In this article, we explore some of the roles of cameras in policing in the United States. We outline the trajectory of key new media technologies, arguing that cameras and social media together generate the ambient surveillance through which graphic violence is now routinely captured and circulated. Drawing on Michel Foucault, we suggest that there are important intersections between this video footage and police subjectivity, and propose to look at two: recruit training at the Washington state Basic Law Enforcement (...) Academy and the Seattle Police Department’s body-worn camera project. We analyze these cases in relation to the major arguments for and against initiatives to increase police use of cameras, outlining what we see as techno-optimistic and techno-pessimistic positions. Drawing on the pragmatism of John Dewey, we argue for a third position that calls for field-based inquiry into the specific co-production of socio-techno subjectivities. (shrink)

This essay offers a new way to conceptualize the “police violence against Blacks” phenomenon. I argue that we should see the situation as an instance of what Thomas Hobbes called the state of nature, that is, a state without effective law. This understanding of the phenomenon stands in sharp contrast to that offered by Professor Michelle Alexander in her book The New Jim Crow. Alexander sees the phenomenon as a continuation of centuries-old patterns of state-backed anti-Black racism. My account is (...) that police are not under control of the state in their interactions with Blacks. (shrink)

« D’où jaillit la Musique? Des bruits du monde? Des clameurs issues des assemblées? De nos émotions? Et comment la définir? Rien de plus difficile que de répondre à ces questions. J’ai préféré dire ce qu’elle est en trois contes. Légendaire, le premier suit la vie d’Orphée, son initiation auprès des Bacchantes et des Muses, puis sa plongée dans les Enfers à la recherche d’Eurydice, son amante. Comment aimer en Musique? Autobiographique, le second envahit le Grand Récit de la connaissance (...) qui devient ici une Grande Symphonie. Peut-on penser en Musique? Biblique enfin, le dernier psalmodie, de la Genèse à la Nativité. Doit-on prier en Musique? » Michel Serres. (shrink)

The relationship between Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity and Hendrik A. Lorentz’s ether theory is best understood in terms of competing interpretations of Lorentz invariance. In the 1890s, Lorentz proved and exploited the Lorentz invariance of Maxwell’s equations, the laws governing electromagnetic fields in the ether, with what he called the theorem of corresponding states. To account for the negative results of attempts to detect the earth’s motion through the ether, Lorentz, in effect, had to assume that the laws (...) governing the matter interacting with the fields are Lorentz invariant as well. This additional assumption can be seen as a generalization of the well-known contraction hypothesis. In Lorentz’s theory, it remained an unexplained coincidence that both the laws governing fields and the laws governing matter should be Lorentz invariant. In special relativity, by contrast, the Lorentz invariance of all physical laws directly reflects the Minkowski space-time structure posited by the theory. One can use this observation to produce a common-cause argument to show that the relativistic interpretation of Lorentz invariance is preferable to Lorentz’s interpretation. (shrink)

More or less explicitly inspired by the Aristotelian classification of arguments, a wide tradition makes a sharp distinction between argument and proof. Ch. Perelman and R. Johnson, among others, share this view based on the principle that the conclusion of an argument is uncertain while the conclusion of a proof is certain. Producing proof is certainly a major part of mathematical activity. Yet, in practice, mathematicians, expert or beginner, argue about mathematical proofs. This happens during the search for a proof, (...) then when the proof is presented and discussed by experts, and finally when it is taught or used in didactical contexts. (shrink)

Background Moral distress is a phenomenon that can lead to an imbalance of the mind and body. There are many coping strategies to overcome the obstacles that lead the subject to this condition. Some coping strategies are capable of being achieved through the cultivation of moral resilience. Aim The aim is to identify the strategies of moral resilience in the nursing management of University Hospitals in Brazil. Research design The research design is the qualitative study with discursive textual analysis. Participants (...) and research context : 44 nurse managers and nurses in leadership positions participated in a total of 30 University Hospitals in Brazil. Data were collected online, using a questionnaire with open questions. Ethical considerations The Ethics Committee approved the study. Participants received information about the research, agreed to respond to the questionnaire, and were guaranteed anonymity. Findings Personal adaptive strategies (intrapersonal and interpersonal) and organizational collaborative strategies (intrinsic and transformational management) emerged from this process. The intrapersonal strategies involved elements of rationality, flexibility, rebalancing practices, moral courage, and detachment. The interpersonal strategies addressed support networks, team involvement, and dialog. Organizational strategies dealt with actions which reorient ethical infrastructure, ethical education, and psychological protection, as well as fostering dialogical relationships, empowerment, and cooperation. Conclusion From the perspective of social historical construction, it is understood that developing personal and organizational strategies is essential to cultivating moral resilience. (shrink)

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (….

According to Husserl, the epochè (or suspension of judgment) must be left incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of “reduction.” In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of (...) the phenomenological reduction advocated by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings,” rather than expectations about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not only reduction to experience, or to “pure consciousness,” but also reduction to the “living present.”. (shrink)

Mallarmes madness * You think I'm mad? Someday I'll explain to you that my madness lies elsewhere. Mallarme to H. Cazalis, Mallarme inaugurates: the first ...

Predictive Processing (PP) is an increasingly influential neurocognitive-computational framework. PP research has so far focused predominantly on lower level perceptual, motor, and various psychological phenomena. But PP seems to face a “scale-up challenge”: How can it be extended to conceptual thought, language, and other higher cognitive competencies? Compositionality, arguably a central feature of conceptual thought, cannot easily be accounted for in PP because it is not couched in terms of classical symbol processing. I argue, using the example of language, that (...) there is no strong reason to think that PP cannot be scaled up to higher cognition. I suggest that the tacitly assumed common-sense conception of language as Generative Grammar (“folk linguistics”) and its notion of composition leads to the scale-up concerns. Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) plays the role of a cognitive computational paradigm for folk linguistics. Therefore, we do not take LOTH as facing problems with higher cognition, at least with regard to compositionality. But PP can plausibly play the role of a cognitive-computational paradigm for an alternative conception of language, namely Construction Grammar. If Construction Grammar is a plausible alternative to folk linguistics, then PP is not in a worse position than LOTH. (shrink)

The images of migrants and refugees arriving in precarious boats on the shores of southern Europe, and of the makeshift camps that have sprung up in Lesbos, Lampedusa, Calais and elsewhere, have become familiar sights on television screens around the world. But what do we know about the border places – these liminal zones between countries and continents – that have become the focus of so much attention and anxiety today, and what do we know about the individuals who occupy (...) these places? In this timely book, anthropologist Michel Agier addresses these questions and examines the character of the borderlands that emerge on the margins of nation-states. Drawing on his ethnographic fieldwork, he shows that borders, far from disappearing, have acquired a new kind of centrality in our societies, becoming reference points for the growing numbers of people who do not find a place in the countries they wish to reach. They have become the site for a new kind of subject, the border dweller, who is both 'inside' and 'outside', enclosed on the one hand and excluded on the other, and who is obliged to learn, under harsh conditions, the ways of the world and of other people. In this respect, the lives of migrants, even in the uncertainties or dangers of the borderlands, tell us something about the condition in which everyone is increasingly living today, a 'cosmopolitan condition' in which the experience of the unfamiliar is more common and the relation between self and other is in constant renewal. (shrink)

Jan G. Michel argues that we need a philosophy of scientific discovery. Before turning to the question of what such a philosophy might look like, he addresses two questions: Don’t we have a philosophy of scientific discovery yet? And do we need one at all? To answer the first question, he takes a closer look at history and finds that we have not had a systematic philosophy of scientific discovery worthy of the name for over 150 years. To answer (...) the second question, Michel puts forward three arguments that show the importance of a philosophy of scientific discovery. Briefly, he arrives at the following answers: No, we don’t yet have a philosophy of scientific discovery, and yes, we definitely need one. To remedy this shortcoming, Michel analyzes the concept of discovery, leading him to the insight that scientific discoveries have an underlying structure with certain structural features. Some of these features may be important but not indispensable to scientific discovery processes; these include eureka moments, serendipities, joint discoveries, special science funding, and others. In addition, Michel identifies three indispensable structural features which he examines in detail and which he places in a picture with a certain dynamics according to which the process of making scientific discoveries can be seen as a path, leading us from finding and acceptance to knowledge. (shrink)

For molecular biologists, the question What is Life?" disappeared in the 1960s to reemerge recently. The reasons for this reemergence will be analysed: they tell us much about the recent transformations of biology, and its present state. This question can be considered as a thermometer, which measures the balance between reductionist vs. holist explanations in biology: when the question disappears, reductionist approaches are dominant; when the question reappears, the reductionist vision is challenged.

Henri Bouillard est initié par Kant à un regard critique. Sa rencontre avec saint Thomas le solidarise avec la «nouvelle théologie», et l'ouvre à une démarche herméneutique. Sa rencontre avec Maurice Blondel l'amène à opérer le tournant anthropologique en théologie. Sa rencontre avec Karl Barth le conduit à se rallier avec réserve à la position de celui-ci. Sa rencontre avec Éric Weil l'entraîne à approfondir le tournant anthropologique, mais à récuser les théologies politiques, et à repousser le recours aux sciences (...) humaines en théologie. Bref, ces quatre rencontres l'engagent à passer d'une démarche dogmatique à une approche herméneutique, mais à écarter une méthode généalogique entée sur les sciences humaines. (shrink)

Depuis 2001, France Culture et l'Université libre de Bruxelles, l'une des plus prestigieuses universités d'Europe, se sont associées pour organiser tous les ans un colloque international francophone sur les sujets qui font question dans le monde contemporain. Alors que l'éclatement et la spécialisation des savoirs semblent avoir totalement fragmenté notre connaissance ; alors que les rationalités philosophiques et scientifiques, la poésie et l'expérience mystique semblent s'être séparées dans des domaines irréductibles si ce n'est même opposés, il a semblé intéressant, dans (...) un effort transdisciplinaire qui réunissait, entre autres, physiciens, psychologues et philosophes, de s'interroger sur une unité globale de la connaissance. Celle-ci implique-t-elle l'unité essentielle de l'être humain, ou l'unité du monde dans lequel nous sommes plongés - ou éventuellement même ces deux unités elles-mêmes réunifiées? (shrink)

L'extraordinaire philosophie du corps développée par Maine de Biran dans les premières années du XIXe siècle est tributaire d'un travail phénoménologique préalable : si le corps est subjectif, sa nature dépend de celle de la subjectivité. Tant que cette dernière reste prise dans les postulats de la pensée classique, qui seront encore ceux de la phénoménologie contemporaine, tant que la " conscience " se résout dans la représentation, dans l'intentionnalité ou dans la Transcendance de l'Être, alors le corps lui-même est (...) traversé par cette déhiscence où se défait son pouvoir : celui d'agir, d'être une force. A partir d'une conception entièrement neuve - non grecque - de la phénoménalité du corps, Maine de Biran a produit des descriptions admirables de sa constitution comme de sa représentation dans le corps objectif - descriptions qui renvoient toutes cependant à un Corps originel, non constitué, qui s'identifie en nous à l'essence de la vie. Unique héritier du cogito perdu de Descartes, Mairie de Biran n'est pas un précurseur de la phénoménologie historique : il proposait un autre programme dont il nous est donné aujourd'hui d'apercevoir enfin la pertinence et la fécondité. (shrink)

When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. (...) This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I mainly pursue the following two goals: on the one hand, I want to show how a central Fregean insight is tried to be captured within a two-dimensional strategy. On the other hand, I want to show that, in the light of Saul Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism, this strategy is faced with a fundamental problem. I proceed in four steps: in a first step, I bring together the passages that contain a central Fregean insight as a source (...) of inspiration for a two-dimensional reconstruction and that suggest a descriptivist reading of Frege’s view. In a second step, I shortly present Kripke’s threefold argumentation against two versions of descriptivism, which is also the basis for Kripke’s view that proper names are rigid designators. In a third step, I explain the basic idea of a Frege-inspired two-dimensional strategy which is used to reconcile theories of definite descriptions with theories of rigid designation and which is sometimes characterized as ‘neo-descriptivism’. Since the two-dimensional strategy is dependent on rigidified definite descriptions, I argue, in a fourth step, that, in the light of Kripke’s epistemological and semantic arguments, the two-dimensional strategy is problematic and untenable – though it is, nevertheless, motivated by Kripke’s modal argument. (shrink)

Bilingual Yearbook published by the Chromatiques whiteheadiennes scholarly society since 2005.