necessity and a thin view of personhood. In this paper, I attempt to bring into focus these two aspects of the notion of human rights. I will first analyse the genealogical method advocated by Geuss and argue that it has the merit of elucidating our historical contingencies; however, it is argued that any view in favour of the genealogical method relies on the idea that evaluative or normative concepts cannot be defined in terms of a common denominator. We reconstruct the Aristotelian idea of ‘focal meaning’ as core-resemblance and show that there is a unifying concept of human rights. We conclude that the perspectivist spirit of genealogy is not far from the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle’s inquiry into a concept that could grasp different perspectives and contingencies as opposed to a Platonic understanding of abstract and universal forms shows that genealogical worries are germane to the tradition. (shrink)

El concepto cartesiano de una _mathesis universalis _tiene como antecedente histórico inmediato algunas de las ideas defendidas en el contexto de las discusiones del aristotelismo renacentista acerca de la certeza matemática y el puesto de las matemáticas en la clasificación de las ciencias. Una de las figuras principales en este debate es la del jesuita valenciano Benet Perera (1535 – 1610). A través de la presentación de una serie de pasajes extraídos de los manuscritos inéditos de Perera, en este artículo (...) analizamos la defensa que este autor realiza de la existencia de una ciencia matemática común, en relación con algunas de sus ideas fundamentales, como la impugnación del carácter científico de las matemáticas, o la división de la metafísica en una filosofía primera dedicada al ente en cuanto ente y una teología natural que estudia las inteligencias y Dios. (shrink)

What happens in the agent that enables her to comply with the legal command or directive? When we perform an action because we are complying with the legal command or directive, are we still active, self-governed autonomous agents? In what sense are we still autonomous agents? The task of this study is to explain what legal authority is and the premise of the study is that this question can only be answered through understanding of how legal authority operates upon the (...) agent: if we recognize that legal commands or directives intervene upon, affect and change the agent’s practical reasoning, then we need to understand and explain how this happens. (shrink)

This article contends that Dworkin's notion of ‘genuine’ theoretical disagreements, which is a fundamental pillar in his criticism of legal positivism and semantic disagreements, requires a realist reinterpretation. This view is defended according to two core arguments. First, a realist reinterpretation of ‘genuine’ theoretical disagreements enables Dworkin to avoid semantic criticisms such as the one advanced by Joseph Raz, who propounds a sophisticated model of criterial semantics to explain theoretical disagreements. Second, to make intelligible the distinction between theoretical and semantic (...) disagreements in law, we need to resort to realist elements. The conclusion is striking and in clear contradiction with Dworkin's ametaphysical and epistemic abstinence. The article shows that there is a problematic tension within Dworkin's constructivist project and that he should revise either its ametaphysical view and epistemic abstinence, or notions such as ‘genuine’ theoretical disagreements. (shrink)

Este artículo representa el primer paso para demostrar que la akrasia[1] proporciona la característica estructural subyacente en los juicios de culpabilidad o responsabilidad ética y jurídica por actos negligentes; el trabajo explica el fenómeno de la akrasia y compara las concepciones clásicas y contemporáneas de este fenómeno. Argumentamos que actuamos inadvertidamente porque actuamos acráticamente, lo que se explica en términos de un compromiso defectuoso específico del razonamiento práctico por parte del agente ejecutor, es decir, una falta de integración entre el (...) carácter y el pensamiento que debe entenderse como una falla para habitar la perspectiva deliberativa-aspiracional. (shrink)

The received view on the nature of legal authority contains the idea that a sound account of legitimate authority will explain how a legal authority has a right to command and the addressee a duty to obey. The received view fails to explain, however, how legal authority truly operates upon human beings as rational creatures with specific psychological makeups. This book takes a bottom-up approach, beginning at the microscopic level of agency and practical reason and leading to the justificatory framework (...) of authority. The book argues that an understanding of the nature of legal normativity involves an understanding of the nature and structure of practical reason in the context of the law, and advances the idea that legal authority and normativity are intertwined. This point can be summarised thus: if we are able to understand both how the agent exercises his or her practical reason under legal directives and commands and how the agent engages his or her practical reason by following legal rules grounded on reasons for actions as good-making characteristics, then we can fully grasp the nature of legal authority and legal normativity. Using the philosophies of action enshrined in the works of Elisabeth Anscombe, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, the study explains practical reason as diachronic future-directed intention in action and argues that this conception illuminates the structure of practical reason of the legal rules' addressees. The account is comprehensive and enables us to distinguish authoritative and normative legal rules in just and good legal systems from 'apparent' authoritative and normative legal rules of evil legal systems. At the heart of the book is the methodological view of a 'practical turn' to elucidate the nature of legal normativity and authority. (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende exponer la recepción del atomismo de Epicuro y la reinterpretación dialéctica de la teoría del clinamen en la tesis doctoral de 1841 de Karl Marx, con el propósito de extraer algunas aportaciones para una teoría de la libertad. Para ello se analizan las implicaciones del enfoque dialéctico marxiano aplicado a la declinación epicúrea a la luz de las aportaciones del pensamiento filosófico de Schiller y la fenomenología hermenéutica de Ricoeur. Marx descubre en Epicuro una “ciencia de la (...) atomística” en la cual el clinamen es la autodeterminación formal del átomo respecto de la materia; su ley interna, por medio de la cual se abre la posibilidad de una libertad humana que transgrede el determinismo. Se intenta mostrar que causalidad natural y libertad no son excluyentes en un materialismo idealista como el epicúreo, en el que, conforme a la interpretación de Marx, idea y materia se integran en una síntesis dialéctica. (shrink)

The central problem of the ‘normativity of law’ concerns how legal rules or directives give us reasons for actions. The core of this question is how something that is external to the agent, such as legal rules or directives, can be ‘part of the agent’, and how they can guide the agent in performing complex actions (such as legal rule-following) that persist over time. David Enoch has denied that the normativity of law poses any interesting challenge to theories of law. (...) He argues that law provides reasons for actions in terms of what he calls triggering-reasons and he advances the view that because there are many circumstances in which reasons are triggered, law does not pose a special challenge. According to Enoch, once we understand the way that triggering reasons operate, we can understand how legal rules and directives provide us with reasons for actions. In §II of this paper, I set the stage for the debate and establish a set of principles that emerge from the common sense of view of reasons for actions and argue that any theory of reasons for action should provide a coherent explanation of these key principles. I focus on the idea that a satisfactory account of reasons for action should also explain reasons in actions. In §III I explain briefly the different theories of reasons for action and locate Enoch’s conception of reasons for action as triggering-reasons within this theoretical framework. In §IV I show that Enoch’s conception of reasons for actions does not explain some of the key features or principles that emerge from our common sense view of reasons for action and nor does it explain reasons in actions.Resumen:El problema central de la ‘normatividad del derecho’ versa sobre cómo las reglas o directrices jurídicas nos dan razones para la acción. El núcleo de esta cuestión reside en cómo algo que es externo al agente, tal como las reglas o directrices jurídicas, pueden ser ‘parte del agente’, y cómo pueden guiar a ese agente al llevar a cabo acciones complejas (tal como la obediencia de las reglas) que persisten en el tiempo. David Enoch ha negado que la normatividad del derecho presente algún reto interesante a las teorías del derecho. Arguye que el derecho provee razones para la acción en términos de lo que él llama razones detonantes (triggering-reasons) y propone la perspectiva de que, dado que hay muchas circunstancias bajo las cuales se detonan las razones, el derecho no plantea ningún reto especial. De acuerdo con Enoch, una vez que entendemos la manera en que operan las razones detonantes, podemos comprender cómo las reglas y directrices jurídicas nos proveen razones para la acción. En la sección II de este artículo, fijo el escenario para el debate y establezco una serie de principios que emergen de la visión de sentido común sobre las razones para las acciones, y sostengo que cual- quier teoría de las razones para la acción debería proporcionar una explicación coherente de estos principios clave. Me centro en la idea de que una concepción satisfactoria de las razones para la acción también debe- ría explicar las razones en las acciones. En la sección III, explico brevemente las diferentes teorías de las razones para la acción y ubico la concepción de Enoch de razones para la acción como razones detonantes (triggering-reasons) dentro de este marco teórico. En la sección IV muestro que la concepción de Enoch de razones para las acciones no explica algunas de las principales características o principios que emergen de nuestra visión de las razones para la acción basada en el sentido común, ni tampoco explica las razones en las acciones. (shrink)

I will advance two criticisms and one comment to Hershovitz's Law is a Moral Practice. First, I will argue that the idea that law is a moral practice because it rearranges our moral relationships tends to be circular, unless a conception of practical reason connected to morality and human practices are advanced. Second, I will problematise the predominance of a backward-looking legal reasoning that focuses on rights and wrongs only. Finally, I will explore Bernard Williams diagnosis regarding ‘the problem of (...) the morality system’ and scrutinise how his reflections might have implications for the key premises advanced by Hershovitz. I demonstrate that any explanation of law as moral practice needs to explain the role of our engagement with the law as the kind of creatures we are, i.e. rational creatures. This means that any account of the relationship between law and morality that does not explain the character of practical reason and how it engages with the law is deficient and unsatisfactory. Hershovitz is eager to show that law cannot be neutral and he tells us that it is instead a moral practice that deals with rights and wrongs in a robust manner. However, his account cannot explain to us how the judge and legislator make this possible through the law. Therefore, within this conception, there is no mediation or bridge between law and moral practice qua rational (and not qua practice). Hershovitz seems to discard the ancient philosophical platitude, namely that we cannot understand and engage with right and wrong, good or bad, except through the mediation of reason. (shrink)

Women’s marginalized position in Christianity has been a central concern in much of Michèle Roberts’ fiction, springing from her Catholic education and her awareness of the sexist ideology underlying Christian doctrine. Her growing fascination with the figure of the female saint is reflected in Impossible Saints,1 her most recent novel dealing with Christianity, where she offers an utterly transgressive exploration of female sainthood through the subverted, fictionalised lives of a number of women who have been canonized as saints by the (...) Church. This paper examines the global message of Impossible Saints as a radical questioning of the traditional Christian perception of the female saint, as well as its role in Roberts’ spiritual development and in her search for an empowering image of woman in the religious sphere. (shrink)

Dworkin advances the view that judges decide legal cases according to constructive interpretation. The aim of constructive interpretation is to justify the coercion of the State. A trivial implication of this view is that officials and citizens will comply with the law because of the justification that has been advanced by judges in their exercise of constructive interpretation. Consequently, neither officials nor citizens comply with the law because they have been coerced or because they have been simply told to do (...) so. But then, it seems that constructive interpretation cannot really provide any guidance since officials and citizens have been asked toacceptthe interpretation of the law that has been put forward by the judges since arguably, it is the best possible interpretation of what the law is in this particular case. However, why they ought to do so?I will argue that the mistake of the theory of constructive interpretation lies in a misleading and implausible conception of action that believes that action is raw behavioural data and that therefore we need to ‘impose meaning’, ‘value’ or ‘purpose’ on them. I will defend a more plausible conception of action along the classical tradition that understands practice as originating in agency and deliberation. The outcome is that constructive interpretation and its conception of ‘imposing meaning’ on practice is a theoretical perspective that neglects and misunderstands action and practical reason. (shrink)

I would like to locate the thought-provoking ideas advanced by Lane’s Of Rule and Office: Plato’s Idea of the Political within the context of contemporary intellectual legal philosophy and constitu...