The purpose of the paper is a discussion of the meaning and relevance of the Pareto principle in economics. To begin with, the principle is briefly retraced in Pareto’s own writings. Its contemporary meaning was, however, developed in the context of the “New Welfare Economics”. While Pareto technically employed the principle in order to describe an equilibrium situation, Kaldor and Hicks developed it somewhat differently as a yardstick for economic policy formulation. Sometimes, the principle is also (...) discussed as a decision rule, and in this context some critics - though not the present author - believe it to have a conservative bias. Finally, recent discussions center around the incompatibility of the Pareto principle and “liberal” values. This conflict might be of limited relevance, only, due to a misconstrued formalism. (shrink)

We offer a concise introduction to the methodology of order-ethics and highlight how it connects aspects of economic theory and, in particular, game theory with traditional ethical considerations. The discussion is conducted along the lines of five basic propositions, which are used to characterize the methodological approach of order ethics.

Two forms of continuity are defined for Pareto representations of preferences. They are designated “continuity” and “coordinate continuity.” Characterizations are given of those Pareto representable preferences that are continuously representable and, in dimension two, of those that are coordinate-continuously representable.

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the (...) interval-order property, and acyclicity. (shrink)

The article is devoted to Vilfredo Pareto’s reflections on socialism and dicusses thoroughly his important work Les syst`emes socialistes, especially its first part dealing with so called real socialist systems. This large treatise edited in 1901-1902 played an important role in the evolution of Pareto’s ideas. It brought the early version of his famous theory of social elites that was strictly connected with his refutation of historiosophical progressivism. Pareto examined many historical examples– from ancient to some tendencies (...) in contemporary policy – in order to elaborate the precise typology of the systems of real socialism. He tried to demonstrate that real socialism was an obstacle to economic and cultural development. Socialism was for him on the one hand utopian, and on the other hand – immoral. He didn’t exclude however that in the future the well organized socialist movement would come into power. (shrink)

This article explores the influence of Simmel and Pareto on the social theory of J. Freund (1921-1993). Recognized as an interpreter and promoter of the sociology of both authors in the French academic context of the last third of the past century, both play a fundamental role in the construction of his social philosophy, a central part of which is his theory of essences, developed especially in L’essence du politique (1965). However, this influence has not been yet sufficiently studied. (...) This article proposes a preliminary approach, highlighting the presence of both authors in the definition of what I will be described here as Freundian “dialectical interactionism”, his methodological perspective for the study of dynamics and social equilibrium. (shrink)

Despite immediate appearances, this book is not primarily a hermeneutical exercise in which the superiority of one interpretation of canonical texts is championed against others. Its origin lies elsewhere, near the overlap of history, psychoanalysis, aesthetics, and social theory of the usual kind. Weber, Pareto, Freud, W. I. Thomas, Max Scheler, Karl Mannheim, and many others of similar stature long ago wondered and wrote much about the interplay between societal rationalization and individual rationality, between collective furor and private psychopathology—in (...) short, about the strange and worrisome union of “character and social structure” (to recall Gerth and Mills). Pondering the history of social thought in this century can lead to the unpleasant realization that such large-scale questions slipped away, especially from sociologists, sometime before World War II. Or, if not entirely lost, they were so transformed in range and rhetoric that a gap opened between contemporary theorizing and its European background. Perhaps this partly explains Weber’s continuing appeal. By dealing with him, one might again broach topics long at odds with “social science” of the last forty years.—From the Preface. (shrink)

Is the minimum wage ethically justifiable? In this chapter, we attempt to answer this question from an order-ethical perspective. To this end, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an order-ethical viewpoint. Our investigation yields a twofold conclusion. Firstly, order ethicists should prefer a tax-funded wage subsidy over minimum wages, if they assume that labour markets are perfectly competitive. Secondly, order ethics suggests that the minimum (...) wage can be ethically justified if employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process. As it turns out, then, order ethics neither favours nor disfavours the minimum wage. Rather, it implies conditions under which this form of labour market regulation is justified and, hence, allows empirical science to play a great role in answering the ethical questions that arise in the context of the minimum wage debate. This illustrates one of order ethics’ strengths, viz. the fact that it tends to de-ideologize the debate about ethical issues. (shrink)

This paper discusses justice-constrained libertarian claims that were proposed as a way to circumvent the impossibility of the Paretian liberal. Since most of the results are negative in character, we suggest an alternative route: A requirement on the structure of individual orderings should be combined with the idea that under particular circumstances individual decisiveness should be controlled by higher-order principles.

This paper provides variants of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that there exists no non-dictatorial aggregation rule satisfying weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality. In this paper, independence of irrelevant alternatives and collective rationality are simultaneously relaxed. Weak independence is imposed instead of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Social preferences are assumed to satisfy the semi-order properties of semi-transitivity and the interval-order property. We prove that there exists a vetoer when the number of alternatives is (...) greater than or equal to six. (shrink)

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of finite type if it is stated in terms of ordered T-tuples of alternatives for some positive integer T. The concept was introduced informally by Knoblauch (2005). We give a clear, complete definition below. We prove that a characterization of finite type can be used to determine in polynomial time whether a binary relation over a finite set has the property characterized. We also prove a simple but useful nonexistence theorem and (...) apply it to three examples. (shrink)

In order to solve the shortcomings of particle swarm optimization in solving multiobjective optimization problems, an improved multiobjective particle swarm optimization algorithm is proposed. In this study, the competitive strategy was introduced into the construction process of Pareto external archives to speed up the search process of nondominated solutions, thereby increasing the speed of the establishment of Pareto external archives. In addition, the descending order of crowding distance method is used to limit the size of external (...) archives and dynamically adjust particle parameters; in order to solve the problem of insufficient population diversity in the later stage of algorithm iteration, time-varying Gaussian mutation strategy is used to mutate the particles in external archives to improve diversity. The simulation experiment results show that the improved algorithm has better convergence and stability than the other compared algorithms. (shrink)

In order to understand the various strands of general equilibrium theory, why it has taken the forms that it has since the time of Léon Walras, and to appreciate fully a view of the state of general equilibrium theorising, it is essential to understand Walras's work and examine its influence. The first section of this book accordingly examines the foundations of Walras's work. These include his philosophical and methodological approach to economic modelling, his views on human nature, and the (...) basic components of his general equilibrium models. The second section examines how the influence of his ideas has been manifested in the theorising of his successors, surveying the models of theorists such as H. L. Moore, Vilfredo Pareto, Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Abraham Wald, John von Neumann, J. R. Hicks, Kenneth Arrow, and Gerard Debreu. The treatment also examines models of many types in which Walras's influence is explicitly acknowledged. (shrink)

Tsui and Weymark (Economic Theory, 1997) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.

We present an abstract social aggregation theorem. Society, and each individual, has a preorder that may be interpreted as expressing values or beliefs. The preorders are allowed to violate both completeness and continuity, and the population is allowed to be infinite. The preorders are only assumed to be represented by functions with values in partially ordered vector spaces, and whose product has convex range. This includes all preorders that satisfy strong independence. Any Pareto indifferent social preorder is then shown (...) to be represented by a linear transformation of the representations of the individual preorders. Further Pareto conditions on the social preorder correspond to positivity conditions on the transformation. When all the Pareto conditions hold and the population is finite, the social preorder is represented by a sum of individual preorder representations. We provide two applications. The first yields an extremely general version of Harsanyi's social aggregation theorem. The second generalizes a classic result about linear opinion pooling. (shrink)

The point of departure in my story is the contrast between two models of democratic voting process: popular democracy and what might be called committee democracy. On one interpretation, voting in popular democracy is a procedure whose function is to aggregate the individuals’ preferences to something like a collective preference, while in committee democracy what is being aggregated are committee members’ judgments. The relevant judgments on the agenda often address an evaluative question. It is such value judgments that this paper (...) focuses on. The question is how their aggregation differs from aggregation of preferences. I focus on the case in which the two aggregation scenarios exhibit a far-reaching structural similarity: more precisely, the case in which, in the judgment aggregation scenario, the individual inputs are value rankings. This means that, formally, the individual judgments in this case have the same structure as preference rankings over a given set of alternatives, but while in a preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives: say, this alternative is best, those two alternatives are second-best, that alternative is third-best, etc. I suggest that this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two aggregation scenarios has important implications for the task of aggregation. In particular, distance-based methods that look fine for the aggregation of judgments turn out to be inappropriate for the aggregation of preferences: Minimization of distance from individual inputs violates the Pareto condition. When applied to judgment aggregation, distance-based methods can also be approached from the epistemic standpoint: the questions canl be posed concerning their advantages as a truth-tracker. In this context, what matters is not only the probability of the outcome of the aggregation procedure being true, but also the expected verisimilitude of the outcome: its expected distance from truth. (shrink)

Function optimization underlies many real-world problems and hence is an important research subject. Most of the existing optimization methods were developed to solve primarily unconstrained problems. Since real-world problems are often constrained, appropriate handling of constraints is necessary in order to use the optimization methods. In particular, the performances of some methods such as Genetic Algorithms can be substantially undermined by ineffective constraint handling. Despite much effort devoted to the studies of constraint-handling methods, it has been reported that each (...) of them has certain limitations. Hence, further studies for designing more effective constraint-handling methods are needed. For this reason, we investigated the guidelines for a method to effectively handle constraints. The guidelines are that the method 1) takes the approach of repair operators, 2) monotonically decreases both the number of violated constraints and constraint violations, and 3) searches over the boundaries of violated constraints. Based on these guidelines, we designed a new constraint-handling method Pareto Descent Repair operator in which ideas derived from multi-objective local search and gradient projection method are incorporated. Experiments comparing GA that use PDR and some of the existing constraint-handling methods confirmed the effectiveness of PDR. (shrink)

There is an idea, extremely common among social contract theorists, that the primary function of social institutions is to secure some form of cooperative benefit. If individuals simply seek to satisfy their own preferences in a narrowly instrumental fashion, they will find themselves embroiled in collective action problems – interactions with an outcome that is worse for everyone involved than some other possible outcome. Thus they have reason to accept some form of constraint over their conduct, in order to (...) achieve this superior, but out-of-equilibrium outcome. A social institution can be defined as a set of norms that codify these constraints.1 Simplifying somewhat, one can then say that social institutions exist in order to secure gains in Pareto-efficiency. (shrink)

We address the question of how finitely additive moral value theories (such as utilitarianism) should rank worlds when there are an infinite number of locations of value (people, times, etc.). In the finite case, finitely additive theories satisfy both Weak Pareto and a strong anonymity condition. In the infinite case, however, these two conditions are incompatible, and thus a question arises as to which of these two conditions should be rejected. In a recent contribution, Hamkins and Montero (2000) have (...) argued in favor of an anonymity-like isomorphism principle and against Weak Pareto. After casting doubt on their criticism of Weak Pareto, we show how it, in combination with certain other plausible principles, generates a plausible and fairly strong principle for the infinite case. We further show that where locations are the same in all worlds, but have no natural order, this principle turns out to be equivalent to a strengthening of a principle defended by Vallentyne and Kagan (1997), and also to a weakened version of the catching-up criterion developed by Atsumi (1965) and by von Weizsäcker (1965). Footnotes1 For valuable comments, we would like to thank Marc Fleurbaey, Bart Capéau, Joel Hamkins, Barbara Montero, Tim Mulgan, and two anonymous referees for this journal. (shrink)

Model predictive control technology can effectively reduce the bad effect caused by inaccurate data prediction in microgrid energy management problem. However, the use of MPC technology needs to dynamically select an optimal solution from the Pareto solution set to implement, which needs the participant of the decision-makers frequently. In order to reduce the burden on decision-makers, we designed a knee point-based evolutionary multiobjective optimization algorithm, termed KBEMO. Knee point is the solution on Pareto front with the maximum (...) marginal utility, which is considered as the preferred solution if there is no other preference. This algorithm focuses on obtaining the knee region and automatically outputs knee points after the optimization. By combining this algorithm with MPC technology, it can effectively reduce the amount of computational consumption and obtain better convergence. Experimental results show that this method is more competitive than the traditional single-objective MPC method. (shrink)

Decision theory aims at a general account of rationality covering humans but to begin makes idealizations about decision problems and agents' resources and circumstances. It treats inerrant agents with unlimited cognitive power facing tractable decision problems. This book systematically rolls back idealizations and without loss of precision treats errant agents with limited cognitive abilities facing decision problems without a stable top option. It recommends choices that maximize utility using quantizations of beliefs and desires in cases where probabilities and utilities are (...) indeterminate and using higher-order utility analysis in cases of limited access to probabilities and utilities. For agents burdened with mistakes, it advocates reasonable attempts to correct unacceptable mistakes before deciding. In decision problems without a stable top option, a topic of game theory, it proposes maximizing self-conditional utility among self-supporting options. In games of strategy, the new principles lead to solutions that are Pareto optimal among equilibria composed of jointly self-supporting strategies. Offering an account of bounded rationality, the bookmakes large strides toward realism in decision theory. (shrink)

This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players’ concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.” In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate (...) in all periods of the repeated game, including the final period, at which point the player type who is unconcerned about fairness takes the opportunity to defect, i.e., he “backstabs” the uninformed player. Despite such last-minute defection, our results show that the introduction of incomplete information can actually result in a Pareto improvement under certain conditions. We connect the predictions of this “backstabbing” equilibrium with the frequently observed decline in cooperative behavior in the final period of finitely repeated experimental games. (shrink)

Applying the solutions defined in the axiomatic bargaining theory to actual bargaining problems is a challenge when the problem is not described by its Utility Possibility Set (UPS) but as a social choice environment specifying the set of alternatives and utility profile underlying the UPS. It requires computing the UPS, which is an operational challenge, and then identifying at least one alternative that actually achieves the bargained solution’s outcome. We introduce the axioms of Independence of Non-Strongly-Efficient Alternatives (resp. Weakly) and (...) Independence of Redundant Alternatives. A solution satisfying these axioms can be applied to a simplified problem based on any reduced set of alternatives generating the strong (resp. weak) Pareto frontier of the initial problem, without changing the outcome, making the application of bargaining solutions to actual problems easier. We compare our axioms to usual independence axioms, and discuss their consistency with usual bargaining solutions. Then, we introduce monotonicity conditions corresponding to the existence of an interest group, i.e., agents ranking the alternatives in the same order. For such monotonic social choice environments, we provide a parameterized family of alternatives that generates the Pareto frontier of the bargaining problem, in line with our previous results. Our analysis illustrates that an axiomatic approach can be useful to foster the application of bargaining solutions, in complement to usual computational methods. (shrink)

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem (...) without the Pareto principle. (shrink)

This article provides unified axiomatic foundations for the most common optimality criteria in statistical decision theory. It considers a decision maker who faces a number of possible models of the world (possibly corresponding to true parameter values). Every model generates objective probabilities, and von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility applies where these obtain, but no probabilities of models are given. This is the classic problem captured by Wald’s (Statistical decision functions, 1950) device of risk functions. In an Anscombe–Aumann environment, I characterize Bayesianism (...) (as a backdrop), the statistical minimax principle, the Hurwicz criterion, minimax regret, and the “Pareto” preference ordering that rationalizes admissibility. Two interesting findings are that c-independence is not crucial in characterizing the minimax principle and that the axiom which picks minimax regret over maximin utility is von Neumann–Morgenstern independence. (shrink)

Evolutionary multi-objective optimization algorithms have been successfully applied in many real-life problems. EMOAs approximate the set of trade-offs between multiple conflicting objectives, known as the Pareto optimal set. Reference point approaches can alleviate the optimization process by highlighting relevant areas of the Pareto set and support the decision makers to take the more confident evaluation. One important drawback of this approaches is that they require an in-depth knowledge of the problem being solved in order to function correctly. (...) Collective intelligence has been put forward as an alternative to deal with situations like these. This paper extends some well-known EMOAs to incorporate collective preferences and interactive techniques. Similarly, two new preference-based multi-objective optimization performance indicators are introduced in order to analyze the results produced by the proposed algorithms in the comparative experiments carried out. (shrink)

Waiting time is widely used in health and social policy to make resource allocation decisions, yet no general account of the moral significance of waiting time exists. We provide such an account. We argue that waiting time is not intrinsically morally significant, and that the first person in a queue for a resource does not ipso facto have a right to receive that resource first. However, waiting time can and sometimes should play a role in justifying allocation decisions. First, there (...) is a duty of fairness prohibiting line-cutting where a sufficiently just queue exists. Second, waiting time has several morally attractive features that can justify its incorporation into allocation schemes. Where candidates are in relevantly similar circumstances, allocating by waiting time is relatively efficient, maximizes distribution equality relative to other Pareto efficient distributions, and treats candidates fairly. The claim that allocation using waiting time is fair is controversial. Some have claimed that formal lotteries are a fairer way to select among equal beneficiaries. We argue that lotteries are no fairer than allocation based on waiting time when it is equiprobable how a prospective queue will be ordered. In practice, lotteries share many of the disadvantages of queues; which is fairer will depend on contingent features of the allocation scenario. The upshot is that first-come, first-served is in fact a just way to allocate resources in many of the cases where it seems pre-theoretically compelling, and waiting time has unique normative properties which frequently justify its incorporation into resource allocation schemes. (shrink)

In many voting systems, voters’ preferences on a set of candidates are represented by linear orderings. In this context, scoring rules are well-known procedures to aggregate the preferences of the voters. Under these rules, each candidate obtains a fixed number of points, sk\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$s_k$$\end{document}, each time he/she is ranked k\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$k$$\end{document}th by one voter and the candidates are ordered according to the total number of (...) points they receive. In order to identify the best scoring rule to use in each situation, we need to know which properties are met by each of these procedures. Although some properties have been analyzed extensively, there are other properties that have not been studied for all scoring rules. In this paper, we consider two desirable social choice properties, the Pareto-optimality and the immunity to the absolute loser paradox, and establish characterizations of the scoring rules that satisfy each of these specific axioms. Moreover, we also provide a proof of a result given by Saari and Barney, where the scoring rules meeting reversal symmetry are characterized. From the results of characterization, we establish some relationships among these properties. Finally, we give a characterization of the scoring rules satisfying the three properties. (shrink)

Various potential strategic interactions between a “strong” Artificial intelligence and humans are analyzed using simple 2 × 2 order games, drawing on the New Periodic Table of those games developed by Robinson and Goforth. Strong risk aversion on the part of the human player leads to shutting down the AI research program, but alternative preference orderings by the human and the AI result in Nash equilibria with interesting properties. Some of the AI-Human games have multiple equilibria, and in other (...) cases Pareto-improvement over the Nash equilibrium could be attained if the AI’s behavior towards humans could be guaranteed to be benign. The preferences of a superintelligent AI cannot be known in advance, but speculation is possible as to its ranking of alternative states of the world, and how it might assimilate the accumulated wisdom of humanity. (shrink)

Electric-mechanical equipment manufacturing industries focus on the implementation of intelligent manufacturing systems in order to enhance customer services for highly customized machines with high-profit margins such as electric power transformers. Intelligent manufacturing consists in using supply chain data that are integrated for smart decision making during the production life cycle. This research, in cooperation with a large electric power transformer manufacturer, provides an overview of critical intelligent manufacturing technologies. An ontology schema forms the terminology relationships needed to build two (...) intelligent supply chain management modules for the IM system demonstration. The two core modules proposed in this research are the intelligent supplier selection and component ordering module and the product quality prediction module. The intelligent supplier selection and component ordering module dispatches orders that match the best options of suppliers based on combined analytic hierarchy process analysis and multiobjective integer optimization. In the case study, the intelligent supplier selection and component ordering module demonstrates several acceptable Pareto solutions based on strict constraints, which is a very challenging task for decision makers without assistance. The second module is the product quality prediction module which uses multivariate regression and ARIMA to predict the quality of the finished products. Results show that the R square values are very close to 1. The module shortens the time for the company to accurately judge whether the two semifinished iron cores for the product meet the quality requirements. The component supplier selection module and the finished product quality prediction module developed in this research can be extended to other IM systems for general high-end equipment manufacturers using mass customization. (shrink)

This research implements a recent evolutionary-based algorithm of equilibrium optimizer to resolve the constrained combined economic emission dispatch problem. This problem has two objective functions that represent the minimizing of generation costs and minimizing the emission of environmental pollution caused by generators. The proposed algorithm integrates the dominant criteria for multiobjective functions that allow the decision-maker to detect all the Pareto boundaries of constrained combined economic emission dispatch problem. In order to save the effort for the decision-maker to (...) select the best compromise alternative, a cluster study was carried out to minimize the size of the Pareto boundary to an acceptable size, representing all the characteristics of the main Pareto frontier. On the other hand, in order to deal with the infringement of constraints, a repair algorithm was used to preserve the viability of the particles. The proposed algorithm is applied to solve the standard 30-bus IEEE system with 6 generators to validate its robustness and efficiency to produce a well-distributed Pareto frontier for constrained combined economic emission dispatch problem. Compared with other studies, good results in solving constrained combined economic emission dispatch problem are obtained and a reasonable reduced Pareto set is found. (shrink)

Le critère d’absence d’envie, introduit par J. Tinbergen et utilisé par certaines théories de la justice distributive, ne permet pas, dans tous les cas, d’identifier des allocations de biens respectant l’exigence de pareto-optimalité. Pour cette raison il a été, durant un temps, délaissé. Néanmoins, ce critère demeure utile dans certains contextes dont nous voudrions préciser les caractéristiques. En effet, plusieurs travaux récents d’économie normative ont montré que, sous certaines conditions et même dans un contexte de production, l’absence d’envie offre (...) une solution à la recherche d’allocations équitables. Ainsi, nous voudrions examiner, à partir de ces résultats, sous quelles conditions le champ d’application du critère d’absence d’envie peut être étendu, en vue d’identifier des allocations équitables, dans un contexte économique d’échange comme de production.The non envy criterium, introduced by Tinbergen and convoqued by some theories of justice, cannot always be used to identify allocations which also satisfy the requirement of Pareto-optimality. This is the reason why it had been neglected for a while. Nevertheless, it is still useful in some contexts we would like to describe. In fact, recent conclusions of normative economy demonstrated that, in some conditions and even in the framework of production, this criterium provide a solution for fair allocations. Precisely, we would like, on the basis of these results, to determine which extent has the implementation of non envy criterium in order to identify fair distributive allocations in a context of exchange and production as well. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUMAN NATURE AND POLITICS: A MIMETIC READING OF CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN THE WORK OF NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI 1 Harald Wydra Universität Regensberg Perhaps more than any other political philosopher2, Machiavelli's writings have given rise to extremely controversial and emotionally charged interpretations.3 Ifone were to pinpoint the guiding lines ofdispute in Machiavelli scholarship, one could argue that his "foes" are convinced of his amorality and the tyrannical bias, while his (...) "friends" stress the liberal and republican basis ofhis teaching. This debate between good and the evil in Machiavelli's teaching has accompanied the conflict on the tyrannical and the republican character of his work ever since.4 While the essence of his prescriptions continues to be contested, most interpreters concur on Machiavelli 's realism or political pragmatism defined in The Prince 25 as effectual 1 I am grateful to Anthony J. Parel, Arpad Szakolczai, and AdolfTrägler for comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 2Perhaps with the exception of Marx who shares with Machiavelli the heritage of an inflationary and contentious scholarship. Despite this resemblance, there are fundamental differences when it comes to declare oneself a follower of Machiavelli or follower of Marx. See Aron (256-259). 3In his extensive overview, Berlin estimates the totality of the bibliography at more than 3,000 titles. Needless to say that is has considerably increased since then. The recent wave of new translations into English (Mansfield and Tarcov, or Codevilla) and several new approaches provide for the richness of debate. This debate sometimes acquires a heated intensity, such as in the exchange on Strauss's Machiavelli between Mansfield and Pocock in Political Theory, 3:4 (1975), 372-405. 4See for a recent update the introduction to a new translation ofthe Discourses in Mansfield and Tarcov. Harald Wydra37 truth (verità ejfetuale). In this stress on factual reality as opposed to imagination many have seen the sources of Machiavelli's advocacy of technicity, rationality and reason of state. Such a viewpoint is supported by Machiavelli's pure and emotionless style ofwriting. Machiavelli's effectual truth is essentially about the mastery over conflict and contingency in politics. Yet, there are hardly systematic studies on the status and role ofpolitical conflict and its consequences for political order in Machiavelli's work.5 Most classical studies include analysis of conflict (Pocock; Lefort; Sasso), but they do so by sticking to the natural textual division ofhis major works. This article sets out to elaborate some guidelines ofa Machiavellian theory ofconflict by linking it to René Girard's theory of mimetic conflict. It aims to achieve two things: first, to analyze the nature of political conflict in Machiavelli's work. Second, to reexamine some widespread assumption on the autonomy of politics. The Affinity of Machiavelli and Girard: Crisis and Conflict Methodologically, a reading ofMachiavelli through Girard has a status different from that of orthodox comparisons oftwo thinkers.6 This can be illustrated by considering Raymond Aron's comparison between Machiavelli and Marx. On the one hand, Machiavelli's political philosophy is marked by a stress on cyclical repetition and permanent instability. His realism maintains that the more things change the more they remain the same. On the other hand, Marx's economic philosophy of history envisages long-term progress and as such reflects upon change by its confidence in Providence. Yet, essentially both works are concerned with the contingent modalities of collective conflict over time. While for Machiavelli the struggle for power unfolds between political groups such as nobles and the people, Marx suggests the social and economic roots ofconflicts in social formations. Against this background, a reading of Machiavelli through Girard diverges from conventional comparisons. Machiavelli's work emanates from his experience as a practitioner ofpolitics who aims to be the counsellor of Princes. A trained historian and literary critic, Girard analyzes fundamental 5To my knowledge, by far the most balanced and detailed treatment is given by Sasso. For a thematic treatment of civil discord, see also Bock. 60ne can mention Raymond Aron's two fine essays "La comparaison de Machiavel et Pareto" (Aron 86-109) and "Machiavel et Marx" published in Italian in the first edition of Machiavelli's Principe (1975) and again in... (shrink)

This paper provides an axiomatic analysis of sufficientarian social evaluation. Sufficientarianism has emerged as an increasingly important notion of distributive justice. We propose a class of principles that we label generalized critical-level sufficientarian orderings. The distinguishing feature of our new class is that its members exhibit constant critical levels of well-being that are allowed to differ from the threshold of sufficiency. Our basic axiom assigns priority to those below the threshold, a property that is shared by numerous other sufficientarian approaches. (...) When combined with the well-known strong Pareto principle and the assumption that there be a constant critical level, the axiom implies that the critical level cannot be below the threshold. The main results of the paper are characterizations of our new class and an important subclass. As a final observation, we identify the generalized critical-level sufficientarian orderings that permit us to avoid the repugnant conclusion and the sadistic conclusion, which are known as two fundamental challenges in population ethics. (shrink)

The term “political” egalitarianism is used here, not to refer to equality within the political sphere, but rather in John Rawls’s sense, to refer to a conception of egalitarian distributive justice that is capable of serving as the object of an overlapping consensus in a pluralistic society.1 Thus “political” egalitarianism is political in the same way that Rawls’s “political” liberalism is political. The central task when it comes to developing such a conception of equality is to determine what constraints a (...) principle of equality must satisfy in order to qualify as “freestanding,” or to be justifiable in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of any one member of the set of reasonable yet incompatible “religious, philosophical and moral” doctrines that attract large numbers of adherents in our world.2 (Rawls uses the analogy of a “module” in order to describe the way that a properly political conception of justice “fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it.”3 Political egalitarianism would be “modular” in this sense.) Rather than getting embroiled in the controversies that have arisen over Rawls’s formulation of this idea, I would like simply to accept the intuition, widespread among political philosophers, that equality is the sort of principle that – if given a proper formulation – could satisfy the requirements of a political conception of justice. After all, regardless of what peoples’ projects, values, or conceptions of the good life may be, it should be possible to design a set of arrangements that would provide equal opportunity to pursue these goals, or that would treat each conception of the good with equal respect, etc. From this perspective, the principle of equality resembles the principle of Pareto-efficiency, or certain formulations of the principle of liberty – it is one that everyone should be able to endorse, insofar as it does not privilege, or presuppose the correctness of, any particular set of projects, values.. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and (...) the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided. (shrink)

The usefulness of the main schools of welfare economics in measuring inequality is analysed. It is noted that the literature on Pareto optimality avoids distributional judgements altogether, and that the standard social welfare functions approach also fails to provide a framework for distributional discussions because of its concentration on individual orderings only. Utilitarianism, is too concerned with the welfare sum to be concerned with the problem of distribution and can produce strongly anti‐egalitarian results. Hence, the use of welfare economics (...) for measuring inequality is rejected. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and CharacterIvan A. BoldyrevMark D. White. Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 270. Cloth, $55.00.This remarkable book provides a new ethical perspective for economics based on Kantian ethics of autonomy and dignity. There are two main messages in it that I find particularly important. First, Mark White derives from Kant the (...) idea of irreducible moral principles that govern the behavior of economic agents independently of welfarist and, more generally, consequentialist concerns. These principles of duty and the “incomparable worth” (21) of human dignity, as well as justice or rights, may not be economically traded off against some other motivations; hence, they simply evade economic reasoning altogether.Second, White endorses a version of libertarian Kantianism that treats people as individuals in essence (“autonomous”) and social in orientation (respecting the rights and the choices of the others). In discussing individualism, White attacks the conventional wisdom of economics and claims that preferences alone do not account for the identity of individuals [End Page 298] in space and time, although their unique characters do. Persons should be given free choice (absent in deterministic rational-choice models) and hence responsibility for their choices that incorporates the social factors in decision-making. However, White never mentions the almost insurmountable difficulties associated with fleshing out the truly individual features of a given person. Although he allows for a person’s identity and character changing over time, he does not recognize that character itself is in many respects a social construction.White criticizes paternalistic economic policies that suggest manipulating choice environments in order to follow the “true” preferences of the individuals. Instead, real consent, as satisfying both relevant preferences and principles (e.g. rights and human dignity), is, in his view, the sole criterion for justifying particular policy measures—not Pareto-efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks compensation. Economists’ obsession with efficiency leading to the misconceived notions such as “efficient level of crime” or “manageable level of terrorism” is also severely criticized.For White, the most popular formalistic version of the categorical imperative is less important than the other two—prohibiting treating other people simply as means and instituting the “Kingdom of Ends.” Formalism is reserved merely for the negative evaluation of actions and providing strict perfect duties that give clear guidance concerning what should not be done. White’s “Kantian-economic” model of decision-making incorporates perfect duties as constraints, and imperfect (positive) duties as preferences. He also stresses that for Kant, duties derived from the imperative depend on empirical knowledge, the context of decision-making, and judgment as a unique personal interpretation of the moral law. He further emphasizes the intersubjective role of Kantian morality: moral law should be universalizable to all rational persons (the “Kingdom of Ends” formula of the imperative), whereas rationality means not just following the patterns of behavior developed in the preference-oriented choice model, but rather acting on one’s beliefs and desires or choosing not to follow them, thus exhibiting genuine autonomy.The new and important contribution to the discussion is an explicit treatment of will as an inner faculty that, together with judgment, constitutes a person’s character or “self,” and helps to overcome the mere inclination to follow duty. Will is the missing link between decision and action and should be “well-trained” for bringing about true morality.The book is clearly written, and the author has upheld the interdisciplinary appeal of the topic, demonstrating an outstanding knowledge of the vast literature on ethics (both Kantian and not) and economics. White’s emphasis on the irreducibility of moral principles is absolutely relevant for current economic and political debates. However, some reservations are in order.There is an ambiguity concerning the status of his analysis. If in its positive aspect White’s recommendations for economists is to accept the Kantian vision of morality, then almost no arguments are given for this, and his modifications of the standard choice model are introduced in an ad hoc manner, just to reconcile it with the Kantian framework. Are an individual’s decisions to act on principles and to overcome mere inclinations really... (shrink)

Like Mises before him, Hayek challenges the validity of socialism as a centrally planned economic regime typically characterized by state ownership of all means of production. What is typical of Hayek's challenge is that he holds that this question is fully theoretical in nature and that it has consequently to be raised and decided as a scientific question. Sketching the historical background of the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s, I first show how this debate is linked with (...) the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem, which indeed constitutes the very topic of Hayek’s 1923 Ph. D. dissertation. I recall that the Pareto-Barone approach based on General Equilibrium Theory (GET) has determined the conceptual framework of this controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's impracticability argument against market socialism and try to show how it is related to, but different from, Mises’s logical impossibility argument. I argue that the contexts of discussion were completely different in both cases: if Mises was criticizing the possibility of rational economic decisions in a moneyless economy, Hayek was debating against the Lange-Dickinson-Lerner model of market socialism where the prices of first order goods were supposedly fixed following a GET simulation of the competetive market process. The core of Hayek’s line of reasoning is shown to be related to a clever analysis of the notion of ‘data’: the data on which a Central Planification Board is suppose to work out a production and distribution schema for the whole economy are simply unavailable to him because this kind of economic knowledge (which Michael Polanyi calls “tacit knowledge”) cannot be accumulated and stored up anywhere in society, as if the global economy could be directed by a super-brain possessing complete knowledge of every particular situation and able to compute a perfect solution to any economic problem whatsoever.. (shrink)

During the 19th and the 20th century the concept of system undergoes significant transformations. The interplay of biology and sociology gives rise to an olistic definition of the concept, in order to understand society by means of schemes developed in the field of theoris of organisms. It is possible to follow this development from Pareto and Henderson, to Parsons, and finally to Luhmann, by examining the various biological models to which they refer.

In this essay I argue that vanity is a Janus-faced feature of social cooperation: as Hobbes stresses, it certainly can lead to conflict, yet it can also motivate enforcing norms of fairness. What Hobbes call “vain glorious” individuals will walk away from “vile and contemptible” Pareto gains. A society composed of both egoists and glory-seekers is thus more likely to stabilize fair terms of cooperation than even the most enlightened society of self-interested agents. Rather than, as in many economically-inspired (...) analyses of social order such as James Buchanan’s in The Limits of Liberty, modeling a society of self-interested agents, we would do better to model polymorphic populations, containing multiple agent types. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes an index ordering and a social ordering function as a simple way to formalize the indexing problem in the social choice framework. Two main conclusions are derived. First, the alleged dilemma between welfarism and perfectionism is shown to involve a third possibility, exemplified by the fairness approach to social choice. Second, the idea that an individual is better off than another whenever he has more (goods, functionings, etc.) in all dimensions, which is known to enter in conflict (...) with the Pareto principle, can be partly salvaged by adopting the fairness approach. (shrink)

The non envy criterium, introduced by Tinbergen and convoqued by some theories of justice, cannot always be used to identify allocations which also satisfy the requirement of Pareto-optimality. This is the reason why it had been neglected for a while. Nevertheless, it is still useful in some contexts we would like to describe. In fact, recent conclusions of normative economy demonstrated that, in some conditions and even in the framework of production, this criterium provide a solution for fair allocations. (...) Precisely, we would like, on the basis of these results, to determine which extent has the implementation of non envy criterium in order to identify fair distributive allocations in a context of exchange and production as well. (shrink)

In a 2013 article, David Gauthier noted upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Morals by Agreement that his contractarian approach to morality had found a niche among ‘some of those who remain unpersuaded by either Kantianism or utilitarianism’. In this article I will focus on Pareto optimization and I will argue that the Gauthier contract, even in spite of the article’s revisions, is still less useful for consultation purposes than Gauthier is assuming. To highlight the conceptual distance (...) that I think separates the Gauthier contract from real-world circumstances—a separation that is greater than Gauthier supposes—I will focus on the problem of ‘civic defection’. The point is not for us to repudiate as such the deliverances of the Gauthier model, but simply to use caution in our deployment of the model, and, in order to access the full extent of the model’s offerings, to resist the temptation to deploy it in the service of purposes which it is not capable of accomplishing. (shrink)

Two processes have shaped the political order of the modern age: bureaucratization and democratization. The political sociology of Max Weber is commonly associated only with the first of these. Its relationship to democracy, by contrast, seems ambiguous. Political scientists oriented towards natural law, such as Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin or Robert Eden, condemn the value-relativism of his political sociology, its agnosticism or even nihilism, and conclude that it is incapable of taking a positive stance vis-à-vis democracy. Others take offence (...) at the overemphasis on power in Weber’s theory (Aron, von Ferber), at the élitist or oligarchic understanding of politics which puts Weber close to pre-fascist élite theorists such as Mosca, Pareto or Michels (Mommsen), at the latent fascism implicit in his concept of charisma (Becker 1988) and so on. Max Weber appears as a forerunner of Carl Schmitt (Mommsen, Habermas), or as a precursor of the authoritarian and dictatorial Führerstaat (Löwith). Even those who value him for his pitiless unmasking of the illusory character of modern mass democracy and its transformation into Bonapartist Caesarism (Marcuse, Lukács) leave little doubt that they regard Weber as standing solidly on the side of the latter.1 Max Weber and democracy? Not all his interpreters, perhaps, but certainly a large number, would find ‘Max Weber contra democracy’ a more accurate title. (shrink)

We study a principle of ‘Non-Interference’ in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings.

An axiomatic basis for a social preference ordering with interval-scaled utility levels satisfying the principles of anonymity and pareto superiority is elaborated. The ordering is required to be sensitive to distributional equality: Redistribution of utility income from poor to rich persons without changing their social rank should lead to a superior evaluation. The axiom of separability is weakened in order to make it compatible with distributional equality. We prove that every continuous ordering satisfying the upper axioms can be (...) represented by a utility function which is positively linear on the convex cone of rank-ordered utility vectors. A modified unnormalized Gini coefficient is one possible choice, but it contradicts, as well as related proposals, the principle of adequacy of means for some distribution problems. (shrink)

People inhabit a vast and intricate social network nowadays. In addition to our own decisions and actions, we confront those of various groups every day. Collective decisions and actions are more complex and bewildering compared to those made by individuals. As members of a collective, we contribute to its decisions, but our contributions may not always align with the outcome. We may also find ourselves excluded from certain groups and passively subjected to their influences without being aware of the source. (...) We are used to being in overlapping groups and may switch identities, supporting or opposing the claims of particular groups. But rarely do we pause to think: What do we talk about when we talk about groups and their decisions? At the heart of this dissertation is the question of collective agency, i.e., in what sense can we treat a group as a rational agent capable of its action. There are two perspectives we take: a philosophical and logical one. The philosophical perspective mainly discusses the ontological and epistemological issues related to collective agency, sorts out the relevant philosophical history, and argues that the combination of a relational view of collective agency and a dispositional view of collective intentionality provides a rational and realistic account. The logical perspective is associated with formal theories of groups, it disregards the psychological content involved in the philosophical perspective, establishes a logical system that is sufficiently formal and objective, and axiomatizes the nature of a collective. The first topic that is addressed is the ontology of collective agency, i.e., the question what exactly is collective agency. The philosophical discussion of collective agency centres around the reduction problem of the concept of a collective. Individualism and Cartesian internalism have long influenced orthodox theories and made them face the choice between an irreducible concept of a collective and ontological reductionism. Heterodox theories such as functionalism and interpretationism reinterpret the concept of agency and accept it as also realized on the level of a collective. To adequately explain social phenomena that are essentially relational in nature, we propose a relational, holistic account of collective agency and argue that functionalism and interpretationism can be integrated into such an account. While acknowledging the irreducibility of the concept of a collective, we find that there is a deep incompatibility between the concept of a collective and the concept of intentionality as the mark of the mental. To explain how collective intentionality nevertheless is possible and why we tend to use it analogously to how we use the concept of individual intentionality, we explore a dispositional account of intentionality which enables us to give an account of the concept of intentionality at both the individual and collective level. Specifically, we subdivide the dispositional account into three aspects: behavioral, purely mental, and cognitive. We then argue that collective intentionality is real by analyzing different forms of attributive judgments of intentionality and by introducing the perspective of indispensable collective responsibility. We also analyze how philosophical theories about collective agency relate to central features of formal theories about collective decisions, such as game theory. Although the two fields are both concerned with collectives, there are also differences that need to be addressed. For example, game theory is clearly anti-psychologistic since its aim is a formal and objective analysis. However, from the relational and dispositional perspective, intentionality at the individual level and collective intentionality as we analyze it, inevitably involve mental content. In order to explain this difference and identify where the boundary is, we analyze the relationships between the three basic concepts involved, namely intentionality, preference, and dependency, so as to provide a unified picture of collective theory across philosophical and formal theories. After paving the nexus between philosophical and formal perspectives, the logical perspective becomes the theme of our discussion. To be able to express game theoretical concepts and to connect them to our philosophical perspective, We present a logic of preference and functional dependence and its hybrid extension, and provide an axiomatization which is sound and strongly complete. The decidability of this logic is also proved. Its application to modeling non-cooperative and cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulting framework provides a unified view of Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Finally, we conclude and clarify the position of our theory in the broader field of research on the topics addressed in the thesis. Also, we point out many new questions and directions suggested by our analysis, including philosophical and logical open problems. (shrink)