The article is devoted to the justification of the law of inertia. It is often called Newton's first law. It was established that this is not a law, but a postulate. Modern definitions of this law are given. It turned out that well -known definitions of this law are similar to each other. It is shown that this law before Newton was formulated by Descartes, Balillians, Ballo and Galileo. The ontology and philosophical significance of the category "cause" are considered. It (...) is shown that any thing or phenomenon arises for some reason, and nothing happens for no reason and nothing exists. And Democritus understood that there was nothing causeless and could not be. Democritus’s mistake is that he did not recognize a chance. Causality is a philosophical category showing the ontological connection of such two phenomena, when the second phenomenon arises due to the first. Moreover, the first phenomenon is called the cause, and the second is the consequence. In this connection of phenomena, the first phenomenon (cause) necessarily predicts the second phenomenon (investigation). And the mutual relationship between the first and second phenomena is called a causal relationship. is present in all known phenomena of the world, and it is usually understood as the occurrence of the same effects with the same causes. It is shown that in history many ideas and scientific achievements attributed to a certain author have often been discovered before them by other authors. For example, Lobachevsky and Boiai are considered to be the founders of hyperbolic geometry. In fact, this discovery was actually made before them by the now almost forgotten F.A. Taurinus (Taurin). The same can be said about the law of refraction of light. This law was discovered by the Dutch scientist Willebrord Snellius. In fact, 600 years before him, this law had been discovered by the great scientist and philosopher Bahmanyar al-Azerbaijani. And the same mistake is Newton's first law. Therefore, it is best to henceforth always refer to this law as the law of inertia. (shrink)

Die grundlegende These dieser Arbeit ist die Ontologie Kants. Der Verfasser versucht, die praktisch-moralische Logik Kants (die impliziten Postulate) argumentativ zu systematisieren. Er will die Realität der reinen Moralität durch ihre Wirkungen beweisen, die Möglichkeit der Moralität durch die Vernunft (durch deren Mechanismus) erklären und die Ethik Kants von allen empirischen und religiösen Bedingungen und Elementen reinigen. Dies geschieht, um den Kritizismus im Moralischen, gegen den Skeptizismus, den Dogmatismus und den Empirismus wieder herzustellen.

Efficient identification of influential nodes is one of the essential aspects in the field of complex networks, which has excellent theoretical and practical significance in the real world. A valuable number of approaches have been developed and deployed in these areas where just a few have used centrality measures along with their concerning deficiencies and limitations in their studies. Therefore, to resolve these challenging issues, we propose a novel effective distance-based centrality algorithm for the identification of influential nodes in concerning (...) networks. EDBC algorithm comprises factors such as the power of K-shell, degree nodes, effective distance, and numerous levels of neighbor’s influence or neighborhood potential. The performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated on nine real-world networks, where a susceptible infected recovered epidemic model is employed to examine the spreading dynamics of each node. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm outperforms the existing techniques such as eigenvector, betweenness, closeness centralities, hyperlink-induced topic search, H-index, K-shell, page rank, profit leader, and gravity over a valuable margin. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada XI. yüzyılda yaşamış olup günümüz tasavvuf çevrelerince adı ve makamı pek bilinmeyen ilk dönem sûfîlerden İbn Yezdânyâr-ı Hemedânî’nin, kendisi gibi tasavvuf tarihi kaynaklarında adına ve künyesine pek yer verilmemiş Ravzatü’l-Mürîdîn adlı eseri değerlendirilmiştir. Eserin tıpkı Tehzibü’l-Esrâr ve Keşfü’l-mahcûb gibi erken dönem tasavvuf kaynaklarından birisi olduğu görülmektedir. Eser, sûfîlerin makam ve hâlleri açısından öncülü olan eserlere benzese de tasavvuf risalelerinde daha önce karşılaşılmamış kimi sûfî anlatılarına da sahiptir. Ayrıca Baba Tâhir-i Uryân, Baba Cafer-i Ebherî, Aynü’lkudât-ı Hemedânî gibi sûfîlerin başını (...) çektiği Hemedân merkezli Cibâl tasavvuf anlayışı ile bu bölgede doğup gelişen tasavvufi düşüncenin özellikleri hakkında önemli bilgiler ihtivâ eder. (shrink)

In _Opposition to Philosophy in Safavid Iran_ Ata Anzali and S.M. Hadi Gerami offer a critical edition of what is arguably the most erudite and extensive critique of philosophy from the Safavid period. The editors’ extensive introduction offers an in-depth analysis that places the work within the broader framework of Safavid intellectual and social history.

al-Qism al-awwal. Fī ḍawābiṭ al-fikr (manṭiq) --.

Abstrak: Pembacaan atas aspek apokaliptik Kitab Daniel sering dipusatkan pada bagian kedua kitab itu (Dan. 7-12). Bagian pertamanya (Dan. 1-6) hanya dibaca sebagai cerita-cerita heroisme iman. Dengan begitu, sifat apokaliptik tidak kelihatan sebagai karakteristik kitab itu secara keseluruhan. Apokaliptik sendiri cenderung dikaitkan dengan eskatologi, dan bagian kedua kitab tersebut secara mencolok memakai kata “akhir.” Pengaitan aspek apokaliptik dengan fatalisme akhir zaman berkembang di kalangan sekte kiamat. Kendati aspek eskatologisnya, apokaliptik seharusnya juga dipahami dalam matriks hikmat. Jika dibaca dalam kesatuan (...) dan keutuhannya, kitab itu memperlihatkan gagasan mengenai hidup berhikmat dalam mengantisipasi kiamat, bukan dengan menarik diri dari dunia, melainkan setia kepada Allah dan kritis terhadap arogansi kekuasaan. Kata-kata Kunci: apokaliptik, kiamat, radikal, Makabe, sektarian, nubuat, hikmat, eskatologi. Abstract: The reading of the apocalyptic aspect of the Book of Daniel is often focused on the book’s second part (Dan. 7-12). Its first part (Dan. 1-6) is read only as stories of faithful heroism. In this manner, the apocalyptic dimension is not seen as characteristic of the book as a whole. Apocalypse itself tends to be associated with eschatology, and indeed the second part of the book strikingly makes use of the word “end.” The association of apocalypse with the fatalism of the end time develops within the doomsday sect. Despite its eschatological dimension, the apocalyptic aspect should be read within the matrix of wisdom. When being read in its unity and integrity, the book demonstrates the idea of living wisely in the anticipation of the end, not by withdrawing oneself away from the world, but by being faithful to God and being critical of the arrogance of power. Keywords: apocalyptic, doomsday, radical, Maccabees, sectarian, prophecy, wisdom, eschatology. (shrink)

Shihäb al-Din al-Suhrawardi was born around 1154, probably in northwestern Iran. Spurred by a dream in which Aristotle appeared to him, he rejected the Avicennan Peripatetic philosophy of his youth and undertook the task of reviving the philosophical tradition of the "Ancients." Suhruwardi's philosophy grants an epistemological role to immediate and atemporal intuition. It is explicitly anti-Peripatetic and is identified with the pre-Aristotelian sages, particularly Plato. The subject of his _hikmat al-Ishraq_—now available for the first time in English—is the "science (...) of lights," a science that Suhrawardi first learned through mystical exercises reinforced later by logical proofs and confirmed by what he saw as the parallel experiences of the Ancients. It was completed on 15 September 1186; and at sunset that evening, in the western sky, the sun, the moon, and the five visible planets came together in a magnificent conjunction in the constellation of Libra. The stars soon turned against Suhrawardi, however, who was reluctantly put to death by the son of Saladin, the sultan of Egypt, in 1191. (shrink)

Mulla Sadrā refers to ancient Greek philosophers in his writings quite often, especially when the subject matter is the soul. In this article, I will address how Mulla Sadra reiterates Avicenna’s summary and analyses of ancient theories of the soul as discussed in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of, al-Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliya fi asfār al-ʿaqliyyat al-arbaʿa. The source of these discussions, when the structure and basic contents are considered, is Aristotle’s De Anima Book I. Before defining the soul, (...) Aristotle discusses what kind of a science, a science on the soul should be, and afterwards, he evaluates previous theories on the soul as those defining the soul through movement, perception, and life. We observe that this evaluation on previous theories play a preparatory role for his own definition of the soul as perfection and actualization. In a similar manner, in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of Asfār al-aqliyyat al-arbaʿa, Mulla Sadrā reinterprets and discusses Ancient theories in such a way that the discussion leads us to a theory similar to Mulla Sadrā’s. In the presentation of this chapter, we find out that the soul is immaterial and modulated (tashkīkī) reality and is represented as a unity which is in a constant movement in its substance. The soul is matter in its origin, yet turns into an immaterial reality through substantial movement. In direct disagreement with Aristotelian philosophy, for Mulla Sadrā, movement in substance is possible as well as it is essential in understanding the reality of the soul. When Mulla Sadrā evaluates the ancient discussions and the criticisms by Avicenna, he finds that the discussion focuses on the source of mobility yet the soul is supposed to be defined as the source of immobility equally. Next in the discussion on movement, he focuses on the necessity of accepting the principle of substantial movement. According to Mulla Sadrā, Avicenna (following Aristotle’s presentation and interpretation) is misleading in his evaluation and criticisms of the ancient theories on the soul mainly because he follows a literalist reading. On the contrary, sources for Ancients’ knowledge is perennial wisdom, and their words on the soul have deeper meanings than what is understood at the first reading. When read with more trustful lenses, it will be manifested that the soul is an immaterial reality for them as well. For example, when they talk about the soul as a sphere, Mulla Sadrā thinks that they want to direct attention to the perfection. When fire is mentioned, the dynamic reality of the soul is brought to light. Mulla Sadrā, adds the principle of gradation (tashkīk) to his presentation and talks about modulation of fire from material fire to the immaterial light (nūr).The lowest level of fire is related to the changes in nature of the soul, the soul responsible of irascible and concupiscent establishes the next level. Once the soul is under total control, then it completes the passage to its incorporeality and becomes light. So this chapter is important in its structure because it allows us to read into how Sadrā’s historical reiteration is influenced by his own theoretical framework on the one hand. On the other hand, thanks to the long lineage of De Anima commentary literature, we can compare Sadrā with Aristotelian readings in this chapter. The interpretative reading of Mulla Sadrā, in opposition to the literalist reading of Avicenna on the ancient theories, also leans on a history of other philosophers before him. In this regard, a lineage of historiography might be traced back to Āmirī, Qādi Saʿīd, and Shahristāni. What the article comes to conclude is that a particular presentation found in Aristotles’ De Anima- Book I is molded in Mulla Sadrā’s hands with a more interpretative version of pre-Socratic theories to such an extent to support Mulla Sadra’s own theories on the soul. (shrink)

I should, I suppose, begin by taking some personal responsibility for this controversy. When my late friend Hossein Ziai and I published our edition and translation of Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (hereafter Philosophy of Illumination), we chose “innate” as our rendering of fiṭrī. I don’t remember discussing the rendering, and we did not bother to mention it in the glossary. Hossein had used this rendering in his first book, Knowledge and Illumination, stating that “innate ideas serve as the grounds for knowledge.”1 (...) Others, however, have rendered the term and its source, fiṭra, as “nature,” “natural spirit,”2 or “innate disposition.”3So what does fiṭra mean? Al-Tahānawī, in his dictionary of Islamic technical .. (shrink)

The present study on al-Dīn Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his logic under the background of his remarkable epistemology of pis some witness of d resence. The paper paves the way for responding to the challenges of Tony Street on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism that at first sight seems quite close to that of Ibn Sīnā. In fact, Suhrawardī's modalities are to be understood as (...) the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. Accordingly, necessarily necessary modality relates actual instances (presences) of the Subject-Term with actual (presences) of the Predicate-Term; in contrast, necessarily contingent modality relates these terms conditionally, notably involving states of the Subject-Term within time intervals. Suhrawardī's main innovation, so we claim, is the explicit dialectical role presences or actual instances have in his modal-temporal logic, and particularly so in shaping his notion of contingency that admits both a generic and an individual or de re form of plenitude. (shrink)

Despite the fact that it has been more than 40 years since Henry Corbin and Hossein Ziai pointed out that the work of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1155, 587/1191) has not yet been systematically studied, a thorough investigation of his work is still in its infancy. The present brief study, which aims to contribute to filling such a gap by further developing some of the points contained in Rahman & Seck's (2022) paper, articulates some remarks on the relevance of Suhrawardī's epistemology (...) of presence for contemporary studies on temporal logic. More specifically, we will focus our brief presentation on the fruitfulness of his postulate of the priority of experience of immediate knowledge discussed in the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq and how this postulate is related to the concept of self-consciousness (وعي الذاتي).Thus the particularity of this study is that Suhrawardī's epistemology of presence, unlike contemporary temporal logic developed for example by Prior, emphasizes the temporalization of the instantiation of an event or the performance of an act rather than of the propositions that express that event or act. Moreover, in Suhrawardī's modal syllogistic, there is an analysis of contingency that differs from most contemporary authors and that also involves several dimensions of time. More generally, Suhrawardī's notion of direct knowledge offers new insights into the logical and ontological status of the now. (shrink)

This article examines a proverbial saying "Wisdom is a tree of life" (Prov. 3:18) through the lens of conceptual metaphor. Such a metaphor works by mapping two conceptual domains. The direction goes from the SOURCE domain (an ancient myth of a miraculous tree that whets human’s appetite for eternal youth) to the TARGET domain (a concept of wisdom in life). Conceptual metaphor helps us to understand that the tree metaphor in Prov. 3:18 instills in the readers’ mind a kind of (...) reward powerful enough to motivate them to pursue wisdomand to persevere in that quest. The boon will arouse their desire so that they will do anything. This article also suggests that the tree metaphor in Proverbs receives its fuller sense through Prov. 11:30; 13:12; 15:4. Conceptual metaphor, thus, enables the reader to notice a holistic presentation of the book of Proverbs, which has been all too often considered as a compilation of various self-contained sayings. Abstrak Artikel ini menganalisis ungkapan "Hikmat adalah pohon kehidupan" (Ams. 3:18) dengan perspektif metafora konseptual. Metafora konseptual adalah sebuah pendekatan linguistik yang menitikberatkan pemetaan relasi yang terjadi antara dua domain yang berbeda. Pada ayat tersebut, akan dicermati arah pergerakan dari domain SUMBER (yakni, sebuah mitos kuno tentang pohon mujarab yang berkhasiat menghidupkan) menuju domain TARGET (yakni, konsep kebijaksanaan dalam hidup). Tidak seperti metafora stilistika yang berfokus pada aspek keindahan bahasa metaforis itu sendiri, metafora konseptual lebih berfokus pada proses pemahaman kognitif yang ada dalam benak si pembaca. Melalui kajian konseptual ini, akan ditunjukkan bagaimana metafora pohon kehidupan (Ams. 3:18) beserta aspek mitologisnya menstimulasi imajinasi para pembaca tentang adanya ganjaran yang amat menggiurkan ketika seseorang mengejar hikmat. Ia akan tergerak untuk melakukan segala daya upaya dalam meraih hikmat demi memperoleh ganjaran tersebut. Artikel ini juga bertujuan menunjukkan bahwa ketiga pemunculan lain dari metafora pohon ini (pada Ams. 11:30; 13:12; 15:4) rupanya berperan menyajikan gambaran yang lebih utuh mengenai pohon mujarab ini. Apabila dilihat lebih luas lagi, keempat ayat secara bersama-sama mengikat seluruh isi kitab Amsal. Metafora konseptual tentang pohon kehidupan ini menawarkan sebuah gagasan holistik terhadap pembacaan kitab Amsal. Kata-kata Kunci: metafora stilistika, metafora konseptual, hikmat, pohon kehidupan, ganjaran. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm, d. 1641- Criticism and interpretation ; Ḥikmat-i Mutiʻālīyah ; Islamic philosophy.

It would not be an overstatement to say that Mulla Sadra’s metaphysical system—commonly known as transcendent philosophy or transcendent wisdom (hikmat muta‘aliyyah)—is founded on the fundamentality of existence and the subjectivity of quiddity or whatness. I will begin this essay by drawing a rather simple picture of this principle under the title “A Common Error.” Then I will proceed by explaining its background and the reasoning supporting it, while offering a more detailed elucidation of the problem. The essay will (...) end by examining two recent interpretations that have gone to extremes in describing quiddity’s subjective nature. (shrink)

In this paper, a comparison is made between the rationalistic and phenomenological approaches to understanding the Islamic philosophy of illumination. The analysis shows that the rationalistic bias in translations of the relevant texts causes a misunderstanding of Suhrawardī’s argument and a subsequent misinterpretation of his key terms. The Islamic philosophy of illumination is especially vulnerable to rationalistic mis-translations due to the intuitional-eidetic character of its epistemology. In contrast to rationalism, the new phenomenological ontologies provide an adequate framework for reading Suhrawardī. (...) A parallel is made between Suhrawardī’s treatment of the central principle, nūr mujarrad, and Husserl’s epoché and phenomenological reduction. Without this comparison, nūr mujarrad is translated as a symbolic, metaphoric term referring to an ideal entity. However, the closeness of Husserl’s and Suhrawardiīs views on consciousness, and the phenomenological nature of evidence in Part 2 of Hikmat-al Ishrāq, prove that nūr mujarrad refers to the pure subjectivity of consciousness, which is lived reality available in presentive intuition. Consequently, the term nūr mujarrad is not metaphorical, but descriptive, i.e. direct signification referring to pure awareness as the self-effulgence of consciousness-being, an ontological principle by which all selves and things in existence are present for us. (shrink)

Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi was born around 1154, probably in northwestern Iran. Spurred by a dream in which Aristotle appeared to him, he rejected the Avicennan Peripatetic philosophy of his youth and undertook the task of reviving the philosophical tradition of the "Ancients." Suhruwardi's philosophy grants an epistemological role to immediate and atemporal intuition. It is explicitly anti-Peripatetic and is identified with the pre-Aristotelian sages, particularly Plato. The subject of his hikmat al-Ishraq --now available for the first time in English--is (...) the "science of lights," a science that Suhrawardi first learned through mystical exercises reinforced later by logical proofs and confirmed by what he saw as the parallel experiences of the Ancients. It was completed on 15 September 1186 and at sunset that evening, in the western sky, the sun, the moon, and the five visible planets came together in a magnificent conjunction in the constellation of Libra. The stars soon turned against Suhrawardi, however, who was reluctantly put to death by the son of Saladin, the sultan of Egypt, in 1191. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of BeingLatimah-Parvin Peerwani ArlingtonMullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. By Sajjad H. Rizvi. Culture and Civilization in the Middle East Series, edited by Ian Richard Netton. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xii + 222. Hardcover $135.00.In Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, Sajjad H. Rizvi focuses on tashkīk (modulation), variously translated as the systematic ambiguity, analogical gradation, or just (...) gradation of being from the perspective of Mullā Ṣadrā, comparing it with classical Islamic philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. He states that he makes two major claims in this study. First, he argues that modulation is a hermeneutic concept that describes the threefold division of being and its gradation. Second, gradation and modulation occur in each mode of being. Each mode of being refers to a branch of Ṣadrā's philosophy: mental being is a discussion of epistemology and psychology; 'being-in-language' is critical to Sadrian semantic theory; being in re focuses on 'traditional metaphysics.' But the philosophy of Ṣadrā is not compartmentalized; being cuts across these fields and unites them. Each mode of being as modulated shares features of intensification. According to Rizvi, Ṣadrā has extended the normal understanding of modulation and of being beyond the simple division of the two realms of mental and concrete existence to bring out the semantics of being. This aspect of Islamic philosophy, according to Rizvi, has often been neglected (p. 3). [End Page 278]This study consists of an Introduction and two parts. In the Introduction, Rizvi states the problem of tashkīk as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian ontology. An analysis of this critical concept, according to Rizvi, facilitates our understanding of Ṣadrā's position on a wide variety of important philosophical issues such as predication, the problem of reconciling unity and plurality in being, and God-world relationship. It provides an answer to the age-old problem of the One and the many, and the median way between the ontological monism of Ibn ʿArabi and the metaphysical pluralism of Avicenna. Rizvi says that according to Ṣadrā there are four levels of being: the concept of being, its reality, its uttered manifestation (sound), and its written manifestation.Part 1 consists of two chapters. In the first chapter Rizvi outlines his methodology and some of his assumptions about the cultural history of the period and the context of Ṣadrā. The significant contention, according to Rizvi, is that a proper understanding of Ṣadrā's philosophy requires an appreciation of philosophy in the Neoplatonic traditions "as a way of life" that is often closely related to spiritual practice and religious commitment. The aim of philosophical inquiry for Ṣadrā, according to Rizvi, is therapy for the rational soul and its perfecting and development in its path of return to its origins in the One.Four methodological approaches are utilized in this study. (1) Tashkīk is seen as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian metaphilosophy, and not ontology; Rizvi argues that tashkīk is a central guiding principle in Ṣadrā's metaphilosophy and permeates all branches of his philosophical system. (2) The aporetic method is used in analyzing Ṣadrā's philosophy. (3) Rizvi maintains that Ṣadrā's philosophy is processual, for it represents a shift from substance to process metaphysics. (4) Ṣadrian hikmat (philosophy, wisdom) is approached as a metaphilosophical inquiry. Metaphysics is a foundational science for Ṣadrā, instrumental in the possibility of acquiring knowledge and in the construction of definitions and meaningful discourse. Hikmat, according to Rizvi, is doubly transcendent, (1) as a higher synthesis of Avicennan, Illuminationist, Sufi, and esoteric Shiʿite systematic thought, and (2) as a prophetic philosophy that claims to be derived from direct 'revelation.'The second chapter introduces the tashkīk (modulation) of being. Rizvi traces its historical development from the Aristotelian pros hen homonym to Avicenna, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Ibn ʿArabi, and offers an account of an intensifying scale of being toward a hierarchy of being that is singular but with multiple degrees defined by their intensity, that is, in terms of scales of intensification and deliberation. He makes explicit the Neoplatonic logic of being that this implies and examines how... (shrink)

“Maqamat as-Sufiyya” is a small theoretical works of Shihab ad-Din as-Suhrawardi (ab. 1154-1191), the founder of the Philosophy of Illumination. It contains practical instructions and theoretical reflections and proofs. As-Suhrawardi especially notes terminology used by philosophers and terminology used by sufis in “Maqamat as-Sufiyya”.

As a contemporary neo-Sadraian philosopher, Muhaqeq Isfahani has proposed his own account of the ontological argument for the existence of Allah. This account of the argument is unprecedented and has caught the attention of many contemporary thinkers. There have been proposed five accounts of this argument upon three pivots. First is the concept of necessary being as a mental concept. Second is the concept of necessary being so far as it denotes something beyond the concept. And third is the very (...) reality of necessary being existing by itself in the outside world. Each of the above accounts is open to some criticisms. Prof. Mahdi Ha’iri Yazdi has leveled four criticisms at that account of the argument such as counter-argument, begging the question, the confusion of categorical proposition with non-categorical one. The proponents of ontological argument have raised objections to Ha’iri’s criticisms. Most of those objections are not valid for they stem from the insufficient consideration of the fact that concepts such as “necessary being”, “God”, “partner of Creator” and the like are philosophical secondary intelligible. Accordingly, most of Prof. Ha’iri’s criticisms against Muhaqeq Ishafani are valid and thus the ontological argument fails to prove the existence of Allah. (shrink)

Based on an epistemological approach, humanities and natural sciences are two completely different realms that are governed by different rules. From this position, it is usually concluded that these two should not interfere in each other's territory. This idea, which also has supporters in other categorizations such as science and theology, relies mainly on Wittgenstein's doctrines. The purpose of the article is to argue that such an approach ultimately leads to the isolation of different realms of knowledge. We argue why (...) this position is incorrect and has adverse consequences for the development of knowledge in all domains. (shrink)