The present century has seen renewed interest in characterizing cognition, the object of inquiry of the cognitive sciences. In this paper, I describe the problem of cognition—the absence of a positive characterization of cognition despite a felt need for one. It is widely recognized that the problem is motivated by decades of controversy among cognitive scientists over foundational questions, such as whether non-neural parts of the body or environment can realize cognitive processes, or whether plants and microbes have cognitive processes. (...) The dominant strategy for addressing the problem of cognition is to seek a dichotomous criterion that vindicates some set of controversial claims. However, I argue that the problem of cognition is also motivated by ongoing conceptual development in cognitive science, and I describe four benefits that a characterization of cognition could confer. Given these benefits, I recommend an alternative criterion of success, ecumenical extensional adequacy, on which the aim is to describe the variation in expert judgments rather than to correct this variation by taking sides in sectarian disputes. I argue that if we had an ecumenical solution to the problem of cognition, we would have achieved much of what we should want from a “mark of the cognitive”. (shrink)

Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a (...) novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis. -/- Since expert judgments about the extension of “cognition” vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are ecumenically extensionally adequate. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive. -/- I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with parameters, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause “behavior,” and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered “behavior.” Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters. -/- I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the “sensitive management of organismal behavior.” The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems. (shrink)

Functionalism is widely regarded as the central doctrine in the philosophy of cognitive science, and is invoked by philosophers of cognitive science to settle disputes over methodology and other puzzles. I describe a recent dispute over extended cognition in which many commentators appeal to functionalism. I then raise an objection to functionalism as it figures in this dispute, targeting the assumption that generality and abstraction are tightly correlated. Finally, I argue that the new mechanist framework offers more realistic resources for (...) understanding cognitive science, and hence is a better source of appeal for resolving disagreement in philosophy of science. (shrink)

In particular, as we shall see, Collingwood is often dismissed as having held an indefensible, outmoded ‘ideal’ theory, according to which the work of art is primarily ‘mental’, while his potential role in current debates is simply ignored. I will argue that this view is largely mistaken.

The many-Hilbert-spaces approach to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics is reviewed, and the notion of wave function collapse by measurement is formulated as a dephasing process between the two branch waves of an interfering particle. Following the approach originally proposed in Ref. 1, we introduce a “decoherence parameter,” which yields aquantitative description of the degree of coherence between the two branch waves of an interfering particle. By discussing the difference between the wave function collapse and the orthogonality of the (...) apparatus' wave functions, we analyze critically two proposals, recently appeared in the literature, (2, 3) and argue that neither one describes a dephasing process. We conclude that the concept of “wave function collapse,” according to the conventional Copenhagen interpretation, is to be replaced by that of a statisticallydefined dephasing process. (shrink)

The many-Hilbert-spaces theory of quantum measurements, which was originally proposed by S. Machida and the present author, is reviewed and developed. Dividing a typical quantum measurement in two successive steps, the first being responsible for spectral decomposition and the second for detection, we point out that the wave packet reduction by measurement takes place at the latter step, through interaction of an object system with one of the local systems of detectors. First we discuss the physics of the detection process, (...) using numerical simulations for a simple detector model, and then formulate a general theory of quantum measurements to give the wave packet reduction in an explicit form as a sort of phase transition. The derivation is based on the macroscopic nature of the local system, to be represented in a continuous direct sum of many Hilbert spaces, and on the finite-size effect of the local system, to give phase shifts proportional to size parameters. We give a definite criterion for examining any instrument as to whether it works well as a detector or not. Finally, we compare the present theory with famous measurement theories and propose a possible experimental test to discriminate it from others. A few solvable detector models are also discussed. (shrink)

It has been suggested that preparing to teach and teaching are conditionally effective in enhancing one’s own learning. This paper focuses on interactivity—the level of teacher-student interaction in expected or actual teaching—as the potential key to understanding and controlling the variability in the effectiveness of learning by preparing to teach and teaching. By summarizing and reanalyzing the results of previous studies, I suggest that the learning benefits of studying with the expectation of direct teaching (i.e., teaching a student face-to-face) are (...) greater than those of studying with the expectation of indirect teaching (i.e., teaching a student indirectly by creating a lecture video, providing written explanations, or using other means) and that learning by direct teaching surpasses learning by explaining to oneself or indirect teaching at least after preparing to do so. Next, three candidate explanations for the impact of interactivity are discussed: the advantages of asking and answering questions, obtaining additional information about and from one’s student, and enhancing one’s motivation to process learning material deeply while preparing to teach and teaching. Finally, I conclude with the remaining questions and directions for future research. (shrink)

Cognitive science is unusual in that cognitive scientists have dramatic disagreements about the extension of their object of study, cognition. This paper defends a novel analysis of the scientific concept of cognition: that cognition is the sensitive management of an agent’s behavior. This analysis is “modular,” so that its extension varies depending on how one interprets certain of its constituent terms. I argue that these variations correspond to extant disagreements between cognitive scientists. This correspondence is evidence that the proposed analysis (...) models the contemporary understanding of cognition among scientists, without artificially resolving questions that are currently considered open. (shrink)

The term ‘functionalism’ is usually heard in connection with the philosophy of mind or cognition. The functionalism of Wilfrid Sellars, however, is in the first instance as response to the worries about the metaphysics not of mental states, but of meaning. Only late in his career did Sellars explore the possibility of extending his functionalism into an account of cognition. It has been suggested, though, that Sellars’ extension of his functionalist theory into subpersonal territory is not successful. In particular, there (...) is a worry abroad that in order to be a functionalist about cognitive states, Sellars must succumb to a special form of the Myth of the Given. In this essay I will review and elucidate what I take to be the structure of Sellars’ functionalism, defending it from this worry. I will suggest a resolution of some apparent textual contradictions based in part on the chronology of Sellars’ writing, with the assumption that later writings express Sellars’ more nuanced views. -/- Draft of 2009. (shrink)

Cultural similarities and differences in facial expressions have been a controversial issue in the field of facial communications. A key step in addressing the debate regarding the cultural dependency of emotional expression is to characterize the visual features of specific facial expressions in individual cultures. Here we developed an image analysis framework for this purpose using convolutional neural networks that through training learned visual features critical for classification. We analyzed photographs of facial expressions derived from two databases, each developed in (...) a different country, in which corresponding emotion labels were available. While the CNNs reached high rates of correct results that were far above chance after training with each database, they showed many misclassifications when they analyzed faces from the database that was not used for training. These results suggest that facial features useful for classifying facial expressions differed between the databases. The selectivity of computational units in the CNNs to action units of the face varied across the facial expressions. Importantly, the AU selectivity often differed drastically between the CNNs trained with the different databases. Similarity and dissimilarity of these tuning profiles partly explained the pattern of misclassifications, suggesting that the AUs are important for characterizing the facial features and differ between the two countries. The AU tuning profiles, especially those reduced by principal component analysis, are compact summaries useful for comparisons across different databases, and thus might advance our understanding of universality vs. specificity of facial expressions across cultures. (shrink)

The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) holds that that not all human cognition is realized inside the head. The related but distinct Hypothesis of Extended Mentality (HEM) holds that not all human mental items are realized inside the head. Clark & Chalmers distinguish between these hypotheses in their original treatment of cognitive extension, yet these two claims are often confused. I distinguish between functionalist theories on which functional roles are individuated according to computational criteria, and those on which functional roles (...) are individuated according to rational criteria. I then present an argument for a modest version of HEC from computational functionalism, based on Clark & Chalmers’ original argument. In doing so I articulate a successor to their parity principle, and review studies by Wayne Gray et al. that provide plausible evidence for actual cognitive extension. I then respond to a new criticism of HEC by Mark Sprevak using the modest account I have developed, arguing that Sprevak conflates HEC and HEM. (shrink)

20世紀後半アメリカを中心にしたラディカル・エコロジーの成果と、西田幾多郎・和辻哲郎の思想の比較検証を通して、仏教的な自然・環境観が明示する“今日的意義”を提起した労作。.

Examining the notion of wavefunction collapse (WFC) in quantum measurements, which came again to be in question in the recent debate on the quantum Zeno effect, we remark that WFC is realized only through decoherence among branch waves by detection, after a spectral decomposition process from an initial object wavefunction to a superposition of branch waves corresponding to relevant measurement propositions. We improve the definition of the decoherence parameter, so as to be fitted to general cases, by which we can (...) quantitatively estimate the degree of WFC given by detectors. Finally, we briefly discuss whether two special detector models, with very huge and very small degrees of freedom, can provoke WFC. (shrink)

The nucleolus is a region of the nucleus with high protein density and it acts as a ribosome factory. The nucleolus contains a distinct region of the genome, the ribosomal RNA gene repeats (rDNA) that supply ribosomal RNA (rRNA) molecules. The rDNA is the most‐abundant gene and occupies a large part of the genome, for example, there are thousands of rDNA copies in the genomes of plant cells. Therefore, it is natural to suppose that the condition of the rDNA, such (...) as its stability, might affect cellular functions. Here I would like to propose a new model regarding the roles of the rDNA and nucleolus. The key point of this model is that they act to preserve genome stability and trigger aging. BioEssays 30:267–272, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Este ensayo está dedicado a la serie grey paintings del artista norteamericano Cy Twombly. A partir de un análisis de Panorama y Cold Stream, planteo que la serie se vincula a formas de inscripción asociadas, simultáneamente, a lo verbal y lo pictórico. Si bien no es posible identificar letras ni palabras, estas obras manifiestan un estrecho vínculo con una dimensión gestual y corporal de la escritura. En mi análisis establezco relaciones con inscripciones arcaicas, con la criptografía, y con procesos de (...) alfabetización escolar. (shrink)

西田幾多郎の中心概念「永遠の今」を外部の多様な言説に向けて開放することで、西田哲学の新たな可能性を切り開く。プラトン、アウグスティヌス、ハイデッガー、九鬼周造、デリダ、アガンベン、木村敏といった西洋哲 学、宗教学、現代思想、精神病理学の代表者たちの議論と西田の言説を突き合わせ、その緻密な解釈と検証を通して、これまで時間論で見逃されてきたカイロスの系譜とその意義を照らし出す。既成の西田研究に問題を投げ かける著者十年の集大成。岩波現代文庫オリジナル版。.

Continuing Pfeiffer 1972, Pfeiffer 2018 examines inherited Dravidian etyma of Kurux, one of the most northerly Dravidian languages. After an overview of the book, we discuss problems involved in Pfeiffer’s arguments, methods, and materials. Then we try to narrow down the conditions of some of the sound changes Pfeiffer proposes, in conformity with the Neogrammarian hypothesis of regularity. We also point out that closer study of word-final phonology would answer some of the pending questions of Kurux-Malto morphology. Finally, we argue (...) that phonological and morphological reconstruction can unveil more features to help revise the subgrouping of Kurux-Malto in the Dravidian family. (shrink)

The Fist-Edge-Palm task, a manual hand task, has been used to detect frontal dysfunctions in clinical situations: its performance failures are observed in various prefrontal cortex -related disorders, including schizophrenia. However, previous imaging studies reported that the performance of the FEP task activated motor-related areas, but not the PFC. Here, we aimed to investigate the relationships between the performance of the FEP task and PFC functions. Hemodynamic activity in the PFC, including the dorsolateral PFC and frontal pole, was recorded. Healthy (...) young subjects performed the FEP task as well as a palm tapping task three times. The subjects also completed a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Schizotypal Personality Scale questionnaire. We found that hemodynamic activity in the PFC increased in the first trial of the FEP task but decreased considerably in the second and third trials compared to the PT task. The number of performance errors in the FEP task also decreased in the second and third trials. Error reduction in the FEP task between the first and second trials was negatively correlated with schizotypal trait and the number of perseveration errors in the WCST. Furthermore, changes in the PFC hemodynamic activity between the first and second trials were positively correlated with error reduction in the FEP task between the first and second trials, and negatively correlated with the number of perseveration errors in the WCST. These results suggest that learning in the FEP task requires PFC activation, which is negatively associated with perseveration errors in the WCST. The results further suggest that the FEP task, in conjunction with near-infrared spectroscopy, may be useful as a diagnostic method for various disorders with PFC dysfunction. (shrink)

We investigate stationarity of types over models in simple theories. In particular, we show that in simple theories with finite SU-rank, any complete type over a model having Cantor-Bendixson rank is stationary.

This paper examines assumptions concerning the relationship between citizenship, justice, and well-being, based on representative political philosophies, including egoism, utilitarianism, libertarianism, liberalism, and communitarianism. A previous paper raised the possibility of an inter-disciplinary framework for collaboration between psychology and political philosophy. This study picks up that thread and attempts to actualize a collaborative research effort based on a framework grounded in positive political psychology. The first part of this study reflects on the methodology situated between empirical psychology and philosophy in (...) reference to the debates caused by psychological and philosophical situationism. In response to its criticism against virtue ethics, the possibility of reconstructing it on empirical psychology has paradoxically emerged. Similarly, this study validates assumptions on political philosophies employing the psychological method concerning well-being. Accordingly, the central part examines the plausibility of the assumptions by empirical evidence obtained from two internet surveys in Japan. The relationships between citizenship, justice, and well-being are the most substantial in the communitarian assumption. The exploratory factor analysis of the two surveys illuminates that the correlations between citizenship, justice, and well-being are substantial. This relationship denies the egoism assumption. Moreover, almost all correlations between the three are higher based on virtue-related indicators than hedonic ones. These findings are not in tune with the utilitarian assumption and are most congruent to the communitarian assumption. In addition, citizenship and justice correlate more with political well-being than overall well-being. As these are more directly associated with political well-being in the communitarian assumption, this result aligns with the assumption. Furthermore, the positive relationship between disparity elimination and well-being fits the liberal rather than the libertarian assumption. Nevertheless, the substantial correlation between ethical justice and well-being is higher by virtue-related indicators than hedonic indicators, suggesting distributive justice is associated with the ethical dimension. Again, this fits the communitarian assumption rather than the liberal assumption. Thus, philosophical psychology empirically verifies the interdependence of the three conceptions and the relative plausibility of the communitarian assumption. Moreover, as the relationship between the three is essential for political philosophies, the result increases the reliability of communitarianism. (shrink)

I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also possible to fail (...) to distinguish between statements that are true about conscious states in virtue of their phenomenality, and statements that are true in virtue of other properties of conscious states. I review empirically informed arguments by scientists Bernard Balleine and Anthony Dickinson, Stevan Harnad, and Jeffrey Alan Gray, arguing that each of them makes errors based on the ambiguity. I conclude with some tentative suggestions for avoiding further confusion about the ambiguity. (shrink)

Microaggressions are, roughly, acts or states of affairs that express prejudice or neglect toward members of oppressed groups in relatively subtle ways. There is an apparent consensus among both proponents and critics of the microaggression concept that microaggressions are “subjective.” We examine what subjectivity amounts to in this context and argue against this consensus. We distinguish between microaggressions as an explanatory posit and microaggressions as a hermeneutical tool, arguing that in either case there is no reason at present to regard (...) microaggressions as subjective and that microaggressions in the hermeneutical sense should be regarded as objective. (shrink)

Microaggressions are hypothesized to play a causal role in undesirable population effects such as racial health gaps, but the mechanisms through which this occurs are not yet well understood. I call inquiry about these mechanisms the “explanatory project.” I suggest that the explanatory project has been hindered by microaggression concepts tailored to be applicable under conditions of lived uncertainty, rather than to facilitate understanding of structural causes. I defend a pluralist, structural account of microaggressions from arguments by Regina Rini that, (...) while appropriate for ethical projects, do not apply to the explanatory project. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception ( mānasapratyakṣa ), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] ( mānasa ) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally (...) called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ ( idam iti jñānam ). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense. (shrink)