La neurofenomenologia è l’ultimo grande progetto al contempo scientifico, filosofico ed esistenziale al quale Francisco Varela ha lavorato. Ma, prima di parlarne, vorrei evocare brevemente quella che credo sia la fonte vissuta e unica della sua opera, e in particolar modo della neurofenomenologia. Questa fonte, così come l’ho percepita, è una volontà molto forte, quasi tirannica, di tenere insieme l’integralità dei fili del tessuto umano, a partire dall’indagine scientifica spinta a un optimu...

This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...) Issues can only be addressed productively by gathering a research community armed with new pragmatic tools for the development of a science of consciousness. I will claim that no piecemeal empirical correlates, nor purely theoretical principles, will really help us at this stage. We need to turn to a systematic exploration of the only link between mind and consciousness that seems both obvious and natural: the structure of human experience itself. In what follows I motivate my choice by briefly examining the current debate about consciousness at the light of Chalmer’s hard problem. Next, I outline the phenomenological strategy. Finally I conclude by discussing some of the main difficulties and consequences of this strategy. (shrink)

Apresento neste trabalho as linhas gerais dos desenvolvimentos metodológicos operados na fenomenologia contemporânea a partir do crescente processo de naturalização. Naturalizar a fenomenologia corresponde à interação de descrições fenomenológicas tradicionais com as descrições oriundas das ciências naturais. Em um primeiro momento apresento as variações metodológicas derivadas dessa interação e os resultados já consolidados na literatura. Posteriormente caracterizo de maneira mais precisa o projeto da neurofenomenologia e apresento algumas contribuições relativas ao estudo da afetividade tendo como pano de fundo a (...) compreensão desse fenômeno em termos enativistas. Chamo atenção, em particular, para um tipo de fenômeno afetivo específico, os sentimentos corporais de tipo existencial. Será possível, assim, apresentar uma avaliação de ordem metodológica relativa ao modo de acesso e descrição desses fenômenos, assumindo como ponto de partida a ideia neurofenomenológica de restrições mútuas entre os níveis de descrição. (shrink)

From an investigation of the theoretical, structural, methodological, and conceptual rudiments of the neurophenomenology, such as developed by Francisco Javier Varela, I seek, at first, to investigate the possibility of a theoretical model whose purpose consists in the integration between the subjective experience and the cerebral dynamic. To the study of the fundamental diagnosis of neurophenomenology — namely, the interpretation which Varela offers to the theoretical and methodological position of Chalmers’ ‘hard problem’ of consciousness —, I will associate the conception (...) of downward determination I borrow from the emergentism. My intention is to demonstrate that the notion of downward determination — as exemplified in meditative practice — can greatly contribute to the consolidation of a theoretical perspective for the problem of mind-body-life relations which is beyond the theoretical, structural, methodological and conceptual implications of the highly acclaimed ‘explanatory gap’. From my belief that meditation brings with it the possibility of filling the mind-body gap on a phenomenological level, I proceed to investigate the elements through which Buddhism and phenomenology can mutually benefit the sciences cognitive; in this sense, I am not presupposing the limitations, but rather the possibilities and the scope of the introspective method, as Varela has previously done in his neurophenomenology. (shrink)

No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is (...) turned into a wine of consciousness” is now among the mainstream problems of cognitive science. (shrink)

El autor realiza una lectura en clave perspectivista de la neurofenomenología, enfoque transdisciplinar y metodológico iniciado a mediados de los 90 por el neurobiólogo Francisco J. Varela desde el ámbito experimental de las ciencias de la mente. La originalidad del artículo reside en que estudia comparativamente el problemático entrecruce de la neurofenomenología de Varela con el perspectivismo científico de Ronald N. Giere, mostrándonos que la neurofenomenología no sólo lo antecedió cronológicamente, sino que fue mucho más radical al tener en cuenta (...) la la dimensión fenomenológica y trascendental de la experiencia vivida humana y al aplicarla en los protocolos de las neurociencias cognitivas. // The author makes a perspectivist reading of neurophenomenology, a transdisciplinary and methodological approach pioneered in the 90’s by the neurobiologist Francisco J. Varela, who worked in the experimental field of the science of mind. The originality of the article consists in studying with a comparative method the problematic intertwine of Varela’s neurophenomenology and the scientific perspectivism recently defended by Ronald N. Giere. In this way, the autor shows how neurophenomenology notonly came before Giere’s proposal but also how it was more radical in considering the phenomenological and transcendental human dimension and in trying an implementation in cognitive neuroscience protocols. (shrink)

Spero che mi si perdonerà lo slancio con cui, in queste pagine, sottolineerò gli aspetti militanti del pensiero neurofenomenologico, concedendomi toni che potrebbero apparire enfatici o retorici, e che potrebbero forse non rispecchiare la sensibilità degli altri contributori di questo volume, ma che ritengo più che mai opportuno usare, anche per onestà intellettuale, essendo implicitamente chiamato a dichiarare, in questa curatela, la mia opinione sulla funzione reale della neurofenomenologia...

This article has as its objective to analyze the relationship between the human decision making processes and self-regulating capacity / in the development of top-down regulation, in this particular case, by means of contemplative practices, principally mindfulness meditation. This debate is supported upon the nexus established between the cognitive and emotional processes, searching for comprehension of the casual bases of human decision making and the cognitive and affective process. From this theoretical perspective, emotions exercise the role of prominent neurobiological mechanisms (...) in the decision-making process, thus revoking very influential rationalist and dualist Cartesian logic that have held sway until the present day. Through such characteristics, the dichotomous perspective between emotional and cognitive processes loses impact and augmentative influence, whereas the collaborative and integrative role between these two mechanisms that regulate the decision making behavior of individuals is reinforced. The theoretical foundation that supports the approach defended in this study is sustained upon neurophenomenology, which interacts synergistically with phenomenological approaches, modern discoveries from neuroscience and the oriental contemplative practices. In another sense, the interdisciplinarity between philosophy and the practical sciences provides the means for a conceptual proposal that produces a consistent dialogue with that of experimental, cognitive and neural discoveries. Thus producing the groundwork for a meaningful analysis of neurobiological and philosophical hypotheses of the classic problems related to our capacity for self-determination, self-government and voluntary control over our actions. In summary, through an examination of the current situation, few academic discussions propose such a broad and interdisciplinary debate on this theme, thus falling time and time again upon old conceptual paradigms, which are today already noticeably outweighed by empirical findings of the mind. Therefore, by incorporating into the philosophical debate cognition, millenary practices and scientific experience, we will produce a short theoretical conceptual revision concerning decision making until our arrival at the modern experiments performed with experienced meditators. Through this journey we will propose a philosophical discussion that presents new academic perspectives congruent with the debates on modern decision making and our capacity to self-regulate. (shrink)

In questo lavoro intendo confrontare le posizioni di Searle e Dennett nell’ambito della teoria della mente con la teoria husserliana della coscienza. Mostrerò come questi autori modifichino la nozione fenomenologica di intenzionalità, trasformandola in un modello di descrizione in “terza persona”. Tale cambiamento ha conseguenze problematiche riguardanti la distinzione fra un atto mentale e il suo contenuto e la conseguente critica alla teoria rappresentazionale della mente; l’argomento del teatro cartesiano, quello dell’omuncolo e lo smantellamento della nozione di soggettività; il rifiuto (...) dell’inconscio. Mostrerò come le concezioni di Searle e Dennett nascano da un concetto contraddittorio di riduzionismo, implicito anche negli sviluppi della “fenomenologia naturalizzata” e della neurofenomenologia. Queste difficoltà non si possono risolvere adattando o applicando il metodo fenomenologico alle scienze cognitive, né tornando semplicemente alla teoria husserliana. Bisogna invece individuare i problemi specifici affrontabili fenomenologicamente all’interno di un contesto scientifico: per esempio, la struttura temporale della coscienza e la questione dei contenuti inconsci della mente. (shrink)

Il soggetto empirico indagato dagli psicologi trattiene forti legami con il soggetto puro indagato dai fenomenologi. Ne deriva il paradosso di una differenza che è insieme identità. L’analisi fenomenologica allora potrebbe assumere presupposti naturalistici, esito che Husserl ha decisamente escluso, affermando invece la necessità dell’epoché, della ricerca eidetica e il primato della coscienza intenzionale. Le ricerche che vertono sulla coscienza vedono oggi consumarsi un contrasto tra i sostenitori dell’embodiment, secondo cui le neuroscienze sono in grado di spiegare a sufficienza i (...) fenomeni psichici, e i fenomenologi, i quali, basandosi sul concetto husserliano di hyle, configurano una soggettività sensoriale, ovvero una coscienza legata strettamente all’esperienza sensibile. La ricerca di scientificità nel primo caso giunge attraverso le scienze della complessità alla matematizzazione della psiche, mentre nel secondo caso i fenomenologi si appoggiano ai progressi delle neuroscienze. (shrink)

En el presente artículo hacemos una revisión del método neurofenomenólogico de Thomas Metzinger y su capacidad para responder a problemas habituales de filosofía de la mente y evitar dificultades de otros materialismos. Metzinger define estados mentales en función de estados cerebrales, sin embargo, frente al materialismo eliminativo, sí considera como real la experiencia fenoménica y rechaza su reducción conceptual o epistémica. Esta peculiaridad salva su propuesta de críticas como la de José Ignacio Murillo o Graham Harman, que parecen dirigidas a (...) otros tipos de materialismos. Por ello, consideramos necesario repensar las consecuencias éticas de la tajante negación del libre albedrío y la afirmación de la posibilidad de máquinas artificiales conscientes que conlleva la propuesta de Metzinger. (shrink)