"... both an excellent introduction and a thoroughgoing analysis of Kristeva’s writing." —Signs "The book is a brilliant combination of a recuperative and a critical reading of Kristeva’s work." —Changes: An International Journal of Psychology & Psychotherapy "... a thorough, detailed, and critical analysis of the writings of Julia Kristeva." —Elizabeth Grosz "... the most involved and engaging study of Julia Kristeva’s work to date..." —The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory This first full-scale feminist interpretation of Kristeva’s work (...) situates her within the context of French feminism. Oliver guides her readers through Kristeva’s intellectual formation in linguistics, Freud, Lacan, and poetics. This comprehensive introduction to Kristeva makes accessible her important contributions to philosophy, linguistics, and psychoanalytic feminism. (shrink)

In this title, new and established scholars demonstrate the application of feminism in a range of academic disciplines including history, philosophy, politics, and sociology.

Although the biological bases of forgetting remain obscure, the consensus among cognitive psychologists emphasizes interference processes, rejecting decay in accounting for memory loss. In contrast to this view, recent advances in understanding the neurobiology of long-term memory maintenance lead us to propose that a brain-wide well-regulated decay process, occurring mostly during sleep, systematically removes selected memories. Down-regulation of this decay process can increase the life expectancy of a memory and may eventually prevent its loss. Memory interference usually occurs during certain (...) active processing phases, such as encoding and retrieval, and will be stronger in brain areas with minimal sensory integration and less pattern separation. In areas with efficient pattern separation, such as the hippocampus, interference-driven forgetting will be minimal, and, consequently, decay will cause most forgetting. (shrink)

We present a plural logic that is as expressively strong as it can be without sacrificing axiomatisability, axiomatise it, and use it to chart the expressive limits set by axiomatisability. To the standard apparatus of quantification using singular variables our object-language adds plural variables, a predicate expressing inclusion (is/are/is one of/are among), and a plural definite description operator. Axiomatisability demands that plural variables only occur free, but they have a surprisingly important role. Plural description is not eliminable in favour of (...) quantification; on the contrary, quantification is definable in terms of it. Predicates and functors (function signs) can take plural as well as singular terms as arguments, and both many-valued and single-valued functions are expressible. The system accommodates collective as well as distributive predicates, and the condition for a predicate to be distributive is definable within it; similarly for functors. An essential part of the project is to demonstrate the soundness and completeness of the calculus with respect to a semantics that does without set-theoretic domains and in which the use of settheoretic extensions of predicates and functors is replaced by the sui generis relations and functions for which the extensions were at best artificial surrogates. Our metalanguage is designed to solve the difficulties involved in talking plurally about individuals and about the semantic values of plural items. (shrink)

For at least the last twenty years, philosophers have attempted various strategies for reviving the Hegelian notion of recognition and redeploying it in discourses centered around social justice, including multiculturalism, feminism, race theory, and queer theory. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic may seem like an obvious place to start to analyze the oppression of one group by another. Given that Hegel is not literally talking about slaves, however, but a stage of consciousness, indeed the onset of self-consciousness, we might wonder why his (...) notion of recognition has become so important to these contemporary discourses on oppression. One reason is that the Hegelian model of recognition proposes that.. (shrink)

Urban street trees (USTs) have a range of values – some of which are easier to quantify than others. Focusing specifically on the UK context and using the Sheffield Tree Protests (2012–) as a case study, whilst confirming existing research as to the variety of values associated with their specifically ‘cultural’ services, the article argues that USTs have an additional potential form – what I call ‘civic-transformative value’. This form of value has at least three key characteristics. Firstly, it is (...) place-based and communal; second, its form is ‘relational’; and finally, as intrinsically contingent, it is pluralistic in the sense that its civic-transformative potential is dependent on successfully integrating a range of other values. The article emphasises both the possibility and necessity of ‘convergence’ – that is, a pluralistic and pragmatic alliance of values which might help protect not only USTs, but other embattled sites of nature. (shrink)

As a linguist, Julia Kristeva has pioneered a revolutionary theory of the sign in its relation to social and political emancipation; as a practicing psychoanalyst, she has produced work on the nature of the human subject and sexuality, and on the "new maladies" of today's neurotic. _The Portable Kristeva_ is the only fully comprehensive compilation of Kristeva's key writings. The second edition includes added material from Kristeva's most important works of the past five years, including _The Sense and Non-Sense of (...) Revolt_, _Intimate Revolt_, and _Hannah Arendt_. Editor Kelly Oliver has also added new material to the introduction, summarizing Kristeva's latest intellectual endeavors and updating the bibliography. (shrink)

In medizinethischen Kontexten bezeichnet der Ausdruck „Odysseus-Verträge“ Selbstbindungen, die in der vorausschauenden Bitte von Patienten an ihre Ärzte bestehen, eigene spätere Behandlungspräferenzen nicht zu befolgen. Umstritten ist jedoch, ob eine vorhergehende Anweisung ein Handeln gegen den Patientenwillen in der aktualen Behandlungssituation rechtfertigt. In diesem Beitrag wird die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit von Odysseus-Anweisungen erörtert. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass die Befolgung einer Odysseus-Anweisung eine Form des paternalistischen Handelns darstellt und die Frage nach der Verbindlichkeit von Odysseus-Anweisungen daher in diejenige nach der (...) Rechtfertigung paternalistischen Handelns zu überführen ist . Im Folgenden wird als Rechtfertigungsmodell für paternalistisches Handeln ein Zustimmungsmodell verteidigt , dem zufolge eine paternalisierende Maßnahme durch die antizipierte spätere Zustimmung des Patienten zu dieser Maßnahme gerechtfertigt wird . Nach einer Erörterung des Einwandes, dass damit die besonderen normativen Probleme von Odysseus-Anweisungen aus dem Blick geraten , werden abschließend Fälle untersucht, in denen aufgrund eines irreversiblen Kompetenzverlustes keine spätere Zustimmung zur paternalisierenden Maßnahme mehr möglich ist. In diesen Fällen, so die These, ist ein paternalistisches Handeln gegen den aktualen Patientenwillen nicht gerechtfertigt; kommt es hier also zu einem Konflikt zwischen dem in der Vorausverfügung dokumentierten und dem aktualen Patientenwillen, ist letzterer zu respektieren .In the context of medical ethics, the term „Ulysses contract“ denotes an advance directive by means of which a patient binds himself for the future by instructing a doctor to act against his foreseen future preferences. There is some controversy, however, about whether a person’s prior decisions should be regarded as mandatory for the doctor even when they conflict with her present desires. In this contribution, I address the questions whether and under what circumstances Ulysses instructions should be regarded as binding. In Part , I attempt to show that observing a Ulysses instruction means acting paternalistically and that therefore the question whether Ulysses contracts ought to be respected should be transformed into the question how paternalistic action can be justified. Parts and are concerned with the justification of paternalistic action. On the basis of a conception of welfare as being tied to the person’s interests and preferences, I defend a consent-based model of justification . More specifically, I suggest that the patient’s anticipated later consent to a precedent paternalistic action should count as its justification . In what follows, I attempt to rebut the objection that this account does not do justice to the specific normative problems of Ulysses contracts . Finally, I examine cases in which, due to an irreversible loss of competence, a paternalistic action cannot be assented to by the patient. I argue that in these cases, acting against the patient’s present wishes cannot be justified. If in such a case a patient’s present request runs contrary to the past request expressed in the advance directive, the former should be respected. (shrink)

The use of behavioural science to inform policy is one of the main developments in the social sciences over the last several decades. In this book, Adam Oliver offers an accessible introduction to the development of behavioural public policy, examining how behavioural economics might be used to inform the design of a broad spectrum of policy frameworks, from nudges, to bans on certain individual behaviours, to the regulation of the commercial sector. He also considers how behavioural economics can explain (...) and predict phenomena as a challenge to economists' assumptions around how people perceive time, utility and money. The book offers an intellectual foundation for all those concerned with behavioural public policy, from academics, undergraduate and postgraduate students with a diverse range of disciplinary perspectives, such as economics, political science, sociology and anthropology, to policy makers and practitioners working directly with behavioural public policy in their everyday working lives. (shrink)

This book offers a critical Arabic edition, annotated English translation, introductory study, and two-way glossaries of a pharmacological masterpiece composed around the middle of the 12th century CE in Baghdad by the Nestorian physician Ibn at-Tilmīḏ.

This book offers an Arabic edition, English translation, study and glossaries of ʿUbaidallāh Ibn Buḫtīšūʿ’s important work on apparent death; an appendix moreover provides the Arabic and Hebrew recensions of ʿUbaidallāh’s lost Greek _Vorlage_.

One of postmodernism's toughest challenges to Christian thought is its wholesale rejection of metaphysics. This profound book meets the challenge squarely, offering a surer foundation for the idea of being and a new theological perspective of supreme relevance to today's world. In a brilliant turn of postmodern thought itself, Oliver Davies argues for a renewal of metaphysics based on a dynamic new understanding of ontology as narrative and performance. His repairing of the Western metaphysical tradition is grounded both in (...) the divine self-naming in Exodus -- which, for the rabbis, identified God's presence in the world with God's compassionate acts -- and in the compassionate resistance of Etty Hillesum and Edith Stein to the violence of the Holocaust. Building on a new metaphysics of compassion that is attentive to the deepest histories of the contemporary world, Davies offers a renewed systematic theology focused on divine speech and God's compassionate relation to human culture. (shrink)

Writing about the intellectual development of a philosopher is a delicate business. My own endeavor to reinterpret the influence of Hegel on Dewey troubles some scholars because, they believe, I make Dewey seem less original.1 But if, like Dewey, we overcome Cartesian dualism, placing the development of the self firmly within a complex matrix of social processes, we are forced to reexamine, without necessarily surrendering, the notion of individual originality, or what Neil Gross calls “discourse[s] of creative genius.”2 To (...) use a mundane example, I can recall several conversations with Dewey scholars about his dislike for his home state of Vermont, all of which revolved around personal reasons he may.. (shrink)

The character of the scholarly patronage community of Jixia in the Warring States polity of Qi has been hotly debated. Was it indeed an “academy,” as it has been retrospectively dubbed? What kind of activities did resident scholars engage in? What teachings did they propound, what writings did they compose? Following the lead of research by Nathan Sivin and Andrew S. Meyer, the present article does not treat Jixia as an academy proper, but assumes that it was a patronage community (...) sponsored by the Tian/Chen clan. Rather than indulge in more speculations about institutional arrangements and the activities of specific scholars, however, it is argued that intertextual relationships are more likely to shed light on the intellectual concerns of scholars at Jixia. To demonstrate the viability of such an approach, this article analyzes dialogues between King Xuan of Qi and Master Meng in the book Mengzi, demonstrating that they can be divided into hostile and supportive ones, the latter propounding the principle of “sharing pleasures.” Dialogues included in other compilations that advocate the same principle are then shown to be almost invariably associated with Jixia scholars. The notion of sharing pleasures, it is finally argued, was part of a wider political debate on princely wastefulness that was characteristic of Qi and is likewise reflected in such compilations as Guanzi, Yanzi chunqiu, and Liu tao. (shrink)

Our stereotypes of maternity and paternity as manifest in the history of philosophy and psychoanalysis interfere with the ability to imagine loving relationships. The associations of maternity with antisocial nature and paternity with disembodied culture are inadequate to set up primary love relationships. Analyzing the conflicts in these associations, I reformulate the maternal body as social and lawful, and I reformulate the paternal function as embodied, which enables imagining our primary relationships as loving.

Through an absorbing investigation into recent, high-profile scandals involving one of the largest kosher slaughterhouses in the world, located unexpectedly in Postville, Iowa, Aaron S. Gross makes a powerful case for elevating the category of the animal in the study of religion. Major theorists have almost without exception approached religion as a phenomenon that radically marks humans off from other animals, but Gross rejects this paradigm, instead matching religion more closely with the life sciences to better theorize human (...) nature. Gross begins with a detailed account of the scandals at Agriprocessors and their significance for the American and international Jewish community. He argues that without a proper theorization of "animals and religion," we cannot fully understand religiously and ethically motivated diets and how and why the events at Agriprocessors took place. Subsequent chapters recognize the significance of animals to the study of religion in the work of Ernst Cassirer, Emile Durkheim, Mircea Eliade, Jonathan Z. Smith, and Jacques Derrida and the value of indigenous peoples' understanding of animals to the study of religion in our daily lives. Gross concludes by extending the Agribusiness scandal to the activities at slaughterhouses of all kinds, calling attention to the religiosity informing the regulation of "secular" slaughterhouses and its implications for our relationship with and self-imagination through animals. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the anthropological analyses of Blaise Pascal's Pensées and aims to elucidate their significance in the history and present from a methodological point of view. In its hermeneutic approach, Pascal's anthropology proves to be compatible with contemporary anthropologies such as Charles Taylor's description of man as a self‐interpreting animal. Finally, the potentials of such hermeneutic anthropologies for ethical questions should be indicated in perspective.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 275-291 [Access article in PDF] The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric 1 - [PDF] Alan G. Gross and Marcelo Dascal The standard view--that the Rhetoric lacks conceptual unity--has strong and prestigious support, stretching over most of the century. To David Ross in 1923 the unity of the Rhetoric was practical, not theoretical; to misunderstand this fact was to see this work, mistakenly, as (...) "a curious jumble of literary criticism with second-rate logic, ethics, and politics, and jurisprudence, mixed with the cunning of one who knows well how the weaknesses of the human heart are to be played upon" (285). So unaltered has been this view over the years that, in 1995, Jonathan Barnes could turn Ross's metaphor into an argument concerning the Rhetoric's lack of intellectual focus: it presents, not one art, but fragments of three arts, and of three arts that exist quite independently of rhetoric. The sections on logic have the closest connections with dialectic and in part overlap with what Aristotle says in the Topics; the sections on the emotions are linked to the ethical and psychological writings; Book III... shares its subject matter with the Poetics. Rhetoric... is a magpie, thieving a piece of one art and a piece of another, and then botching a nest of its own. (Companion 263-64) To Ross and Barnes, while logos, êthos, and pathos are essential to rhetorical invention, and style and arrangement are essential to rhetorical performance, they have nothing conceptually in common. Insofar as disciplinary identity depends on such conceptual unity, rhetorical studies lack such identity.William Grimaldi offers an alternate view; beneath Ross's jumble, he sees as the work's fundamental unifying principle, the enthymeme, which serves both as a form of argument and as a source for arguments about fact, character, and emotion. On this view, the factual content of a rhetorical argument is structured logically, a structure that is then molded linguistically [End Page 275] by means of êthos and pathos to suit the requirements of the particular case: "The content of... statements, the manner in which propositions will be expressed, the language, and images in casting the statements will be determined by the topical examination of the ethos and pathos of [a] particular speaker-auditor's situation" (Commentary I, 335n). Grimaldi convinced no one that this was the case; as Jakob Wisse has pointed out, Grimaldi's interpretation takes unacceptable hermeneutic liberties (27-28); nothing in the Rhetoric supports his view of the enthymeme as the central organizing principle of the work.Although we agree that Grimaldi was mistaken, we would like to argue that he was correct in seeing inferential processes as the key to the Rhetoric's conceptual unity. We would like to claim, however, that, contrary to Grimaldi's view, each of the three pisteis is inference-based, as is the canon of style. Moreover, the canon of arrangement, while not inference-based for Aristotle, plays a vital role in strengthening the patterns of inference that speakers prefer; in addition, it can be inference-based, as Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have shown. So much conceptual unity seems to us consistent with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric; if such unity exists, it would mean that Aristotle was correct in calling rhetoric a tekhnê, which was, like dialectic or medicine, a unified body of knowledge (1.1.2-1354a1-14)We are not going to argue that the text as we have it is conceptually unified; obviously, no text that contains inconsistent views and serious ambiguities can be unified and there is little doubt that the Rhetoric contains such inconsistencies and ambiguities. With the aid of current scholarship, however, we intend to construct from the text a consistent theory of persuasion with inference as its base. In our construction, we will add nothing to Aristotle. But we will omit some passages--especially, a crucial one in which he seems clearly to spurn emotional and ethical means of persuasion (1.1.3-1354a16-45). We will also prefer some interpretations--especially an... (shrink)

In the post-Newtonian world motion is assumed to be a simple category which relates to the locomotion of bodies in space, and is usually associated only with physics. Philosophy, God and Motion shows that this is a relatively recent understanding of motion and that prior to the scientific revolution motion was a much broader and more mysterious category, applying to moral as well as physical movements. Simon Oliver presents fresh interpretations of key figures in the history of western thought (...) including Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Newton, examining the thinkers' handling of the concept of motion. Through close readings of seminal texts in ancient and medieval cosmology and early modern natural philosophy, the book moves from antique to modern times investigating how motion has been of great significance within theology, philosophy and science. Particularly important is the relation between motion and God, following Aristotle traditional doctrines of God have understood the divine as the 'unmoved mover' while post-Holocaust theologians have suggested that in order to be compassionate God must undergo the motion of suffering. Philosophy, God and Motion suggests that there may be an authentically theological, as well as a natural scientific understanding of motion. (shrink)

This paper discusses Habermas’s characterization of Kierkegaard as a religious author in his main profession and as an existential philosopher on the side. I would like to argue that Kierkegaard is primarily an existential philosopher, also in his function as a religious author. At first, I would like to interpret his religious authorship as a form of indirect communication, and after that I discuss indirect communication as a method of existentialism. In this way, the article aims to demonstrate that Kierkegaard (...) becomes the precursor of existential philosophy not least by his religious authorship as a theory and practice of indirect communication. (shrink)

Ausgehend von der Disparatheit diverser systematischer Definitions- und Konturierungsversuche zur Existenzphilosophie rekonstruiert die vorliegende Studie die philosophiehistorischen Prämissen dieser Strömung, um im Anschluss daran einheitsstiftende Momente herauszuarbeiten. Zentrale These der Untersuchung ist, dass Søren Kierkegaard und Friedrich Nietzsche die beiden ebenbürtigen Initialfiguren der Existenzphilosophie sind. Mittels der systematischen Schwerpunkte Metaphysik, Anthropologie, Ethik und Darstellungsformen von Philosophie werden die inhaltlichen Umbrüche, die Kierkegaard und Nietzsche im Denken des 19. Jahrhunderts vollzogen und die somit die Voraussetzungen für die Existenzphilosophie bilden, im Detail (...) analysiert. Waren Kierkegaard und Nietzsche zu ihren Lebzeiten noch „Unzeitgemäße“, so entfaltet ihr Denken im 20. Jahrhundert sein ganzes wirkungsgeschichtliches Potenzial, das in der Existenzphilosophie seinesgleichen sucht – beide werden zu „Zeitgemäßen“. Im Anschluss an diese philosophiehistorischen Analysen und unter Berücksichtigung des wirkungsgeschichtlichen Kontextes beider Initialfiguren erfolgt der Entwurf eines Katalogs sowohl historischer als auch systematischer Merkmale der Existenzphilosophie. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 46 Heft: 1 Seiten: 297-307.

Postcolonial discourse is incredibly diverse and postcolonial art in Australia has numerous critical modes. This paper describes an approach in Contemporary Indigenous art that attempts a critique of the law from within the law rather than outside of it. It takes a radical form of over-proximity, rather than avant-garde distance, and finds the gap and failure in law’s attempt at creating legal subjects of us all. In the work of Gordon Bennett, Danie Mellor and the duo Adam Geczy and Adam (...) Hill, there is a working through the political and legal ramifications of the Indigenous subject in contemporary Australia. The focus on processes of initiation and subjectivization, or what Althusser called “interpellation” and show the effects of this interpellation in the Indigenous subject and offer modes of resistance. The artists are informed by Lacanian notions of subjectivization and utilise this approach to semiotics and power as the starting point for their critique. (shrink)

L’avocat allemand semble jouir d’un statut plus valorisant au sein du système judiciaire allemand que son homologue français dans le sien. La formation commune avec les futurs magistrats, en l’absence d’une formation spécifique de type école de la magistrature ou école des avocats, contribue à une certaine affinité entre les deux professions et davantage de respect entre elles. L’Allemagne a intégré les avocats en entreprise dans la profession, notamment afin de les faire bénéficier de la caisse de retraite des avocats, (...) bien plus intéressante que le régime général. Les règles déontologiques qui leur sont applicables sont censées garantir leur indépendance et la confidentialité (moins absolue, il est vrai, qu’en France). Le système de rémunération par barème en fonction de la valeur de litige pourrait être un modèle pour une réforme de l’article 700 du code de procédure civile français bien plus ambitieuse et efficace que les idées du comité des États généraux de la justice à cet égard. (shrink)

Under an ‘antitheodicy’, I understand any attempt to show the principal impossibility of a morally respectable and rationally convincing theoretical answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is understood as a problem of consistency and rational coherence between propositions. In this paper, I will analyse the concept of rationality which is presupposed at least in some strands of antitheodicy. A. Gleeson’s ‘A frightening love. Recasting the Problem of Evil’ presupposes a dichotomy between an engaged-existential and a detached-impersonal kind of (...) philosophical thinking which are respectively characterized by a stress on authenticity and the acknowledgement of particularity and contingency in the first case and by precision, logic, provability and an instrumental understanding of rationality in the second case. The second kind of reasoning which underlies all theodicies is inapt for dealing adequately with the real problem of evil. I try to show that the dichotomy of impersonal objective and existentially subjective kinds of philosophy is not a contradictory one but leaves out a broad field in-between which can be characterized as ‘informal reasoning’ and which allows a morally sensitive answer to the theoretical problem of evil which is not isolated from the ‘real’ problem of evil. (shrink)

Definition of the problem “Ulysses contracts” are advance directives by means of which a patient authorizes compulsory treatment for a phase of a temporary inhibition of competence. Ethical discussion of Ulysses contracts usually focuses on the question of the “moral authority” or the “binding force” of Ulysses contracts, i.e., of whether Ulysses contracts should be honored or whether the competent patient’s prospective wishes for compulsory treatment are overridden by the patient’s actual preferences in the situation of treatment. Arguments In this (...) contribution, I argue that, even if the Ulysses contract undoubtedly applies to the actual situation, there may be reasons for not acting upon it. The main argument is that acting in conformity to a Ulysses contract may be justified but nevertheless wrong. After some terminological clarifications, I argue that Ulysses contracts justify the use of compulsory treatment but do not necessarily make it the right course of action. They authorize physicians to act in accordance with the patient’s advance directive and, thereby, protect them from blame and sanctions in case they administer compulsory treatment. Whether compulsory treatment is right or wrong, however, hinges on whether the patient retrospectively consents to it. It may be the case that administering compulsory treatment in conformity to the Ulysses contract is justified but turns out to be wrong if the patient does not retrospectively consent to it. It may also be the case that not obeying the Ulysses contract turns out to be right if the patient retrospectively consents to not following it. Conclusion In view of this, I conclude that Ulysses contracts should not be seen as morally binding and that they should not be made legally binding. They are not normatively on par with other advance directives that relate to, for example, states of dementia. (shrink)