Michel Foucault's The History of Sexuality-the first volume of which was published in 1976-exerts a vast influence across the humanities and social sciences. However, Foucault's interest in the history of sexuality began as early as the 1960s, when he taught two courses on the subject. These lectures offer crucial insight into the development of Foucault's thought yet have remained unpublished until recently. This book presents Foucault's lectures on sexuality for the first time in English. In the first series, held (...) at the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 1964, Foucault asks how sexuality comes to be constituted as a scientific body of knowledge within Western culture and why it derived from the analysis of "perversions"-morbidity, homosexuality, fetishism. The subsequent course, held at the experimental university at Vincennes in 1969, shows how Foucault's theories were reoriented by the events of May 1968; he refocuses on the regulatory nature of the discourse of sexuality and how it serves economic, social, and political ends. Examining creators of political and literary utopias in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from Sade to Fourier to Marcuse, who attempted to integrate "natural" sexualities, including transgressive forms, into social and economic life, Foucault elaborates a double critique of the naturalization and the liberation of sexuality. Together, the lectures span a range of interests, from abnormality to heterotopias to ideology, and they offer an unprecedented glimpse into the evolution of Foucault's transformative thinking on sexuality. (shrink)

In 1942-1943, when he was completing his doctoral thesis in medicine, Georges Canguilhem gave at the Faculté des Lettres of Strasbourg relocated to Clermont-Ferrand a lecture on Les normes et le normal. In 1962-1963, he again gave a lecture at the Sorbonne, this time entitled La norme et le normal. The first of these lectures identified the “philosophical demon” that also inspired the medical thesis: the aim was to make philosophy a philosophy of values. The second does not abandon (...) this commitment. Canguilhem draws the conclusion that philosophy, whose task is the critical resolution of conflicts of values, cannot itself have one of these values as its norm. Hence the apparent paradox that “there is no such thing as philosophical truth”. (shrink)

ContextThe recent development of “serious games” has produced encouraging results in maintaining adherence to health-related interventions. In alcohol research, several studies have shown that computerized training on attentional bias decreases alcohol consumption bias among students. However, these highly controlled experimental situations, do not allow for direct large-scale dissemination. Our objective is to evaluate an attentional bias remediation program using a gamified smartphone training procedure.MethodsFifty students from Clermont-Ferrand University were invited to participate in the study. After a cognitive assessment in (...) the laboratory, the smartphone application was installed on each Student’s smartphone. Participants were randomly assigned to either the alcohol attentional training group or the control group Each student had to complete the 2-min program at least once a day for 15 days. After 15 days, a new cognitive assessment of attention bias was conducted in the laboratory. Forty-seven students were included in the study.ResultsOur analyses did not show any effect of the cognitive remediation program on attentional bias reduction between the two group [F < 1, p = 0.87], attentional performance [F = 1.63, p = 0.20] or inhibitory abilities [F < 1, p = 0.73]. These results were confirmed by Bayesian analyses.DiscussionDespite the absence of group effects, both the alcohol and control version of this program appeared to reduce attentional bias and increase inhibition capacities in the subset of participants who had attentional bias for alcohol at baseline This pilot study identifies areas for improvement in smartphone applications for future developments. Attentional bias remediation programs remain an interesting way to explore. (shrink)

Previous chapter Michel Serres, who had made, in the 1960s, the acquaintance of Foucault at the Blaise-Pascal University in Clermont-Ferrand, briefly joined with him the post-1968 experimental Vincennes University, and was eventually appointed to a chair in the history of science at the Sorbonne. In 1977, he published La Naissance de la physique dans le texte de Lucrèce : fleuves et turbulences – The Birth of Physics in which he argued that the - Physique – Nouvel article.

It is commonly thought that authors can make anything whatsoever true in their fictions by artistic fiat. Harry Deutsch originally called this position the Principle of Poetic License. If true, PPL sets an important constraint on accounts of fictional truth: they must be such as to allow that, for any x, one can write a story in which it is true that x. I argue that PPL is far too strong: it requires us to abandon the law of non-contradiction and (...) entails a radical revision of otherwise ordinary commitments about truth in fiction. (shrink)

There is a striking difference between the methodology of the young Einstein and that of the old. I argue that Einstein’s switch in the late 1910s from a moderate empiricism to an extreme rationalism should at least in part be understood against the background of his crushing personal and political experiences during the war years in Berlin. As a result of these experiences, Einstein started to put into practice what, drawing on Schopenhauer, he had preached for years, namely to use (...) science as his means of escaping from “the merely personal.” Whatever the exact sources of Einstein’s about-face, the older man has left us with a highly misleading picture of how the younger man achieved the successes that we still celebrate today. This has had a harmful influence on theoretical physics. If the young Einstein’s successes are any guide as to how successful theoretical physics is done, close adherence to general features of the empirical data is much more and mathematical elegance is much less important than the old Einstein wanted us to believe. (shrink)

Jan G. Michel argues that we need a philosophy of scientific discovery. Before turning to the question of what such a philosophy might look like, he addresses two questions: Don’t we have a philosophy of scientific discovery yet? And do we need one at all? To answer the first question, he takes a closer look at history and finds that we have not had a systematic philosophy of scientific discovery worthy of the name for over 150 years. To answer (...) the second question, Michel puts forward three arguments that show the importance of a philosophy of scientific discovery. Briefly, he arrives at the following answers: No, we don’t yet have a philosophy of scientific discovery, and yes, we definitely need one. To remedy this shortcoming, Michel analyzes the concept of discovery, leading him to the insight that scientific discoveries have an underlying structure with certain structural features. Some of these features may be important but not indispensable to scientific discovery processes; these include eureka moments, serendipities, joint discoveries, special science funding, and others. In addition, Michel identifies three indispensable structural features which he examines in detail and which he places in a picture with a certain dynamics according to which the process of making scientific discoveries can be seen as a path, leading us from finding and acceptance to knowledge. (shrink)

The focus of this article is a question that has been neglected in debates about digitalization: Could machines replace human scientists? To provide an intelligible answer to it, we need to answer a further question: What is it that makes (or constitutes) a scientist? I offer an answer to this question by proposing a new demarcation criterion for science which I call “the discoverability criterion”. I proceed as follows: (1) I explain why the target question of this article is important, (...) and (2) show that it leads to a variant of the demarcation problem of science. (3) By arguing that it is probably an essential feature of science that we can make scientific discoveries, I suggest a novel way of dealing with this problem by proposing a new demarcation criterion. Before introducing it, (4) I analyze an exemplary case of a real scientific discovery, and (5) argue that scientific discovery processes have a general underlying structure. (6) I introduce my discoverability criterion for science and present my master argument that helps us understand which criteria have to be fulfilled in order to decide whether machines can replace human scientists or not. (7) I conclude by answering the article’s target question and bringing forward a take-home message. (shrink)

These thirteen lectures on the 'punitive society,' delivered at the Collège de France in the first three months of 1973, examine the way in which the relations between justice and truth that govern modern penal law were forged, and question what links them to the emergence of a new punitive regime that still dominates contemporary society. Praise for Foucault's Lectures at the Collège de France Series “Ideas spark off nearly every page...The words may have been spoken in [the 1970s], but (...) they seem as alive and relevant as if they had been written yesterday.”—Bookforum “Foucault is quite central to our sense of where we are...[He] is carrying out, in the noblest way, the promiscuous aim of true culture.”—The Nation “[Foucault] has an alert and sensitive mind that can ignore the familiar surfaces of established intellectual coded and ask new questions...[He] gives dramatic quality to the movement of culture.”—The New York Review of Books. (shrink)

Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte expérimental, (...) car il s'identifie à ce qui se manifeste à grande échelle au laboratoire. Que faire pour ne pas laisser ces cas extrêmes de côté? Généraliser la méthode scientifique. Ne plus la borner à définir et à caractériser des objets, mais l'étendre à la coordination directe des expériences. Telle est la révolution de pensée qu'il faut accomplir pour résoudre, ou plutôt dissoudre, deux questions-limites de la science : le problème de l'origine de la conscience et le paradoxe du "chat de Schrödinger" en physique quantique. (shrink)

This article examines the rise of foreign ownership in France and Germany. I argue that the firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace organization constitute the most significant variable to account for the greater attractiveness of French firms over their German counterparts to short-term, impatient capital—namely, hedge and mutual funds. I demonstrate how key notions of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective—institutional interaction, institutional latency, and the distinction between institutional framework and the mode of coordination that follows from these institutions—provide important theoretical insights (...) to account for the different structures of foreign ownership in France and Germany. (shrink)

L'ONTOLOGIE comme question de l'Etre aura dominé le XXe siècle, avec L'Etre et le Temps de Heidegger et l'Etre et le Néant de Sartre. Mais que dire sur l'Etre sans le présupposer, sans dire qu'il est ceci ou cela alors que c'est ce dire même qui fait problème? L'Etre se présente ainsi comme la problématicité de la philosophie, et c'est du même coup cette problématicité qui pose question avant tel ou tel objet, aussi éminent soit-il. En se voulant interrogation sur (...) l'Etre, la philosophie néglige de prendre en compte l'être de sa propre interrogation, et de s'interroger non seulement sur son questionnement, mais sur le questionnement en général, qu'elle met cependant en œuvre comme une évidence. Le but de cet ouvrage est d'analyser, de Platon à Heidegger, en passant par Kant, Sartre, Bergson et Wittgenstein, les apories de l'ontologie et leur dépassement par la thématisation du questionnement, la problématologie. Car qu'est-ce que la philosophie sinon un questionnement radical, à questionner enfin comme tel, et non plus au travers de l'Etre ou du sujet? MICHEL MEYER. (shrink)

Sors de l'enfance, ami, réveille-toi ! -- Le monde est ma représentation -- Porte un regard attentif sur les choses -- Ainsi s'objective le vouloir-vivre -- Le théâtre du monde -- Conduite de la vie : ce que nous sommes -- La conduite de la vie : ce que l'on a.

Ce livre est une profession de foi philosophique. Michel Lacroix nous fait partager les valeurs auxquelles il croit et qui ont orienté sa vie : la confiance dans la raison, l'exigence de liberté, la passion de l'éducation, le souci de l'esprit. Loin de dénigrer notre héritage occidental, comme on le fait si souvent, il proclame son attachement à la civilisation qui a forgé l'idéal, universellement valable, de la personne éclairée et autonome, c'est-à-dire libre à la fois de ses jugements (...) et de ses actes. Mais aujourd'hui, cet idéal d'émancipation est menacé par des obscurantismes, des aliénations, des fanatismes nouveaux. La notion même d'universalité est battue en brèche par un insidieux multiculturalisme. En partageant sa conception rationaliste-libérale de l'homme, Michel Lacroix ne nous livre pas seulement un témoignage autobiographique sur ses convictions, il nous donne des repères pour affronter le périlleux XXIe siècle. (shrink)

English summary: This commentary of Plato's Euthydemus demonstrates its place as the clearest text for understanding the relationship between Platonism and Sophism. French description: De tous les dialogues de Platon, l'Euthydeme est peut-etre le plus exclusivement consacre a l'elucidation de la relation du platonisme avec la sophistique. Ce qu'on a pris pour indigence de son contenu, c'est l'acuite avec laquelle la forme y est consideree. Formalisme moral de Socrate, formalisme eristique des sophistes: dans la lecon d'eristique donnee a Socrate apparait, (...) plus clairement peut-etre que dans aucun texte antique, la logique propre au discours sophistique, celle-la meme a laquelle a affaire dans sa totalite le texte platonicien. La sophistique, et Platon avec elle, relevent d'un regime de discours pre-aristotelicien, et c'est dans la pratique de ce discours que demande a etre reinscrite la tant galvaudee ironie socratique. (shrink)

Scientific progress depends crucially on scientific discoveries. Yet the topic of scientific discoveries has not been central to debate in the philosophy of science. This book aims to remedy this shortcoming. Based on a broad reading of the term “science” (similar to the German term “Wissenschaft”), the book convenes experts from different disciplines who reflect upon several intertwined questions connected to the topic of making scientific discoveries. -/- Among these questions are the following: What are the preconditions for making scientific (...) discoveries? What is it that we (have to) do when we make discoveries in science? What are the objects of scientific discoveries, how do we name them, and how do scientific names function? Do discoveries in, say, physics and biology, share an underlying structure, or do they differ from each other in crucial ways? Are other fields such as theology and environmental studies loci of scientific discovery? What is the purpose of making scientific discoveries? Explaining nature or reality? Increasing scientific knowledge? Finding new truths? If so, how can we account for instructive blunders and serendipities in science? -/- In the light of the above, the following is an encompassing question of the book: What does it mean to make a discovery in science, and how can scientific discoveries be distinguished from non-scientific discoveries? (shrink)

The writings published here are not so much an epitome as episodes. But most do not digress. They mark the turns and turning points of a human style, the tropes of an expressive life embodying the changing tempos of an age. Until we fall silent, all of us are trying to say. These fragmentary efforts to speak to, rejoin, and help create a new community of liberated human beings constitute the epigraphs of Sartre's historical inscription.