Philosophy of science appears caught in what Einstein (1933) called the ‘eternal antithesis between the two inseparable components of our knowledge – the empirical and the rational’ (p. 271). It wants to employ metaphysical speculation, but impressed with the methods of the subject it studies, it fears overreaching. Philosophy of science thus tries to walk a fine line between scientifically grounded metaphysics and its more speculative cousins. Here I try to draft some of the contour of (...) this boundary. (shrink)

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of (...) class='Hi'>science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to unveil the very foundations of science. The present collection of essays brings together both strands of interest. It elucidates the ontological profile of dispositionalism by exploring its ontological commitments, and it discusses these from the perspective of the philosophy of science. The essays are written by both proponents of dispositionalism and sceptics so as to initiate an open-minded, constructive dialogue. (shrink)

Backed by its technological achievements, modern science appears as the de facto source of truth to the majority of our contemporaries. Its sole reliance on reason and empirical data gives it an air of objectivity that has conferred upon it an almost unquestioning authority. Against the backdrop of this pervasive scientism, Philosophy of Science in the Light of the Perennial Wisdom is a daring attempt to offer an intellectual critique of modern science in its foundation by (...) rigorously examining the intrinsic limitations of rational thought and empirical investigation. Unique of its kind, this book offers a refreshing look at the traditional doctrines of epistemology and metaphysics as an antidote to the subjective as well as objective errors of modern science, which is thus revealed as no more than a belief system that falls radically short of offering a full knowledge of reality; this, in contrast to the perennial wisdom of the world's great religions that for millennia have offered humankind not only keys to true knowledge, but also the means of attaining it, which precisely constitutes man's reason for being. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Philosophy of science is a study of the general nature of scientific practice, explanations, theories, and the relation of scientific knowledge ...

The first in-depth reference in the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, _The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia_ is a two-volume set that brings together an international team of leading scholars to provide over 130 entries on the essential concepts in the philosophy of science. _The areas covered include:_ biology chemistry epistemology and metaphysics physics psychology and mind the social sciences key figures in the combined studies of science and philosophy. The essays (...) represent the most up-to-date philosophical thinking on timeless scientific topics such as: determinism, explanation, laws of nature, perception, individuality, time, and economics as well as timely topics like adaptation, conservation biology, quantum logic, consciousness, evolutionary psychology, and game theory. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science: An Anthology assembles some of the finest papers in the philosophy of science since 1945, showcasing enduring classics alongside important and innovative recent work. Introductions by the editor highlight connections between selections, and contextualize the articles Nine sections address topics at the heart of philosophy of science, including realism and the character of scientific theories, scientific explanations and laws of nature, singular casusation, and the metaphysical implications of modern physics Provides an (...) authoritative and accessible overview of the field. (shrink)

The article reviews Christopher Hitchcock’s Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, aims to present contemporary issues in philosophy of science through a series of eight debates between leading analytic philosophers in the given specialist field. Each contributor argues for or against a proposed motion of the debate, ranging from issues of metaphysics and epistemology of science to specific philosophical questions in physics, biology and psychology. In that they draw on a wealth of techniques from the (...) practice of philosophy of science from conceptual clarifications to invocation of examples from scientific practice. Nonethless, against the background of philosophical work associated with contemporary scientific practice the topics selected for this volume seem limited in both depth and scope. The volume’s great worth is in presenting ‘philosophy of science in action’ by exercising many tricks of the trade in several self-contained chapters. (shrink)

The Discourse on Metaphysics and the Correspondence with Arnauld together form the best introduction to Leibniz's thought. This collection includes essays which taken together cover most of hte central themes of these related works and provide a groundwork of exegesis, explanation, and criticism essential for the student of Leibniz and his ideas.

This volume offers a collection of in-depth explorations of pragmatism as a framework for discussions in philosophy of science and metaphysics. Each chapter involves explicit reflection on what it means to be pragmatist, and how to use pragmatism as a guiding framework in addressing topics such as realism, unification, fundamentality, truth, laws, reduction, and more. -/- .

The philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that examines the profound philosophical questions that arise from scientific research and theories. A sub-discipline of philosophy that emerged in the twentieth century, the philosophy of science is largely a product of the British and Austrian schools of thought and traditions. The first in-depth reference in the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia is a two-volume (...) set that brings together an international team of leading scholars to provide over 130 entries on the essential concepts in the philosophy of science. The areas covered include biology, chemistry, epistemology and metaphysics, physics, psychology and mind, the social sciences, and key figures in the combined studies of science and philosophy. Essays range in length from 3,000 to 7,500 words and represent the most up-to-date philosophical thinking on timeless scientific topics such as determinism, explanation, laws of nature, perception, individuality, time, and economics as well as timely topics like adaptation, conservation biology, quantum logic, consciousness, evolutionary psychology, and game theory. Offering thorough explorations and destined to become the most authoritative presentation of the field available, this Encyclopedia is a unique and groundbreaking guide to this fascinating field. (shrink)

According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, dispositionalism is receiving growing interest among philosophers of (...) class='Hi'>science. This reflects the substantial role scientific findings play in arguments for dispositionalism which, as a metaphysics of science, aims to elucidate the very foundations of science. In this introductory chapter, I give an overview of the state of the debate and explain the twofold aim of the present collection of essays which is (i) to explore the ontological commitments of dispositionalism and (ii) to discuss these against the background of latest scientific research, by bringing together perspectives from both metaphysics and the philosophy of science. I finally provide a summary of this intellectual journey. (shrink)

This chapter explores Nagel’s polemics. It shows these have a two-fold character: (i) to defend liberal civilization against all kinds of enemies. And (ii) to defend what he calls ‘contextual naturalism.’ And the chapter shows that (i-ii) reinforce each other and undermine alternative political and philosophical programs. The chapter’s argument responds to an influential argument by George Reisch that Nagel’s professional stance represents a kind of disciplinary retreat from politics. In order to respond to Reisch the relationship between Nagel’s (...) class='Hi'>philosophy of science and his politics is explored and this chapter shows how both are anchored in what Nagel once called his ‘contextual naturalism’—a metaphysics that resists imposing the unity of the world and treats all entities as embedded in a wider network of entities. Part of the argument traces out how Nagel’s views on responsible speech and professionalism reflect a distinct understanding of the political role of philosophers of science. (shrink)

This volume of new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? The essays address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological investigations.

Harre shows how various views about the nature of science are related to the great historical schools of philosophy. He sets out his argument in terms of concrete episodes in the history of science. This new edition includes a chapter on science and society, which explores issues such as the morality of experimentation on live animals and the premise that knowledge is a basis for moral good. Harre also examines the theory that science is a (...) form of art, and looks at the way scientific knowledge affects out religious beliefs. (shrink)

This chapter explores Nagel’s polemics. It shows these have a two-fold character: to defend liberal civilization against all kinds of enemies. And to defend what he calls ‘contextual naturalism.’ And the chapter shows that reinforce each other and undermine alternative political and philosophical programs. The chapter’s argument responds to an influential argument by George Reisch that Nagel’s professional stance represents a kind of disciplinary retreat from politics. In order to respond to Reisch the relationship between Nagel’s philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>science and his politics is explored and this chapter shows how both are anchored in what Nagel once called his ‘contextual naturalism’—a metaphysics that resists imposing the unity of the world and treats all entities as embedded in a wider network of entities. Part of the argument traces out how Nagel’s views on responsible speech and professionalism reflect a distinct understanding of the political role of philosophers of science. (shrink)

About the Series Contemporary philosophy of science combines a general study from a philosophical perspective of the methods of science, with an inquiry, again from the philosophical point of view, into foundational issues that arise in the various special sciences. Methodological philosophy of science has deep connections with issues at the center of pure philosophy. It makes use of important results, for example, in traditional epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of language. It also (...) connects in various ways with other disciplines such as the history and sociology of the sciences, with pure logic, and with such branches of mathematics as probability theory. These volumes are, for the most part, devoted to readings in the methodological aspects of the philosophy of science. One volume, however, takes up the philosophical issues in the foundations of a particularly important special science, that is the issues in the foundations of theories of contemporary physics. The methodological volumes cover a number of crucial general problem areas. The first volume takes up issues in the nature of scientific explanation, and the related issues of the nature of scientific law and of the casual relation among events. The second volume explores issues in the nature and structure of scientific theories. The third volume collects inquiries into the nature of scientific change, as one theory is replaced by another. Volume four is devoted to readings concerning the nature of probability and the nature and justification of inductive reasoning in science. The following volume continues the exploration of the issue of confirming and rejecting theories with a series of readings devoted to Bayesian methodologies in science and to the exploration of non-inductive strategies for rationalizing belief. Finally, volume six explores three major problem areas in the foundation of physics: the nature and rationale for physical theories of space and time; the interpretive problems arising out of the quantum theory; and some puzzles arising out of statistical mechanical theories of physics. The readings are selected and arranged to provide the user with systematic access to the most important contemporary themes in methodological philosophy of science and in philosophy of physics. The selections include many recent contributions to the field, as well as papers and extracts from books and journals otherwise not easily available. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans (...) divides the selections into several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

In order to determine what are the metaphysical presuppositions of science, we have to first define the terms ‘presupposition’ and ‘metaphysics’ or ‘metaphysical’. We shall begin with the former.Arthur Pap in his article Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions? discusses two senses of the term. A presupposition may be a necessary condition: p presupposes q, dt = p implies q, i.e. not-g implies not-p. a premise or a rule of inference used in deriving a belief. Thus in this sense, (...) p presupposes q means that if q were false, then the belief in p would cease to be grounded. (shrink)

Feminist philosophy of science has led to improvements in the practices and products of scientific knowledge-making, and in this way it exemplifies socially relevant philosophy of science. It has also yielded important insights and original research questions for philosophy. Feminist scholarship on science thus presents a worthy thought-model for considering how we might build a more socially relevant philosophy of science—the question posed by the editors of this special issue. In this analysis (...) of the history, contributions, and challenges faced by feminist philosophy of science, I argue that engaged case study work and interdisciplinarity have been central to the success of feminist philosophy of science in producing socially relevant scholarship, and that its future lies in the continued development of robust and dynamic philosophical frameworks for modeling social values in science. Feminist philosophers of science, however, have often encountered marginalization and persistent misunderstandings, challenges that must be addressed within the institutional and intellectual culture of American philosophy. (shrink)

In this book I have attempted to give an account of some of the most im­ portant of Whitehead's philosophical writings - his writings on the philoso­ phy of science as well as his metaphysics. I have tried to show that although there are novelties in Whitehead's later philosophy there are also continuities with his earlier work in the philosophy of science. For a more detailed account of Whitehead's metaphysics, I would refer the reader to my (...) book The Philosophy of Whitehead (The Muirhead Library of Philosophy), Allen and Unwin, London 1959 (Collier Books, New York 1962). On the whole I believe my view of Whitehead in that work, at least as far as his metaphysics is concerned, is not materially different from that held in the present one, although there are some differences in emphasis and interpretation. I wish to thank the administrateur delegue of the Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Brussels; the publishers Allen and Unwin, London; and Sprin­ ger-Verlag, Heidelberg, for kindly giving me permission to publish amended versions of the following papers which I originally published with them: "Whitehead and the Idea of Equivalence" Revue Internationale de Philoso­ phie, No. 56-57, 1961, pp. 167-184; "The Relevance of "On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World" to Whitehead's Philosophy", in The Relevance of Whitehead. Ed. Ivor Leclerc (The Muirhead Library of Philo­ sophy) Allen and Unwin 1961, pp. 235-260; "Whitehead and the Philosophy of Time". Studium Generale. Springer-Verlag 1970, pp. (shrink)

This anthology of selections from the works of noted philosophers affords the student an immediate contact with the unique historical background of the philosophy of science. The selections, many of which have not been readily accessible, follow the development of the philosophy of science from 1786 to 1927. Each selection is preceded by a brief introduction by the editor designed to familiarize the reader with a particular philosopher and provide insights into his work. Joseph J. Kockelmans (...) divides the selections into several sections. Part 1, from 17861850, includes chapters by Immanuel Kant, on the metaphysical foundations of natural science, John Frederick William Herschel, on experience and the analysis of phenomena, William Whewell, on the nature and conditions of inductive science, and John Stuart Mill, on induction and the law of universal causation; part 2, from 18701899, includes chapters by Hermann Von Helmholtz, on the origin and significance of geometrical axioms, William Stanley Jevons, on the philosophy of inductive inference, John Bernard Stallo, on the kinetic theory of gasses and the conditions of the validity of scientific hypotheses, Ernst Mach, on the economical nature of physical inquiry, Karl Pearson, on perceptual and conceptual space, Emile Boutroux, on mechanical laws, Heinrich Hertz, on the appropriateness, correctness, and permissibility of scientific theories, and Ludwig Boltzmann, on the fundamental principles and basic equations of mechanics. The third part, covering the first decade of the twentieth century, includes chapters by Henri Jules Poincare, on science and reality, Charles Peirce, on Induction, Pierre Marie Duhem, on the laws of physics, William Ostwald, on energetism and mechanics, Emile Meyerson, on identity of thought and nature as the final goal of science, Ernst Cassirer, on functional concepts of natural science; part 4, from 19101927, includes chapters by Charles Dunbar Broad, on phenomenalism, Alfred North Whitehead, on time, space, and material, Bertrand Russell, on the world of physics and the world of sense, Norman Robert Cambbell, on the meaning of science, Moritz Schlick, on basic issues of the philosophy of natural science, and Percy Williams Bridgman, on the concepts of space, time, and causality. Philosophy of Science provides a concise single volume text to the discipline and enables students to understand and evaluate the various trends in our contemporary philosophy of science. Joseph J. Kockelmans is professor emeritus of philosophy at the Pennsylvania State Univers. (shrink)

Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at Its Seams is a clear and lively explanation of key concepts and issues in the philosophy of science. It surveys the field from positivism to social constructivism, focusing on the metaphysical implications of science as a form of knowledge gathering that explains what the world is really like, while simultaneously arguing for the superiority of a holistic model of scientific theories over competing models. An innovative feature (...) is the use of immunology as the central domain of illustration, in contrast to other philosophy of science texts that draw examples predominantly from physics. The text also presents Thomas Kuhn's model of science clearly and accurately, rectifying the notorious and widespread misinterpretations projected upon it in the past. Klee discusses both traditional models of science and alternative interpretations, most notably nonfeminist and feminist models inspired by the work of Kuhn. Richly illustrated and complete with a glossary of over eighty key terms, this book serves as an ideal text for undergraduates, because it presents a highly accessible and contemporary investigation of science as a form of inquiry capable of revealing to us the structure of the world. (shrink)

"Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" explores conceptual issues in psychiatry from the perspective of analytic philosophy of science. Through an examination of those features of psychiatry that distinguish it from other sciences - for example, its contested subject matter, its particular modes of explanation, its multiple different theoretical frameworks, and its research links with big business - Rachel Cooper explores some of the many conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry. She shows how these (...) pose interesting challenges for the philosopher of science while also showing how ideas from the philosophy of science can help to solve conceptual problems within psychiatry. Cooper's discussion ranges over such topics as the nature of mental illnesses, the treatment decisions and diagnostic categories of psychiatry, the case-history as a form of explanation, how psychiatry might be value-laden, the claim that psychiatry is a multi-paradigm science, the distortion of psychiatric research by pharmaceutical industries, as well as engaging with the fundamental question whether the mind is reducible to something at the physical level. "Psychiatry and Philosophy of Science" demonstrates that cross-disciplinary contact between philosophy of science and psychiatry can be immensely productive for both subjects and it will be required reading for mental health professionals and philosophers alike. (shrink)

The principles of Kant's pure physics (conservation of quantity of matter, inertia, equality of action and reaction) are a priori in the same sense as are the principles of the understanding. We account for the empirical content of physics by showing that the pure principles operate as rules for generating wellformed empirical descriptions, and as rules for analysis of motion. The relationship between the metaphysics of matter and empirical descriptions is neither deductive, nor as loose as Buchdahl alleges. Belief that (...) a priori principles will apply to empirical cases requires acceptance of methodological presuppositions, chief among which is the principle of affinity. (shrink)

Part I: Inductivism and its Critics:. 1. Some Historical Background: Inductivism, Russell and the Cambridge School, the Vienna Circle and Popper. 2. Popper’s Critique of Inductivism. 3. Duhem’s Critique of Inductivism. Part II: Conventionalism and the Duhem-Quine Thesis:. 4. Poincare’s Conventionalism of 1902. 5. The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis. Part III: The Nature of Observation:. 6. Observation Statements: the Views of Carnap, Neurath, Popper and Duhem. 7. Observation Statements: Some Psychological Findings. Part IV: The Demarcation between Science (...) and Metaphysics:. 8. Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper’s Critique. 9. Metaphysics in relation to Science: the Views of Popper, Duhem and Quine. 10. Falsification in the light of the Duhem-Quine Thesis. (shrink)

Critical Notice for: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays. Edited by Matthew H. Slater and Zanja Yudell. Oxford University Press, 2017. x + 258 pp.

The essays in this collection have been written for Gerd Buchdahl, by colleagues, students and friends, and are self-standing pieces of original research which have as their main concern the metaphysics and philosophy of science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They focus on issues about the development of philosophical and scientific thought which are raised by or in the work of such as Bernoulli, Descartes, Galileo, Kant, Leibniz, Maclaurin, Priestly, Schelling, Vico. Apart from the initial bio-bibliographical piece (...) and those by Robert Butts and Michael Power, they do not discuss Buchdahl or his ideas in any systematic, lengthy, or detailed way. But they are collected under a title which alludes to the book, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant (1969), which is central in the corpus of his work, and deal with the period and some of the topics with which that book deals. (shrink)

Many introductions to this field start with the problem of justifying scientific knowledge but Alexander Bird begins by examining the subject matter, or metaphysics, of science. Using topical scientific debates he vividly elucidates what it is for the world to be governed by laws of nature. This idea provides the basis for explanations and causes and leads to a discussion of natural kinds and theoretical entities. With this foundation in place he goes on to consider the epistemological issues of (...) how science arrives at knowledge, favouring a treatment of scientific reasoning based on inference to the best explanation. Drawing on contemporary work in epistemology, Bird argues that scepticism about induction should not be a problem for science and examines the consequences of this position for controversies surrounding the ideas of scientific progress and scientific revolution. Bird's insightful treatment makes Philosophy of Science an ideal text for undergraduate courses. The guides to further reading provided in each chapter help the reader pursue interesting topics and facilitate the use of the book in conjunction with primary sources. (shrink)

Classical philosophy of science ran out of gas because it lacked a subject matter all along. It belongs "subsumed under a unified social science which in its search for regularities and causal mechanisms will provide the basis for science policy".

In recent years there has been an immense upsurge of writings on the philosophy of science. It is noticeable, however, that much of this writing is ‘philosophical’ in only a rather remote sense of the word. The Reader in the History and Philosophy of Science in the University of Cambridge has set out to recall philosophers of science to ‘the general nature of philosophical thinking and of the philosophical tradition that has accumulated over the centuries’. (...) A complementary aim of the work is ‘to remind the students of general philosophy that their philosophical heritage is deeply grounded in, if not originating from, speculation about science, showing that the methods and results of scientific enquiry have had a profound direction on philosophical thought’. (shrink)

This papers follows the history of the differents views on the distinction between science and philosophy (or metaphysics): classical philosophy, modern rationalism, contemporary philosophy.

Numerous scholarly works focus solely on scientific metaphysics or biological practice, but few attempt to bridge the two subjects. This volume, the latest in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science series, explores what a scientific metaphysics grounded in biological practices could look like and how it might impact the way we investigate the world around us. From Biological Practice to Scientific Metaphysics examines how to reconcile the methods of biological practice with the methods of metaphysical cosmology, (...) notably regarding the origins of life. The contributors take up a wide range of traditional metaphysics and philosophy of science topics, including natural kinds, medicine, ecology, genetics, scientific pluralism, reductionism, operationalism, mechanisms, the nature of information, and more. Many of the chapters represent the first philosophical treatments of significant biological practices. From causality and complexity to niche constructions and inference, the contributors review and discuss long-held objections to metaphysics by natural scientists. They illuminate how, in order to learn about the world as it truly is, we must look not only at what scientists say but also what they do: for ontology cannot be read directly from scientific claims. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Epistemology of Science The Metaphysics of Science.

Philosophy of science studies the methods, theories, and concepts used by scientists. It mainly developed as a field in its own right during the twentieth century and is now a diversified and lively research area. This book surveys the current state of the discipline by focusing on central themes like confirmation of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanation, causality, the relationship between science and metaphysics, scientific change, the relationship between philosophy of science and science studies, the (...) role of theories and models, unity of science. These themes define general philosophy of science. The book also presents sub-disciplines in the philosophy of science dealing with the main sciences: logic, mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, cognitive science, linguistics, social sciences, and economics. While it is common to address the specific philosophical problems raised by physics and biology in such a book, the place assigned to the philosophy of special sciences is much more unusual. Most authors collaborate on a regular basis in their research or teaching and share a common vision of philosophy of science and its place within philosophy and academia in general. The chapters have been written in close accordance with the three editors, thus achieving strong unity of style and tone. (shrink)

In this era of endless anthologies dedicated to the philosophy of science, Morgenbesser has missed a golden opportunity to put together a first rate collection. Gathered under one cover are sixteen of the best and most original philosophers of science treating a great variety of topics, yet the result is disappointing. For those who know something about the issues examined, there is little here that is new, and many of the views developed have been stated in greater (...) detail and with greater sophistication in other easily available places. For those ignorant of what is going on in the philosophy of science, they can sample something of the variety of issues discussed and positions taken, but they will probably be bewildered about the significance of the issues and how they interconnect. A few footnotes to contemporary discussions and a selected bibliography would have helped to make this a much more useful book. The papers are based on broadcasts for the Voice of America.—R. J. B. (shrink)

Explorations of different philosophies of science, their (metaphysical, epistemological, ontological and other assumptions).These are the institutionalized empiricist approaches and the post-cognitive ones, but still anthropo-centered and (inter) subject-oriented ones. Their pre-suppositions are identified and alternatives are suggested.