Peter Brian Herrenden Birks 1941-2004Hugh Redwald Dacre 1914-2003William Hugh Clifford Frend 1916-2005John Andrew Gallagher 1919-1980Philip Grierson 1910-2006Stuart Newton Hampshire 1914-2004William McKane 1921-2004John Malcolm Sabine Pasley 1926-2004Benjamin John Pimlott 1945-2004Robert Duguid Forrest Pring-Mill 1925-2005John Edgar Stevens 1921-2002Peter Strawson 1919-2006Henry William Rawson Wade 1918-2004Alan Harold Williams 1927-2005Bernard Arthur Owen Williams 1929-2003John James Wymer 1928-2006.

Forty years ago Amartya Sen delivered his Tanner Lecture, 'Equality of What?', in which he introduced to the world a novel approach to the idea of equality by way of the notion of 'basic capability' as 'a morally relevant dimension'. We can now see with hindsight that Sen's argument - that we should focus upon equality of basic capabilities ('a person being able to do certain basic things') - launched what has become an academic armada now proceeding under the flag (...) of 'the capability approach'. While that flag has ventured far and wide and engaged many area of inquiry, this volume of essays is the first to explore how the capability approach (the CA) might shed light upon labour law. Three dimensions of the CA's potential for illuminating labour law are examined. Part I enquires into the nature of the basic relationship between CA and labour law - do they share common ground or disagree about what is important? Can the CA provide a normative 'foundation' for labour law? Part II goes further by examining the relationship of the CA and other well-established perspectives on labour law, including economics, history, critical theory, restorative justice, and human rights. Part III examines the possible relevance of the CA to a range of specific labour law issues, such as freedom of association, age discrimination in the workplace, trade, employment policy, and sweatshop goods. (shrink)

This article provides an explanation of Anselm’s understanding of necessity. Anselm did not write much about modality, and what he did write is puzzling. The dominant readings of Anselm see him as having two concepts of necessity, one merely physical or causal, the other logical or “alethic.” This article argues that Anselm has just one concept of necessity, which corresponds best to what is now called broadly logical or absolute necessity, but whose metaphysics is in terms of powers and lacks (...) of power. The rival interpretations of A. D. Smith, Thomas Williams, and Sandra Visser are discussed and criticized in detail. (shrink)

The Ozark Highlands’ karst topography of caves and hollows has provided refuge and escape for myriad peoples seeking to evade mainstream society throughout history, ranging from displaced Native Americans to counter-cultural back-to-the-landers. This ethnographic and ethnohistorical research moves beyond the popular misconception that the back-to-the-land movement merely represented an offshoot of the countercultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, and situates it within a deeper historical context. In this paper, I present the Arcadian evocations in various Ozark-related media and how (...) they relate to homesteading in the region, and demonstrate the shared agrarian values among diverse waves of agrarian Ozark homesteaders, recent and historical. (shrink)

This paper examines and critiques the ethical issues in postmortem sperm retrieval and the use of postmortem sperm to create new life. The article was occasioned by the recent request of the parents of a West Point cadet who died in a skiing accident at the Academy to retrieve and use his sperm to honor his memory and perpetuate the family name. The request occasioned national media attention. A trial court judge in New York in a two-page order authorized both (...) the retrieval and use of the postmortem sperm. (shrink)

In, it was argued that Professor David Kaplan's model of S-explanation could be formulated so as to provide a unified framework for three types of explanation, viz., potential, rationally acceptable, and true. In this note I correct an error in the statement of the conditions for a potential direct S-explanans, show that the corrected version leads to a further simplification in the conditions of the model, and propose a fourth type of explanation which the framework of S-explanation can accommodate.

This essay aims to explain what Aquinas does and does not mean when using the word ‘God’. It also tries to explain why Aquinas thinks it reasonable to conclude that God exists and how Aquinas can be compared and contrasted with certain thinkers both agreeing and disagreeing with this conclusion. The essay places emphasis on Aquinas’s notion of esse and on the fact that he consistently asserts that we do not know what God is.

Thomas Aquinas was first and foremost a Christian theologian. Yet he was also one of the greatest philosophers of the Middle Ages. Drawing on classical authors, and incorporating ideas from Jewish and Arab sources, he came to offer a rounded and lasting account of the origin of the universe and of the things to be found within it, especially human beings.

Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism and Physicalism, and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but (...) nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice. (shrink)

What is it that perfects and fulfils human beings and what is really good for them? To put it at its simplest, Thomas Aquinas’ answer is that we are perfect, fulfilled, and good when we are happy, the notion of happiness here being human action in pursuit of the final good, which is God. In this chapter, the concept is investigated independently of Christian revelation. The different sections of the chapter address happiness and God, happiness and need, practical reasoning, virtues, (...) and natural law. (shrink)

Classical thinkers such as St Anselm of Canterbury and St Thomas Aquinas insist that God is beyond reason because he is incomprehensible. More recent authors, including Søren Kierkegaard, Karl Barth and Colin Gunton have argued that God is beyond reason since natural theology is an inherently suspect notion. In this article, I first note ways in which all the authors just mentioned may be thought of as agreeing with each other. I then proceed to argue against the critique of natural (...) theology coming from Kierkegaard, Barth and Gunton. My conclusion is that, in one sense, it may be premature to conclude that God is beyond reason. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas maintains that God's mercy and love are aspects of his providence, but he has more to say about providence than that. In this chapter, his teaching on providence is examined, first from a general viewpoint, and then looking at the three implications of this for Aquinas – those concerning chance, the action of created secondary causes, and predestination. Finally, a look is taken at what he says on three topics that fall within the notion of providence as he, (...) and others, have understood it – miracles, human freedom, and prayer. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas thinks that God defies our comprehension, but, as has been discussed earlier in the book, he also holds that we are still able to make true statements about him. So far, the book has only looked at how Aquinas defends this thesis in general terms, but here some particulars are addressed. What Aquinas thinks that we can say of God deal with assertions of two types: those that can be made and defended on rational grounds without recourse to (...) special revelation; and those that derive from revelation. In this chapter, and the three chapters following, the first group of assertions are considered, starting with the assertions ‘God is perfect’ and ‘God is good’. The last part of the chapter discusses the ancient and much discussed problem of God and evil. (shrink)

Since Thomas Aquinas considers God to be entirely mysterious and unknowable, the question is discussed of his position on how we can think of, or indeed say anything about him. The attitude of earlier Christian writers to this matter is outlined, and then Aquinas’ thinking on the subject is discussed: he says that in talking of God in a positive way, we do, in a sense, describe him – even though God is above naming, our statements about him can signify (...) the divine nature. This amounts to what is known as the doctrine of analogy: that words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way. In essence then, Aquinas holds to three theses: We do not know what God is, for he cannot he defined and he differs quite radically from the things to which we compare him; As the source of his creatures, however, God may be said to resemble them, though he lacks all creaturely limitations; and There is room for arguing that certain specific predicates can be ascribed to him. The chapter ends with comments on the conclusion propounded by Aquinas that while creatures are really related to God, God is not really related to them. (shrink)

The author recounts his own journey from inductive arguments for God’s existence and the Free Will Defense, to the Thomistic claim that we do not know God’s essence (which implies, among other things, that God cannot be classified among things in the world). Propositions can be truly affirmed of God, if we distinguish knowing that a proposition is true and understanding what makes the proposition true. We can say “God exists” without knowing what God is. If God is the Unknown (...) that makes all other things to be, are all our choices positively caused, not just permitted, by God? Since God is not an agent among other agents in the world, he does not coerce us from outside. We are free not in spite of God, but rather because of Him. This does not mean that all our actions are pre-determined; it means, rather, that God creatively makes people who act as they do, to be. The reasons for supposing that we do not know what God is, are the same as the reasons for thinking that He (as the creative source of everything) is more present to us than any creature is. (shrink)

Aquinas never describes himself as a ‘philosopher.’ He typically uses that word when referring to such “pagans” as Aristotle. Yet he often presents what we can now view as purely philosophical arguments. And it is some of these with which MacIntosh is concerned in this fine new book, which is divided into three parts, as is Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae. MacIntosh has previously published two books on Robert Boyle, who features from time to time in the present volume.In part 1, “Natural (...) Philosophy,” MacIntosh reports a number of things that Aquinas has to say about necessity and possibility, causality, time and motion, and time and infinity. Part 2, “Natural Theology,” deals with Aquinas under the headings... (shrink)

For Thomas Aquinas, the heart of Christian teaching is the doctrine of the Trinity, and this is the first specifically Christian topic that he turns to in Summa Theologiae. Historically speaking, Aquinas is one of the most important writers on the doctrine of the Trinity, and it is these writings that are addressed in this chapter. Aquinas takes for granted the substance of early texts on the Trinity such as the Creed of Asthanius, so his position is thoroughly orthodox. Consequently, (...) his own treatment of the Trinity deals with three main topics, each of which is discussed separately: the relevance of philosophy to the doctrine; the divine processions, and hence the relations, involved in the Trinity; and the persons of the Trinity taken individually. (shrink)

Aristotle speaks of virtues as dispositions that make people good and cause them to function well, and St Paul speaks in a similar way about faith, hope, and love. With these points in mind, and following the practice of his day, Thomas Aquinas asserts that the theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity; these, he says, are the means by which we come to God by grace as opposed to nature. Their presence is what chiefly allows us to say that, (...) in the time of the New Law, people have become sharers in the divine nature. For Aquinas, faith, hope, and charity are the heart of the life of grace. In this chapter, therefore, what he says about them is explored in some detail, with the aim of showing how it is that much of Aquinas’ thought as covered in earlier chapters comes to a kind of culmination when he turns to what, for him, is clearly the most important aspect of our lives. (shrink)