We give a simple and direct proof that super-consistency implies the cut-elimination property in deduction modulo. This proof can be seen as a simplification of the proof that super-consistency implies proof normalization. It also takes ideas from the semantic proofs of cut elimination that proceed by proving the completeness of the cut-free calculus. As an application, we compare our work with the cut-elimination theorems in higher-order logic that involve V-complexes.

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...) of some emergence ascriptions that traditional accounts are unable to accommodate. (shrink)

The “gift exchange theory” articulated by Marcel Mauss, along with his core concept of a threefold obligation, is the dominant theoretical framework used to explain the majority of gift issues in marketing. This perspective assumes that some interest always lies behind gifts, such that a gift always implies a counterpart of receiving something in return. Despite the relevance of this approach in understanding the day-to-day consumer behavior, this paper presents empirical cases where the consumer is also able to give freely, (...) that is to say without implying a counterpart or even expecting it. To explain those empirical cases, we mobilize a key teaching of the Catholic Church: the “gratuitous gift” and then introduce the concept of the “need to give.” We show that gratuitousness is a relevant concept to understand most of gifts made by consumers, and we develop the normative aspect of gratuitous gift for ethical marketers. We also show that Catholic Social Teaching offers an appropriate anthropology to understand consumer behaviors motivated by this need for gratuitousness. To conclude, we propose further avenues of research. (shrink)

Sixteen years after Kim’s seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the emergence concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim’s work that does more justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic third way between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction of supervenience and irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon—theoretical, explanatory and causal emergence—is properly identified and (...) defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists’ agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges. (shrink)

We represent consensus formation processes based on iterated opinion pooling as a dynamic approach to common knowledge of posteriors :1236–1239, 1976; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis in J Econ Theory 28:192–200, 1982). We thus provide a concrete and plausible Bayesian rationalization of consensus through iterated pooling. The link clarifies the conditions under which iterated pooling can be rationalized from a Bayesian perspective, and offers an understanding of iterated pooling in terms of higher-order beliefs.

In this paper, we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws of nature that they are immutable (though we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question whether they do actually change once in a while). In order to do so, we survey three popular accounts of lawhood—(Armstrong-style) necessitarianism, (Bird-style) dispositionalism and (Lewis-style) ‘best system analysis’—and expose the extent, as well as the philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave (...) room for the possibility of changing laws. (shrink)

This essay discusses attempts that have been made to explain the striking similarities between two theories propounded in 1905 by Albert Einstein and Henri Poincaré without any mutual reference.

In this paper, I put forward a benchmark account of emergence in terms of non-explainability and explicate the relationship that exists between its synchronic and diachronic declinations. I develop an argument whose conclusion is that emergence is essentially a “two-faceted” notion, i.e. it always encapsulates both synchronic and diachronic dimensions. I then compare this account with alternative recent accounts of emergence that define the concept through the notion of unpredictability or topological non-equivalence.

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic “third way” between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses—distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between derivational and functional reduction—I (...) define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism . I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter. (shrink)

We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know and believe (...) about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata. (shrink)

In this paper I study two ways of transforming decision problems on the basis of previously adopted intentions, ruling out incompatible options and imposing a standard of relevance, with a particular focus on situations of strategic interaction. I show that in such situations problems arise which do not appear in the single-agent case, namely that transformation of decision problems can leave the agents with no option compatible with what they intend. I characterize conditions on the agents’ intentions which avoid such (...) problematic scenarios, in a way that requires each agent to take account of the intentions of others. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de mettre en évidence deux stratégies émergentistes possibles qui constituent une médiation intéressante entre les extrêmes classiques que sont le physicalisme réductionniste et le dualisme des substances. En distinguant trois niveaux de tension possibles entre monisme et dualisme — le niveau des substances, le niveau des propriétés causales et celui des prédicats — nous sommes amené à formuler deux positions philosophiques associées à deux concepts d’émergence distincts : l’émergence représentationnelle et l’émergence causale. Ces deux (...) concepts s’avèrent fidèles aux intuitions des premiers émergentistes véhiculées au travers de l’étymologie même du concept d’émergence, et permettent une interprétation non triviale de la maxime classique : « Le tout est plus que la somme des parties. »I emphasize in this paper two possible emergentist strategies that constitute interesting middle grounds between classical views that are reductive physicalism and substance dualism. By distinguishing three levels of tension between monism and dualism — the levels of substance, causal properties and predicates — one is allowed to formulate two philosophical views that may be associated with two distinct concepts of emergence : representational emergence and causal emergence. Both concepts are faithful to the intuitions of early emergentists that are conveyed in the very etymology of the concept of emergence, and they allow a non-trivial reading of the classical maxim : “the whole is more than the sum of the parts”. (shrink)

Many recent studies on network technologies and cities share an alarmist view of the impact of technological or regulatory change in utility sectors on the social and spatial fabric of cities, pointing to growing discrimination and inequalities, alienation, enhanced social exclusion and urban “splintering” on a universal scale. A science and technology study perspective on these matters is helpful in moving beyond this “universal alarmism” by emphasizing the ambivalence inherent to all technologies, the significant potential of contestation of, and resistance, (...) to technology-supported forms of discrimination, and the deeply contingent nature of the process of appropriation of new technologies and, as a consequence, of the social “effects” of technologies. Adopting this perspective would mean actively searching for and exploring these context-dependent and often conflictive appropriation processes. For it is in these spaces that we might begin to identify urban technological politics that break free from an intellectually and politically disabling technological pessimism. (shrink)

In this paper we study substantive assumptions in social interaction. By substantive assumptions we mean contingent assumptions about what the players know and believe about each other’s choices and information. We first explain why substantive assumptions are fundamental for the analysis of games and, more generally, social interaction. Then we show that they can be compared formally, and that there exist contexts where no substantive assumptions are being made. Finally we show that the questions raised in this paper are related (...) to a number of issues concerning “large” structures in epistemic game theory. (shrink)

In this paper, after presenting three challenges that any knowledge-based demarcation between science and non-science should meet, namely, the skeptical, triviality, and mimicry challenges, I show how a recent contender in epistemology, viz., presuppositional epistemic contextualism, allows these challenges to be met, hence pointing toward a novel solution to the perennial demarcation problem. Conceiving of scientific knowledge from the vantage point of contextualism forces us to consider science as being first and foremost a distinctive epistemological context, which has the peculiarity (...) of coming with a very high degree of stringency for the truth conditions of putative knowledge attributions. The fact that science imposes particularly stringent norms on knowledge is measured by the extension of the set of counterpossibilities that science is (i) in the business of eliminating on the basis of available evidence and (ii) ready to take seriously (insofar as they are consistent with the scientific community’s pragmatic presuppositions at a given time and place). (shrink)

The main purpose of the present chapter is to argue in favor of the claim that, contrary to what is usually and tacitly assumed, organization is not necessary for organicism. To this purpose, I first set up the stage by providing a working characterization of organicism that involves two free parameters, whose variations allow for covering the rich and diverse conceptual landscape of organicism, past and present. In particular, I contend that organization is usually construed as a “mean to an (...) end” notion, or as a tool put at the service of vindicating organicism’s twofold defining assumption, namely, that organisms are determinative entities in their own right, to the effect that (organismic) biology is epistemologically autonomous from physico-chemistry. After a short detour devoted to show that organicism generally collapses on a spectrum of variants of emergentism, I take inspiration from a recent account of emergence called “transformational emergence” to put forward a transformational version of organicism. For such a version meets organicism’s defining standards in a way that is free of any commitment to organization, arguing for its very conceptual soundness finally allows for legitimizing the claim that organicism doesn’t really need organization. (shrink)

Le concept d’émergence est récemment réapparu avec force sur le devant de la scène philosophique. La notion est séduisante, notamment en cela qu’elle permettrait de promouvoir une vision « non réductionniste » du monde naturel. À cet égard, elle se retrouve souvent mobilisée à tort et à travers à tous les niveaux du discours scientifique, de la physique aux sciences cognitives, en passant par la biologie. Mais qu’est-ce que l’émergence exactement ? Est-ce seulement un concept cohérent ? N’y gagnerait-on pas (...) à identifier, derrière l’idée traditionnelle du « tout est plus que la somme des parties », une pluralité de lectures possibles, chacune associée à des limites et des enjeux différents ? (shrink)

On a souvent souligné que l’usage du concept de substance était problématique dans les Méditations, préférant l’exposé plus rigoureux des Principia. À l’encontre de cette interprétation, cet article affirme que le traitement analytique de la substance est non seulement conforme à l’ordre des raisons, mais que s’y développe une aventure révélatrice : si la réflexion sur l’ ego et la cogitatio tend à faire de celui-ci une quasi substance, la formule « ego autem substantia » accomplit dans la Troisième Méditation (...) une substantialisation qui n’est que transitoire. Car cette substantialisation, fondée sur la présomption de l’ ego se concevant comme author, est aussitôt contestée à la lumière de la relation que l’ ego entretient au Dieu infini. (shrink)

Esquisses, plans, documents et photographies présentent l'exposition en cours de construction. Un texte explicatif donne les principales clés de lecture du poème de Rimbaud "Après le déluge", extrait des "Illuminations", et de la scénographie adoptée pour le mettre en scène.

Comment interpréter le regain d'intérêt pour les réflexions sur la transcendance, la quête de sens, la morale et l'éthique dans nos sociétés contemporaines? C'est ce sur quoi Lawrence Olivier et Yves Boisvert se sont penchés dans cet ouvrage ; le premier accuse les théoriciens de la postmodernité d'être de grands fabulateurs qui font la promotion de la reconfiguration des systèmes moraux, tandis que le second reproche aux nihilistes d'être de grands nostalgiques de la Vérité qui ont sombré dans un (...) fatalisme total et un individualisme radical face à l'échec du projet de la modernité. Leur désaccord portant principalement sur l'interprétation à donner à ce retour des grands questionnements sur les valeurs et le sens de la vie, l'hypothèse de base est que les individus ont besoin de croire à une certaine forme de transcendance et qu'ils ressentent un profond besoin de donner un sens à leur vie. Invités à se prononcer sur cette question, anthropologues, philosophes, politicologues, sociologues et théologiens livrent ici leurs propres analyses de cette problématique par un riche panorama des réflexions sur la sexualité, la mort, la mode, l'art, les jeunes de la rue, les activités extrêmes, la religion et la pop psycho. Sans épuiser la problématique de la transcendance contemporaine, cet ouvrage stimulera la curiosité de tous les lecteurs intéressés aux nouvelles valeurs culturelles ou aux nouveaux comportements sociétaux. (shrink)

In this paper I study intentions of the form, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version (...) of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to show that, when properly understood, both the ’scientifically proven’ and calls to conspiracy are grounded in the very same epistemic misunderstanding about the exact nature of what is commonly required to acquire knowledge. In other words, I will track and identify the common (illegitimate) basis for both these rhetorical manoeuvres which unfortunately occupy most of the space in public debates nowadays. On this basis, I will offer a modest philosophical recommendation for science (...) communicators. With these objectives in mind, I will first present a historical case about the acquisition of new scientific knowledge (section 2). This may initially seem a secondary issue but it will help render a given epistemic process salient and this will then be accounted for by a recent epistemological theory (section 3). On this basis, both the ’scientifically proven’ and calls to conspiracies will be characterized, the aim being to show that these rhetorical strategies actually constitute the two sides of the same epistemic fallacy. (shrink)

En tout généralité, le concept d’émergence capture une relation entre deux entités, un « émergent » E et sa « base d’émergence » B, de telle manière que l’on puisse affirmer que E dépend de B et que, malgré cette dépendance, E s’avère irréductible à B. Une façon classique de concrétiser cette idée est de considérer E comme un « tout » et B comme les « parties » de ce tout. Dans l’esprit de la maxime classique selon laquelle « (...) Le tout est plus que la somme de ses parties », l’émergence cristallise ainsi un double refus : celui de la simple assimilation du tout à ses parties, ainsi que celui de la radicale déconnexion entre le tout et ses parties. À cet égard, affirmer par exemple qu’une cellule vivante émerge d’une base moléculaire inerte sous-jacente revient à considérer que, d’une part, la nature de la cellule est bien dépendante de la nature des molécules qui la composent et que, d’autre part et malgré cette dépendance, certaines propriétés de la cellule ne peuvent être réduites aux propriétés de ces molécules. Ainsi posée, l’émergence se révèle un outil philosophique prometteur pour constituer et défendre une voie médiane entre le réductionnisme et le dualisme, positions selon lesquelles, respectivement, « le tout n’est que la somme de ses parties » et « le tout est hétérogène à ses parties ». Elle permet alors de faire droit à l’intuition selon laquelle les sciences comme la biologie ou la psychologie, ainsi que les objets que ces sciences étudient – par exemple les organismes ou l’« esprit » – témoignent d’une relative autonomie par rapport aux sciences étudiant les constituants élémentaires de la réalité naturelle. -/- Dans la présente entrée, après avoir introduit à l’idée générale de l’émergence et au projet philosophique initiateur de l’émergentisme, et après avoir fait recension de différents phénomènes possiblement émergents, nous tâchons d’élucider les déterminants historiques des différentes théories contemporaines de l’émergence. Dans un effort ensuite plus conceptuel, nous nous attachons à distinguer les différents sens dans lesquels une entité peut être considérée comme émergente. Nous concluons cette entrée en identifiant les apories majeures de l’émergentisme actuel dans sa version dominante. (shrink)

The main contention of the present paper is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to ontological emergence and, accordingly, to some clear-cut empirical cases of such an emergence. The bias in question is twofold. It consists in considering whatever emerges to be both systematically simultaneous with, as well as belonging to a higher level with respect to, what it emerges from. What (...) I aim at showing in this paper is that putting aside such a twofold postulate allows for devising and exploring the prospects of an alternative perspective on ontological emergence, referred to as “flat emergence”. More particularly, I argue that sketching a theory of such an emergence is relevant in two respects: one conceptual, the other empirical. Not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense of some emergence ascriptions that synchronic and/or hierarchical accounts are unable to accommodate. Traduzione dall'inglese a cura di Erica Onnis. (shrink)

We open this paper by explicating the content of « Laplace’s myth », which we construe as an inference resting on the conjunction of two premises, the hypothesis of an unlimited intelligence and the hypothesis of an ontologically deterministic universe, and leading to the thesis of epistemological determinism. We then aim at showing that such an inference is not valid. To this purpose, we seek for a particular metaphysical framework within which it is possible to hold the conjunction of the (...) premises of the Laplacean inference together with the negation of its conclusion. In particular, after having assessed – and then discarded – the possibility that Bergsonism be a suitable framework to this effect, we show that a specific philosophy of evolution, which has been influenced by – but also took its distance with regard to – Bergsonism, turns out to be the required framework. Emphasising the existence as well as the very consistence of this philosophy is the occasion for putting an end to Laplace’s myth. (shrink)

Après avoir présenté l’oscillation contemporaine entre un excès d’attention à la conjugalité au détriment de la filiation, puis un excès d’attention à la filiation au détriment de la conjugalité, et la spécificité de chacun de ces liens, l’auteur cherche à comprendre la fragilité conjugale actuelle à travers une histoire des idées et des images du couple amoureux en Occident. L’invention du mariage amoureux, qui coïncide avec l’invention du divorce (J. Milton), son apothéose avec le cinéma parlant hollywoodien, laissent aujourd’hui la (...) place à une profonde désaffection. L’Occident ne croit plus à l’un de ses mythes les plus fondamentaux. (shrink)

L'article adopte un point de vue plus systématique qu'historique sur la métaphysique de Christian Wolff et, en particulier, sur sa théorie de la conscience. Il s'intéresse à des écrits de controverse de l'époque, impliquant Lange, Ludovici et un certain Bequignole, officier dans l'armée prussienne. Ce dernier, bien qu'il ne fût pas un philosophe professionnel, a relevé dans la Métaphysique allemande quelques défauts graves de la théorie wolffienne de la conscience. En refusant d'attribuer la raison aux bêtes et en décrivant la (...) mémoire du chien en termes très proches de la mémoire de soi propre aux personnes, le philosophe de Halle n'a pas pu éviter de se contredire. The paper adopts a more systematic than historical point of view on Christian Wolff's metaphysics and, in particular, on his theory of consciousness. It is interested in controversial writings of those days with reference e.g. to Lange, Ludovici and an officer of the Prussian army so-called Bequignole ; the latter, though he tvas no professional philosopher, found a few serious defects of Wolff's theory of consciousness in the latter's German Metaphysics. By refusing to grant reason to animals and by describing the dog's memory in terms very close to the self memory specific to persons, Wolff couldn't avoid contradicting himself. (shrink)

Le potentiel de développement porté par les TIC reste quelque chose de purement théorique pour des millions de personnes compte tenu de l'existence de la fracture numérique qui sépare les « inforiches » des « infopauvres ». Dans la perspective de la construction d'une société de l'information inclusive, la question de l'accès universel aux TIC est donc centrale, notamment pour les pays africains. Cette problématique ne doit cependant pas être réduite à la question de la disponibilité des infrastructures de télécommunications; (...) elle doit prendre en compte l'accès réel, c'est-à-dire les usages. Afin de résoudre les problèmes de diverses natures interdisant l'appropriation des TIC par le plus grand nombre, il faut aller au-delà de la régulation par le marché et mettre en oeuvre de vigoureuses politiques publiques visant à faire de l'accès universel une réalité concrète pour tous ceux dont les chances de bénéficier pleinement des opportunités offertes par la société de l'information sont aujourd'hui hypothéquées.The potential of ICT-led development remains something purely theoretical for millions of people due to the existence of the digital divide between the "haves" from "have-nots". In view of the construction of the information society inclusive, the issue of universal access to ICTs is central, especially for African countries. This issue should not be reduced to the question of the availability of telecommunications infrastructure, but must take into account the actual access, that is to say, uses. To solve problems of various kinds prohibiting the appropriation of ICTs by the largest number, you must go beyond regulation by the market and implement vigorous public policies to make universal access a reality concrete for all those whose opportunities to benefit fully from the opportunities offered by the information society are now mortgaged. (shrink)