This is a reply to Ryszard Wójcicki's polemics against the view expressed in the author's paper „Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later” which have been published together in the previous issue of Filozofia Nauki. Contrary to Ryszard Wójcicki, the author is of the opinion that Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning is pragmatic, and more exactly syntactico-pragmatic. The reason for this claim is the indisputable fact that while formulating the meaning-directives and the definition of synonymity and meaning, Ajdukiewicz has used merely (...) syntactical and pragmatical notions (the notion of meaning, which could have semantic implications, was the subject of explication). Since (for obvious reasons) Ajdukiewicz did not want to make use of the semantic notions as primitive notions, he had no other option. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers, especially the \"post-modern ones,\" claim that analytical philosophy has committed self-destruction by undermining the position of cognitive realism and questioning its main pillars: theory of objective reference of expressions and correspondential theory of truth. One of such philosophers is Rorty, an indefatigable critic of the conception of \"right representations,\" a concept that - according to him - is \"an empty compliment which we pay to helpful beliefs while realising our intentions.\" In order to support his nihilistic position, (...) Rorty many times refers to Quine. In my paper I seek to answer the question whether Rorty\'s and the views of other post-modern philosophers can be supported by Quine\'s philosophical conceptions. Analysing some selected trends of his philosophy, in particular the thesis about indeterminacy of reference (ontological relativity), I seek to prove that - contrary to Rorty\'s claim - Quine did not devalue the idea of objective reference. I also prove that the semantic concept of truth as relativised to the model of language plays in Quine\'s epistemology an equally essential role to the role of the immanent concept of truth as \"disquotational.\" The former is closer to the correspondential conception of truth. The conclusions which Rorty draws from the conception of Quine are rash, and sometimes they are an outcome of biased interpretation. (shrink)

Tarski believed that the notion of truth should be relativised not to the notion of meaning - as many philosophers would claim - but rather to the notion of language. In general terms, he would identify a language with a structure L = containing an alphabet, a class of sentences and an operation of consequence. As to the specific languages of deductive sciences Tarski maintained that they should be inseparably conjoined with theories, so that the notion of language should be (...) supplemented with a set of axioms and a set of true sentences: L' = . First four elements of L' are quite conveniently expressable in syntactic terms. About the set of Ver, to the contrary, it can be said only that it is one of many complete and coherent sets of sentences containing Ax and closed for the operation Cn. For a very general characteristic it could perhaps be enough. For a more specific definition of Ver, however, Tarski needed some semantic tool. As is well known, he used the notion of satisfying, defined for every particular language L* . Thus, as it seems, according to Tarski, the general notion of truth relative to language is a primary notion of the theory of formalized languages. Were we after introducing it as a secondary notion, we would have to enrich the notion of language with some semantic (referential) aspects, what in turn would require some standarization of syntax and thus narrow the notion of formalized language. (shrink)

The author claims that Ingarden's ontology is a contemporary version of Platonism. He argues that the concepts of distinct realizations of pure and ideal qualities in ideas and in individuals are unclear and unnecessary. In authors opinion the essential parts of Ingarden's ontology may by explained in terms of possible and real individuals and its possible properties.

In this paper, we discuss several problems with current Big data practices which, we claim, seriously erode the role of informed consent as it pertains to the use of personal information. To illustrate these problems, we consider how the notion of informed consent has been understood and operationalised in the ethical regulation of biomedical research (and medical practices, more broadly) and compare this with current Big data practices. We do so by first discussing three types of problems that can impede (...) informed consent with respect to Big data use. First, we discuss the transparency (or explanation) problem. Second, we discuss the re-repurposed data problem. Third, we discuss the meaningful alternatives problem. In the final section of the paper, we suggest some solutions to these problems. In particular, we propose that the use of personal data for commercial and administrative objectives could be subject to a ‘soft governance’ ethical regulation, akin to the way that all projects involving human participants (e.g., social science projects, human medical data and tissue use) are regulated in Australia through the Human Research Ethics Committees (HRECs). We also consider alternatives to the standard consent forms, and privacy policies, that could make use of some of the latest research focussed on the usability of pictorial legal contracts. (shrink)

The main impulse for this considerations is a beautiful Professor Adam Nowaczyk's text "The spell of Plato. Reflections on Roman Ingarden's ontology". My general (negative) thesis is that no hyper-dietetic, i.e. monocategorial, ontology (meant as the theory of real objects) is not correct. Thus neither the theory of sets (if it assumed the uniqueness of the ontic category of sets), nor reism (if it assumed the uniquenes of the ontic category of things) or eventism (if it assumed the (...) uniqueness of the ontic category of events) are correct ontologies (meant as theses on existence of a certain ontic category). The consequence of this negative thesis is that only non-dietetic, i.e. polycategorial, ontology can be correct. I present a few arguments on account of theses two theses. (shrink)

Ryszard Wójcicki's book „Ajdukiewicz. A Theory of Meaning” opens a series of publications Filozofia polska XX wieku [Polish Philosophy of XXth Century], created by Wójcicki. The main subject of the book is a theory of the meaning of linguistic expressions, which was formulated in the thirties and is known as a directival theory of meaning. The aim that the author has set for himself is not only to present and popularise that theory (these aims are implied by the character of (...) the series), but also the evaluation of its material adequacy and its significance for further investigations of language as a means of representation and transmission of knowledge. Adam Nowaczyk tries to show that Wójcicki's critique of Ajdukiewicz's conception is unjustified, for the fallacy allegedly committed in this conception is either only apparent or else easily remediable. Wójcicki disagrees with Nowaczyk's objection. (shrink)

We reformulate a key definition given by Wáng and Ågotnes to provide semantics for public announcements in subset spaces. More precisely, we interpret the precondition for a public announcement of ???? to be the “local truth” of ????, semantically rendered via an interior operator. This is closely related to the notion of ???? being “knowable”. We argue that these revised semantics improve on the original and offer several motivating examples to this effect. A key insight that emerges is the crucial (...) role of topological structure in this setting. Finally, we provide a simple axiomatization of the resulting logic and prove completeness. (shrink)

Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that (...) there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self-locating skeptical hypotheses. (shrink)

This paper considers the implications of precautionary restrictions against technologies, in the context of the potential for creating and sustaining rumours. It focuses on the restriction against mobile phone use at petrol stations, based on the rumour that a spark might cause an explosion. Rumours have been substantiated by precautionary usage warnings from mobile phone manufacturers, petrol station usage restrictions, and a general lack of technical understanding. Petrol station employees have themselves spread the rumour about alleged incidents, filling the information (...) gap about the basis for the restriction. (shrink)

This book develops a new approach to the mind called mental fictionalism. The key idea behind this approach is that the mind is a useful fiction. The book begins with our ordinary conception of the mind (known as folk psychology). At present, the dominant interpretation of folk psychology sees it as an attempt to describe our inner machinery (a view the author calls Cartesianism). The representational theory of mind (or representationalism) argues that our folk theory is true, and that our (...) thoughts (especially our propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires) are representations inside our heads. Mental fictionalism offers a new interpretation of folk psychology. According to mental fictionalism, when we attribute beliefs and desires, we do not claim that people have representations inside their heads; we merely pretend that they do. Our ordinary conception of the mind is fundamentally metaphorical: we project the ‘outer world’ of human culture (especially language) onto the ‘inner world’ of the mind. This is an enormously useful way of making sense of people and their behaviour. But we should not forget that this inner world is only a fiction. (shrink)

In the past few years, the subject of AI rights—the thesis that AIs, robots, and other artefacts (hereafter, simply ‘AIs’) ought to be included in the sphere of moral concern—has started to receive serious attention from scholars. In this paper, I argue that the AI rights research program is beset by an epistemic problem that threatens to impede its progress—namely, a lack of a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: the problem of explaining why certain brain states give rise (...) to experience. To motivate this claim, I consider three ways in which to ground AI rights—namely: superintelligence, empathy, and a capacity for consciousness. I argue that appeals to superintelligence and empathy are problematic, and that consciousness should be our central focus, as in the case of animal rights. However, I also argue that AI rights is disanalogous from animal rights in an important respect: animal rights can proceed without a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness. Not so with AI rights, I argue. There we cannot make the same kinds of assumptions that we do about animal consciousness, since we still do not understand why brain states give rise to conscious mental states in humans. (shrink)

Smilansky notes that wrongdoers seem to lack any entitlement to complain about being treated in the ways that they have treated others. However, it also seems impermissible to treat agents in certain ways, and this impermissibility would give wrongdoers who are themselves wronged grounds for complaint. This article solves this apparent paradox by arguing that what is at issue is not the right simply to make complaints, but the right to have one's demands respected. Agents must accept the authority of (...) others to make second-personal demands on them before they can expect others to treat their own demands as legitimate. Wrongdoers’ previous wrongdoing shows they do not treat others’ demands as authoritative. However, as they are still beings with dignity, which acts as a source of moral reasons for others, wronging them remains impermissible. (shrink)

language="EN"> The eighth annual meeting of the ASSC took place between June 25th and 28th in Antwerp, an extremely beautiful Belgian city, a major European port and the home of the Peter Paul Rubens, 'the prince of painters and painter of princes'. The meeting was held in a University building at the edge of the old town. This part of the city is remarkable both for the elegance of its architecture and for its innumerable short, interlocking, streets with oddly indistinguishable (...) names. The demands on spatial memory were high and some delegates may still be hunting for the conference dinner which took place, magnificently but improbably, in a hotel - the Elzenveld - inside a hospital. (shrink)

Quite likely the most sacrosanct principle in epistemology, it is near-universally accepted that knowledge is factive: knowing that p entails p. Recently, however, Bricker, Buckwalter, and Turri have all argued that we can and often do know approximations that are strictly speaking false. My goal with this paper is to advance this nascent non-factive project in two key ways. First, I provide a critical review of these recent arguments against the factivity of knowledge, allowing us to observe that elements of (...) these arguments mutually reinforce respective weaknesses, thereby offering the non-factive project a much stronger foundation than when these arguments were isolated. Next, I argue tentatively in favor of Bricker’s truthlikeness framework over the representational adequacy account favored by Buckwalter and Turri. Taken together, while none of this constitutes a knock-down argument against factivity, it does allow us to quiet some of the more immediate worries surrounding the non-factive project. (shrink)

I discussed the ways in which folk psychology is influenced by the need for small-scale cooperation between people. I argue that considerations about cooperation and mutual benefit can be found in the everyday concepts of belief, desire, and motivation. I describe what I call "solution thinking", where a person anticipates another person's actions by first determining the solution to the cooperative problem that the person faces and then reasoning backwards to a prediction of individual action.

Quantum mechanics is humanity's finest scientific achievement. It explains why the sun shines and how your eyes can see. It's the theory behind the LEDs in your phone and the nuclear hearts of space probes. Every physicist agrees quantum physics is spectacularly successful. But ask them what quantum physics means, and the result will be a brawl. At stake is the nature of the Universe itself. What does it mean for something to be real? What is the role of consciousness (...) in the Universe? And do quantum rules apply to very small objects like electrons and protons, but not us? In What is Real?, Adam Becker brings to vivid life the brave researchers whose quest for the truth led them to challenge Bohr: David Bohm, who picked up Einstein's mantle and sought to make quantum mechanics deterministic, all while being hounded by the forces of McCarthyism; Hugh Everett, who argued that everything, big and small, must be governed by the same rules; and John Bell, who went to great lengths to eradicate the power of the god-like observer from the core of quantum physics. And they paid dearly, their reputations, careers, and sometimes lives ruined completely. But history has been kinder to them than their contemporaries were. As Becker shows, the brave intellectual giants have inspired a growing army of physicists and philosophers intent both on making a philosophically more satisfying theory of the universe and a more useful one as well. A gripping story of some of humanity's greatest ideas and the high cost with which many have pursued them, What is Real? is intellectual history at its passionate best. (shrink)

Most contemporary interpreters of Aquinas have assumed that Thomas subscribed to a “non-repeatability principle” such that created entities, once destroyed entirely, cannot be “brought back" into existence, even by God's power. Souls persisting in the interim between death and resurrection thus play an essential identity-preserving role between our death and rising again. No separated souls, no resurrection. Two of Aquinas’s best medieval interpreters, however, reject this interpretation. Leaning largely on one of Aquinas’s late quodlibetal questions, they deny that Thomas held (...) any non-repeatability principle strong enough to bar God’s resurrecting us even from complete destruction, souls and all. Here the chapter argues that careful analysis of the quodlibet and other texts largely vindicates the contemporary interpretation. It does so in a surprising way, however, since it turns out Aquinas’s non-repeatability principle applies only to corruptible, material entities like us, and not to incorruptible entities like angels. The reason Aquinas held this view, the chapter argues, is rooted in his theory of individuation. (shrink)