The purpose of this paper is to attract attention to the extent of mobbing, especially in the public sector and to its destructive character. Mobbing reduces the value of human capital because of incurred psychological and health losses. It influences innovation negatively and in consequence leads to lowering the effectiveness of an organization. Negative effects of mobbing may be also seen in the social and individual dimensions. According to Heinz Leymann, abandoning moral norms, wrongly comprehended tolerance are creating a climate (...) for practising different forms of hidden violence and psychical terror. Psychological war of this kind in workplace involves the abuse of power and manipulation. Once it has appeared, it is – as put by M.F. Hirigoyen – like a machine, which set in motion, may smash everything on its way. This asymmetric and destructive interaction can only keep strengthening unless someone from the outside intervenes decisively. Yet, the introduction of the notion of mobbing to labour code does not provide sufficient protection from mobbing in workplace – regulations leave too wide, unfilled space which needs to be filled up with concrete solutions and measures. On one hand, action taken by an organization should have a formal, administrative and organizational character. On the other hand, it should take into account the ethical sphere of an organization’s functioning. It should put special emphasis on the maintenance and the development of integrity, one of the most important dimensions of the conception of trust. (shrink)

Idea wolności jest klamrą spinającą całą filozofię Hegla. Chrześcijaństwo niesie ze sobą świadomość wolności - państwo jest jej realizacją. Dlatego też idea ta w owej podwójnej relacji jawi się jako punkt centralny systemu łączący sferę ducha absolutnego ze sferą ducha obiektywnego. Hegel przezwycięża opozycję, występującą we wcześniejszej filozofii, między "człowiekiem" i "obywatelem" poprzez zjednoczenie woli subiektywnej z wolą rozumną, konstruując w ten sposób etyczną całość - państwo - będące tą rzeczywistością, w której jednostka posiada wolność i korzysta z niej (tylko (...) o tyle, o ile partycypuje w świadomości ogółu). Treścią religii jest prawda absolutna, ale nie jest jej nadana forma myślowa - występuje raczej w postaci wyobrażenia. Stąd państwo jako twór rozumny sytuuje się pod względem formy wyżej niż religia. Pewne sformułowania Hegla, szczególnie zawarte w "Wykładach z filozofii dziejów" nasuwają myśl, że próbował on dokonać sakralizacji państwa. Jednakże w intencji Hegla nie leży oparcie aksjologii państwa o aksjologię religijną, czemu dobitnie daje wyraz w uzupełnieniu do § 270 "Filozofii prawa". Relacja między państwem a religią w planie społecznym ujęta jest przez Hegla następująco: dziedziną religii jest indywidualna wiara, podczas gdy państwo reprezentuje to, co ogólne, rozumne, etyczne. Można by dojść do przekonania, że Hegel optuje na rzecz liberalnej koncepcji rozdziału Kościoła i państwa. Wniosek taki byłby jednak pochopny, albowiem pomija się w ten sposób plan spekulatywny filozofii Hegla. Nowoczesne państwo jest wskroś rozumowe (a przynajmniej tak jest widziane przez filozofię), dlatego też każda różnica co do ich istoty jest z góry wykluczona. W państwie rozumnym świętość nie jest już czymś zewnętrznym w stosunku do rzeczywistości, lecz czystą wewnętrznością. Można zatem stwierdzić, że państwo stoi. nad Kościołem nie dlatego, iż jest sprzeczne z zasadą chrześcijańską, lecz właśnie dlatego, że jest tej zasady urzeczywistnieniem. Choć więc Hegel nie neguje wpływu religii na życie świeckie, to jednak pragnie ugruntować je na swoistych dlań wartości. (shrink)

The article juxtaposes modern skepticism stating lack of the criterion of true beliefs about transcendent reality with respect to their contents, but accepting the assumption about existence and cognoscibility of those contents on the one hand, and — after M. F. Burnyeat — ancient skepticism understood as one that questions this assumption on the other. The doubt as to existence of beliefs — resp. propositions as contents of beliefs — is a link joining ancient skeptics with Wittgenstein. Their skepticism is (...) not - as modern skepticism - an epistemological position, but an ontological one — nominalism — questioning existence of universals that are the conditions of meaning and hence the conditions of truth of propositions. This is why the ancient dispute concerning the truth was in fact a dispute over the problem of universals, i.e. over existence of constant rules deciding which ways of connecting the subject and the predicate in a proposition are right and which are not. Realists referred to such rules, sophists denied their existence, and skeptics stated that without having such a rule at their disposal they do not ha-.: a basis for deciding the dispute between realists and sophists. This does not have much to do either with so-called correspondence concept of the truth or with the modern understanding of conceptual realism talking about \"ideal paradigms\" or \"common properties\" of things. Today\'s typologies of philosophical positions do not fit antiquity. Ch. S. Peirce\'s and D. Armstrong\'s arguments lead to the conclusion that Plato was a... nominalist in the modern meaning of the world. P. T. Geach\'s and N. Wolterstorff s analyses allow stating the same about St Thomas Aquinas. This places under the question mark the statement that the latter could be an advocate of the generally ascribed to him correspondence theory of truth, which also cannot be derived from Aristotle\'s philosophy without any doubts. (shrink)

The article is an analysis of various versions of the correspondence theory of truth and shows that this theory - in all of its versions - rests on two irreconcilable assumptions. First, according to the theory, the relation between the truth bearer and the truth maker - i.e. the portion of reality which makes the bearer true - is a grounded relation, which means that it holds whenever the elements grounding the relation exist, and that each of the elements may (...) exist independently of the other. Secondly, the correspondence theory of truth explicitly or implicitly presupposes that the truth maker always - i.e. necessarily - makes the truth bearer true. The first assumption implies that truth as a feature of convictions, assertions, judgments, etc. is either impossible or by nature unrecognizable. The second assumption is fulfilled only when the alleged "grounded" relation is replaced by an internal relation of identity between the truth bearer and its truth maker. The thesis that the so-called relation of correspondence between thought and reality is essentially their identity follows - contrary to what is commonly believed - from every version of the correspondence theory of truth that does not lead to either nihilism or scepticism. The author illustrates this fact by means of an analysis of the theories of G. E. Moore, B. Russell, H. Field, B. Smith and A. Newman. All of this paves the way for the identity theory of truth, which nevertheless faces its own difficulties in providing a satisfactory explanation of the existence of falsity. (shrink)

Mental rotation of emotional and neutral stimuli The main aim of the study was to create and validate emotional version of mental rotation task. As all previously conducted experiments utilized neutral material only, such an attempt seemed necessary to confirm the generality of mental rotation effect and its properties. Emotional MRT was constructed using photos of negative facial expressions; a compatible neutral MRT was also created, for detailed comparisons. 2- and 3-dimensional figures and hexagrams served as affect-free stimuli. In three (...) experiments, emotional MRT version was proven to be valid, whereas only hexagram-based neutral MRT version yielded the expected results. A number of differences between the two versions emerged, concerning response times, accuracy and difficulty of trials. The neutral/emotional MRT procedure, although needing more research, seems to give stable results, making the study of content-bound imagery possible. (shrink)

We prove a representation theorem for residuated algebras: each residuated algebra is isomorphically embeddable into a powerset residuated algebra. As a consequence, we obtain a completeness theorem for the Generalized Lambek Calculus. We use a Labelled Deductive System which generalizes the one used by Buszkowski [4] and Pankrat'ev [17] in completeness theorems for the Lambek Calculus.

When introducing changes to an organisation, it is crucial to know how a given change will affect the company’s success. It is easy to forget or, more frequently, fail to appreciate the importance of the feelings and thoughts of the people who experience such changes. The distinction between objective change and subjective change is helpful in understanding the psychological consequences of changes and how they may affect the effectiveness of introducing changes in organisations. Results of studies on the psychological costs (...) of changes for an individual indicate that there are differences in the way people experience objective and subjective changes, and that the way a change is perceived by an individual is crucial for the consequences of change. Studies have also identified factors which can buffer the negative consequences that changes may have on an individual. For changes in an organisation, coaching is one method to nurture these buffering factors in affected individuals, and, most of all, in those who are responsible for planning and introducing the changes, so that the employees of a company can experience the change in the most constructive way possible. (shrink)

We present an algebraic approach to canonical embeddings of arbitrary residuated algebras into powerset residuated algebras. We propose some construction of powerset residuated algebras and prove a representation theorem for symmetric residuated algebras.

We present a labelled version of Lambek Calculus without unit, and we use it to prove a completeness theorem for Lambek Calculus with respect to some relational semantics.

The Polish economy has been transformed for more than three decades by diverse crises. The beginning of the changes was brought by the political transformation, which modified the model of the functioning of the State in almost all areas. To some extent, its continuation was the accession to the European Union, which opened not only markets for sales, labor, but also new sources of technological and scientific development. Economic development did not protect the economy from the negative effects of change, (...) which occurred in the form of rising public debt, unemployment rates and reduced spending on important public sectors. Sudden breakdowns, in turn, forced changes in social needs, as exemplified by the explosive demand for e-services during the covid-19 pandemic. The article analyzed selected indicators that allowed analysis of the degree of differentiation of socio-economic development in Poland against the background of crises. (shrink)

Public universities in Poland receive fairly limited financial support for creating e-textbooks (interactive online textbooks) and lack the appropriate ICT competences among teaching staff, especially in the case of non-technical universities. The authors propose a pedagogical and technological paradigm for e-textbooks in medical education using open source software with minimal IT skills required. Technologies used to develop e-textbooks are connected with: publication and distribution of e-textbooks, e-book readers, and editing tools. The paper also discusses a survey that targeted students of (...) medical sciences, which focused on their understanding of their educational needs that can be met through new online resources as well as their expectations of how such e-textbooks should be like. (shrink)

It has been widely recognized that Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblance solved the problem of universals. This theory may be considered in two ways, however. (1) Family resemblance may be understood in a manner of abstract universals theory. Most commentators accept this interpretation. Though in this case, I would argue, Wittgenstein's contribution to the problem of universals seems to be overestimated. (2) Wittgenstein's theory may also be considered, following one of contemporary Polish philosophers J. Szymura, as a view connected (...) with the Hegelian theory of concrete universals. The article is devoted to put forward some arguments for this interpretation. Firstly, it is coherent with all Wittgenstein's theses on family resemblance and states that there is literally nothing common in things. Secondly, it fits to Wittgenstein's language (terms such as "family", "Ähnlichkeit" and so on). Thirdly, there are some biographical pieces of evidence that Wittgenstein was inspired by Goethe's concept of "Urpflanze", which is very close to concrete universal. (shrink)