[1] ʻAl ʻinyene ḥinukh ha-banim ṿeha-banot ṿi-yeme ha-baḥarut-- [2] ʻAl ʻinyene derekh ha-Ḥasidut lesayeaʻ le-zulato be-ruḥaniyut ṿe-nilṿeh elaṿ mikhteve ḳodesh be-ʻinyan zeh.

In 2015, the Israeli Knesset passed the force-feeding act that permits the director of the Israeli prison authority to appeal to the district court with a request to force-feed a prisoner against his expressed will. A recent position paper by top Israeli clinicians and bioethicists, published in Hebrew, advocates for force-feeding by medical professionals and presents several arguments that this would be appropriate. Here, we first posit three interrelated questions: 1. Do prisoners have a right to hunger-strike? 2. Should governing (...) institutions force-feed prisoners and/or is it ethical to force-feed prisoners? 3. Should healthcare professionals force-feed prisoners? We then focus on the first and third questions. We first briefly provide several arguments to support the right of prisoners to refuse treatment. Next, we critically review the arguments presented in the Israeli position paper, demonstrating that they are all misguided at best. Lastly, we briefly present arguments against force-feeding by medical professionals. We conclude that healthcare providers should not participate in the force-feeding of prisoners. (shrink)

Several bioethicists have recently advocated the force-feeding of prisoners, based on the assumption that prisoners have reduced or no autonomy. This assumed lack of autonomy follows from a decrease in cognitive competence, which, in turn, supposedly derives from imprisonment and/or being on hunger strike. In brief, causal links are made between imprisonment or voluntary total fasting and mental disorders and between mental disorders and lack of cognitive competence. I engage the bioethicists that support force-feeding by severing both of these causal (...) links. Specifically, I refute the claims that VTF automatically and necessarily causes mental disorders such as depression, and that these mental disorders necessarily or commonly entail cognitive impairment. Instead, I critically review more nuanced approaches to assessing mental competence in hunger strikes, urging that a diagnosis of incompetence be made on a case-by-case basis—a position that is widely shared by the medical community. (shrink)

This article poses a response to one argument supporting the force feeding of political prisoners. This argument assumes that prisoners have moral autonomy and thus cannot be force fed in the early stages of their hunger strike. However, as their fasting progresses, their cognitive competence declines, and they are no longer autonomous. Since they are no longer autonomous, force feeding becomes justified. This article questions the recurrent citation of a paper in empirical support of the claim that hunger strike causes (...) mental disorders or cognitive impairments. The paper, written by Daniel Fessler, partially relies on the Minnesota Starvation Experiment conducted in 1944 to 1945 for scientific support. Using widely accepted criteria for assessing the ethical acceptability of clinical research, we argue that the Minnesota Starvation Experiment had significant scientific shortcomings and is a case of unethical research. From this, we question the appropriateness of citing the Minnesota Starvation Experiment and consequently Fessler’s paper. If Citing Fessler’s paper becomes problematic, this particular argument for the force feeding of prisoners loses much of its strength. (shrink)

In a recent article, Joel Marks presents the amoralist argument against vivisection, or animal laboratory experimentation. He argues that ethical theories that seek to uncover some universal morality are in fact useless and unnecessary for ethical deliberations meant to determine what constitutes an appropriate action in a specific circumstance. I agree with Marks’ conclusion. I too believe that vivisection is indefensible, both from a scientific and philosophical perspective. I also believe that we should become vegan (unfortunately, like the two philosophers (...) mentioned by Marks, I too am still struggling to reduce my meat and dairy consumption). However, I am in the dark as to Marks’ vision of normative deliberations in the spirit of amoralism and desirism. (shrink)

This paper argues in support of the WHO’s proposal to forego COVID-19 booster shots until 10% of people in every country are fully vaccinated. The Ethical Argument section shows that we save the most lives and ensure the least amount of suffering by allocating doses first to unvaccinated people. It also argues that there is a duty to support decent lives and to promote health equity, which establish that refraining from boosters is a requirement of justice, not charity. The Replies (...) to Objections section answers objections that appeal to pragmatism, nationalism, ownership, scientific advancement, self-interest, semantics and futility. The Conclusion section emphasizes that for now, wealthy nations should not boost vaccinated people’s immunity and should instead send doses to poorer nations where they are most urgently needed. No data was used in this study. (shrink)

We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such conditions. We present new data showing that under data-limited conditions observers cannot discriminate (...) a simple relation (same versus different) without discriminating the elements themselves and, based on additional computational considerations, we argue that this supports the first interpretation: summary statistics (same/different) are grounded on the transient experience of elements. Second, we examine recent data from a variant of ‘inattention blindness’ and argue that contrary to widespread assumptions, it provides further support for Overflow by highlighting another factor, ‘task relevance’, which affects the ability to conceptualize and report (but not experience) visual element. (shrink)

Can friendship as a political practice offer enough traction to imagine a borderless world? The startling contemporary rise in aggressive ethno-nationalism and end-times ecological crises have the same root: an inability to be together with humans as much as the natural world. Matt Hern and Am Johal suggest that porous renditions of being-together animated by friendship can spark a repoliticization of the political to surpass the foreclosures of the state, speak to a freedom of movement, and find renovated relationships with (...) the more-than-human. This volume includes interviews with Jean-Luc Nancy, Leela Gandhi and Leanne Simpson. (shrink)

Trust has become an important aspect of evaluating the relationship between lay public and technology implementation. Experiences have shown that a focus on trust provides a richer understanding of reasons for backlashes of technology in society than a mere focus of public understanding of risks and science communication. Therefore, trust is also widely used as a key concept for understanding and predicting trust or distrust in emerging technologies. But whereas trust broadens the scope for understanding established technologies with well-defined questions (...) and controversies, it easily fails to do so with emerging technologies, where there are no shared questions, a lack of public familiarity with the technology in question, and a restricted understanding amongst social researchers as to where distrust is likely to arise and how and under which form the technology will actually be implemented. Rather contrary, ‘trust’ might sometimes even direct social research into fixed structures that makes it even more difficult for social research to provide socially robust knowledge. This article therefore suggests that if trust is to maintain its important role in evaluating emerging technologies, the approach has to be widened and initially focus not on people’s motivations for trust, but rather the object of trust it self, as to predicting how and where distrust might appear, how the object is established as an object of trust, and how it is established in relation with the public. (shrink)

Several months ago, an Israeli resident in emergency medicine engaged in a hunger strike to protest 26-hour shifts. His protest was part of a country-wide struggle of medical residents from all disciplines against such long shifts, arguing that they are a thing of the past, and that they harm patient care. While there is actually no evidence that long shifts harm patient outcomes, they very likely reduce civility among staff members and towards patients.1 Two kinds of strategies are possible to (...) address this likely source of incivility: expect and train residents to be kinder and more patient towards their peers and patients, or do away with long shifts. Therein lies the tension in implementing the case for civility made by McCollough et al 2 should we invest in agent-based or system-based interventions? Virtue ethics is prominent in discussions of the professional duties of healthcare providers (HCPs). A common theme that threads throughout these discussions is that HCPs ought to, or are expected to behave in a kind, patient and sensitive manner towards their peers and patients, …. (shrink)

[1] Tseṭil ḳaṭan -- [2] Hanhagot ha-adam -- [3] Mikhtav ḳodesh -- [4] Liḳuṭim neʻimim -- [5] Igeret ha-ḳodesh -- [6] Kitve ḳodesh -- [7] Tefilah noraʼah -- [8] Noʻam Elimelekh -- [9] Yalḳuṭ Darkhe tsedeḳ.

This book is a philosophical introduction to the field of communication and media studies. In search of the philosophical backgrounds of that relatively young field, the book explores why this overwhelmingly popular discipline is in crisis. The book discusses classic introductions on communication, provides an update on lessons learned, and re-evaluates the work of pioneers in the light of up-to-date philosophical standards. It summarizes various debates surrounding the foundations of system theory and especially its applicability to the Social Sciences in (...) general and to Communication Studies in particular. Communication schools promise their students an understanding of the source of a principal and dynamical power in their lives, a power shaping societies and identities, molding aspirations, and deciding their fates. They also promise students a practical benefit, a chance to learn the secret of controlling that dynamical power, improving a set of skills that would ensure them a critical edge in the future job market: become better media experts for all media. Yet no one seems to know how such promises are met. Can there be a general theory of communication? If not, what can (should) communication students learn? This book looks at the problem from a philosophical perspective and proposes a framework wherein critical cases can be tested. (shrink)

The Aristotelian, non-relativistic notion of truth as correspondence with and dependency on actual states of affairs is in principle maintained, but refined and even modified in several different directions. The principal reason for maintaining it is empirical: it seems to reflect the way in which humans deal with the notion "truth" naively or pretheoretically, in ordinary life situations. It is shown that the Kantian crisis in epistemology does not affect this notion, since what is at issue is truth-conditions, not actual (...) truth-values. This great crisis in epistemology does, however, reinforce the requirement that logic, as a vehicle of preservation of assumed truth, be entirely and fundamentally independent of contingent states of affairs. This requirement made it imperative that traditional logic be replaced with a logic of absolute applicability, no matter whether there is or is not an outside world, or, if there is one, how it is or happens to be. The Aristotelian Principle of the Excluded Third is given up, not in favour of truth-value gaps for sentences with reference failure, but rather in favour of three truth-values: truth, minimal falsity , and radical falsity . Truth-value gaps do not occur with sentences that are well-integrated in discourse and context This analysis is linked up with a well-defined trivalent logic. It moreover requires the assumption of entities that are defined by thought processes but do not exist in reality. It is further shown that truth-conditions are not always expressible in autonomously verifiable or falsifiable terms. Many lexical meanings depend, for a complete statement of the associated truth-conditions, on variable cognitive input whose content depends on what is known in general terms, or prototypically, about the things referred to in the discourse at hand. Examples are the whole possessive complex , gradable adjectives, or epistemic modals. This fact does not invalidate the notion of truth as correspondence, but it does shed a new light on how sentences acquire their truth-values. Finally, truth is seen als correspondence not so much with whatever one may assume the world to be in its barest or brütest form, down to its very basics, as with the phenomenal world, that is, the world as it presents itself to human perception and interpretation, with all the projections and reifications that go with it. (shrink)

The pronoun ‘I’ refers to myself from the first-person perspective and a person (me) from the third person perspective. Essentially there is something common between the two perspectives taken: ‘I’ from the first person perspective refers to ‘self’; from the third person perspective refers to a ‘person’. Now ‘self’ and ‘person’ signify the same concept. ‘Self’ is a term used in context of first-person statements and ‘person’ is a term used in third person contexts. Both the terms refer to the (...) same concept but from different perspectives. Consequently the terms ‘no-person’ and ‘no-self’ will be taken as synonymous in this article. The use of ‘I’ signifies one more thing – that there exists a ‘self’ or ‘person’ that exists through time, in other words, it signifies ‘self-identity’ or ‘personal identity’. The aim of this article is to analyze the notion of ‘self’ or ‘person’ as denoted in the usage of the pronoun ‘I’. This article would examine ‘I’ as a fictitious entity in the background of the two historical theories of personal identity – David Hume’s theory and the Buddhist theory. (shrink)

Mind uploading—the transference of mind from a biological brain to a computer— offers the alluring possibility of immortality. This paper provides a novel challenge to mind uploading, focusing on the distinction between abstract objects and concrete individuals. Uploads are abstract objects, while currently, persons are concrete indi- viduals. This presents a dilemma: if the mind is concrete, uploading it to a computer is impossible. Alternatively, if mind uploading is feasible, the resulting abstract upload cannot be numerically identical to the original (...) person. Furthermore, by dif- ferentiating survival from persistence, this paper argues that concrete persons might survive as abstract uploads, but only in a highly restricted sense, without preserving their numerical identity. Despite these philosophical hurdles, practical reasons for considering mind uploading as life nears its end still need to be acknowledged. (shrink)

Posthumanist film and television is both a vehicle for reflection on discrimination and prejudice and a means of gratifying in fantasy deeply imbedded human impulses towards prejudice. Discrimination lies at the heart of posthuman narratives whenever the posthuman coalesces around an identifiable group in conflict with humans. We first introduce the idea of prejudice as a form of psychological defense, contrasting it with other accounts of prejudice in the philosophical literature. We then apply this notion to number of posthumanist film (...) and television narratives. An adequate account of prejudice tells us about posthumanism in film—the significance of posthumanist thinking, speculation and fantasy. It helps account for the proliferation of television series and films about people who—being at one time dead, still dead or partially dead, or only sometimes dead, or have powers and appetites we do not have—are borderline creatures: not fully us, but still near to us. (shrink)

In this paper I propose that, since the mid-eighteenth century medical science has simultaneously generated and disavowed ‘undead’ bodies, suspended between life and death. Through close analysis of three examples of ‘undeath’ taken from different moments in medical history, I consider what these bodies can tell us about medicine, its history, cultural meaning, scientific status and its role in shaping ideas of embodiment, identity and death. My first example is Edgar Allan Poe’s story ‘The facts in the case of M. (...) Valdemar’ which imagines the possibility of a man mesmerised at the point of death. I read this story as a response to the rise of professional, scientific medicine in the 1840s. I then look at the recurring issue of brain death in order to consider tensions within twentieth-century medical hegemony. Finally I read the Alder Hey scandal as a reactivation of undead anxiety in response to the emergent culture of medical consumerism at the end of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This article argues that Karl Rahner’s theme of “eschatological ignorance” should be retrieved to facilitate and to fortify the enactment of Catholic theology’s prophetic commitments in a U.S. context. First, the article presents and defends Rahner’s famous distinction between eschatology and apocalyptic. Second, it characterizes Rahner’s distinction as representative of his conviction of a need for docta ignorantia futuri, which stems from his theology of God as Absolute Mystery, and which, though Rahner recommends it to twentieth-century Europeans, seems particularly well (...) suited for theological application in the twenty-first-century United States. Third, it suggests how Rahner’s eschatological ignorance might make a prophetic impact on the American socio-religio-political climate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I am Not Obese. I am Just Fat.Sarah BrambletteMy body mass index classifies me as super morbidly obese, however my overall vital health statistics would indicate otherwise. I celebrated the American Medical Association’s classification of obesity as a disease for several reasons. First, obesity as a disease involves other medical complications of which I have none, so finally perhaps I can say I am not obese, I am just (...) fat. I am fat, as in my weight is caused by Lipedema and Lymphedema. Lipedema is a congenital condition, which causes my body to produce and accumulate abnormal amounts of adipose tissue in my legs, hips, thighs, and arms. There is not much known about Lipedema in the medical profession, even though it was identified in 1940 by doctors at the Mayo Clinic, and not many treatment options exist. Abnormal Lipedema tissue does not respond to restrictive caloric diet or exercise. Lymphedema is a condition of localized fluid retention and tissue swelling caused by a compromised lymphatic system. The second reason I celebrated obesity being classified as a disease was the hope that more research would be conducted on the actual causes and treatment of obesity and that research might include adipose tissue disorders. My vital health statistics are all normal, yet I still face challenges getting proper treatment in healthcare.My StoryAs I sat staring at the metal beast, I decided to make one final attempt to mount it. I placed my right foot on the step and used both hands to boost myself up, my lower legs were so large there was no room for my left foot. Immediately the exam table began to tip towards me, then slammed loudly against the tile floor as I quickly stepped off. It was a game of exam table teeter–totter I had played many times before and lost more often than won. I gave up, placed the sheet meant to cover my legs on the chair in the corner and squeezed myself down between its arms. The exam gown pinched my arms, barely covering the front of me and draped over my legs.My LegsOne of the main reasons I was seeing a new doctor, my first doctor visit in several years. My previous family doctor had retired. I was not ill, I was concerned. My weight had reached a point to where I was scared for my health and I wanted to get help and answers. I wanted answers about why my legs were so large and leaked fluid.The answer I got was one I had heard before “It’s your weight”.To the doctor’s credit, she did explain it a bit more, she said the fluid in my legs was due to my excess weight putting pressure on my legs. However, she did not actually know how much I weighed. The scale in her office only went to 350lbs, and even with the add–on weight it could not register a weight for me, so we only knew I weighed more than 400lbs. I asked her if she knew if the hospital or another office had a scale that could weigh me. She did not. She may have sent me home with a prescription for a diuretic, I do not remember. I know I was not sent home with any help for my weight or my legs, just a follow–up appointment. It was during that follow up appointment that I advocated for myself and asked if she would refer me for physical therapy, so that I could do some safe and monitored exercise. She agreed, and I began physical therapy in the pool.At the pool I met other people who looked similar to my size. I noticed their legs were normal size and wondered why? Then I thought about sumo wrestlers. Sumo wrestlers weigh hundreds of pounds and their legs are normal too. What was wrong with my legs? One day I heard a man in the pool tell another [End Page 85] patient that he had lost weight. I wondered where he was able to weigh himself, and hoped it was not rude to ask him. He told me... (shrink)

Dennett’s story “Where am I?” is used to set up the difficulty of locating the self in the natural world. The story is told from a first-person point of view in which the narrator maintains his identity across exchanges of brain and body, but there is no physical thing in the story that can act as bearer of his identity. The story seems to present a dilemma between Cartesian dualism and Dennett’s a “no-self” view. This chapter argues for a third (...) option. Prepersonal processes in the brain stabilize separable conceptions of self and world out of patterns in sensory information. The conception of self starts out as a mere sensorimotor point of view but gradually develops into something richer. Seeing how the first-person point of view arises is seeing how the self arises, because the self is nothing but the proper subject of a first-person point of view. (shrink)