This paper examines the role of love in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. I argue that an essential aspect of Cyrus’ knowledgeable rule is a specific understanding of eros and a corresponding strategy to cope with the power of love. Specifically, I contend that by exploiting a common Greek distinction between the beloved and the lover, he articulates the view that lovers are subjects or even slaves to their beloved who deceive themselves into thinking that their attraction and the ensuing behaviors are voluntary. (...) Accordingly, Cyrus attempts to avoid falling in love and to rule as a universally beloved leader. Reflecting on the implications of this solution, I finally suggest that Xenophon wishes to show the limits of Cyrus’ solution. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new interpretation of Gadamer’s problematic appropriation of Platonic metaphysics. It argues that Gadamer, attempting to respond to the challenge posed by Heidegger’s interpretation of Platonic metaphysics and of its role in the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte), downplayed the transcendence of Platonic Forms. Gadamer achieves a reconfiguration of this transcendence and its transposition into what I call here a plane of immanence through two hermeneutic gestures: 1) interpreting Forms in light of Greek mathematics and especially in light (...) of the structure of the sum-number; 2) introducing temporality and historicity in the Medieval doctrine of transcendentals by giving priority to the Beautiful over the Good. I contend that, Platonically speaking, this amounts to the rejection of νοήσις in favor of διάνοια, and that this raises issues concerning the problem of finitude and the potential limits of linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit). (shrink)

Cette étude cherche à rendre compte d’un trait particulier et pratiquement inobservé dans la fondation gadamérienne de l’herméneutique philosophique. Si l’on connaît bien le rôle du platonisme — et plus spécifiquement du dialogue platonicien — parmi les sources au sein desquelles Gadamer a puisé pour formuler le caractère dialogique du comprendre, on a rarement noté que la phénoménologie du dialogue sur laquelle s’appuie une telle fondation s’inscrivait en faux par rapport à son modèle sur un point bien précis : l’ironie, (...) qu’elle soit socratique ou platonicienne. Nous proposons ici que pour bien expliquer la relation trouble que la fondation dialogique de l’herméneutique gadamérienne entretient avec l’ironie socratico-platonicienne, il faille concevoir le platonisme de Gadamer à la lumière d’une certaine forme d’aristotélisation, par laquelle la philia et la phronêsis aristotéliciennes sont en quelque sorte projetées sur le modèle platonicien du dialogue. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article cherche à poser à nouveau l’épineuse question de l’« antimodernisme » dans la philosophie politique contemporaine. Nous proposons à cette fin d’expliquer la critique que fait le philosophe français Alain Renaut d’un des plus grands pionniers du renouveau contemporain de la philosophie politique, Leo Strauss, et d’exposer par la suite une réplique possible à cette critique, reconstituant ainsi un dialogue qui ne put véritablement avoir lieu. Nous cherchons à montrer qu’à terme, la critique de Renaut est en (...) bonne partie injuste et, conséquemment, que la posture « antimoderne » de Strauss n’est peut-être pas aussi « intenable » qu’il le laisse entendre. -/- Abstract This article aims to recover the thorny question of « antimodernism » in contemporary political philosophy. For this purpose, we propose to explain French philosopher Alain Renaut’s critique of one of the greatest pioneers of the contemporary recovery of political philosophy—Leo Strauss—and to expose a possible reply to this critique, aiming thus at the reconstitution of a dialogue that could not really have taken place. We try to show that, ultimately, Renaut’s critique is to a great extent unfair and then, that Strauss’s « antimodernist » stance is not as « untenable » as it is believed to be. (shrink)

This paper aims to show how Heidegger and Arendt’s reappropriations of Aristotle’s thought are structured around a reinterpretation of the double definition of man as a practical being, that is, aszôon logon echonandzôon politikon. I argue that by interpreting the notions that compose and circumscribe this definition — those of life (zôê),logos, production (poiêsis), action (praxis) and contemplation (theôria), Heidegger and Arendt find the main characteristic of human beings by developing upon two distinct possibilities contained in the ambivalent Aristotelian concept (...) ofpraxis. However, they both blur the distinction between activity (energeia) and motion (kinêsis), which expose their critique oftheôriato two difficulties — one concerning the praxical character oftheôria, the other its temporality. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of the function of genre in Gadamer’s hermeneutics by examining his treatment of Plato’s political writings in the context of the “utopian genre.” I argue that Gadamer’s reading of Plato informs us on the hermeneutics of genre, which is otherwise undiscussed in Truth and Method. First, I reconstruct the utopian genre as Gadamer treats it in a 1983 lecture hitherto neglected. Second, I expand Gadamer’s “logic of question and answer” by drawing on the notion of (...) genre as articulated by E.D. Hirsch and show that attention to genre is not only compatible with Gadamerian hermeneutics, but also productive. Finally, I demonstrate that an application of this concept of genre to the case of Plato’s political philosophy reveals a problem in Gadamer’s interpretation, namely a certain confusion between dialogue and utopia, and propose two ways of explaining this confusion and thus of resolving the aporia. (shrink)

This paper examines Gerhard Krüger's interpretation of Plato in light of Martin Heidegger's Destruktion of the Greeks and critique of Platonism. I argue that Krüger's new reading of Plato should be understood as a critique of Heidegger's understanding of Platonism, and thereby as a broader critique of Heidegger's thoughts on Western metaphysics and the history of Being (Seinsgeschichte). The force and originality of Krüger's response to Heidegger consist in the fact that Krüger's Plato anticipates Heidegger's critique of Platonism. Krüger thus (...) contends that Plato (1) does not allow the understanding of truth as correctness (Übereinstimmung) to supplant the understanding of truth as disclosedness (Unverborgenheit), (2) understands and displays philosophy's dependence upon prereflexive attunements (Stimmungen); (3) appreciates the intricate relation between Being and temporality. In sum, Krüger's Plato is not guilty of Seinsvergessenheit, and rather opens up new ways for an authentic meditation on Being and on the human way toward an understanding of Being. (shrink)

Among the educative games of Plato’s Cretan city, choral performances have a prominent role. This paper examines the function of play (παιδιά) in the choral education in virtue in Plato’s Laws. I reconstruct the notion of play as it is elaborated throughout this dialogue, and then show how it contributes to solving the problem of virtue acquisition in the Athenian’s account of moral education through songs and dances. I argue that play in the Laws is best understood an imitative activity (...) that is intrinsically pleasurable, ordered by rules and patterns of repetition, and undertaken for its own sake by a player whose psychic condition is childish. Thus interpreted, we are in a better position to see why choruses must be engaged in playfully. Because the self-likening (ὁμοίωσις) process choral performances aim at requires pleasure and because pleasure normally obtains when there is a concordance between one’s character and the imitations, virtue acquisition is best secured if the imitations of virtue in choruses are performed playfully. (shrink)

What follows is an English translation of two documents pertaining to the Derrida-Gadamer encounter. The first one is the short correspondence between Jacques Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer that lasted from March 1977 to July 2000. The correspondence was written in German and French. The second one is the homage that Derrida wrote in honor of Gadamer in the wake of his passing in 2002. These two documents are now available in English for the first time.

This scoping review addresses the issues of responsible conduct of research (RCR) that can arise in the practice of research-creation (RC), an emergent, interdisciplinary, and heterogeneous field at the interface of academic research and creative activities. Little is yet known about the nature and scope of RCR issues in RC, so our study examined three questions: (1) What are the specific issues in RC in relation to RCR? (2) How does the specificity of RC influence the understanding and practice of (...) RCR? (3) What recommendations could help address the issues highlighted in the literature To answer these questions, we conducted a scoping review of the academic literature (n = 181 texts) dealing with RCR in RC. We found that researcher-creators faced some very different RCR challenges in comparison with their colleagues in the rest of academia. Addressing these issues is important for both the RCR and RC communities in order to ensure that the rapid development of this field occurs in line with the norms of RCR which, nonetheless, should be adapted to respect the particularities of RC and allow its contributions to the academic world. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 676-690, July 2022.

M. Oaksford and N. Chater presented a Bayesian analysis of the Wason selection task in which they proposed that people choose cards in order to maximize expected information gain as measured by reduction in uncertainty in the Shannon-Weaver information theory sense. It is argued that the EIG measure is both psychologically implausible and normatively inadequate as a measure of epistemic utility. The article is also concerned with the descriptive account of findings in the selection task literature offered by Oaksford and (...) Chater. First, it is shown that their analysis data reported in the recent article of K. N. Kirby is unsound; second, an EIG analysis is presented of the experiments of P. Pollard and J. St. B. T. Evans that provides a strong empirical disconfirmation of the theory. (shrink)

Background: Studies on autistic strengths are often focused on what they reveal about autistic intelligence and, in some cases, exceptional and atypical reasoning abilities. An emerging research trend has demonstrated how interests and strengths often evident in autism can be harnessed in interventions to promote the well-being, adaptive, academic and professional success of autistic people. However, abilities in certain domains may be accompanied by major limitations in others, as well as psychiatric and behavioral issues, which may challenge their inclusion in (...) support programs. Objectives: To provide an in-depth, pragmatic, real-life example of the psychological and psychiatric management of interests and strengths in an autistic adolescent. Method: An autistic teenager, C.A., with above-average calendar calculation and musical abilities, received psychiatric, neuropsychological, and language standardized and clinical assessments, combined with a measurement of his musical and calendar calculation abilities. C.A. and his parents then received psychiatric and psychological support over a 14-month period, targeting their perceptions of C.A.’s interests, strengths, and co-occurring difficulties. Results: C.A. had a verbal IQ within the intellectual disability range and a non-verbal IQ in the low mean range. Modest calendar calculation, absolute pitch, and matrix abilities coexisted with severe receptive and expressive language disorder. The discrepancy between his abilities in areas of strengths and his limitations in other domains led to anxiety, frustration, and sometimes behavioral issues. Displacing the focus from academic performance to interests, as well as promoting the use of his strengths to develop new skills independently of their short-term adaptive benefits yielded positive effects on C.A.’s self-assessment, quality of life, and behavior at follow up. Discussion: The appealing idea that abilities mostly found in autistic people, such as calendar calculation, can be directly harnessed into academic achievement and lead to paid employment may have detrimental effects, especially when such abilities are modest and associated with other limitations. These abilities should be primarily used to maximize well-being and quality of life, independently of their short-term adaptive function, which may or may not be positive. (shrink)

The lesson to be learned from the paradoxical St. Petersburg game and Pascal’s Mugging is that there are situations where expected utility maximizers will needlessly end up poor and on death’s door, and hence we should not be expected utility maximizers. Instead, when it comes to decision-making, for possibilities that have very small probabilities of occurring, we should discount those probabilities down to zero, regardless of the utilities associated with those possibilities.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ST. THOMAS'S FOURTH WAY AND CREATION LAWRENCE DEWAN, 0.P Dominican College ofPhilosophy and Theology Ottawa, Ontario, Canada EXPLAINING that what he means by "creating" is "causing things ex nihilo," Jacques Maritain, the renowned twentieth-century interpreter of Thomas Aquinas, says:... it is clear that this very fact, that things are created, is only known by us once we know that the First Cause exists; consequently, we cannot make use of (...) it in order to demonstrate the existence of that First Cause. All we know from the outset is that things are caused.1 This remark is made concerning all five ways. At the same time, Maritain presents the five not only as "typically distinct" from each other, but as... distributed in a certain order in which the depth of thought and the complexity of the discussion increase. In proportion as the mind delves deeper into the world of experience in order to reach the first starting point of its thinking, it discerns in the First Being more and more meaningful aspects, and richer perspectives are disclosed to it.2 Now, I agree entirely as to the depth of the starting-points and the progressively richer perspectives,' but I disagree with Maritain as to the role of the creature's createdness in leading to the knowledge of God in the Fourth Way. How is it "clear" that the createdness of things is only known once we know that a first cause exists? How, in general, does the createdness of things 1 Maritain, Jacques, Approaches to God, tr. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 64; see Approches de Dieu (Paris: Alsatia, 1953), 79.-ln this paper, "ST'' and "SCG" stand for Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae and Summa contra gentiles. 2 Maritain, Approaches, 63; Approches, 76-77. 3 See my paper, "The Number and Order of St. Thomas's FIVE WAYS", Downside Review 92 (1974): 1-18 371 372 LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P. come to light, and why should it not come to light in things and so lead to the knowledge of the existence of the proper cause of such an effect? Indeed, can one really arrive at a knowledge of the existence of a "First Being" without having seen, by priority, the createdness of being? Let us recall the general plan for a way to God, as presented in the Summa theologiae. We are to reason from the existence of an effect, better known to us than its proper cause, to the existence of that proper cause.4 What is the effect, seen as an effect, in the Fourth Way, and to what "proper" cause does it lead us? The Fourth Way leads to a maximal being, which is cause of being for ALL beings. The universality of this effect is to be noted. The cause in question is viewed as the cause of a universal effect. Thomas does not content himself with saying that there is a first being which is the cause of being for all other beings. That, I would say, would not be wrong, but it would be mild and apt to mislead. Rather, he "goes out of his way," one might say, to establish that the cause of which he is speaking is such as to dominate an entire field in what I would call a "formal " way. After reasoning to the actual existence of the maximal being, by what is clearly an efficient/exemplar causal route,S he adds that such a maximal item is the cause of all things which belong to the same order. He then comes to God, named precisely as he wished to arrive at God in this Fourth Way, viz. as "cause of being for all beings." The importance of the incorporation of this point about the universality of the effect can be better apprec\ated if one looks back at the Summa contra gentiles. The SCG 1.13 argument which corresponds to the Fourth Way does not mention the point about universality at all. It uses Aristotle's Metaph. 2 only to 4 ST 1.2.2: "From any effect one can demonstrate the existence of its proper cause, if, of course, its effects... (shrink)

Brian Garrett claims, in defence of Gaunilo’s Perfect Island and contra Plantinga, that ‘Properly understood, the great-making qualities of an island are maximal’. This article demonstrates that they are not, thus ‘the greatest conceivable island’ remains an incoherent concept and Gaunilo’s parody fails.

This is the second part of a paper devoted to the study of the maximal intermediate propositional logics with the disjunction property , whose first part has appeared in this journal with the title “A method to single out maximal propositional logics with the disjunction property I”. In the first part we have explained the general results upon which a method to single out maximal constructive logics is based and have illustrated such a method by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of (...) maximal constructive logics extending the logic ST of Scott, for which, in turn, a semantical characterization in terms of Kripke frames has been given. In the present part we complete the illustration of the method of the first part, having in mind some aspects which might be interesting for a classification of the maximal constructive logics, and an application of the heuristic content of the method to detect the nonmaximality of apparently maximal constructive logics. Thus, on the one hand we introduce the logic AST , which is compared with ST and is seen as a logic “alternative” to it, in a sense which will be precisely explained. We provide a Kripke semantics for AST and show that there are maximal constructive logics which neither are extensions of ST nor are extensions of AST. Finally, we give a further application of the results of the first part by exhibiting the Kripke semantics of a maximal constructive logic extending AST. On the other hand, we compare the maximal constructive logics presented in both parts of the paper with a constructive logic introduced by Maksimova , which has been conjectured to be maximal by Chagrov and Zacharyashchev ; from this comparison a disproof of the conjecture arises. (shrink)

We should now be able to come to some general conclusions about the main lines of Cuvier's development as a naturalist after his departure from Normandy. We have seen that Cuvier arrived in Paris aware of the importance of physiology in classification, yet without a fully worked out idea of how such an approach could organize a whole natural order. He was freshly receptive to the ideas of the new physiology developed by Xavier Bichat.Cuvier arrived in a Paris also torn (...) by many overlapping debates on the nature of classification, and in particular that between the natural and artificial systems. The very validity of the enterprise of classification was questioned in many quarters. Cuvier's achievement on his entry into the Parisian world of science was not simply to establish himself as a highly competent anatomist: far more important, he also began to use ideas from many different specialties to change completely the notion of what was involved in natural history.124 At the same time that he himself swung away from the guiding image of the field naturalist as the ideal of the specialty, he took ideas from the new physiology to answer questions about the order of the animal world, and from comparative anatomy to resurrect extinct creation — and to come to conclusions from that creation about the history of the forms of life and the manner of their succession. He showed himself able to alter the relationships between natural history and many other fields of study in a way that implied, rightly or wrongly, his own complete mastery over such a movement. Partly he was able to do this because the ideas he borrowed were not themselves logically articulated and thus could be easily adapted and refocused for many different specific purposes. The value of the heuristic possibilities inherent in the idea of life, for example, far outweighed its inability to generate full systems of classification. Cuvier also consistently refused to consider in science matters relating to the first causes of events. Freed from the consideration of first-order phenomena, he was able to use second-order explanations across a far wider field of applicability. Personal doubts about the validity of a theology that had used science in order to bolster its own claims were combined here with the strong influence of the Kantian critique of the limits of human reason.125Cuvier's characteristic mode of procedure was that of intellectual appropriation and a bold capacity for altering the relationships between different fields of knowledge, rather than, with the exception of taxonomy, the technique of expanding their subject matter. His claims to originality came, first, from this reappropriation and reorientation and, second, from the sheer scope of his work, which aimed at nothing less than the cataloging and classification of all animate objects.126 They rested also on his acute use of his assertion of a certain relationship with the past of his subject. Very often he would present this history in such a way as to obscure his own intellectual genealogy, and often too he would give differing accounts of the priority of use of an idea in order to distract attention from the questionable exactitude of his own claims to originality. Cuvier came to Paris at precisely the time when society and institutions were most profitably malleable for a newcomer; it was also a time when many scientific disciplines had reached a stage advanced in terms of their factual content, yet relatively inadequate in conceptual organization. They were ripe for takeover by large-scale organizing ideas such as the animal economy and the subordination of characteristics. Paleontology is a particularly good example of a specialty in this particular form of underdevelopment in 1795.Cuvier paid a high price for his initial success. His electic applications of large-scale organizing ideas tended to mean that little of his own work had complete coherence at all levels. Ideas, as we have seen, that proved capable of providing a complete reform of the larger groups of the animal kingdom were incapable of producing its detailed working-out in the taxonomy of smaller groups, which had to be supplied from observed analogical correlations. Further, his physiological approach to classification involved the breakdown of strict correspondence between organs and functions, which left the way open for workers such as Geoffroy St. Hilaire gradually to tilt the balance away from the study of the correlations of hierarchies of functions, and toward morphology as the basis of the order of nature. Cuvier's brilliant appropriations from physiology from the beginning, therefore, contained the seeds of conflict with Geoffroy.Cuvier's eclectic approach made it very nearly impossible for him to present a clear idea of the ways in which the life sciences could be said to be lawful. In spite of his efforts to assimilate them to the position of the physical sciences in this respect, he was forced in the end to accord only an ambiguous status as “laws” to observational correlations. From this area of failure came much of the attempt to give his own two laws — the correlation of parts and the subordination of characteristics — predictive qualities, particularly in relation to paleontological research.It is not surprising that Cuvier's title as the “legislator” of natural history should represent more a claim than a reality. How, then, was he able to emerge as the leading French naturalist of his day? First of all must be adduced the sheer scale of his undertakings. Then comes his expertise as a practical anatomist, and the range of different topics toward which he turned his interest. His collaborators cannot be given credit for his output nor, as we have seen, for slavish adherence to his ideas. Cuvier was able to successfully claim to have dominated the underdeveloped specialties, such as paleontology, and turned them into a major heuristic input into both geology and comparative anatomy; but in other fields, such as physiology, he appropriated concepts and encouraged research but made little impact on the field himself. His attempts in 1812 to head off, or neutralize and absorb the growth of morphological studies landed him in a dangerously rigid position, which despite his encouragement of the new physiological research under the Restoration made further elaboration of his own conceptual underpinnings almost impossible.Cuvier's authority in the scientific world would in any case have been great because of his substantive achievement in taxonomy, but the rest of his work had enough ambiguities and dislocations for it to need the support of his political and social power. Cuvier's detractors seized on a vital fragment of the truth when they accused him of finding the political dimension all-important: it obscured the disjunctions in his theories and at the same time gave him the authority to make new claims for the status of the observational sciences - and for their relations of power with their surrounding specialties. Cuvier's science both thrived on and was halted by the power games of intellectual appropriation, manipulation of the past to confirm the present, and continual claims for hegemony. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Love develops the existential metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, applying it to explore the ontological structure of the human person. Published first in 1962, this book demonstrates the fertility of Thomistic metaphysics and the enduring influence of Thomism on Western philosophy. It uncovers the ecstatic structure of human existence, in dialogue with philosophers ranging from Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, to Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Tillich, Zubiri, and Ortega y Gassett, as well as theologians and historians Romano Guardini, (...) class='Hi'>Hilaire Belloc, and Eric Voegelin. Philosophical and theological examinations of love have in various ways raised the following question: how can love of self (eros) be harmonized with love of others (agape)? These types of love represent two drives, Wilhelmsen argues, that in the end must be seen as aspects of existence itself. Moral and psychological problems of love turn out to be manifestations of metaphysical issues. While different cultures have emphasized one of these drives or the other, a healthy culture will not completely forget either. Cultures differ in the way they emphasize one or the other, or flee from one or the other. These dimensions of human existence provide the framework for a person's love of self, neighbour, and God. This volume is part of Transaction's Library of Conservative Thought series. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas St. Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican priest and Scriptural theologian. He took seriously the medieval maxim that “grace perfects and builds on nature; it does not set it aside or destroy it.” Therefore, insofar as Thomas thought about philosophy as the discipline that investigates what we can know naturally about God and … Continue reading Thomas Aquinas →.

This paper revisits the Pasadena game (Nover and Háyek 2004), a St Petersburg-like game whose expectation is undefined. We discuss serveral respects in which the Pasadena game is even more troublesome for decision theory than the St Petersburg game. Colyvan (2006) argues that the decision problem of whether or not to play the Pasadena game is ‘ill-posed’. He goes on to advocate a ‘pluralism’ regarding decision rules, which embraces dominance reasoning as well as maximizing expected utility. We rebut Colyvan’s argument, (...) offering several considerations in favour of the Pasadena decision problem being well posed. To be sure, current decision theory, which is underpinned by various preference axioms, leaves indeterminate how one should value the Pasadena game. But we suggest that determinacy might be achieved by adding further preference axioms. We conclude by opening the door to a far greater plurality of decision rules. We suggest how the goal of unifying these rules might guide future research. (shrink)

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty (...) about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Objective: To identify perceived barriers to capacity building for local research ethics oversight in El Salvador, and to set an agenda for international collaborative capacity building. Methods: Focus groups were formed in El Salvador which included 17 local clinical investigators and members of newly formed research ethics committees. Information about the proposed research was presented to participants during an international bioethics colloquium sponsored and organized by the St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in collaboration with the National Ethics Committee of (...) El Salvador and the University of El Salvador. Interviews with the focus group participants were qualitatively analyzed. Results: Participants expressed the need to tailor the informed consent process and documentation to the local culture; for example, allowing family members to participate in decision‐making, and employing shorter consent forms. Participants indicated that economic barriers often impede efforts in local capacity building. Participants valued international collaboration for mutual capacity building in research ethics oversight. Conclusions: Research ethics committees in El Salvador possess a basic knowledge of locally relevant ethical principles, though they need more training to optimize the application of bioethical principles and models to their particular contexts. Challenges increase the value of collaborative exchanges with ethics committee members in the United States. Further research on facilitating communication between host country and sponsor country ethics committees can maximize local research ethics expertise, and thus raise the standard of protecting human participants involved in international research. (shrink)

In this thesis, I deal with the notions of a condition holding for some proposition and a proposition being true in a certain number of possible worlds. These notions are called propositional quantifiers and numerical modalizers respectively. In each chapter, I attempt to dispose of a system. A system consists of: a language; axioms and rules of inference; and an interpretation. To dispose of a system is to prove its decidability and its consistency and completeness for the given interpretation. I (...) shall, in passing, make applications to de definability, translatability and other topics. In Chapter 1, I consider the system 5SQ. Its language is that of 55 with Q as a fresh unary operator. Its axioms and rules of inference are those for 85 plus the following special axiom-schemes for Q: 1) QA::>MA 2) Q A ::> L V L 3) L ::> 4) Q A ::> L Q A. 'QA' is interpreted as 'A is true in exactly one possible world.' I dispose of the system by showing that every formula in it is equivalent to one in normal form. In Chapter 2 I consider the system S5n. Its language is that of S5 but with the unary operators Qk for each non-negative integer k. Its axioms and rules are those of S5 plus the following special axiom-schemes for Qk: 1) Qk A>~Q1 A, 1˂K 2) Qk A ≡ Vki≡oQi ˄ Qk-I 3) L ˂ 4) Qk A ˂ L Qk A 5) Qo A ≡ L ~ A, 1 ≥ 0, k ≥ 1 ‘Qk A’ is interpreted as 'A is true in exactly k possible worlds.' I dispose of this system by generalising the normal forms of S5Q. In the chapters 3-5, I consider three systems which result from adding propositional quantifiers to S5. The first two systems, S5╥+ and S5╥, contain the usual axioms and rules for quantifiers. The first contains, in addition, the axiom-scheme G = )). The last, S5╥-, results from S5╥ by restricting the Scheme of Specification, viz., A > A, B free for P in A, to formulas B of the propositional calculus. To interpret these systems we must specify which propositions the variable P ranges over. For St╥-, we merely require that if p and q are propositions, then and are also propositions. For S5╥+, we also require that each possible world be describable i.e. that there be a proposition which is true in that world alone. And for S5╥, we require not that each possible world be describable but that there be a proposition which is true in just those possible worlds which are describable. Again, we dispose of the systems by normal forms. This requires that we eliminate quantifiers and nested occurrences of L by adding new symbols to the language. For S5╥+, the operators Qk suffice. For S5╥, the operators Qk suffice. For S5╥, we also require the constant g and a fresh unary operator N. For S5╥-, even greater additions are required. In the last two chapters, 6 and 7, I turn to systems which have essentially the same language as S5╥. However, ‘Qk A' is now interpreted as 'A is true in exactly k possible worlds accessible from the given world.' Different conditions on R, the relation of accessibility, lead to different axioms. In chapter 6 I consider the conditions of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity, and in Chapter 7 the conditions of being a partial, convergent, total or dense order. I prove consistency and completeness by the method of maximally consistent systems. The method can yield decidability results, but I do not go into the matter. I have, as a rule, not given acknowledgements for well-established results or terminology. The main references are at the end of each chapter. Fuller references are in the bibliography. (shrink)

The axiom Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus was drawn up by Cyprian of Carthage in the middle of the third century. In the Middle Ages it was essential for the pontifical theocracy with popes like Gregory VII (Dictatus papae, 1075) Inocent III (IV Lateran Council, 1215) and Boniface VIII (Bull Unam Sanctam , 1302).With the necessary adaptations and nuances (St. ThomasAquinas in the XIIIth century; the theologians of Salamanca in the XVIth century, the II Vatican Council in the XXth century) the (...) controversy around this maxim has reached our days. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 31, Number 1, April 2005, pp. 63-92 Utilitarianism with a Humean Face ELIZABETH ASHFORD Introduction There is a long-standing debate over whether or not Hume's moral theory1 should be viewed as some version of utilitarianism.2 Among opponents of a utilitarian reading, many contrast the subtlety and psychological plausibility of Hume's account of morality with what they take to be utilitarianism's failure both to capture the complexity (...) of morality and to be suited to the nature of human beings.3 Geoffrey Sayre-McCord is, in my view, one of the most incisive and forceful advocates of this position.4 He interprets Hume as an exponent of what he calls the "Bauhaus theory" of ethics. The Bauhaus theory avoids a commitment to a single overarching moral principle by which to solve all moral questions. On this view, the virtues are each well-suited to solving a particular problem which we find collectively salient when we take up the general point of view, " and different problems may demand dramatically different, sometimes incompatible solutions" (282). Sayre-McCord contrasts this with what he considers the overly systematic nature of utilitarianism, which identifies traits as virtues solely on the grounds of their tendency to realise or promote well-being. In addition, he contrasts the Bauhaus theory, which "portrays morality's demands as grounded in the expansive interests and affections, generous and not, of real people looking for... solutions to problems they face," with what he takes to be utilitarianism's psychological implausibility. The question of whether Hume's moral theory should be viewed as a version of utilitarianism will, of course, largely depend on how utilitarianism is defined. It is important to separate utilitarianism's key tenets from claims that have come to Elizabeth Ashford is Lecturer in Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, Edgecliffe, The Scores, St Andrews, KY16 9AL, United Kingdom, e-mail: [email protected] 64 Elizabeth Ashford he associated with the theory but that do not follow from these tenets. My discussion of whether Hume's moral theory is utilitarian will focus on Sayre-McCord's argument that "no version of utilitarianism... sits comfortably as an interpretation of Hume." One of the strengths of Sayre-McCord's argument is that he bases it on the most uncontentious and ecumenical account of utilitarianism's core tenets. He argues that there are three ways in which a theory may fail to qualify as utilitarian, and that Hume's theory fails on all three counts: (i) a theory might rely on neither actual nor expected utility as the determinants of evaluation; or (ii) it might not take into account all the consequences for everyone affected; or (iii) it might not take utility to be a single measure of interpersonal value. I will argue that Hume's account of morality adheres to the first two tenets that Sayre-McCord rightly identifies as definitive of utilitarianism, welfarism and impartiality. This means that Hume's theory is a version of what Thomas Scanlon calls "philosophical utilitarianism, " according to which "all that counts morally is the well-being of individuals, no one of whom is singled out as counting for more than the others."5 By showing that Hume's account is a version of philosophical utilitarianism I hope to demonstrate that a moral theory's adherence to these two fundamental tenets of utilitarianism is compatible with its having considerable complexity and psychological plausibility. I will then argue that Hume also takes welfare to be "a single measure of interpersonal value," and so also adheres to what Sayre-McCord takes to be essential to the third tenet of utilitarianism. I will argue, contra Sayre-McCord, that Hume's account of the moral point of view is based on the interests of all, rather than the interests of each seriatim (as on contractualist accounts) or the individual selfinterest of the participants (as on Hobbesian contractarian accounts). Admittedly, though, Hume shows no commitment to maximizing the net sum total of welfare. Such a commitment has come to be viewed as definitive of classical utilitarianism. In fact, as I will argue, Hume does not seriously address the problem of interpersonal conflicts... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:At St. Isidore’s Franciscan College in Rome, the following maxim attributed to St. Patrick is inscribed above the door-way of the church: Si quae difficiles quaestiones in hac insula oriantur ad Sedem Apostolicam referantur; ut Christiani ita et Romani sitis.1 The college was founded in 1625 by Luke Wadding, O.F.M. and, under his direction, became a major seat of theological learning and political influence for the Irish in Rome.2 (...) In the nineteenth century, the Friars Minor of the Province of Ireland assigned many documents from St. Isidore’s for use in their Irish friaries. In 1872, amid the unrest caused by the Risorgimento, medieval and early-modern Irish Franciscan manuscripts were transferred to Dublin.3 At the Merchants’ Quay Convent, the librarians T.A. O’Reilly, O.F.M. and E.B. Fitzmaurice, O.F.M. divided the manuscripts into sections with alphabetically ordered shelf-marks.4 This practical approach followed the long-established system used at Italian libraries and archives in Franciscan custody.5 From 1947 until 2000, the manuscripts of the Irish Friars Minor were kept at the Franciscans’ Dún Mhuire House of Studies in Killiney, County Dublin, before their transfer to the Archives, University College Dublin.The ‘D’ collection is preserved in twenty-six sets of volumes, folders and boxed papers. The greater part consists of Luke Wadding’s correspondence, relating to his activities as theologian, historian, Irish agent in Rome and consultor to several congregations and commissions at the papal secretariat.6 In the 1920s, Paul Grosjean, S.J. included four manuscripts then housed at Merchants’ Quay in a catalogue of hagiographical works.7 Clement Schmitt, O.F.M. treated of a collection of the Franciscan documents kept in Dublin in 1964.8Letters to and from Luke Wadding are also preserved at the Vatican Library; the Archivo Generale at the General Curia of Friars Minor, Rome; the Biblioteca Landiana, Piacenza; the Biblioteca Nazionale, Naples; the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan; the Archives of the Bollandists, Brussels; the Archives Générales de Royaume, Brussels; the Von Harrach Archive, Vienna; and the Franciscan friary of St. Jerome in Vienna.9Compared to some six hundred that Luke Wadding received, “the text of approximately one hundred of his letters, in whole or in part, has survived.”10 Nearly all Wadding’s extant correspondence dates from the three decades after the publication of his Acta legationis on the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in 1624. Most of his letters were sent from St. Isidore, some from the friaries of Aracoeli and San Pietro in Montorio, Rome, and a few from Naples.11Luke Wadding was born in Waterford on October 16, 1588, the eleventh of fourteen children.12 He was baptized two days later on the Feast of St. Luke. His father Walter was a well-established Waterford merchant and his mother Anastasia a kinswoman of the prominent Lombard family of Waterford. After the death of his parents, Luke left Ireland with his elder brother, Matthew, who enrolled him at the Irish Jesuits’ College in Lisbon. At seventeen years of age, Wadding made his way to Matozinhos in northern Portugal, near Oporto, where he entered the Franciscan Order. On completion of his novitiate, Wadding’s superiors sent him to the University of Coimbra and from there, to Salamanca. At Easter 1613, Luke Wadding was ordained to the priesthood after his studies. He was then appointed as a professor of theology at the Franciscan College of León and later at his own alma mater, Salamanca.13Called to the Spanish capital, Luke Wadding stayed at the Convent of Jesus and Mary in the south-east of Madrid where “lived not only the heads of the Franciscan Order in Spain but also the principal preachers.”14 Such was the distinction Wadding achieved that he was chosen by Philip III for the office of theologian in the embassy sent to defend the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in Rome.15 He lived there for almost forty years, in which time he founded St. Isidore Franciscan College, the.. (shrink)

Lam, Joseph On 11 April 2015 Pope Francis called for a special of Year of Mercy, which subsequently was symbolically inaugurated with the opening of the Holy Doors of the Basilicas of St Peter and of St John in Rome on 8 December. According to the Argentinian Pontiff, upon whose episcopal ministry is placed the maxim miserendo atque eligendo, mercy is the key element leading to the rediscovery of the spiritual joy that appears to have faded away in the life (...) of the church. To counter this pessimism, Francis reminds his flock of the affectionate and tenderhearted look of God, whose merciful and loving gaze enriches and liberates the life of every Christian: 'Thanks solely to this encounter or renewed encounter with God's love, which blossoms into an enriching friendship, we are liberated from our narrowness and self-absorption'. Yet, Francis in his major teaching documents seems to caution against the concept of happiness, even though his description of the effects produced by the mercy and joy of the Gospel leads to human growth, within which human happiness is understood as a right. He has called for an integral development that includes society's most neglected members,6 and that respects and includes all forms of existence. Nonetheless, it is not a soft choice, as if mercy opens the door to all forms of pleasure as long as they make people happy. (shrink)

Ethical theories grounded in utilitarianism suggest that social welfare is improved when agents seek to maximize others' welfare in addition to their own (i.e., are altruistic). However, I use a simple game-theoretic model to demonstrate two shortcomings of this argument. First, altruistic preferences can generate coordination problems where none exist for selfish agents. Second, when agents care somewhat about others' utility but weight their own more highly, total social welfare may be lower than with selfish agents even in the absence (...) of coordination problems. (Published Online April 18 2006) Correspondence:c1 105 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6; [email protected]. Footnotes1 I thank Adam Brandenburger and Mara Lederman for helpful comments. (shrink)

In a 1987 paper Thomas Morris introduced the phrase ‘perfect being theology’ and argued that in our efforts to construct an adequate theistic conception of God the most fruitful procedure will be for us to engage in reflection and dialogue about what a maximally perfect being would be like . To some of us that approach seems so obvious as to be without a significant alternative, but there are other approaches that have been followed – such as working up a (...) conception of God solely from the statements in a purported repository of divine revelation, such as the Bible . Another approach has been to study a wide range of religious scriptures to see what common conception of the divine can be found in them or most plausibly constructed from them. Those approaches, Morris said, have left us with something unsatisfactorily incomplete, static, and perhaps self-contradictory. Morris argued, a la St. Anselm and René Descartes, that the notion of a maximally perfect being is the north star that has been at the heart of the theistic traditions of the world, and it is that notion that we must explore and elaborate in order that we might construct an adequate conception of God. I agree. (shrink)

Sorensen provides a panoramic view of paradoxes of theoretical and practical rationality. These puzzles are organized as apparent counterexamples to attractive principles such as the principle of charity, the transitivity of preferences, and the principle that we should maximize expected utility. The following paradoxes are discussed: fearing fictions, the surprise test paradox, Pascal’s Wager, Pollock’s Ever Better wine, Newcomb’s problem, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Kavka’s paradoxes of deterrence, backward inductions, the bottle imp, the preface paradox, Moore’s problem, Buridan’s ass, Condorcet’s (...) paradox of cyclical majorities, the St. Petersburg paradox, weakness of will, the Ellsberg paradox, Allais’s paradox, and Peter Cave’s puzzle of self-fulfilling beliefs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Heidegger’s Craving Being-on-SchellingDavid L. Clark (bio)What we call spirit exists by virtue of itself, a flame that fuels itself. However, because as something existing, it is opposed by Being, the spirit is consequently nothing but an addiction to such Being, just as the flame is addicted to matter. The most base form of the spirit is therefore an addiction, a desire, a lust.—Friedrich Schelling, Stuttgart Private Lectures1. Just Say (...) NoHow not to speak of addiction? We know from Derrida that in talking this way we are always asking two overlapping questions, 1 both of which remind us that what is still confusedly called “addiction”—and with it, a host of related concepts ranging from “drugs” and “toxicity” to “dependence” and “simulation”—is perhaps best held open as a question or, rather, in the strange space between two questions, quite possibly more. First, an interrogative: a query that calls for a certain vigilance and responsibility when it comes to thinking about addiction, and that draws attention to the ways in which addiction is figured, the rhetorics or tropologies as well as the knowledges of addiction. Like mourning and longing, Schellingian philosophemes to which it is closely related and to which I will return in this essay, addiction is among other things a figure of understanding, to use Tilottama Rajan’s evocative phrase. 2 As a figure, so the first question goes, “addiction” deserves to be written and to be read slowly, not only for what might be called “political” reasons, which is to say, reasons having to do with the normalizing efficiency that comes of speaking the word too quickly, of claiming to know “who” the addict is as such and “what” it means to be addicted, but also because when it comes to addiction—again, like mourning and longing—we are dealing with a term that is irreducibly allegorical in nature, a term that inevitably says more than it says. One could almost say that “how not to speak of addiction” means “let us try to speak well or properly of addiction, even and especially if this means speaking properly of addiction’s multiple improprieties.” One could almost say this, if “addiction,” understood as a fundamental structure of desire that “holds valid for all possible contents of the world” [Slawney 42], were not precisely that which displaces and disorganizes firm oppositional limits between [End Page 8] propriety and impropriety, as it does between responsibility and irresponsibility, voluntarity and compulsion, delinquency and productivity, sickness and health, the very limits that the medical, juridical, and criminal discourses of addiction often seem most in the service of inscribing and enforcing. But of course the inability unequivocally to speak well (or, for that matter, unwell) of “addiction” in no way suggests that we have nothing to say about it—the collection of papers of which this one forms a small part is proof of that—and this goes to the heart of my second question, not interrogative but rhetorical in kind. “How not to speak of addiction?” also means that there is no way not to speak of it; insofar as addiction names a structure that precedes and exceeds the knowing subject (and is thus “older” than it), that subject is always “speaking” of it, as if answering and answerable to an imperious law, the law of addiction that amounts to an addiction to the law. Addiction there is: that is the strange, anonymous, and always anterior logic of craving, a craving no longer necessarily in thrall to the thought of self-possession and sobriety that Schelling scandalously evokes and explores, and that Heidegger directly pursues in his lectures on Schelling. More: where the human is, so too is “the deepest self-craving [der tiefsten Eigensucht]” [Heidegger, ST 140; 42, 244]. 3 Under these maximally habituated conditions, “how not to speak of addiction?” means that we are not unwilling but incapable of just saying no to a form of radical intoxication. Instead we find ourselves, as ourselves, whether speaking specifically about addiction or not, responding in a kind of passive affirmative to an originary craving, saying yes to addiction even when, in the name of an... (shrink)

THE HOLY STATE. THE FIRST BOOK. CHAPTER I. THE GOOD WIFE. ST. PAUL to the Colossians (iii.) first adviseth women to submit themselves to their husbands, ...

For a free filter F on $$\omega $$, let $$N_F=\omega \cup \{p_F\}$$, where $$p_F\not \in \omega $$, be equipped with the following topology: every element of $$\omega $$ is isolated whereas all open neighborhoods of $$p_F$$ are of the form $$A\cup \{p_F\}$$ for $$A\in F$$. The aim of this paper is to study spaces of the form $$N_F$$ in the context of the Nikodym property of Boolean algebras. By $$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ we denote the class of all those ideals $$\mathcal {I}$$ on (...) $$\omega $$ such that for the dual filter $$\mathcal {I}^*$$ the space $$N_{\mathcal {I}^*}$$ carries a sequence $$\langle \mu _n:n\in \omega \rangle $$ of finitely supported signed measures such that $$\Vert \mu _n\Vert \rightarrow \infty $$ and $$\mu _n(A)\rightarrow 0$$ for every clopen subset $$A\subseteq N_{\mathcal {I}^*}$$. We prove that $$\mathcal {I}\in \mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ if and only if there exists a density submeasure $$\varphi $$ on $$\omega $$ such that $$\varphi (\omega )=\infty $$ and $$\mathcal {I}$$ is contained in the exhaustive ideal $$\text{ Exh }(\varphi )$$. Consequently, we get that if $$\mathcal {I}\subseteq \text{ Exh }(\varphi )$$ for some density submeasure $$\varphi $$ on $$\omega $$ such that $$\varphi (\omega )=\infty $$ and $$N_{\mathcal {I}^*}$$ is homeomorphic to a subspace of the Stone space $$St(\mathcal {A})$$ of a given Boolean algebra $$\mathcal {A}$$, then $$\mathcal {A}$$ does not have the Nikodym property. We observe that each $$\mathcal {I}\in \mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ is Katětov below the asymptotic density zero ideal $$\mathcal {Z}$$, and prove that the class $$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ has a subset of size $$\mathfrak {d}$$ which is dominating with respect to the Katětov order $$\le _K$$, but $$\mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ has no $$\le _K$$ -maximal element. We show that, when $$\mathcal {I}$$ is a density ideal, $$\mathcal {I}\not \in \mathcal{A}\mathcal{N}$$ holds if and only if $$\mathcal {I}$$ is totally bounded if and only if the Boolean algebra $$\mathcal {P}(\omega )/\mathcal {I}$$ contains a countable splitting family. Our results shed some new light on differences between the Nikodym property and the Grothendieck property of Boolean algebras. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dominus Deus Noster Deus Unus Est:Aquinas on Divine UnityArchbishop Rowan Williams"The Lord our God is one LORD," says the Shema (Deut 6:4), echoed by Christians and Muslims alike. "We believe in one God," the Nicene Creed announces; and the Shahada's "There is no deity but God" affirms the same. But at first sight, Christian theology looks like the outlier here, as St. Thomas obliquely acknowledges when, early in his (...) discussion of the Trinity (Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 30, a. 1, obj. 1 and ad 1), he quotes Boethius: "That [alone] is truly one in which there is no numeration" (obj. 3). If there is a plurality of relation in God, there is something that can be enumerated, says Thomas. This objection is duly met by distinguishing between "absolute" plurality and the mutually definitory relations of the Trinitarian life which rule out any "composition" in God. But, for this fully to make sense, we must return to Thomas's explicit discussion of divine unity (ST I, q. 11). The present essay attempts a brief examination of how divine unity is understood in this quaestio, in the hope of clarifying an aspect of Aquinas's Trinitarian thought, and also of suggesting ways of developing an implicit theme of some significance for contemporary theology.It is still a textbook commonplace that "Western" Trinitarian theology begins from the divine unity and treats the distinction of the divine persons only in the light of this prior reality. The eloquent polemic of Orthodox theologians like Vladimir Lossky has played a major role in canonizing this supposed opposition. He writes, for example, that Western Trinitarianism treats the relationships of the divine hypostases as "a system of relationships within the one essence: something logically posterior to the essence," with [End Page 555] the distinguishing "relations of origin" (originary fatherhood, generatedness, procession) as "more or less swallowed up in the nature or essence."1 Examples could be multiplied, from Lossky and many others, and from Western theologians influenced by this characterization.2 The very structure of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, with the quaestiones de Deo uno preceding those de Trinitate, is sometimes adduced in support of this analysis of the ambiguities and inadequacies of Thomist Trinitarianism, and of a general Western resistance to the radical personalism of authentic patristic theology.But, polemic apart, what is Aquinas actually saying in his treatment of divine unity, primarily in ST I, q. 11? The four articles of the quaestio deal with whether saying that something is "one" actually tells us anything beyond the postulation of something as a coherent subject/substance; with whether unity and plurality are simply opposed and incompatible notions; with whether it is right to say that God is one, and if so, whether he is maxime unus, one in a unique and unsurpassable sense. Basic to his argument, as we shall see, is something touched on briefly in ST I, q. 30, a. 1, where his response (ad 3) to the Boethian formulation associates divine unity with simplicity—that is, with non-composition:3 affirming the divine unity is, crucially, denying the applicability of certain kinds of discourse in theology. But, as we shall see, part of the abiding importance of Aquinas's discussion is, perhaps unexpectedly, to open the door to a new ontological perspective in which laying out the difference between different senses of "unity" allows for the development of a more systematically relational metaphysics. Related to this is the distinction drawn (especially in ad 2 of [End Page 556] a. 3) between "mathematical" and "metaphysical" unity; one of the problems with a good deal of modern criticism of Western Trinitarianism is a failure to reckon with the diversity of ways in which "unus est" might be used, and St. Thomas is in fact abundantly clear about the senses that must be ruled out in theology—including any sense that would oppose an "individual" essence to "multiple" hypostases, as if the divine essence were itself a sort of numerically identified individual.The ground for this is laid in the first article. If we say that something is "one," we are surely offering a determination of it, specifying one way of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction to the Special Issue on Pediatric Decision-MakingErica K. SalterUnlike in the traditional decisional dyad in adult-based care, pediatric decision-making typically involves a triadic relationship among the patient, their parents, and the health-care providers. This complex relationship raises questions and concerns regarding each party’s expectations, obligations, and authority. For example, should a parent be allowed to withhold a poor diagnosis from an adolescent patient? Should an HLA-matched six-year-old sister (...) be permitted to serve as a bone marrow donor for her older sibling with lysosomal storage disease? Or, should parents be given decisional authority to consent to gender-affirming care for an adolescent with gender dysphoria? Cases like these are among the most ethically challenging decisions faced by parents and health-care providers because they present competing interests and values, and it’s not always clear what is in the best interests of the child.In the context of American medicine, the best interest standard has been identified as the primary ethical and legal guide for decision-making. In its most prominent form, the best interest standard requires parents and pediatric practitioners to choose the medical treatment that maximizes benefits and minimizes harms to the particular child in question. However, over the past few decades, the standard has come under significant scrutiny, with discussions and debate in the academic bioethics literature asking whether the standard is able to serve the [End Page 181] purposes it is thought to serve and whether alternative standards might be better suited to the task(s). Despite vigorous interest in these issues, the academic literature did not seem to generate any sense of identifiable consensus about how others ought to make health-care decisions on behalf of children.Thus, in June 2022, 17 scholar-experts on pediatric decision-making standards gathered in St. Louis, MO, for a three-day symposium of discussion and consensus-building. The participating authors represented different disciplinary perspectives and different viewpoints in the debate about guidance principles that underlie pediatrics. Despite apparent disagreement about such standards in the literature, the group was able to generate a set of six consensus-based recommendations (see Table 1) for pediatric decision-making. These recommendations, as well as their application, justification, and limitations, were published as a special article in Pediatrics in August 2023 (Salter et al. 2023), which was composed with the primary goals of accessibility, teachability, and implementability for practicing pediatric clinicians. Click for larger view View full resolutionTable 1.Six consensus recommendations for pediatric decision-makingWhile the group was able to find agreement about these six central principles of pediatric decision-making, there remained several related issues that were outside of the scope of the symposium aims. For example, should these recommendations apply to neonates, children in state custody, or adolescents, and if so, how would their application be operationalized? What specific conditions should justify state intervention on parental authority? How should parents and health-care providers think about obligations to siblings in health-care decisions? This [End Page 182] special issue of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine provides a forum for our authors and collaborators to further explore these, and other, important questions.The issue opens with a piece by the symposium organizers and editors of this special issue, Erica Salter, Lainie Friedman Ross, and D. Micah Hester, describing the symposium’s inspiration and design, its execution, and the implications it might have for pediatric ethics. This contribution compares the six symposium recommendations with existing statements about pediatric decision-making, in particular the statements developed by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP). In “How We Found Consensus on Pediatric Decision-Making and Why It Matters,” readers will find a detailed account of the process engaged to develop the six consensus-based recommendations, as well as a discussion of the value and limitations of such a process, which may serve as a model of consensus-building useful for other unsettled topics of interest in the bioethics community.The issue’s second article, “Childhood Interests: What They Are, and Why It Matters,” by Johan Bester and Jeffrey Blustein, dives into the conceptual foundation of the symposium’s first two recommendations. This... (shrink)

A work of music is repeatable in the following sense: it can be multiply performed or played in different places at the same time, and each such datable, locatable performance or playing is an occurrence of it: an item in which the work itself is somehow present, and which thereby makes the work manifest to an audience. As I see it, the central challenge in the ontology of musical works is to come up with an ontological proposal (i.e. an account (...) of what sort of thing a work of music is) which enables us to explain what such repeatability consists in, whilst doing maximal justice to the way in which we conceive of musical works in our reflective critical and appreciative practice. To this end, many have found it tempting to defend some version or other of the type-token theory : the thesis that a work is a type and its occurrences are its tokens. Much of the early debate prompted by the publication of Jerrold Levinson's seminal 'What a Musical Work Is' in 1980 has taken the type-token theory for granted, choosing to focus on how musical works, qua types, are individuated. (A key question here has been whether we should hold, with the sonicist , that works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike; or whether we should agree with Levinson's contextualist thesis that exact sound-alikes are distinct, if composed in distinct musico-historical contexts.) More recently, however, the type-token theory itself has been put under pressure, and alternatives have been suggested. So, e.g. Gregory Currie and David Davies have held versions of the thesis that musical works (and artworks generally) are acts of composition, whilst Guy Rohrbaugh has recommended that we think more innovatively about our metaphysical categories, and treat musical works (along with all repeatable artworks) as historical individuals . Historical individuals, like particular substances, come into and go out of existence, could have been somewhat different than they are, and can change through time; but such items, unlike particular substances, are nonetheless capable of having occurrences. In the last few years, ontologists of music have also stepped back to consider the very nature of their enterprise. In particular, a debate has ensued concerning the cogency of ontological proposals (such as those of Nelson Goodman, Nicholas Wolterstorff and Julian Dodd) that are substantially revisionary of our folk concept of a work of music. Amie Thomasson, David Davies and Andrew Kania occupy, to a greater or lesser degree, the descriptivist standpoint, according to which such revisionary ontologies are misconceived. The debate between revisionists and descriptivists in the ontology of music – if prosecuted against the backdrop of an awareness of developments in meta-ontology more generally – is a particularly fertile area in the philosophy of music at present. Author Recommends Wollheim, Richard. Art and its Objects . 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. This seminal study nicely introduces and motivates the type-token theory, and in the course of doing so, helpfully, although perhaps contentiously, distinguishes types from both sets and properties. Wollheim's treatment was to a large part responsible for stimulating the subsequent debate as to the ontological nature of musical works. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is.' Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980); reprinted in his Music, Art and Metaphysics , 63–88. This paper has, perhaps, been the most influential account of the nature of musical works, post-Wollheim. Presuming the type-token theory to be correct, Levinson elaborates it by claiming musical works to be, not sound structures (i.e. structured patterns of sound-types), but a species of types he calls indicated structures . According to Levinson, a work of music is not to be identified with its sound structure, S ; it is, in fact, a compound of S and a performance-means structure, PM , as indicated (typically, via a score) by its composer on a certain occasion : something that we can represent as S/PM -as-indicated-by- X -at- t . Such indicated structures, Levinson argues, fit the bill for being what works of music are, because they come into being with their indication (i.e. their composition), are individuated in terms of the musico-historical context in which they were composed, and have their specified performance-means (i.e. their instrumentation) essentially. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Part I of this book sees Wolterstorff defend a Platonistic version of the type-token theory (although Wolterstorff calls them 'kinds' rather than 'types'). According to Wolterstorff, considerations about the existence conditions of types commit us to the thesis that works of music, qua types, are entities that cannot come into or go out of existence. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defence.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 19 (1983): 109–29. In this article, Kivy ingeniously (and wittily) defends a variety of Platonism about works of music against the animadversions of Levinson. Currie, Gregory. An Ontology of Art . New York: St, Martin's Press, 1989. Here Currie introduces and defends the thesis that works of music (and, indeed, all artworks) are compositional action-types. The book also contains some well-aimed criticisms of Levinson's account. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. In this book, Dodd defends the type-token theory, but argues that no version of it can escape the Platonisic consequence that musical works exist at all times (and hence, are discovered, rather than created, by their composers). Dodd also defends another controversial thesis, this time concerning musical works' individuation. According to Dodd, and pace Levinson and others, sonicism is correct: works that sound exactly alike are identical. Rohrbaugh, Guy. 'Artworks as Historical Individuals.' European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 177–205. In this essay, Rohrbaugh makes some pointed criticisms of the type-token theory of repeatable artworks in the course of arguing that such works should be viewed, not as types, but as historical individuals (see above). Rohrbaugh suggests that treating musical works as historical individuals best captures our intuitions about such works' temporal and modal characteristics, and, in the course of elaborating his position, he makes some meta-ontological claims that see him endorsing a non-revisionary, descriptivist approach to the ontology of art. As Rohrbaugh sees it, ontologies of art are 'beholden to our artistic practices' (179), and 'aesthetics should not be beholden to the metaphysics on offer, but rather should drive new work in metaphysics' (197). Ridley, Aaron. 'Against Musical Ontology,' Journal of Philosophy 100 (2003): 203–220. This paper sees Ridley outlining a sceptical attitude towards the project of formulating ontological proposals. In his view, a 'serious philosophical engagement with music is orthogonal to, and may well in fact be impeded by, the pursuit of ontological issues' (203). Thomasson, Amie. 'The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics.' JAAC 63 (2005:221–9). Thomasson defends descriptivism in the ontology of art by arguing that such a position is a consequence of the only defensible solution to a problem in the theory of reference: the so-called 'qua' problem concerning how the reference of a term can be fixed. Davies, David. Art as Performance . Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Davies' position is characterised by two theses: one methodological, the other ontological. The methodological claim is that the ontology of art faces a pragmatic constraint : roughly speaking, the ontology of art is answerable to the epistemology of art. The ontological claim is that the rigorous enforcement of the pragmatic constraint commits us to the thesis that all artworks are compositional action-tokens. Online Materials http://www.blackwell-compass.com/subject/philosophy/article_view?article_id=phco_articles_bpL173 Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology.' Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1113–34. doi: [DOI link] http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118557784/abstract Thomasson, Amie. 'Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here?' Philosophy Compass 1/3 (2006): 245–55. doi: [DOI link] http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122517227/abstract Davies, David. 'Works and Performances in the Performing Arts.' forthcoming in Philosophy Compass . doi: [DOI link] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/ Kania, Andrew. 'The Philosophy of Music.' Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . Sample Mini-Syllabus Week 1: The Type/Token Theory Introduced Wollheim, Richard. Art and its Objects , §§4–8, 21–3, 35–7. Kivy, Peter. Introduction to a Philosophy of Music , chapter 11. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 1. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art , chapter 2. Week 2: The Type/Token Theory and Platonism in Music Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Works and Worlds of Art , chapter 2. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is'. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapters 2–5. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defence.' Grazer Philosophische Studien 19 (1983): 109–29. Kivy, Peter. 'Platonism in Music: Another Kind of Defence.' American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1987): 245–52. Predelli, Stefano. 'Against Musical Platonism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 35 (1995): 338–50. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Can a Musical Work be Created?' British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (2004): 113–34. Week 3: Musical Works as Indicated Structures Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is'. Levinson, Jerrold. 'What a Musical Work Is, Again', in his Music, Art and Metaphysics . Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1990. 215–63. Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works as Eternal Types.' British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (2000). Davies, Stephen. Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Account , chapter 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Howell, Robert. 'Types, Indicated and Initiated.' British Journal of Aesthetics 42 (2002): 105–27. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Fine Individuation.' British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (2007): 113–37. Week 4: Musical Work as Historical Individuals Rohrbaugh, Guy. 'Artworks as Historical Individuals'. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 6. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Defending Musical Perdurantism.' British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2006): 59–69. Caplan, Ben and Carl Matheson. 'Defending "Defending Musical Perdurantism".' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 331–37. Week 5: Musical Works as Compositional Actions Currie, Gregory. An Ontology of Art . New York: St, Martin's Press, 1989. Davies, David. Art as Performance . Oxford: Blackwell, 2004. Dodd, Julian. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology , chapter 7. Week 6: Meta-ontology of Music: What are we Doing When we do the Ontology of Music? Ridley, Aaron. 'Against Musical Ontology'. Thomasson, Amie. 'The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics'. Thomasson, Amie. Ordinary Objects , chapter 11. OUP, 2007. Davies, David. 'The Primacy of Practice in the Ontology of Art.' Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2009): 159–72. Kania, Andrew. 'Piece for the End of Time: In Defence of Musical Ontology,' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 65–79. Kania, Andrew. 'The Methodology of Musical Ontology: Descriptivism and its Implications.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 426–44. Cameron, Ross. 'There are No Things That are Musical Works.' British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 295–314. Dodd, Julian. 'Musical Works: Ontology and Meta-Ontology.' Philosophy Compass 3/6 (2008): 1113–1134. doi: [DOI link] Focus Questions 1. Are musical works literally created by their composers? 2. Critically examine Levinson's thesis that musical works are 'indicated structures'. 3. What, if anything, is wrong with the thesis that musical works are identical just in case they sound exactly alike? 4. Should we immediately be sceptical of ontological proposals for works of music that are substantially revisionary of the way in which we ordinarily think of them? (shrink)