This paper is an attempt to analyse the concept of literary autonomy, to explore its various manifestations in previous and current theories of literary studies and literary aesthetics, and to fit it into a broad outlook of literature's specificity and uniqueness. It defends the idea of literature's separate identity, however, not at the expense of breaking free of the concept of meaning in the strict sense, seeking special literary value in the independence of aesthetic value from other values, or in (...) the claim that literature has no purpose outside of itself, and then argues that such position need not be confounded with reductionism. (shrink)

One of the main obstacles for panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, is the difficulty of explaining how simple subjects could combine to form complex subjects. Known as the subject combination problem, it poses a possibly insurmountable challenge to the view. In this paper, I will assume that this challenge cannot be overcome and instead present a version of panpsychism that completely avoids talk of combination. Inspired by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics of monads, I will focus on (...) a relational explanation of how simple subjects could constitute complex experiences, without them having to combine in virtue of their subjectivity. I call this view monadic panpsychism. Additionally, my proposal will not rely on emergence and so it will circumvent problems commonly faced by emergentist accounts. As I will argue, monadic panpsychism is preferable to combinatory and emergentist panpsychism because it faces a significantly less worrisome set of objections. Apart from being unaffected by the seemingly insuperable issue of subject combination, I will demonstrate that monadic panpsychism also has tools to address other kinds of the combination problem. That alone justifies the need for a new formulation of panpsychism, one which faces unique difficulties but also offers unique solutions. (shrink)

This is a review of the book Quantum [Un]speakables: From Bell to Quantum Information. Reinhold A. Bertlmann and Anton Zeilinger (editors). xxii + 483 pp. Springer-Verlag, 2002. $89.95.

In this text, a variety of modal logics at the sentential, first-order, and second-order levels are developed with clarity, precision and philosophical insight.

This study utilizing correlation, regression, confirmatory factor analyses, ANOVA, moderation and mediation analysis investigated connections of stereotypes, emotions, and sociocultural variables in a single-sample/single-group design. Prior to data processing, Georgian versions of the Stereotype Content Model questionnaires were validated through CFA. The study looked at Georgian students' attitudes to: representatives of German-speaking countries and representatives of English-speaking countries. Emotions predicted to these groups by social–structural antecedents—vitality and fear of assimilation—and stereotypes were admiration, pride, and sympathy. In addition, envy was predicted (...) for the English-speaking group. The prediction of envy is explained by moderation analysis according to which it is elicited by the interplay of warmth and competence, as well as fear of assimilation and competence. The former interaction mediates the link between social–structural antecedents to emotions. Thus, distant out-groups elicit envy as a result of their perceived vitality, fear of assimilation, warmth, and competence. Social–structural antecedents come forward to elicit emotions of envy independently as well as in interaction with stereotypes when small country representatives evaluate representatives of the influential group of English-speaking people. (shrink)

En el marco del naturalismo moral PeterF. Strawson propone que la moralidades parte de nuestra natural participaciónen relaciones humanas donde los otrosno pueden resultarnos indiferentes. Sinembargo, esta innegable ganancia teóricade Strawson, puede quedar debilitadapor la insuficiente importancia que elanglosajón concede a las comunidadesmorales. Como agudamente lo ha puestode pr e s e nt e Ror t y, l os s e nt i mi e nt osmorales, tal como los concebía Strawson,no t ranscurren f uera o al margen dediversas comunidades (...) morales. Cuestiónque nos ha conducido a afirmar, inspiradosen Rorty, que responsabilizarse por el otrodepende de la posibilidad de constituircomunidades morales más incluyentes.A e l l o de b e s uma r s e , pe ns a mo s , e lplanteamiento de Baeir, de una educaciónsentimental que comienza en el nacimientocon el recibimiento amoroso de nuestrosfamiliares, quienes a través de su afectoprogresi vamente nos van entregandoesa confianza inicial que nos permitirác o n q u i s t a r “ u n a v e r s i ó n mo d e s t a ,atemperada, no fanática de la hermandadcristiana”*las comuniDaDes moralesfrom partiCipative interaCtions to moral Communitiesde alcance universalIn the framework of the moral naturalism Peter F. Strawson proposes that moralityis part of our natural participation inhuman rel ati ons where others cannotturn out indifferent to us. Nevertheless,this undeniable theoretical achievementof Strawson, can result weakened becauseof the insufficient importance that the Anglo-saxon gives to moral communities.Acutely, has said Rorty, moral sentimentsin the way conceived by Strawson do nottakes place outside or to the margin ofdiverse moral communities. This issuehas conducted us to affirm, inspired inRorty, that being responsible for the otherdepends on the possibility of built moreinclusive moral communities. We guessBaeir’s approach related to sentimentaleducation should be added to that, which starts from the birth with the lovely reception of our relatives, who throughtheir dearness progressively are giving usthe initial trust that will permit us conquer“a modest version, attenuated, non fanaticof the Christian brotherhood”of universal reach. (shrink)

In this paper we explain how the intentional objects of our mental states can be represented by the intensional objects of conceptual realism. We first briefly examine and show how Brentano’s actualist theory of judgment and his notion of an immanent object have a clear and natural representation in our conceptualist logic of names. We then briefly critically examine Meinong’s theory of objects before turning finally to our own representation of intentional objects in terms of the intensional objects of conceptual (...) realism. We conclude by explaining why existence-entailing concepts are so basic to our commonsense framework and how these concepts and their intensions can be used to model Meinong’s ontology. (shrink)

Theories of well-being that I call “loving-the-good” claim that one intrinsically benefits if and only if one loves what is objectively good. For these views, well-being comes to be when the correct connection between world and mind obtains. Intuitively, ill-being is the opposite of well-being. I explore the resources of loving-the-good views to explain ill-being, especially whether they can do so and also meet the theoretical virtues of continuity and unity. Continuity is met when ill-being theory mirrors the well-being theory. (...) Unity is met when all instances of a phenomenon are given the same kind of explanation. I argue that, strikingly, the key insight of loving-the-good theories of well-being does not seem plausible for ill-being. A consequence is that loving-the-good theories face significant problems to meet continuity. I examine alternatives for these views to meet unity. I argue that plausible explanations of ill-being do not meet unity either. (shrink)

A first-order formulation of Leśniewski's ontology is formulated and shown to be interpretable within a free first-order logic of identity extended to include nominal quantification over proper and common-name concepts. The latter theory is then shown to be interpretable in monadic second-order predicate logic, which shows that the first-order part of Leśniewski's ontology is decidable.

The Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory of spontaneous wave function collapse is known to provide a quantum theory without observers, in fact two different ones by using either the matter density ontology (GRWm) or the flash ontology (GRWf). Both theories are known to make predictions different from those of quantum mechanics, but the difference is so small that no decisive experiment can as yet be performed. While some testable deviations from quantum mechanics have long been known, we provide here something that has (...) until now been missing: a formalism that succinctly summarizes the empirical predictions of GRWm and GRWf. We call it the GRW formalism. Its structure is similar to that of the quantum formalism but involves different operators. In other words, we establish the validity of a general algorithm for directly computing the testable predictions of GRWm and GRWf. We further show that some well-defined quantities cannot be measured in a GRW world, for example the number of collapses in a system during a chosen time interval. (shrink)

The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form (...) of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. (shrink)

In this systematic historical analysis, Nino Langiulli focuses on a key philosophical issue, possibility, as it is refracted through the thought of the Italian ...

The strange thing about Dick Pels' claim about the conventional view of knowledge in “Strange Standpoints” is that, in order for knowledge to be true, it must be “value-free, disinterested and universal.” Allegedly, the challenge to this conventional view comes from “standpoint epistemologies” which, to use the opposite terms descriptive of “true knowledge,” are value-laden, interested, and particular. In short, “standpoint epistemologies” is an inflated term for what used to be and still is called subjectivism. Standpoint epistemologies are theories about (...) knowledge claims. According to these epistemologies, any knowledge claim is always made from the perspective of the speaker (the view from somewhere in contrast to the view from everywhere or nowhere), whereby time, place, gender, race and class count as determinative of its truth-value. (shrink)

The systems view on life and its emergence from complex chemistry has remarkably increased the scientific attention on metabolism in the last two decades. However, during this time there has not been much theoretical discussion on what constitutes a metabolism and what role it actually played in biogenesis. A critical and updated review on the topic is here offered, including some references to classical models from last century, but focusing more on current and future research. Metabolism is considered as intrinsically (...) related to the living but not necessarily equivalent to it. More precisely, the idea of “minimal metabolism”, in contrast to previous, top‐down conceptions, is formulated as a heuristic construct, halfway between chemistry and biology. Thus, rather than providing a complete or final characterization of metabolism, our aim is to encourage further investigations on it, particularly in the context of life's origin, for which some concrete methodological suggestions are provided. Also see the video abstract here:https://youtu.be/DP7VMKk2qpA. (shrink)