This article explores the practical approach to global justice advocated by the cosmopolitan political theorists Pogge, Beitz and Buchanan. Using a comparative exposition it outlines their reliance on international law and on human rights law in particular. The essay explores the neo-Kantian influence on the practical approach and offers an original critique of this trend in contemporary international political theory.

Transnational Cosmopolitanism is a text that aims to build upon Kant’s account of cosmopolitanism through the post-WWI writings and political life of W.E.B. Du Bois. Through the work of these two figures, Valdez constructs the notion of “transnational cosmopolitanism” to describe situations of global injustice and to imagine worlds otherwise. By demonstrating the limits of Kantian cosmopolitanism through an anti-colonial reading of “Perpetual Peace,” Transnational Cosmopolitanism illustrates how these limits still emerge within neo-Kantian (...) frameworks and writing. In order to overcome these limitations, Valdez artfully utilizes Du Bois’ political writings and his radical coalitional politics to argue that Du Bois’ writings and actions should inform our theorization and normative insights. This text provides a unique and robust contribution to the literature of cosmopolitanism that questions the current use of Kant’s canonical approach and enlists overlooked readings and resources to compose a transnational cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

Based on the theoretical reconstruction of neglected post-WWI writings and political action of W. E. B. Du Bois, this volume offers a normative account of transnational cosmopolitanism. Pointing out the limitations of Kant's cosmopolitanism through a novel contextual account of Perpetual Peace, Transnational Cosmopolitanism shows how these limits remain in neo-Kantian scholarship. Inés Valdez's framework overcomes these limitations in a methodologically unique way, taking Du Bois's writings and his coalitional political action both as text that should (...) inform our theorization and normative insights. The cosmopolitanism proposed in this work is an original contribution that questions the contemporary currency of Kant's canonical approach and enlists overlooked resources to radicalize, democratize, and transnationalize cosmopolitanism. (shrink)

The article considers that the relationship between the work of the Neo-Kantian philosopher, Hermann Cohen, and the legal theorist, Hans Kelsen has been shaped by a tendency to detach, and render relatively unthematized, the question of the cosmopolitan orientation of their work. The reintroduction of the question of cosmopolitanism enables the relationship between the theoretical projects of Cohen and Kelsen to be reconsidered in which Kelsen’s development of a pure theory of law contains a sustained critique of the (...) ‘dogma of the state’, which has as its necessary corollary a theory of legal monism. These elements are, in turn, the articulation of the potential for an international juridical order, in its primacy over states, to encompass the possibility for world peace. The revelation of the cosmopolitan orientation of Kelsen’s pure theory of law then offers the capacity to reconfigure the relationship to Cohen on the basis of the question of cosmopolitanism. In this reconfiguration, the characterization of their relationship becomes that of identity and difference: a shared cosmopolitanism combined with a divergent articulation of its theoretical foundation and development. (shrink)

This paper re-contextualizes Karl Popper's thought within the anti-nationalist cosmopolitan tradition of the Central European intelligentsia. It argues that, although Popper was brought up in an assimilated Jewish Viennese household, from the perspective of the Jewish Enlightenment or Haskalah tradition, he can be seen to be a modern day heterodox Maskil (scholar). Popper's ever present fear of anti-Semitism and his refusal to see Judaism as compatible with cosmopolitanism raise important questions as to the realisable limits of the cosmopolitan ideal. (...) His inability to integrate an understanding of Jewishness in his cosmopolitan political ideal resulted in his strong opposition to Zionism and the state of Israel. By comparing Popper's positions with those of Hermann Cohen, another neo-Kantian philosopher, I argue that although their solutions fall short in certain respects, their arguments have continuing purchase in recent debates on cosmopolitanism and the problem of the integration of minority groups. In addition, the arguments of the Jewish Enlightenment thinkers offer important insights for the current debates on minority integration and xenophobia. (shrink)

What are the differences between cosmopolitanism and globalization? Are they “natural” historical processes or are they designed for specific purposes? Was Kant cosmopolitanism good for the entire population of the globe or did it respond to a particular Eurocentered view of what a cosmo-polis should be? The article argues that, while the term “globalization” in the most common usage refers and correspond to neo-liberal globalization projects and ambitions, and the Kantian concept of “cosmopolitanism” responded to the (...) second wave, “de-colonial cosmopolitanism” refers to global processes and conceptualizations delinking from both neo-liberal globalization and liberal cosmopolitan ideals. But it delinks also from theological and Marxist visions of a homogenous world center around religious ideals or state socialist regulations. De-colonial cosmopolitanism is a cosmopolitanism of multiple trajectories aiming at a trans-modern world based on pluriversality rather than on a new and good universal for all. (shrink)

Contemporary liberal theory has kept up a long love affair with Kant. John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, to name just two of the most prominent neo-Kantian liberals, draw extensively from Kant's moral philosophy. There are indeed powerful resources for liberalism in Kant's thinking—from his view of human dignity to his constructivist method in ethics to his rationalist cosmopolitanism. Kant has also been lauded for his critique of European colonialism and his general objection to a world state. By contrast, (...) John Stuart Mill has not fared nearly so well among contemporary liberals. Rawls's critique of utilitarianism has largely sidelined liberal figures in that tradition. Mill in particular has garnered special... (shrink)

This book examines the history of cosmopolitanism from its origins in the ancient world up to its use in Kantian political philosophy. Taking the idea of 'common property of the land' as a starting point, the author makes the original case that attention to this concept is needed to properly understand the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship. Offering a reconstruction of cosmopolitanism from an interdisciplinary point of view, Toward Kantian Cosmopolitanism shows how the concept sits at (...) the intersection between philosophical debates, legal realities and the origins of the construction of the discipline of international law. Essential reading for all researchers and advances students of cosmopolitanism, political philosophy and the history of international law, it broadens the current understanding of the concept of cosmopolitanism and reflects on cosmopolitan studies from a historical and philosophical point of view. (shrink)

This thesis is a constructive work in the tradition of morality. The thesis divides into three parts. Part One argues that morality is best considered as a tradition (in MacIntyre’s sense) in ethical thinking which begins with the Stoics, develops in Christian thought and reaches its apotheosis in Kant. This tradition structures ethical thinking around three basic concepts: cosmopolitanism, or universal applicability to human beings as such, the dignity of human beings and reciprocity. It is this tradition in ethical (...) thinking which Nietzsche sets out to destroy. Part One then critiques conceptions of morality which take it that universal and exceptionless rules form the core of morality: it criticises both the possibility of putting forward an adequate set of such rules and the proposed relationship between morality and human life that is implicit in these accounts. Part Two begins with Nietzsche’s challenge: that morality is a system of values rooted in nihilistic resentment at the vitality of other, stronger modes of living. It argues that this challenge must be taken seriously, and that the best way to do this is to make it clear that morality has as its fundamental basis a responsiveness to the value of human life; hence it is Nietzsche’s ethics that should be called nihilistic. The rest of Part Two examines the possibility of answering Nietzsche’s challenge by demonstrating a necessary connection between human selfhood and the acknowledgement of the dignity of human beings. Here I argue that neither Christine Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian arguments nor Charles Taylor’s phenomenologically based approach can provide a convincing reason for thinking that there is such a necessary connection. Part Three turns towards pragmatism, and in so doing gives up on the attempt to show that morality is somehow necessary for all human beings. Nietzsche’s challenge is answered more subtly: an empirically backed theory of human selfhood explains the point of morality in terms of our basic need for recognition. I complete the reconstruction of morality by reinterpreting the dignity of human beings in a naturalistic way and adopting a conception of moral rules that is informed by Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics. (shrink)

One of Heidegger’s main targets of criticism in History of the Concept of Time is Husserl’s theory of intentionality. This criticism, however, has roots in Heidegger’s earliest thinking over the course of his student years and pertains to what Ernst Tugendhat called the problem of encounter as such. In this article I present how the critical appropriation of Rickert’s and Lask’s ideas shaped a unique interpretation of the subject’s existence in the early stages of Heidegger’s career, contributing to the (dis)solution (...) of the encounter problem and anticipating an independent version of phenomenology more than a decade before the publication of Being and Time. These alternative sources of influence illuminate Heidegger’s own path, which is significantly different from Husserl’s from the very start. In particular, I show in the article how Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Neo-Kantian sources allows him already during the 1910s to see the derivative status of the theoretical subject-object dichotomy and to realize the need to investigate living subjectivity in its embeddedness in the world. (shrink)

The latter half of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century witnessed a remarkable resurgence of interest in Kant’s philosophy in Continental Europe, the effects of which are still being felt today. _The Neo-Kantian Reader_ is the first anthology to collect the most important primary sources in Neo-Kantian philosophy, with many being published here in English for the first time. It includes extracts on a rich and diverse number of subjects, including logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy (...) of science, and transcendental idealism. Sebastian Luft, together with other scholars, provides clear introductions to each of the following sections, placing them in historical and philosophical context: the beginnings of Neo-Kantianism: including the work of Hermann von Helmholtz, Otto Liebman, Friedrich Lange, and Hermann Lotze the Marburg School: including Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer the Southwest School: including Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Emil Lask, and Hans Vaihinger responses and critiques: including Moritz Schlick, Edmund Husserl; Rudolf Carnap, and the 'Davos dispute' between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer. The Neo-Kantian Reader is essential reading for all students of Kant, nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy, history and philosophy of science, and phenomenology, as well as to those studying important philosophical movements such as logical positivism and analytic philosophy and its history. (shrink)

Abstract‘Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is conceptualized in many ways. We argue that one cannot be indifferent about the issue of its conceptualization. In terms of methodology, our position is that any conceptual discussion must embed CSR in political theory. With regard to substance, we link up with the discussion on whether CSR must be defined on the basis of a tripartite or a quadripartite division of business responsibilities. We share A.B. Carroll’s intuition that a quadripartite division is called for as (...) a basis to define CSR. However, defending the quadripartite division of business responsibilities requires that the distinctions between economic, legal, ethical and discretionary business responsibilities be made intelligible. Carroll’s account is defective in this respect. We argue that contemporary Neo-Kantian political ethics is able to make sense of these distinctions, because of its specific interpretation of liberalism. Interestingly, from a conventional liberal perspective this interpretation of liberalism is atypical, as it extends public morality beyond the domain of the law. (shrink)

Despite remarkable efforts, it remains notoriously difficult to equip quantum theory with a coherent ontology. Hence, Healey (2017, 12) has recently suggested that ‘‘quantum theory has no physical ontology and states no facts about physical objects or events’’, and Fuchs et al. (2014, 752) similarly hold that ‘‘quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world’’. While intriguing, these positions either raise the question of how talk of ‘physical reality’ can even remain meaningful, or they must ultimately embrace (...) a hidden variables-view, in tension with their original project. I here offer a neo-Kantian alternative. In particular, I will show how constitutive elements in the sense of Reichenbach (1920) and Friedman (1999, 2001) can be identified within quantum theory, through considerations of symmetries that allow the constitution of a ‘quantum reality’, without invoking any notion of a radically mind-independent reality. The resulting conception will inherit elements from pragmatist and ‘QBist’ approaches, but also differ from them in crucial respects. Furthermore, going beyond the Friedmanian program, I will show how non-fundamental and approximate symmetries can be relevant for identifying constitutive principles. (shrink)

'Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is conceptualized in many ways. We argue that one cannot be indifferent about the issue of its conceptualization. In terms of methodology, our position is that any conceptual discussion must embed CSR in political theory. With regard to substance, we link up with the discussion on whether CSR must be defined on the basis of a tripartite or a quadripartite division of business responsibilities. We share A. B. Carroll's intuition that a quadripartite division is called for (...) as a basis to define CSR. However, defending the quadripartite division of business responsibilities requires that the distinctions between economic, legal, ethical and discretionary business responsibilities be made intelligible. Carroll's account is defective in this respect. We argue that contemporary Neo-Kantian political ethics is able to make sense of these distinctions, because of its specific interpretation of liberalism. Interestingly, from a conventional liberal perspective this interpretation of liberalism is atypical, as it extends public morality beyond the domain of the law. (shrink)

This essay argues that a restatement of Thomistic natural law reasoning is increasingly necessary in jurisprudential debate about international law. Mindful of Pope John Paul II's call for a renewal of international law, the essay engages with the present-day tension between Morgenthau-type realism and neo-Kantian discourse-oriented cosmopolitanism. The essay addresses whether the former is sufficiently realistic in our global 21st century context, and whether the latter is adequately cosmopolitan. Attention is drawn to Aquinas's understanding of the relation between (...) custom, consent and political authority in order to expose some of the limits of present-day statism, and to suggest that Thomistic natural law reasoning is, potentially at least, better able to cope with the intractable disagreement that characterises 21st century global relations than some forms of neo-Kantian jurisprudence. (shrink)

This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment. The second part (...) explicates transcendental subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self-referential and constitutes objects, in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel's absolute subject. Rather than delineating the differences between neo-Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti-psychologist and non-metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the major transformations in the Marburg neo-Kantian account of experience. By focusing on the problem of ‘conceptualism’, it traces connections between four issues that are central to the transcendental projects of the Marburg philosophers: the interpretation of Kant, the critique of experiential givenness, the account of objective cognition in science, and the relation between scientific and pre-scientific experience. My historical narrative identifies two shifts. The first is from Cohen's conceptualist answer to the threat of subjectivism to (...) Cassirer's functionalist answer to empiricism. The second is from Cassirer's conceptualism about scientific experience to his symbolic non-conceptualism about everyday perception. My reconstruction reveals the fate of neo-Kantian conceptualism to be linked to the fate of pre-scientific perception and suggests that the continuing significance of the Marburg philosophers lies in their responses to the coming apart of the manifest and the scientific image. (shrink)

The Kantian legacy has had a key impact on the landscape of theoretical philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. Philosophers both in Germany and in Russia saw Immanuel Kant’s ideas as seminal for their philosophical research. The main schools of that era were formed in discussions of the problems and the solutions which were proposed by Kant. The methodological legacy of the critical philosophy effectively became the main benchmark of the thinking of a whole generation of (...) intellectuals. Research into the unity of “form” in the structure of human cognition was also in many ways mediated by the Kantian tradition. To prove this thesis I first look at the philosophy of Gustav Shpet who creatively interpreted the German tradition and proposed an original project of his own, and then I examine the theory of Ernst Cassirer, an outstanding representative of Neo-Kantianism who in the later period of his work proposed considering the phenomena of the humanities to be symbolic forms closest to the spontaneity of the biological. The common feature of the approaches of the two philosophers is their attempt to preserve the integrity of cognition which is destroyed by mathematisation of the common denominator (ultimate categorisation) and hierarchisation of the phenomena of human life. The alternative is the metaphor of mutational change, through which the concept of “form” acquires a new meaning. In conclusion I show that the analysis of the projects of Shpet and Cassirer has heuristic value for the historical-philosophical understanding of the fate of the Kantian philosophy and for modern philosophical culture. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the work of A. Bely in the development of Russian culture in the late 19th - early 20th centuries. Attention is paid to the motives of the creative path of the philosopher-poet, who created the basis of Russian symbolism. By analyzing the cultural and historical manifestations of the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, reflection in the works of art and science workers, an assessment of the severity (...) of symbolism for the development of Russian philosophy and the field of art in general. In the process of the formation of symbolism in Bely's work, neo-Kantian motives are clearly revealed in the formulation of the problem of the difference between subjective perception and the essence of the object of perception in itself, that is, distinguishing between the symbol and the signified. By comparing Bely's views with the concept of sophiology and anthroposophy, distinct Kantian positions of the philosopher-poet stand out. These include the schematism of space and time, an attempt to apply the categories of natural science to the field of philosophy of art, as well as the demarcation of the immanent and the transcendent. Despite the fact that the ideas of the philosopher-poet in their form have similar positions with the anthroposophy of R. Steiner and with the ideas of V. Solovyov, however, the key content is the neo-Kantian methodology of "critical deepening" of thought and its rationalization. The actualization of Bely's creativity and the issue of his neo-Kantian motives is carried out by attracting research from related branches of knowledge on the principles of interdisciplinary consideration and implementation of an integrated approach. (shrink)

The neo-Kantian transcendentalist reading of the epistemic status of logical axioms in Frege argues that he is committed to the neo-Kantian idea that we are epistemically justified in accepting logical axioms because accepting them is necessary for achieving epistemically crucial goals. However, I show that Frege hesitates to be fully committed to neo-Kantian transcendentalism because he struggles to accept the idea that such a teleological reason can constitute an epistemic warrant. This interpretation shows some crucial aspects of (...) his philosophy of logic, such as his understanding of the relationship between the simplicity and the sufficiency of logical systems. (shrink)

Has Derek Parfit modified his views on personal identity in light of Quassim Cassam’s neo-Kantian argument that to experience the world as objective, we must think of ourselves as enduring subjects of experience? Both parties suggest there is no longer a serious dispute between them. I retrace the path that led to this truce, and contend that the debate remains open. Parfit’s recent work reveals a re-formulation of his ostensibly abandoned claim that there could be impersonal descriptions of reality. (...) I show why Parfit still needs this claim, and how it conflicts with the neo-Kantian view. (shrink)

: Most contemporary attempts to draw inspiration from Kant's cosmopolitan project focus exclusively on the prescriptive recommendations he makes in his article, ‘On Perpetual Peace’. In this essay, I argue that there is more to his cosmopolitan point of view than his normative agenda. Kant has a unique and interesting way of problematizing the way individuals and peoples relate to one another on the stage of world history, based on a notion that human beings who share the earth in common (...) ‘originally’ constitute a ‘commercium’ of thoroughgoing interaction. By unpacking this concept of ‘commercium’, we can uncover in Kant a more critical perspective on world history that sets up the cosmopolitan as a specific kind of historical-political challenge. I will show that we can distinguish this level of problematization from the prescriptive level at which Kant formulates his familiar recommendations in ‘Perpetual Peace’. I will further show how his particular way of framing the cosmopolitan problematic can be expanded and expatiated upon to develop a more critical, reflexive, and open-ended conception of cosmopolitan thinking. (shrink)

More than many other Austrians, Mises tried to found aprioristic methodology on a well defined and developed epistemology. Although references to Kant are scattered rather unsystematically throughout his works, he nevertheless used an unequivocal Kantian terminology. He explicitly defended the existence of ‘a priori knowledge’, ‘synthetic a priori propositions’, ‘the category of action’, and so forth.

One of the most important philosophical topics in the early twentieth century and a topic that was seminal in the emergence of analytic philosophy was the relationship between Kantian philosophy and modern geometry. This paper discusses how this question was tackled by the Neo-Kantian trained philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Surprisingly, Cassirer does not affirm the theses that contemporary philosophers often associate with Kantian philosophy of mathematics. He does not defend the necessary truth of Euclidean geometry but instead develops (...) a kind of logicism modeled on Richard Dedekind's foundations of arithmetic. Further, because he shared with other Neo-Kantians an appreciation of the developmental and historical nature of mathematics, Cassirer developed a philosophical account of the unity and methodology of mathematics over time. With its impressive attention to the detail of contemporary mathematics and its exploration of philosophical questions to which other philosophers paid scant attention, Cassirer's philosophy of mathematics surely deserves a place among the classic works of twentieth century philosophy of mathematics. Though focused on Cassirer's philosophy of geometry, this paper also addresses both Cassirer's general philosophical orientation and his reading of Kant. (shrink)

Kantian moral theory is construed as the paradigm of deontology, where such an approach to ethics is opposed to consequentialism and perfectionism. However, in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, Kant understands historical progress in terms of the realisation of our rational capacities, to the extent that such emphasis on capability actualisation amounts to a form of moral perfectionism: wars and incessant periods of armed conflict lead rulers to grasp the value of peace, because war and (...) armed conflict prevent human beings from achieving self-realisation. For Kant, in order to enable self-realisation, states must work together to establish a federal union of republican governments. The aim of this chapter is to (i) articulate and defend a perfectionist dimension of Kantian ethics; and (ii) propose that an insightful way of articulating Kantian Cosmopolitanism can be provided by paying significant attention to recognition theory. Following Honneth’s model of diagnostic social philosophy, I argue that armed conflict is best understood in terms of a particularly complex form of social pathology, where the peaceful resolution of such conflict requires a complex form of diagnosis and therapy. Under such an account, leadership involves taking the lead in diagnosing armed conflict as arising from an especially traumatic asymmetrical recognition order, and in proposing genuinely practical therapeutic solutions to resolving conflict by advocating specific progressive transformations to the current asymmetrical recognition order. (shrink)

Modern empiricism is usually thought to have emerged in opposition to the then dominant school of neo-Kantianism. True as this may be, it has blinded us to the fact that Kantian and more surprisingly even neo-Kantian elements of philosophy have also had a positive influence upon the development of the new empiricism. One episode in which this influence proves itself in fact dominant and which I will present in the following concerns the philosophical position which Popper adopted vis-à-vis (...) logical empiricism — as advocated by Wittgenstein and Schlick — in Vienna in the late twenties and early thirties of the last century. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen, the founding father of Marburg neo-Kantianism, is known for criticising capitalism from a Kantian ethical perspective. Thus far, the role of the notion of humanity in this critique has been viewed as grounding what I shall call the ‘purposive labour reading’. This reading takes Cohen’s primary interest to lie in a reorganisation of work so that our humanity, which requires us to be treated as ends, remains intact. With the aim to better understand the relevant notion of (...) humanity, I contextualise the discussion within the overall framework of Cohens’ neo-Kantian account of ethical cognition and situate his ideas in the context of his contemporary interlocutors. Revisiting Cohen’s remarks on socialism and capitalism against this backdrop reveals that his discussion of labour serves as an exemplar, showcasing how ethical rationality manifests in the liberal socialists’ demands. I argue that his primary aim was not to prepare the ground for a prescriptive labour theory – though this is likely to follow – but to argue for a framework alternative to historical materialism, allowing us to perceive and interpret social practices in an ethical light. (shrink)

Nas universidades alemãs do período em que Nietzsche esteve intelectualmente ativo, a tradição kantiana foi amplamente substituída por duas escolas independentes e que, desde então, têm sido rotuladas de "neokantismo". Este artigo apresenta quatro teses principais da filosofia da história neokantiana, mostra como elas são uma decorrência de sua adaptação da tradição kantiana e como Nietzsche se envolve criticamente com os mesmos temas na formação de sua própria teoria histórica. Embora não haja uma influência muito direta entre estas escolas, o (...) contraste com a tradição neokantiana nos permite situar melhor a filosofia da história de Nietzsche em seu contexto apropriado. In the German academies of Nietzsche's period of writing, the Kantian tradition was largely displaced in favor of two independent schools that have since been labeled "Neo-Kantianism." This paper presents four key theses about philosophy of history from four Neo-Kantian thinkers, how they follow from their adaptation of the Kantian tradition, and how Nietzsche critically engaged the very same issues in the formation of his own historical theory. Although there is little direct influence between orthodox Neo-Kantianism and Nietzsche, their comparison on these points will illuminate their unique adaptations of the Kantian tradition. (shrink)

Neo-Kantian constructivism aspires to respond to moral skepticism by compelling agents to act morally on pain of irrationality. According to Christine Korsgaard, a leading proponent of constructivism, we construct all reasons for action by following correct deliberative procedures. But if we follow these procedures we will find that we only have reasons to act in morally permissible ways. Thus, we can show the skeptic that he is rationally constrained to act morally. Unfortunately, as I argue in my first chapter, (...) this strong response to moral skepticism renders deliberate immoral action unintelligible. This result is problematic since we often do interpret ourselves and others as deliberately choosing to do wrong. I further suggest that this problem follows from central commitments of Korsgaard’s constructivism, so that any adequate account of immoral action must abandon constructivist metaethics in favor of moral realism, a suggestion reinforced by the argument of my second chapter. There, I call attention to Kant’s solution to a similar problem in his own account of morality. I argue that Korsgaard’s constructivist commitments prevent her from embracing Kant’s solution. I proceed in my third chapter to argue that there is a further tension between Korsgaard’s response to moral skepticism and her work in non-ideal theory. In particular, Korsgaard maintains that, when confronted with injustice, the virtuous person may have reason to do what is wrong in the name of morality. She thus relies on the assumption that one can deliberately do wrong. I argue that this assumption undermines the response to skepticism that motivated Korsgaard’s constructivism in the first place. But despite the problems with constructivism, we may worry that moral realism fails to offer an adequate response to moral skepticism. Indeed, Korsgaard rejects realism in part because she believes that realists simply refuse to respond to moral skepticism. I thus conclude by arguing that moral realists can offer adequate responses to moral skepticism. In fact, I believe Korsgaard’s response is no more effective than those suggested by some moral realists. (shrink)

Frege's historical milieu is investigated under the rubric of the "neo-Kantian paradigm." This term is used loosely to describe those philosophers in the fourth generation after Kant who went back to Kant in protest to the vulgar or scientific materialism which had prevailed in the previous decades. This paradigm is characterized in a linguistic or conceptual fashion, after the historical precedent of the so-called "Cambridge school" . ;Frege's relation to the neo-Kantians of his own day, to Lotze, and to (...) Herbart and the Brentano school are examined. Correlations are traced between the motivations and the impetus for the development of the "new logic" in light of the increasing emphasis upon logic and its relation to thought by such figures as Lotze, Cohen, Natorp, and Husserl. Frege's own developments are then outlined by illustrating how the functional innovations of his Begriffsschrift made possible new accounts of negation, numerical and existential quantification, and the notion of the object, but are accomplished nonetheless against the backdrop of the work of such thinkers as Herbart, Lotze, Stumpf, and Marty. Finally, this historical interpretation is brought to bear on a much-debated topic in the recent literature: Frege's two stipulations of the logical form of the statement of number. (shrink)

Constantine Zurayk, one of the most important Arab thinkers of the twentieth century, has examined and reflected on the principal political events and cultural crises of the period. His main philosophical theses are seen in relation to the "Kulturphilosophie" of turn-of-the-century German thinkers, in particular to the philosophies of life of Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Simmel and to the Neo-Kantian thought of Ernst Cassirer. Both the virtues and shortcomings of Zurayk's philosophy of culture, especially in the Arab context, are seen (...) in his distinction between, and elaboration on, the descriptive and normative approaches to culture. (shrink)

It is a tale often told, and one that has never lost much in the retelling. Scholars never cease to ponder the Schiller-Kant relationship, which continues to be controversial. It is not hard to see why. Schiller once said that he only wanted to follow the spirit of Kant’s philosophy, even if, on a few minor points, he would depart from its letter. But he also did not hesitate to contradict Kant explicitly on major points, attempting, for example, to build (...) an objective aesthetics in direct conflict with Kant’s teaching about the subjectivity of aesthetic judgment. How can we bring both these points together to form an intelligible account of the Kant-Schiller relationship? Scholars have been working on this for generations. There is no simple solution. (shrink)

This paper re-contextualises Popper within a Kantian tradition by examining his interaction with the Vienna Circle. The complexity of Popper's relationship to the Vienna Circle is often a point of confusion as some view him as a member of the Vienna Circle while others minimise his association with this group. This paper argues that Popper was not a member of the Vienna Circle or a positivist but shared many neo-Kantian philosophical tendencies with the members of the Circle as (...) well as many of their philosophical problems and interests. By better understanding the influence of the Circle's members upon Popper, we not only remove the myths surrounding Popper's positivism, but also place the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle within its proper philosophical context. This paper further argues that it was Popper's friend during his formative philosophical years in Vienna, Julius Kraft (1921–1960) who was responsible for the way in which Popper approached Kant. Through Kraft, Popper was introduced to the thought of Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) and Jakob Fries (1773–1843) as well as a tradition of critical rationalism which Popper would continue both in his methodological orientation as well as through his late German Enlightenment intellectual values. (shrink)

This article presents Durkheim as a Neo-Kantian social thinker and a source of the theory of emotional contagion. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life is examined as Durkheim’s paradigm case of Neo-Kantianism. He is first considered among the intellectual context of French Neo-Kantianism and its figures Charles Renouvier, Émile Boutroux, and Octave Hamelin, all whom were influential in his formative years. Durkheim’s Neo-Kantianism in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life is then juxtaposed to the Neo-Kantian legal philosophy of (...) Emil Lask and Hans Kelsen. Agued is that Durkheim’s notions of distortion and emotional contagion are his leading contributions to Neo-Kantianism. (shrink)

Structural realism was born in the attempt to reach a compromise between a realist argument and an antirealist one, namely the ‘no miracle’ ­argument and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’, respectively. According to the ‘no miracle’ argument, scientific realism is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle. The only way of explaining why science is so ­successful in making predictions that most of the time turn out to be verified, is to believe that theoretical terms refer, (...) that theories in mature science are true or at least approximately true, and that the same term refers to the same thing even if it occurs in different theories. It is the referential nature of scientific theories that explains the success of science. (shrink)

The article explores the influence of Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy on a prominent philosopher and educator, Yevhen Vasyliovych Spektorskyi’s (1875–1951) views regarding the nature and methodology of social sciences. First, it explores Spektorskyi’s consideration of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as a philosopher of science, emphasizing the critical aspect of his philosophy and its significant prospects for ethics and social philosophy. Next, it investigates how Spektorskyi became acquainted with and was influenced by Neo-Kantian philosophy, especially the Marburg school. The (...) main problem through the lens of which Spektorskyi analyzed their achievements was the idea of “pure” ethics as a firm foundation for social science, while criticizing Herman Cohen (1842–1918) for claiming this foundation to lie in jurisprudence. Despite being an adherent of the Baden school, Bohdan Kistiakivskyi (1868–1920) presented views that were quite similar to Spektorskyi’s regarding the exceptional status and methods of social science. The emphasis on logical procedures and the need for rational discussion allows us to draw a parallel between Spektorskyi and the development of Kantian ideas in the 20th-century communicative philosophy. The justification of the “moral” sciences led Spektorskyi to criticize the Baden Neo-Kantians, advocating for the moral nature of social sciences and their importance in constructing social reality. The project of rational social science aimed at governance and politics is reminiscent of Kant’s “anthroponomy”. (shrink)

I argue that Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy—in particular the doctrine of transcendental idealism which grounds it—is best understood as an `epistemic' or `metaphilosophical' doctrine. As such it aims to show how one may engage in the natural sciences and in metaphysics under the restriction that certain conditions are imposed on our cognition of objects. Underlying Kant's doctrine, however, is an ontological posit, of a sort, regarding the fundamental nature of our cognition. This posit, sometimes called the `discursivity thesis', while considered (...) to be completely obvious and uncontroversial by some, has nevertheless been denied by thinkers both before and after Kant. One such thinker is Jakob Friedrich Fries, an early neo-Kantian thinker who, despite his rejection of discursivity, also advocated for a metaphilosophical understanding of critical philosophy. As I will explain, a consequence for Fries of the denial of discursivity is a radical reconceptualisation of the method of critical philosophy; whereas this method is a priori for Kant, for Fries it is in general empirical. I discuss these issues in the context of quantum theory, and I focus in particular on the views of the physicist Niels Bohr and the Neo-Friesian philosopher Grete Hermann. I argue that Bohr's understanding of quantum mechanics can be seen as a natural extension of an orthodox Kantian viewpoint in the face of the challenges posed by quantum theory, and I compare this with the extension of Friesian philosophy that is represented by Hermann's view. -/- A shorter version of this paper, focusing specifically on the views of Grete Hermann, has been published as: Cuffaro, Michael (2023). Grete Hermann, Quantum Mechanics, and the Evolution of Kantian Philosophy. In Jeanne Peijnenburg & Sander Verhaegh (eds.), Women in the History of Analytic Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 114-145. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori of Physical Theory (Pap 1946, henceforth FAP) and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics (Cassirer 1937, henceforth DI) may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. (...) Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century. (shrink)

According to W. V. O. Quine's received view, Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (henceforth Aufbau) is a radical empiricist project that attempts at reducing scientific knowledge to a phenomenalistic basis. In Quine's reading, having a phenomenalistic basis is an essential part of the thesis of the Aufbau. According to Michael Friedman, on the other hand, Aufbau is a neo-Kantian project that is primarily concerned with showing the possibility of objective and unified scientific knowledge. Thus, for Friedman, Carnap's (...) choice of phenomenalistic language is rather circumstantial. In this paper, I argue that both Quine and Friedman focus on two different aspects of the Aufbau, which as I shall suggest were equally significant and essential for Carnap's philosophical outlook at the time he was writing Aufbau. Hence, Aufbau should be appreciated for its truly ambitious objective that comprises both the radical empiricist and the neo-Kantian goals. (shrink)