The aim of the paper is to reveal the main methodological problems of neuroethics in the course of its development as an interdisciplinary approach to the study of morality, as well as to propose a critical analysis of the results of cognitive science (neurophysiol­ogy) in the context of moral philosophy. For this purpose, the author analyzes the modern subject field of neuroethical research from the point of view of philosophical ethics and discusses the main conceptions in which the results of (...) neurophysiological studies of the moral decision-making process are summarized. The author describes a general divi­sion of the subject field in terms of “neuroethics No. 1” (a part of bioethics) and “neu­roethics No. 2” (a proclaimed part of moral philosophy). The object of research of this ar­ticle is neuroethics No. 2. It is argued that in neuroethics No. 2 the conceptualization of the moral decision-making process is carried out everywhere in accordance with the scheme of “double processes”: intuitive / quick / associative and discursive / slow / calculation-based. Even if the role of intuition is denied, duality is still preserved. This is so because emotions, as an extra-rational part of the psyche, are considered the basis of a quick decision. It is shown that a non-reflexive borrowing of concepts and concep­tions of moral philosophy is carried out both at the level of formation of the subject of re­search and at the level of method. The qualitatively meaningful meaning of concepts is blurred or substituted. Such a language transition outside the boundaries of the subject area of neurophysiology only simulates the presence of interdisciplinarity. The research remains in the frames of the study of cognitive processes, without their moral component. It is concluded that for the development of neuroethics as an interdisciplinary direction, we need to obtain a synthesis of the meanings developed in the course of cultural devel­opment and of the data on human biological development. Further, in accordance with such a synthetic subject we need to adjust the research method, also we must avoid sub­stituting the concepts of philosophical ethics. (shrink)

The excellent and highly interesting commentaries address the following concerns: (1) neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of catatonia; (2) cognitive-motor deficits in catatonia; (3) conceptual issues; (4) general methodology in neuropsychiatric research; and (5) neurophilosophical implications. The specific problems, issues, and aspects raised by the different commentators are grouped under these categories in Table R1 presented below. These five areas of concern are then discussed in the order listed in the five sections of the Response.

BackgroundPrenatal and early postnatal choline supplementation reduces cognitive and behavioral deficits in animal models of Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder. In a previously published 9-month clinical trial of choline supplementation in children with FASD, we reported that postnatal choline was associated with improved performance on a hippocampal-dependent recognition memory task. The current paper describes the neurophysiological correlates of that memory performance for trial completers.MethodsChildren with FASD who were enrolled in a clinical trial of choline supplementation were followed for 9 months. Delayed (...) recall on a 9-step elicited imitation task served as the behavioral measure of recognition memory. Neurophysiological correlates of memory were assessed via event-related potentials.ResultsDelayed recall on EI was correlated with two ERP components commonly associated with recognition memory in young children: middle latency negative component and positive slow wave. No significant ERP differences were observed between the choline and placebo groups at the conclusion of the trial.ConclusionAlthough the small sample size limits the ability to draw clear conclusions about the treatment effect of choline on ERP, the results suggest a relationship between memory performance and underlying neurophysiological status in FASD. This trial was registered.1. (shrink)

In the first two sections of the paper, some basic terminological distinctions regarding “freedom of the will” as a philosophical problem are expounded and discussed. On this basis, the third section focuses on the examination of two neurophysiological experiments (one by Benjamin Libet and one by William Grey Walter), which in recent times are often interpreted as providing an empirical vindication of determinism and, accordingly, a refutation of positions maintaining freedom of the will. It will be argued that both experiments (...) fall short in this respect, and that in general—for methodical reasons—the prospects of ever deciding the dispute about freedom of the will through empirical research are rather poor. (shrink)

Introduction: Evidence supporting the use of music interventions to maximize arousal and awareness in adults presenting with a disorder of consciousness continues to grow. However, the brain of a child is not simply a small adult brain, and therefore adult theories are not directly translatable to the pediatric population. The present study aims to synthesize brain imaging data about the neural processing of music in children aged 0-18 years, to form a theoretical basis for music interventions with children presenting with (...) a disorder of consciousness following acquired brain injury.Methods: We conducted a systematic review with narrative synthesis utilizing an adaptation of the methodology developed by Popay and colleagues. Following the development of the narrative that answered the central question “what does brain imaging data reveal about the receptive processing of music in children?”, discussion was centered around the clinical implications of music therapy with children following acquired brain injury.Results: The narrative synthesis included 46 studies that utilized EEG, MEG, fMRI, and fNIRS scanning techniques in children aged 0-18 years. From birth, musical stimuli elicit distinct but immature electrical responses, with components of the auditory evoked response having longer latencies and variable amplitudes compared to their adult counterparts. Hemodynamic responses are observed throughout cortical and subcortical structures however cortical immaturity impacts musical processing and the localization of function in infants and young children. The processing of complex musical stimuli continues to mature into late adolescence.Conclusion: While the ability to process fundamental musical elements is present from birth, infants and children process music more slowly and utilize different cortical areas compared to adults. Brain injury in childhood occurs in a period of rapid development and the ability to process music following brain injury will likely depend on pre-morbid musical processing. Further, a significant brain injury may disrupt the developmental trajectory of complex music processing. However, complex music processing may emerge earlier than comparative language processing, and occur throughout a more global circuitry. (shrink)

This article discusses neurophysiological correlates of those processes that mediate face recognition. Neurophysiological research in the past few years has been strongly focused on the N170, a putative correlate of the detection of a face-like visual configuration or structural encoding of faces. Neural correlates of recognition may be inferred from a difference between a repeated and an unrepeated presentation of a particular face. It focuses on effects related to face repetition and familiarity and correlates of face identification that involve retrieval (...) of semantic information or names. A debate around the face-selectivity of event-related potentials dominates underlying neural processes mediating face recognition. The main challenge is to investigate the functional significance of various neural responses in the context of cognitive models. (shrink)

Short-term memory, nonattentional task effects and nonspatial extraretinal representations in the visual system are signs of cognitive penetration. All of these have been found physiologically, arguing against the cognitive impenetrability of vision as a whole. Instead, parallel subcircuits in the brain, each subserving a different competency including sensory and cognitive (and in some cases motor) aspects, may have cognitively impenetrable components.

Over the last decade in Germany, a number of neuroscientists—and among them most prominently Wolf Singer—have claimed to be able to offer scientific evidence derived from neurophysiologic findings to conclusively negate the existence of human free will. In this paper, Singer’s position is examined according to its principal characteristics in order to answer the question whether it is a novel position as opposed to a position pertaining to one of the traditions of western philosophy and anthropology. Furthermore, we try to (...) judge whether the neurobiological findings Singer and others use to justify their position are apt to satisfy the criteria for the presence of scientific evidence, i.e., if they are good reasons to believe that human will is unfree. (shrink)

In this volume, three aspects are examined: a) normal subjects, where new findings on spatial behavior are described. b) brain-lesioned subjects, where the ...

Philosophers and neuroscientists often suggest that we perceptually represent objects and their properties. However, they start from very different background assumptions when they use the term “perceptual representation”. On the one hand, sometimes philosophers do not need to properly take into consideration the empirical evidence concerning the neural states subserving the representational perceptual processes they are talking about. On the other hand, neuroscientists do not rely on a meticulous definition of “perceptual representation” when they talk about this empirical evidence that (...) is supposed to show that we perceptually represent such and such properties. It seems that, on both sides, something is missed. My aim is to show that, in the light of empirical evidence from neuroscience, the case of action properties is a good candidate in order to properly talk of perceptually represented properties. My claim is that the neurophysiological states encoding action properties are perceptual processes and that these perceptual processes are representational processes. That is, in the case of those neurophysiological states involved in the detection of action properties, it is correct to speak of perceptual representational states, and hence, ipso facto, of perceptually represented properties. First, I describe a reasonable and widely agreed upon conception of perceptual representation in the philosophical literature. Then, I report evidence from vision and motor neuroscience concerning the perception of action properties, which is subserved by the ventro-dorsal stream, a portion of the dorsal visual system. Finally, I show that a strong connection can be found between the philosophical idea of perceptual representation I have reported before and the neuroscientific evidence concerning the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream, whose job is, as said, to detect action properties. (shrink)

Cognitive control processes are advantageous when routines would not lead to the desired outcome, but this can be ill-advised when automated behavior is advantageous. The aim of this study was to identify neural dynamics related to the ability to adapt to different cognitive control demands – a process that has been referred to as ‘metacontrol.’ A sample of N = 227 healthy subjects that was split in a ‘high’ and ‘low adaptability’ group based on the behavioral performance in a task (...) with varying control demands. To examine the neurophysiological mechanisms, we combined event-related potential (ERP) recordings with source localization and machine learning approaches. The results show that individuals who are better at strategically adapting to different cognitive control demands benefit from automatizing their response processes in situations where little cognitive control is needed. On a neurophysiological level, neither perceptual/attentional selection processes nor conflict monitoring processes paralleled the behavioral data, although the latter showed a descriptive trend. Behavioral differences in metacontrol abilities were only significantly mirrored by the modulation of response-locked P3 amplitudes, which were accompanied by activation differences in insula (BA13) and middle frontal gyrus (BA9). The machine learning result corroborated this by identifying a predictive/classification feature near the peak of the response-locked P3, which arose from the anterior cingulate cortex (BA24; BA33). In short, we found that metacontrol is associated to the ability to manage response selection processes, especially the ability to effectively downregulate cognitive control under low cognitive control requirements, rather than the ability to upregulate cognitive control. (shrink)

Skinner has made significant contributions to the science of the behavior of organisms, including human ones, especially through his emphasis on observable behavior. He has correctly placed psychology among the biological sciences. My disagreement with his position stems from his apparent belief that a knowledge of the pertinent neurophysiology is not necessary (though perhaps desirable) to an explanation of the behavior of an organism. I believe this is a significant conceptual shortcoming, and that correcting it will bring psychology into a (...) more consistent position with the biological sciences in general. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)