Rückert. - Gottfried Keller. - Berthold Auerbach. - Paul Heyse. - Reuter, Raabe, Goltz. - Literarisches kunterbunt. - Schillerstiftung. - Aus der welt des theaters. - Kulturgeschichtliches. - Paris. - Äckerleins keller. - Berliner erinnerungen. - Wiener erinnerungen. - Schönefeld. - Das kleine diner als kuturelement. - Herbartdenkmal. - Meine vier alten. - Am preussischen hof. - Kriegsakademie. - Fontane kriegsgefangen. - Tunnel und Ellora. - Das Rütli. - Register.

The pattern of credences we are inclined to assign to counterfactuals challenges standard accounts of counterfactuals. In response to this problem, the paper develops a semantics of counterfactuals in terms of the epsilon-operator. The proposed semantics stays close to the standard account: the epsilon-operator substitutes the universal quantifier present in standard semantics by arbitrarily binding the open world-variable. Various applications of the suggested semantics are explored including, in particular, an explanation of how the puzzling credences in counterfactuals come about.

The method of explication has been somewhat of a hot topic in the last 10 years. Despite the multifaceted research that has been directed at the issue, one may perceive a lack of step-by-step procedural or structural accounts of explication. This paper aims at providing a structural account of the method of explication in continuation of the works of Geo Siegwart. It is enhanced with a detailed terminology for the assessment and comparison of explications. The aim is to provide means (...) to talk about explications including their criticisms and their interrelations. There is hope that this treatment will be able to serve as a foundation to a step-by-step guide to be established for explicators. At least it should help to frame and mediate explicative disputes. In closing the enterprise will be considered an explication of ‘explication’, though consecutive explications improving on this one are undoubtedly conceivable. (shrink)

General Theory of Knowledge is an exciting, acutely reasoned treatise, in which Schlick prepares the way for the modern analytic movement. Moritz Schlick is best known as the founder and guiding genius of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists.

Die nachfolgenden Ausführungen ftellen den (nachträglich rekonftruierten) Inhalt eines Vortrages dar, der im Jahre 1929 an der Univerfität Wien als Einleitung in einen volkstümlichen Zyklus „Das Weltbild der Naturwiffenfchaft” gehalten wurde. Die Univerfität hatte die Abficht, jenen Zyklus in Buchform zu veröffentlichen; das Manufkript wurde 1930 in Druck gegeben und fogleich gefetzt und korrigiert. Nachdem der Vortrag nebft mehreren anderen einige Jahre im Satz geftanden hatte, mußte infolge widriger Umftände auf die Herausgabe des Buches verzichtet werden.Dem Zweck, den die Betrachtungen (...) in ihrem erften Rahmen verfolgten, können fie vielleicht auch hier und jetzt noch dienen; deshlb wird der Vortrag in der „Erkenntnis” abgedruckt, obgleich feine Grundgedanken den Lefern diefer Zeitfchrift nicht neu fein dürften. Es erfchien dem Verfaffer geraten, die kleine Arbeit in ihrer urfprünglichen Form zu laffen; er fah alfo davon ab, die damals gewählten Formulierungen durch folche zu erfetzen, deren er fich heute bedienen würde, wenn er das Thema neu zu behandeln hätte. (shrink)

Wir stellen einen pragmatisierten Kalkül des natürlichen Schließens vor, der sich dadurch auszeichnet, dass Ableitungen reine Folgen objektsprachlicher Sätze sind und ohne graphische oder andere Kommentarmittel auskommen.

According to a suggestion by Williamson, outright belief comes in degrees: one has a high/low degree of belief iff one is willing to rely on the content of one’s belief in high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees of outright belief so construed. Starting from the assumption that outright belief aims at knowledge, it is argued that degrees of belief aim at various levels of strong knowledge, that is, knowledge which satisfies particularly high epistemic standards. This (...) account is contrasted with and shown to be superior to an alternative proposal according to which higher degrees of outright belief aim at higher-order knowledge. In an “Appendix”, it is indicated that the logic of degrees of outright belief is closely linked to ranking theory. (shrink)

This encyclopedia article provides a procedural account of explication outlining each step that is part of the overall explicative effort (2). It is prefaced by a summary of the historical development of the method (1). The latter part of the article includes a rough structural theory of explication (3) and a detailed presentation of an examplary explication taken from the history of philosophy and the foundations of mathematics (4).

Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from (...) uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data. (shrink)

Tension and suspense are powerful emotional experiences that occur in a wide variety of contexts (e.g., in music, film, literature, and everyday life). The omnipresence of tension experiences suggests that they build on very basic cognitive and affective mechanisms. However, the psychological underpinnings of tension experiences remain largely unexplained, and tension and suspense are rarely discussed from a general, domain-independent perspective. In this paper, we argue that tension experiences in different contexts (e.g., musical tension or suspense in a movie) build (...) on the same underlying psychological processes. We discuss key components of tension experiences and propose a domain-independent model of tension and suspense. According to this model, tension experiences originate from states of conflict, instability, dissonance, or uncertainty that trigger predictive processes directed at future events of emotional significance. We also discuss possible neural mechanisms underlying experiences of tension. The model provides a theoretical framework that can inform future empirical research on tension phenomena. (shrink)

There is a renewed debate about modus ponens. Strikingly, the recent counterexamples in Cantwell, Dreier and MacFarlane and Kolodny are generated by restricted readings of the ‘if’-clause. Moreover, it can be argued on general grounds that the restrictor view of conditionals developed in Kratzer and Lewis leads to counterexamples to modus ponens. This paper provides a careful analysis of modus ponens within the framework of the restrictor view. Despite appearances to the contrary, there is a robust sense in which modus (...) ponens is valid, owing to the fact that conditionals do not only allow for restricted readings but have bare interpretations, too. (shrink)

Moritz Schulz explores counterfactual thought and language: what would have happened if things had gone a different way. Counterfactual questions may concern large scale derivations or small scale evaluations of minor derivations. A common impression, which receives a thorough defence in the book, is that oftentimes we find it impossible to know what would have happened. However, this does not mean that we are completely at a loss: we are typically capable of evaluating counterfactual questions probabilistically: we can say (...) what would have been likely or unlikely to happen. Schulz describes these probabilistic ways of evaluating counterfactual questions and turns the data into a novel account of the workings of counterfactual thought. (shrink)

Recently the Principia Cybernetica Project undertook a computer‐based collaborative effort to develop a unified system of philosophy. The philosophy and its implementation are explicitly based on evolutionary principles of variation and natural selection (VNS) and a fundamental type of emergence called MetaSystem Transition (MST) which increases the overall freedom and adaptivity of systems. MST, conceived and articulated by Turchin (1977), occurs when a control subsystem is replicated and integrated into a whole through a higher level VNS generated control subsystem. Turchin (...) also articulated the concept of “the will to immortality” which led to Heylighen's (1991) formulation of cybernetic immortality (CI) contingent on immortal meme systems, metarational consciousness, and limitless knowledge. A possible direction of future evolution is the emergence of further levels of organization realized in "superbeing/metabeings.” The precise configuration of these “beings” is still open; an aspect or totality of which may be viewed as "cybernetic immortality.” In this paper, I review aspects of memes and MST as the basis for cybernetic immortality, discuss the potential for further MetaSystem Transitions in humans and human culture (trans‐sapiens and trans‐culture) , generalized CI constructs and interactions between cybernetically immortal constructs. Finally, some reflections are offered concerning the role of CI constructs in future evolution and the evolution of the future. (shrink)

According to the knowledge norm of belief, one should believe p only if one knows p. However, it can easily seem that the ordinary notion of belief is much weaker than the knowledge norm would have it. It is possible to rationally believe things one knows to be unknown The aim of belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). One response to this observation is to develop a technical notion of ‘outright’ belief. A challenge for this line of response is to (...) find a way of getting a grip on the targeted notion of belief. In order to meet this challenge, I characterize ‘outright’ belief in this paper as the strongest belief state implied by knowledge. I show that outright belief so construed allows this notion to play important theoretical roles in connection with knowledge, assertion and action. (shrink)

A knowledge-based decision theory faces what has been called the prodigality problem : given that many propositions are assigned probability 1, agents will be inclined to risk everything when betting on propositions which are known. In order to undo probability 1 assignments in high risk situations, the paper develops a theory which systematically connects higher level goods with higher-order knowledge.

The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, the standard semantics for ‘actually’ implies that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. To elucidate the puzzle, I defend a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. I bring this thesis to bear on certain (...) counter-examples, proposed by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio, to Lewis' ‘principal principle’. (shrink)

Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of Bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem.

L’École de Vienne distingue les problèmes scientifiques et les problèmes philosophiques : les premiers sont relatifs à la vérité ou à la fausseté de propositions ; les seconds sont relatifs au sens des propositions, c’est-à-dire aux moyens de les vérifier ou de les infirmer, un problème étant vide de senssion n’a aucun moyen de répondre par oui ou par non à la question qu’il formule. А ce titre, Socrate apparaît comme le père de la philosophie, et l’erreur de la métaphysique (...) a consisté ä confondre les problèmes de sens avec les problèmes de vérité. Si les disciples de l'Éсоlе de Vienne se sont surtout appliqués а l'élаboration des concepts utilisés dans les sciences formelles et les sciences physiques, leur but le plus élevé reste l’elaboration des concepts moraux ; et, là encore, Socrate montre la voie. (shrink)

Frege's philosophy of language includes detailed views on judgments. His formal logic - the Begriffsschrift - documents some of these views in the introduction and treatment of the judgment stroke. In current logic such an expression is either entirely ignored or, appearing as turnstile, plays an fundamentally different role. In this paper I put forward four claims: (i) Considering Frege's Begriffsschrift, it is methodologically palpable why the judgment stroke was omitted in nearly all logical systems developed after Frege. (ii) The (...) Frege-style inclusion of the judgment stroke in a formal language represents a partial implementation of results from speech act theory. (iii) A more comprehensive implementation, not limited to the judgment stroke, helps to satisfy justified expectations about formal languages and logical calculi. (iv) Such an implementation has not yet been achieved in the current logical mainstream. (shrink)

In the present study we scrutinize the historical development of a remarkable strategy to justify state punishment, conceived in the philosophy of the Enlightenment: the argument from the consent of the offender. We follow the development of this argument and its variants from Grotius to Hegel. Our particular interest lies in ascriptions of purely fictitious mental states to justify palpable moral or legal reactions. This investigation opens up a specific and illuminating perspective on the legal-philosophical theories of the investigated authors (...) and their conceptual connections. In that way it also helps to properly grasp important aspects of the systematic problem of criminal justice. (shrink)

In this country and in those with which we are best acquainted, that large part of the human diet which is derived from grain is mainly eaten in the form of bread. Bread, in order to be palatable and digestible, must be leavened; and this means that the dough must be able to retain some of the carbon dioxide gas produced in it by the agency of yeast or some similar substance. Its capacity for doing this depends upon the presence (...) in the grain of a sufficient amount of proteins of such a kind that when mixed with water they form the elastic substance known as gluten. It is largely because wheat—and especially the species of triticum vulgare to which all our bread wheats belong—is superior to all other grains in this respect that wheat has become the main bread grain of a large part of the world. (shrink)

A paper by Schulz (Philos Stud 149:367–386, 2010) describes how the suppositional view of indicative conditionals can be supplemented with a derived view of epistemic modals. In a recent criticism of this paper, Willer (Philos Stud 153:365–375, 2011) argues that the resulting account of conditionals and epistemic modals cannot do justice to the validity of certain inference patterns involving modalised conditionals. In the present response, I analyse Willer’s argument, identify an implicit presupposition which can plausibly be denied and show that (...) accepting it would blur the difference between plain assumptions and their epistemic necessitations. (shrink)

Linking arbitrary shapes to personal labels or reward values results in immediate processing benefits for those stimuli that happen to be associated with the self or high rewards in perceptual matching tasks. Here we further explored how social and reward associations interact with multisensory stimuli by pairing labels and objects with tones. We also investigated whether self and reward biases persist for multisensory stimuli with the label removed after an association had been made. Both high reward stimuli and those associated (...) with the self, resulted in faster responses and improved discriminability, which persisted for multisensory stimuli even when the labels were removed. However, these self- and reward-biases partly depended on the specific alignment between the physical tones and the conceptual order. Performance for reward associations improved when the endpoints of low or high rewards were paired with low or high tones; meanwhile, for personal associations, there was a benefit when the self was paired with either low or high tones, but there was no effect when the stranger was associated with either endpoint. These results indicate that, unlike reward, social personal associations are not represented along a continuum with two marked endpoints but rather with a single reference point. (shrink)

Why are hard decisions hard? According to the incomparabilists, hard choices are hard because the options cannot be compared. Proponents of parity hold that hard choices are hard because the options can be compared but only in terms of a fourth value relation—parity—in addition to the three standard relations: better, worse, and equally good. Others claim that hard choices are hard because it is vague (or indeterminate) how the options relate in terms of the three standard relations. Lastly, there is (...) the epistemicist. For the epistemicist, hard choices are hard because one is irresolvably ignorant about how the options compare. In the debate about hard choices, epistemicism is often mentioned but rarely defended. The present paper is a contribution to closing this gap. (shrink)

This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models. Doxastic justification, on this picture, is taken to run causally downstream along appropriate causal chains. A theory is offered which accounts for the strength of a derivative belief in terms of (i) the strength of the beliefs on which it is based, and (ii) the epistemic quality of the belief-forming mechanisms involved. It is shown that the structure of degrees of justification (...) converges to ranking theory under ideal conditions. (shrink)

Joshua Greene has famously argued for two distinct processes of how humans make moral judgments. Despite a lively controversy around potential normative implications of this view, less attention has been paid to those philosophical assumptions that are fundamental to Greene’s dual-process theory itself. In this paper, I argue that Greene’s dual-process theory hinges on a modular account of cognition and the brain, and I critically discuss the plausibility of Greene’s view in light of increasing popularity of dynamical systems accounts in (...) cognitive science. If we reject modularity and adopt a dynamical systems perspective instead, we can still hope to find relative differences in the functional specialization of dynamic brain networks within one interconnected system, but Greene’s original theory in terms of two asymmetrically independent processes will no longer be tenable. This imposes constraints on the kind of explanations that we can expect from an empirically informed ethics in that only non-exclusive dual-process theories would be compatible with a dynamical systems account. Ultimately, however, the controversy around the modularity of mind should not be misconceived as a purely empirical question, but rather as a matter of conflicting epistemic standards as to what qualifies as a good explanation in cognitive science. (shrink)

Questions are everywhere and the ubiquitous activities of asking and answering, as most human activities, are susceptible to failure – at least from time to time. This volume offers several current approaches to the systematic study of questions and the surrounding activities and works toward supporting and improving these activities. The contributors formulate general problems for a formal treatment of questions, investigate specific kinds of questions, compare different frameworks with regard to how they regulate the activities of asking and answering (...) of questions, and situate these activities in a wider framework of cognitive/epistemic discourse. From the perspectives of logic, linguistics, epistemology, and philosophy of language emerges a report on the state of the art of the theory of questions. (shrink)