Since Piaget (1936), the concept of development has concerned the forms of adaptation deployed by the subject within his environment. Inspired by this constructivist perspective, many approaches, such as professional didactics (Pastré, 2011), problematization (Fabre, 2009, 2011) and investigation approaches (Grangeat, 2011, 2013) have advanced the idea of training through situations. As part of the socio-constructivist expectations of the latest teaching programs, we analyze teacher activity during a “débriefing after observation” (Villeret, 2008) about Moon phases conducted in primary school (...) classes (Munoz & Villeret, 2012). In this article we examine whether “débriefing after observation” is a situation that allows for the development of teachers and pupils. We show that this activity allows pupils to learn, “problematize”, conceptualize and develop epistemologically based knowledge. It also allows the teacher to develop his skills to «do problematize» the pupils. These results allow us to discuss further the notion of «potential development situation» (Mayen, 1999) to complement it with the notions of “reactive and effective development situations”. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn four studies, we examined the moderating impact of Interoceptive Accuracy and Interoceptive Sensibility (IS, ass...

The objective of this longitudinal study is to analyze the intrinsic drivers and values underlying managers’ organizational citizenship behaviors for the environment from a developmental psychology perspective based on measuring the stages of consciousness that shape the meaning-making systems of individuals. At time 1, the stages of consciousness of 138 managers were qualitatively assessed using the Leader Development Profile test. At time 2, a quantitative survey measured the environmental beliefs and OCBEs of these managers. The links between stages of consciousness, (...) environmental beliefs, and OCBEs were analyzed using hierarchical regressions. The main findings show that managers’ stages of consciousness positively influence two types of OCBEs, namely eco-initiatives and eco-helping, while environmental beliefs influence eco-helping and eco-civic engagement but do not appear to be connected with the stage of consciousness development. This paper first contributes to the literature on corporate greening by shedding more light on the aspects of behavioral and developmental psychology that underlie environmental leadership. Second, it bridges the gap between theories that have developed separately by showing the interconnectedness between the managers’ stage of consciousness and the more concrete environmental behaviors in the workplace that could have emulative effects throughout the organization. (shrink)

Formalisms such as description logics (DL) are sometimes expected to help terminologies ensure compliance with sound ontological principles. The objective of this paper is to study the degree to which one DL-based biomedical terminology (SNOMED CT) complies with such principles. We defined seven ontological principles (for example: each class must have at least one parent, each class must differ from its parent) and examined the properties of SNOMED CT classes with respect to these principles. Our major results are: 31% of (...) the classes have a single child; 27% have multiple parents; 51% do not exhibit any differentiae between the description of the parent and that of the child. The applications of this study to quality assurance for ontologies are discussed and suggestions are made for dealing with multiple inheritance. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe presence of emotional words and content in stories has been shown to enhance a story’s memorability, and its cultural success. Yet, recent cultural trends run in the opposite direction. Using the Google Books corpus, coupled with two metadata-rich corpora of Anglophone fiction books, we show a decrease in emotionality in English-speaking literature starting plausibly in the nineteenth century. We show that this decrease cannot be explained by changes unrelated to emotionality, and that, in our three corpora, the decrease is (...) driven almost entirely by a decline in the proportion of positive emotion-related words, while the frequency of negative emotion-related words shows little if any decline. Consistently with previous studies, we also find a link between ageing and negative emotionality at the individual level. (shrink)

Adolf Reinach belongs to the Brentanian lineage of Austrian Aristotelianism. His theory of social acts is well known, but his account of ownership has been mostly overlooked. This paper introduces and defends Reinach’s account of ownership. Ownership, for Reinach, is not a bundle of property rights. On the contrary, he argues that ownership is a primitive and indivisible relation between a person and a thing that grounds property rights. Most importantly, Reinach asserts that the nature ownership is not determined by (...) positive law but presupposed by it. Some have objected that such realism raises insuperable difficulties as to the origin of ownership, difficulties that could only be dealt with under a more conventionalist approach. I argue that the independence of the nature ownership from positive law is, in fact, compatible with the claim that its existence is dependent on human conventions. (shrink)

A recently published study on the development of the turtle shell(1) highlights the important role that development plays in the origin of evolutionary novelties(1). The evolution of the highly derived adult anatomy of turtles is a prime example of a macroevolutionary event triggered by changes in early embryonic development. Early ontogenetic deviation may cause patterns of morphological change that are not compatible with scenarios of gradualistic, stepwise transformation.

The objective of this paper is to investigate, through a qualitative study based on 38 semi-structured interviews with agents who provide assurance of sustainability reports, how they perceive and manage ethical issues underlying the verification of sustainability reports. Most of the ethical issues observed involve four interconnected aspects: the commercialism underlying sustainability assurance, the symbolic nature of the verification process, interdependency between auditing and consulting activities, and familiarity with the audited companies. The findings shed light on the reflexivity of assurance (...) providers on these issues and the legitimation strategies used to explain how they reconcile the independence and impartiality required for auditing activities with commercial aspects related to client–provider relationships. The study also shows the role of contextual variables in the ethics of assurance services. The paper contributes to the literature on the legitimacy of sustainability assurance and commercialism of the audit function. Practical implications and avenues for future research are also developed. (shrink)

Les Cahiers La Boétie accueillent des travaux interdisciplinaires explorant tous les aspects et les enjeux de l'oeuvre de La Boétie.

When individuals hold expectations about other people, they can elicit from these targets behaviors that are consistent with their expectations, even if these expectations are independent of the target’s real characteristics. In this paper, we consider the role that this phenomenon, known as behavioral confirmation, plays in shaping the social perceptions of perceivers, targets, and outside observers. As well, we address the value of laboratory research on behavioral confirmation for understanding the dynamics and outcomes of social interactions in naturally occurring (...) settings. Building on these considerations, we then examine the role of behavioral confirmation phenomena in shaping intergroup relations, with particular reference to delineating conditions in which such phenomena serve to preserve these relations. Based on this analysis, we suggest that dyadic confirmation phenomena are likely to occur in naturally occurring settings and may contribute to the maintenance and perpetuation of social stereotypes and societal structures. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the proof of the following upward categoricity theorem: Let K be a tame abstract elementary class with amalgamation, arbitrarily large models, and countable Löwenheim-Skolem number. If K is categorical in ‮א‬₁ then K is categorical in every uncountable cardinal. More generally, we prove that if K is categorical in a successor cardinal λ⁺ then K is categorical everywhere above λ⁺.

The relatively late acceptance of Darwinism in German biology and paleontology is frequently attributed to a lingering of Lamarckism, a persisting influence of German idealistic Naturphilosophie and Goethean romanticism. These factors are largely held responsible for the vitalism underlying theories of saltational and orthogenetic evolutionary change that characterize the writings of many German paleontologists during the first half of the 20th century. A prominent exponent of that tradition was Karl Beurlen, who is credited with having been the first German paleontologist (...) to present a full-fledged theory of saltational evolution and orthogenetic change. A review of Beurlen's writings reveals motives and concerns far more complex, however, and firmly rooted in contemporary völkisch thought and Aryan Science. Beurlen's mature theory of evolution can indeed be understood as his own contribution to Aryan Geology and Biology, tainted as it was with National-Socialist ideology. Evolutionary biologists of the time who opposed the theories of Beurlen and likeminded authors, i.e., idealistic morphology, typology, saltational change, orthogenesis and cyclism did so on Darwinian principles, which ultimately prevailed. But at the time when the battle was fought, their adherence to the principle of natural selection was likewise ideologically tainted, namely in terms of racial theory. National-Socialist ideology was unable to forge a unity of evolutionary theory in Germany even amongst those of its proponents who endorsed this ideology. (shrink)

Tous les textes publiés dans l'ouvrage parlent directement de l'œuvre de Jean-Michel Berthelot. La première partie, " Sociologie de Jean-Michel Berthelot ", rassemble les contributions restituant des traits de son œuvre à l'aide d'études de cas précis ou de panoramas plus larges, et balise des domaines de recherche dans lesquels il s'est illustré : sociologie de l'éducation, du corps, des sciences, épistémologie des sciences sociales. La deuxième partie rend compte des perspectives ouvertes par ses travaux et de la manière dont (...) des chercheurs ont mis en œuvre ses réflexions pour leurs propres recherches. Il s'agit donc de restituer la façon dont on peut faire de la sociologie " avec " Jean-Michel Berthelot - à l'aide de ses travaux et des jalons qu'ils posent. La troisième partie est biographique en restituant l'itinéraire académique, intellectuel et humain de Berthelot, que ce soit son parcours universitaire et social, notamment à l'ENS durant mai 68, ou encore sa période " toulousaine " où sa carrière universitaire a débuté et qui en constitue une partie essentielle. Dirigé par Jean-Christophe Marcel et Olivier Martin, cet ouvrage rassemble les contributions de collaborateurs, d'anciens étudiants ou de proches collègues de Jean-Michel Berthelot. (shrink)

A quick, but inconclusive, way to defend generous realism is to rely on the reciprocal conceptual dependency between component and resultant forces. Conceptually, there cannot be component without compounds, nor compounds, or resultants, without components. If there are only component forces, then they are not really component ; and if there are only resultant forces then there are not really resultant.

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s (...) view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom. (shrink)

The rise in computing and multimedia technology has spawned an increasing interest in the role of diagrams and sketches, not only for the purpose of conveying information but also for creative thinking and problem-solving. This book attempts to characterise the nature of "a science of diagrams" in a wide-ranging, multidisciplinary study that contains accounts of the most recent research results in computer science and psychology. Key topics include: cognitive aspects, formal aspects, and applications. It is a well-written and indispensable survey (...) for researchers and students in the fields of cognitive science, artificial intelligence, human-computer interaction, and graphics and visualisation. (shrink)

_Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin_ explore la manière dont les philosophes de l’Antiquité ont tracé une cartographie des vices, analysé leurs causes et leurs effets, et se sont interrogés sur leurs usages. _Les philosophes face au vice, de Socrate à Augustin_ explores how ancient philosophers described the vices, delineated their various kinds, accounted for their causes and effects, and reflected on how to use them.

This paper takes a hierarchical approach to the question whether species are individuals or natural kinds. The thesis defended here is that species are spatiotemporally located complex wholes (individuals), that are composed of (i.e., include) causally interdependent parts, which collectively also instantiate a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) natural kind. Species may form open or closed genetic systems that are dynamic in nature, that have fuzzy boundaries due to the processual nature of speciation, that may have leaky boundaries as is manifest (...) in lateral gene transfer and introgression, that may be of multiple origins through hybridization, and that may split and merge and split again over time. The identity conditions of species qua individuals will have to be anchored in their history, rather than in their unique evolutionary origin. Species qua historically conditioned HPC natural kinds requires the kind to be mereologically structured, subject to the part-whole relation rather than the membership relation. This implies that there can be more than one kind of natural kinds. (shrink)

Our thesis is that there is a notion of justification, corresponding to the active exercise of a competence in order to attain truth, whose value is explained neither by reliabilism, nor by the usual versions of credit theory.

Comment aborder de manière pédagogique la question de l'identité de l'homme dans l'enseignement et l'apprentissage des sciences humaines? Dans cet essai de philosophie pédagogique, voilà l'unique préoccupation à laquelle s'efforce de répondre Olivier Nkulu Kabamba en sa double qualité d'enseignant universitaire en sciences humaines et de philosophe formé en sciences humaines.

Nous distinguons ordinairement le corps de l’esprit : nous parvenons aisément à concevoir (même si nous n’y croyons pas forcément) que notre esprit survive à notre corps, ou qu’il aille se loger dans un autre corps. Il y a là, pensons-nous, une véritable différence de nature. Mais bien que cette distinction nous soit très intuitive, dès lors que nous cherchons à spécifier le critère sur lequel elle repose, elle se dérobe. Tout se passe comme si nous n’avions aucun mal à (...) classer les choses d’un côté ou de l’autre de la frontière qui sépare le corps de l’esprit, mais que nous ne parvenions pas à la définir précisément. A quel critère obéissons- nous en effet lorsque nous opérons une bipartition entre phénomènes mentaux et phénomènes physiques dans un ensemble tel que : une croyance, le téléphone du salon, un aimant, l’envie d’un florentin, le Mont Blanc, la vue du Mont Blanc, un claquement de porte, un regret, le bruit d’un moulin, la connaissance du théorème de Thalès, la jalousie, la couleur de la neige, le souvenir d’un citronnier à Menton ? Nous serions probablement tous d’accord pour ranger du côté des phénomènes physiques le téléphone du salon, le claquement de porte, la couleur de la neige, l’aimant, le Mont Blanc et le bruit du moulin ; et du côté des phénomènes mentaux la croyance, l’envie d’un florentin, le regret, la vue du Mont Blanc, la connaissance du théorème de Thalès, la jalousie et le souvenir d’un citronnier de Menton. Mais nous divergerions probablement si nous avions à formuler le critère d’après lequel nous avons opéré cette bipartition. La première chose à faire est donc de tenter d’examiner les critères qui peuvent nous permettre d’établir la distinction entre le corps et l’esprit afin de retenir le plus pertinent. Dans la mesure du possible, celui-ci devra être à la fois informatif (ne pas nous renvoyer simplement à la distinction intuitive que nous pratiquons quotidiennement) et neutre (par exemple être acceptable aussi bien par un dualiste que par un matérialiste). Une fois cette distinction établie, nous serons en mesure de poser trois problèmes. (shrink)

Sometimes we say that pleasure is distinct form joy, happiness, or good mood. Some other times we say the joy, happiness or good mood are types of pleasure. This suggests the existence of two concepts of pleasure: one specific, the other generic. According to the specific concept, pleasure is one type of positive affects among others. Pleasure is to be distinguished from joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, jubilation; happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being; enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, delectation, (...) enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill; satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph; good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness; relief (or at least from some of these concepts). According to the generic concept of pleasure, a pleasure is any of these positive affects. Joy, gladness, contentment, merriment, glee, ecstasy, euphoria, exhilaration, elation, jubilation, happiness, felicity, bliss, well-being, enjoyment, amusement, fun, rejoicing, delectation, enchantment, delight, rapture, relish, thrill, satisfaction, gratification, pride, triumph, good mood, jollity, gaiety, cheerfulness, relief and pleasure in the specific sense are all species of pleasures. In this thesis, I shall focus on the generic concept of pleasure, in order to address the question “what is the property of pleasantness common to all positive affects?” In order to address this question nevertheless, one need to have at least rough grip on pleasure in the specific sense and on what distinguishes it from other positive affects. I shall therefore start by hinting at the problem of the definition of the specific concept of pleasure. (shrink)

Le sens commun distingue le corps de l’esprit. Il considère par exemple que les désirs et les souvenirs sont des phénomènes mentaux alors que les sons et les courants d’air sont des phénomènes physiques. Au sein de l’esprit, il distingue diverses facultés mentales : il considère par exemple que l’imagination est distincte de la volonté, qui est elle-même distincte de la perception. Au sein de la faculté perceptive, il distingue cinq sens : l’odorat, le goût, la vue, le toucher et (...) l’ouïe. Cette distinction entre différentes modalités perceptives s’avère tout à fait opératoire : nous n’avons le plus souvent aucun mal à répondre à la question « comment avez- vous perçu X : l’avez-vous vu, entendu, touché, ... ? ». En outre, cette distinction semble robuste : elle résiste par exemple à la co-occurrence d’expériences de modalités distinctes. Ainsi pouvons-nous voir et entendre un planeur à la fois. Enfin, nous semblons convaincus, en ce qui concerne les humains, du caractère exhaustif de cette distinction : il nous arrive certes de parler de l’intuition comme d’un sixième sens, ou de parler du sens de l’humour ou des affaires, mais ces expressions sont entendues en un sens figuré. (shrink)

Nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle les images sont phénoménalement transparentes : nous ne voyons (quasiment) jamais leur surface mais seulement ce que les images dépeignent, ce qui implique que notre expérience des images est fondamentalement une illusion. Cette thèse s’oppose à celle de R. Wollheim, qui fait aujourd’hui figure de position standard, selon laquelle nous percevons la surface et le depictum. Une même expérience perceptive, selon nous, ne peut avoir deux objets ou deux aspects. En ce sens, nous sommes (...) plus proche de la position de E.H. Gombrich : nous percevons soit la surface, soit le depictum, mais jamais les deux. Nous cherchons toutefois à la radicaliser en soutenant qu’il est finalement très rare de percevoir la surface de l’image. (shrink)

Faced with the conflict between our intuition that no two things ever share a place at a time and these counterexamples to it, philosophers usually try to find a happy medium between sticking with the original intuition and rejecting all of its counterexamples or giving up the whole intuition and accepting all the counterexamples. Some counterexamples might be rejected on conceptual grounds : one may deny for instance that absolute space is in the same place that the entities located therein (...) on the ground that absolute space is not itself located. One may also reject the distinct existence of some of the entities put forward in the examples : determinable properties might be nothing else than boolean combinations of determinate ones, spots on a screen may be just four dimensional worms whose passing through each other is a matter of part sharing rather than compenetration, etc. But as long as the conceivability of at least one counterexample is granted, the impenetrability intuition has to be weake- ned. To this end, one can weaken either the modal force of the impenetrability intuition or its scope. One may claim for instance that things are impenetrable in our world, but grant that the remaining counterexample refers to genuine metaphysical possibilities (although not natural ones). On the other hand, on may claim that the impenetrability intuition does not bear on every entity in the outside world, but only on some of them. Locke, famously, did not want to give up the metaphysical necessity of impenetrability, but agreed to restrict it to entities of the same kind.4 One other way to restrict the scope of the intuition of impenetrability is to claim that only independent entities (substances, or things proper) are impenetrable , or that only material entities are. (shrink)

One common answer to the question of the unity of pleasures is to try to define pleasantness by appealing to a kind of mental states whose unity is less questionable. Desires have been conceived as the best candidates for this unifying role. Indeed, one way of classifying the preceding options concerning the definition of pleasantness, is to constrast conative (or motivational) theories of pleasure with non conative ones. Conative theories of pleasure are often considered as one homogeneous type of pleasure (...) reductionism1. But there are indeed two importantly distinct way of defined pleasure with the help of desire: one can define pleasures as objects of desires (D7) or as satisfactions of desires (D8). For convenience, I shall call desirabilist the theory of the first kind (D7) and satisfactionist the theories of the second kind (D8). In the following, I shall argue that both these options fail. On the assumption that D7 and D8 are the only desired-based account of pleasure, this implies that pleasure can’t be reduced to desire. (shrink)

I shall defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address an objection against the very possibility of experiencing mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the kind of experience by which we access mind-independence.

Deux choses sont en contact s'il n'y a rien entre elles (ni volume, ni ligne, ni point) et qu'elles ne se chevauchent pas (en un volume, un ligne ou un point). Le contact est la limite de proximité des choses : si deux choses sont en contact, deux autres choses ne peuvent être pas être plus près l'une de l'autre sans se pénétrer.

• Thesis to be defended: there are no tropes. • General argument: there are no good way to account for the particularity of tropes (which is essential to tropes). • Six views to be rejected: 1. Tropes particularized by their locations in formal spaces 2. Tropes as scattered particulars 3. Tropes particularized by their bearers 4. Tropes particularised by their constituents 5. Tropes particularized by their individual dependence to their bearers 6. Tropes as primitely particular .

Assumption: Sensory modalities are individuated by their proper objects. Hearing is the direct perception of sounds, sight the direct perception of colours, etc. Objection: There is no single type of proper sensibles in the case of touch (temperature, solidity, hardness, humidity, texture, weight, vibration...). Answer : 1. accept to distinguish the sense of pressure (touch strictly speaking) from the sense of temperature. 2. argue that pressures are the direct perceptual objects through which one perceives weight, texture, solidity.

This chapter aims to contribute to the endeavour of investigating nonhuman animals as experiencing subjects in their own right with their own species-specific histories. Our focus is on the examination of pain experience in animals. We argue that there is need for more research in which pain experience in animals is accounted for in species-specific terms. Making use of empirical studies in the fields of neurobiology, evolutionary-developmental biology, comparative psychology, and cognitive ethology, we try to offer a phenomenological analysis of (...) indications and expressions of pain experience in animals. We attempt to show how different animals are capable of indicating and expressing specific and unique experiences of pain in terms of their particular species, evolution, and places of living in human and natural contexts. (shrink)

In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome (...) a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects. (shrink)

We open this paper by explicating the content of « Laplace’s myth », which we construe as an inference resting on the conjunction of two premises, the hypothesis of an unlimited intelligence and the hypothesis of an ontologically deterministic universe, and leading to the thesis of epistemological determinism. We then aim at showing that such an inference is not valid. To this purpose, we seek for a particular metaphysical framework within which it is possible to hold the conjunction of the (...) premises of the Laplacean inference together with the negation of its conclusion. In particular, after having assessed – and then discarded – the possibility that Bergsonism be a suitable framework to this effect, we show that a specific philosophy of evolution, which has been influenced by – but also took its distance with regard to – Bergsonism, turns out to be the required framework. Emphasising the existence as well as the very consistence of this philosophy is the occasion for putting an end to Laplace’s myth. (shrink)

En 1936, F. Chapouthier découvrait sous le sol de la pièce III 2 du palais de Malia deux épées de bronze ; le pommeau d'os de l'une était décoré d'une rondelle d'or portant un acrobate au repoussé. Ces trouvailles étaient rapportées par lui au premier palais, datation contestée depuis par plusieurs savants. Une fouille complémentaire en 1946 amenait la découverte sous le dallage de la pièce voisine III 1 d'un groupe de petits vases de Chamaizi. En 1981 un nouveau nettoyage (...) du niveau antérieur a été réalisé après dépose du dallage de III 1. Une installation caractéristique avec plates-formes stuquées, rigoles et vases collecteurs, qui n'était connue jusqu'ici que par des photographies, a été remise au jour, soigneusement relevée et étudiée. La chronologie proposée par Chapouthier a été confirmée : la salle stuquée et donc l'épée à l'acrobate trouvée sur son sol sont à dater de l'époque protopalatiale. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ Enraciné dans la philosophie politique au XVIIIe siècle français, le concept d’association occupe une place essentielle dans la philosophie de Saint-Simon. Chez cet auteur, l’association a pour objet la production, elle présuppose une organisation intégrée et constitue l’unité de la société. La société organique de Saint-Simon évolue selon un principe de complexification vers un grand but industriel commun. Fourier place aussi l’association comme condition de la coopération, mais elle en est le moteur. L’organisation de l’investissement psychologique dans l’association créerait (...) continuellement la société fouriériste. De Saint-Simon, Marx semble retenir l’idée d’association créant l’organisme productif; il emprunte à Fourier la production d’une société nouvelle collectivisant toutes les dimensions personnelles. Mais l’association devient chez Marx le fruit de la dialectique de l’histoire, dont le moment négatif rend l’organisme collectif à lui-même et lui confère une individualité nouvelle. L’association chez Marx s’impose comme une unité. Chacun participe nécessairement à cette réalité qui doit l’affranchir des limites de sa propre individualité. ABSTRACT Rooted in the french philosophy of the XVIIIth french century, the concept of association holds an essential place in the philosophy of Saint-Simon. In this author, association concerns production, it is generated by an integrated organization and forms unity in the society. In Saint-Simon, the organized society evolves according to a principle of complexification towards a great industrial aim. Fourier equally sets association before cooperation, considering it as a real driving force. According to Fourier, psychological commitment in association should make dynamic any cooperation. Marx possibly deducted from Saint-Simon the idea that association should create the collective organism. He borrowed from Fourier the production of a new society, getting collective the whole human person. But, association in Marx's thought becomes the result of the dialectic of history. A negative phase in this dialectic gives the collective organisme to itself back and confers on it a new individuality. In Marx, association is essential as a unity. Each one necessary takes part in this reality which will make him free from the limits of his own individuality. (shrink)

Comment, en pleine crise environnementale, réorienter l’énergie créative du design au service d’une proto-démocratie technique? À partir d’une capacité cachée du design à construire et déconstruire les environnements matériels, nous disons qu’il est avant tout un processus de conception dont la réversibilité permet de comprendre et d’agir progressivement sur nos structures techniques. Et de tenter de se mouvoir dans un monde matériel ramifié à l’extrême.