Để xem bóng đá và phát sóng video trực tiếp tốc độ cao, Xoilac là trang web lý tưởng. Đặc biệt, Xoilac không có bất cứ quảng cáo nào, vì vậy người xem vẫn thoải mái thưởng thức trận bóng đá mà không lo bị phân tâm vì bất cứ vấn đề gì. Ngoài ra, Xoilac có đội ngũ dày dặn chuyên môn, luôn đưa ra những nhận định chuẩn xác cho từng trận đấu bóng đá. Với đồ hoạ sinh (...) động, âm thanh lôi cuốn và sống động, Xoilac sẽ lưu lại dấu ấn sâu đậm trong tâm trí người xem bóng đá. (shrink)

: This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the “argument from explicitness”—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we (...) should believe they are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language. (shrink)

Provides a detailed critical account of the beginning of the argument of part III of Kant’s Groundwork, the section of his writing in which he seems to come closest to offering a direct proof of our absolute freedom. It contends that there are several ambiguities and missteps in what seems to be Kant’s main line of argument here, but these need not count again Kant’s ultimate position. On the contrary, realizing that there may be such fundamental flaws in (...) this part of the Groundwork is the easiest way to understand why Kant never directly refers back to it and why he reversed his method of presentation so dramatically in the second Critique. (shrink)

In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best (...) theories are close to the truth. (shrink)

The essay deals with problems that emerge in new interpretations of Hume’s famous argument concerning induction. In modern Hume scholarship there is a growing tendency to view Hume’s argument not as reasoning concerning the evidential value of our inductions but rather as a kind of explanation of the cognitive process of making causal inferences. The essay describes the main tenets of two currently dominant interpretations . In addition to discussing both interpretations, the article engages in a discussion about (...) the meaning of Hume’s argument by confronting the old skeptical reading of Hume with new interpretations. My contribution to the discussion consists of two arguments against the explanatory tradition of viewing Hume’s argument. (shrink)

Brian Medlin has excluded the possibility of something being self-explanatory in anything but a logical sense. Hence any non-logical necessity has always to be in terms of something other than the explicand. In this context, the principle of sufficient reason cannot escape contraction to a form so patently useless that no proponent of the contingency argument would want to employ it. Many of the objections in Section 4 have point, however, only against an argument which uses such an (...) unacceptable form of the principle.The objections in Section 5 are directed against an argument framed in the only other way allowable under Medlin’s dichotomy, but which is of no use to the theist, for the simple-reason that its conclusion is not existential in the required (present actuality) sense. Objections against such an argument would concern the theist only if their validity were so wide as to embrace a truly existential argument as well. As we have-seen it is in just that case that they break down.In neither Section 4 nor 5, therefore, does the article come to grips with the contingency argument. The objections leave it untouched, because neither of Medlin’s notions of contingency and necessity corresponds to that which is operative in the argument. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to offer a reconstruction of Lon Fuller’s critique of Hart’s legal positivism. I show that contrary to the claims of Fuller’s many critics, one can derive from his work a clear and powerful argument against legal positivism, at least in the guise found in the work of H.L.A. Hart. The essence of the argument is that Fuller’s principles of legality posit that the same considerations that count for law’s excellence are relevant also (...) for the determining what counts as law. I contrast this view with Hart’s legal positivism, which acknowledged that the principles of legality are relevant for law’s excellence, but considered them irrelevant for determining the question what counts as law. I argue that the positivist position is arbitrary, and - a point on which I focus - completely undefended. I draw from this point a more general challenge to Hart’s theory of law (as well as that of many of his followers), namely that though claimed to be a true theory of law, it has no resources to explain why this is so. I argue that Fuller’s theory does not suffer from this problem, because Fuller rejected a staple of contemporary jurisprudence - the separation of conceptual and normative jurisprudence. (shrink)

In recent years, with the appearance of a new wave of realism and non-descriptivism, the old dispute in meta-ethics between cognitivism and non-cognitivism has resurfaced. At present one of the most intensely discussed arguments among meta-ethicists is the so-called Moral Twin Earth argument of Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons. It was presented in a series of articles published at the beginning of the nineties. However, a similar argument was put forth much earlier by Richard Hare, though the participants (...) of the discussion that has arisen in connection with the Moral Twin Earth have passed over it in silence. It appeared for the first time at the beginning of the fifties in The Language of Morals as the Missionary and the Cannibal Islands argument. Hare later renamed it the Reductio ad Absurdum of Descriptivism in an article published in 1986 under the same name. Since then he has made it as his basic instrument against descriptivism. In the present article the author outlines the argument of Moral Twin Earth, presents its prototype, and offers a concise criticism of it. (shrink)

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable (...) that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the Bayesian formulation of the argument from evil for atheism against the background of the contemporary debate on Rowe’s initial inductive formulation of the argument. At the beginning I present the key premises and basics of the Bayesian formulation (especially Bayes’s theorem, the notion of epistemic probability, etc.), then I discuss the most important challenges to Rowe’s weak and strong claims. The main problem with the Bayesian formulation of the (...) class='Hi'>argument is that it does not accomplish what it was intended for: it fails to avoid the confrontation with skeptical theism. The latter has to be refuted in order to save Rowe’s argument (no matter which formulation we take into account, the inductive or the Bayesian). It seems that the debate on Rowe’s evidential argument from evil has reached a deadlock -- more and more analytic philosophers of religion claim we should return to the logical formulation of the problem of evil. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Patricius’s argument on integrality laid out in “Pampsychia”, least researched book belonging to Nova universis philosophia, in comparison with the notions, methodologies and pragmatic reach of the contemporary science of human psyche. I attempted to determine can the argument correspond to the methodological instrument of psychology or the relation is disjunctive, that is, in animosity. I emphasise Patricius’s reflection on the mindcenteredness of the soul while trying to point at the dynamic and dialectical (...) character of the psyche phenomenon as the fundamental determinant of Patricius’s psycho­ontology and the importance of implementing philosophical reflection into the mental health system framework, as a precondition for the holistic, integrative approach to the problem. (shrink)

We must agree, I think, with Frank Ebersole that there is something preposterous in supposing that the God of religious belief, the God who handed down tablets to Moses on Mt. Sinai, etc., should be proven to exist by the ontological argument. Indeed, when we place the one, the ontological argument, by the side of the other, the God of religious belief, there seems hardly to be any connection between them. But if we agree to this perception of (...) things, what sense can we make of the ontological argument, for example, the “pull” that it sometimes exerts on us? (shrink)

This book explores this question through an explication of the idea of the One in philosophy. The argument that is advanced is that the idea of One is central to the theistic account of reality.

This article explores the plausibility of an argument against embryonic stem cell research based on what the regulations already say about research on pregnant women and fetuses. The center of the argument is the notion of vulnerability and whether such a concept is applicable to human embryos. It is argued that such an argument can be made plausible. The article concludes by responding to several important objections.

In this paper, I offer a defense of what I dub “religious rationality pluralism”—that is, that people of various religions can be rational in holding a variety of religious perspectives. I distinguish two arguments against this position: the Uniqueness argument and the Disagreement argument. The aims of this essay are to argue that the Uniqueness thesis is ambiguous between two readings, that while one version of the thesis is quite plausible, it cannot be successfully used to argue against (...) rationality pluralism, and the version of the thesis that would support the argument is false. (shrink)

William Lane Craig has defended a modern First Cause argument based on 1) a principle of universal causality and 2) the claim that the universe must have had a beginning. But 1) is susceptible to counter examples from quantum theory. Moreover, Craig’s defense of 2) is open to serious question. He claims that an actual infinity (of time) is impossible; he also claims that 2) is in fact supported by big bang theory. I argue that both of these claims (...) are mistaken, and that in consequence we have no particular reason to suppose that 2) is true. I conclude that the First Cause argument fails, but I suggest that a weaker inductive argument might be worth a try. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up the conciliatory-steadfast debate occurring within social epistemology in regards to the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will argue, because the conciliatory perspective al-lows us to understand argumentation pragmatically—as a method of problem-solving within a community rather than as a method for obtaining the truth—that in most cases, we should not simply agree to disagree.

An approach to argument macrostructure -- The dialectical nature of argument -- Toulmin's problematic notion of warrant -- The linked-convergent distinction, a first approximation -- Argument structure and disciplinary perspective : the linked-convergent versus multiple-co-ordinatively compound distinctions -- The linked-convergent distinction, refining the criterion -- Argument structure and enthymemes -- From analysis to evaluation.

In the Critique of Judgment Kant had declared the moral will to be the purpose of the world, thus subordinating teleology to morality. But in his final notes, published in the Opus Posthumum, morality is increasingly emphasized as a source of religious inspiration. Some passages clearly contradict all that Kant wrote on the autonomy of the moral law in the Critique of Practical Reason and anticipate what was to become the moral argument. Thus he maintains that the religious interpretation (...) of all duties is not an addition subsequent to their perception as duties but is immediately and necessarily given with it. This means, as Kemp Smith points out, that “the categorical imperative leads directly to God and affords surety of his reality.” “The categorical imperative of the command of duty is grounded in the idea of an imperantis, who is all-powerful and holds universal sway. This is the Idea of God.”. (shrink)

Quine's translation argumnent figures centrally in his views on logic. The goal of this paper is to get clear on that argument. It can be interpreted as an argument to the effect that one should never translate somebody’s speech as going against a law of the translator’s logic. Key to this reading of the translation argument is the premise that one should never translate somebody's speech such that their speech is unintelligible. Ultimately, it is my aim to (...) reject this reading. I argue that only a weaker conclusion—one that says “not most of the time” instead of the stronger “never”—should be attributed to Quine. Accordingly, I propose and defend a weaker version of the first premise that better coheres with the weaker conclusion of the translation argument. Instead of the claim that one should never translate somebody’s speech such that their speech is unintelligible I argue that we should only ascribe to Quine the claim that one should not most of the time translate somebody’s speech in a way that makes it unintelligible. I go on to sum up the results of my discussion and respond to a criticism of my reading. (shrink)

The product/process distinction with regards to “argument” has a longstanding history and foundational role in argumentation theory. I shall argue that, regardless of one’s chosen ontology of arguments, arguments are not the product of some process of arguing. Hence, appeal to the distinction is distorting the very organizational foundations of argumentation theory and should be abandoned.

REASON AND ARGUMENT by P. T. Geach. Blackwell, 1977. xi + 99 pp. £4 cloth, £ 1.75 paper.

In this paper, I reply to Hamri's new kind of cosmological argument for the ultimate ground of being by blocking the argument in more than one place.