In this paper I focus on how the meritorious dimension (or latitude, Spielraum) involved in the promotion of the highest good is closely related to the constitution of an ethical community as a free, open and progressive moral society. I argue that since moral perfection and moral belief/faith as the grounding elements for the promotion of the highest good (synthesis of virtue and happiness) are not objective duties that must be promoted to a definite extent but involve a certain latitude (...) in their employment, the ethical community that emerges out of the pursuit of the highest good does not prove to be a uniform society in terms of the degrees of the pursuit of moral perfection and moral commitment of its citizens. Rather, I point out that the latitude involved in the pursuit of moral perfection and the adoption of moral belief leads to the establishment of an ethical community that emerges as an open and free society entered by its citizens freely and willfully as part of their inner self-constraint. I thus hold that in such an ethical society agents can pursue and promote the highest good not in a strictly prescribed and uniform manner but in various forms and degrees as long as they constantly progress towards a higher form of moral perfection and purer form of religious (or rational) belief/faith. (shrink)

In his Critical corpus, Kant makes two seemingly inconsistent claims concerning the highest good and its relation to the postulates of immortality and God. On the one hand, he argues that the highest good is a duty to be promoted that must therefore be possible by human powers (‘ought implies can’). On the other hand, he asserts that the highest good is an “unconditioned object” of practical reason that can only be attained on the ground of the postulates of immortality (...) and the aid of God. In order to resolve this apparent conflict in Kant’s claims, I intend to argue in this paper that Kant implicitly classifies the highest good as a wide obligation (imperfect duty), which is to be promoted in the world by human agency but goes beyond the limits of human powers and must be assisted and complemented by the postulates of immortality and God. To do so, I argue that the highest good stems from the moral law since the moral law embodies the ground of absolute goodness and holiness that is never fully achievable by rational agents and thus can generate duties that are impossible to attain. In parallel, I argue that two of the components of the highest good, namely moral worthiness and distribution of happiness, are classified as wide obligations that the moral law commands us to pursue infinitely and with the aid of God. In sum, I try to resolve the initial conflict by suggesting that the highest good as an infinite progress towards the holiness demanded by the moral law signifies a wide obligation, which is not achievable merely by human agency but fundamentally requires the postulates of immortality and the existence of God as a complementing and assisting ground. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant proclaims that the ‘transcendental logic’, the form of logic that he uniquely offers, aims at laying out the necessary laws and principles of nature on the basis of the synthesis of the a priori concepts of understanding and the a priori elements of intuition. In this regard, logic, in Kantian sense, is directed towards the knowledge of the nature which he identifies as the phenomenal world (appearances). The noumenal world (transcendental concepts of God, immortality and freedom), on the (...) other hand, is acclaimed to extend beyond the boundaries of logic. Likewise, Ludwig Wittgenstein points to the boundaries of logic. In his view, logic is limited to the states of affairs in the world (the whole reality). In other words, Wittgenstein argues that one can logically think and talk about merely the facts in the world. The transcendental concepts like logical form, philosophy, aesthetic and ethics, on the other hand, are offered to be beyond the boundaries of logicality. Hence, my aim in this study will be to embark on the boundaries and the legitimate use of logic in Kant and Wittgenstein in parallel to each other. (shrink)

In this article I examine how a teleological (or purposive) reading of Spinoza’s conatus shapes the ethical framework of his philosophy. I first introduce Spinoza’s criticism of teleology and argue contra many critics that Spinoza has a mild approach to human teleology. On the basis of this idea, I develop the claim that the human conatus includes purposive elements such that it is envisioned as a purposive being that is oriented towards the adequate knowledge of Nature or God, the conceptions (...) of wisdom, love and joy and the notion of an ideal human nature. From the teleological reading of human conatus, I draw the conclusion that Spinoza’s ethics is inclusive of objective, humanistic, and essentialist elements in the sense that it situates human agents as directed towards ethical ends to be pursued through their conative activity. In this sense, throughout this paper, I take issue with the anti-teleological reading of conatus that is predominantly related to the subjectivistic, anti-humanistic, and non-essentialist interpretation of Spinoza’s ethics. In doing so, I argue that Spinoza’s ethics is not entirely free from objective, humanistic and essentialist elements, by putting a particular emphasis on the distinguishing character of the purposive essence of his human conatus. (shrink)