When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...) a sense experience that P is a source of justification—a reason—for believing that P? Call this the Question. I will discuss various answers to the Question, and defend the one I myself favor. (shrink)

In the leadership literature of the past 100 years or so, rhetoric has been a topic for a long time and ethics was introduced some 30 years ago. However, the three topics, leadership, rhetoric, and ethics, have not been connected. This is astonishing because when ethical leadership made its comeback, scholars acknowledged the debt that ethical leadership owes to Aristotelian ideas. For Aristotle, leadership, ethics, and rhetoric were inseparable: without ethics, there could neither be good leadership nor rhetoric, and rhetoric (...) was the bridge from leader to follower and back. Aristotle is known as the practical philosopher and we argue that closing this major lacuna in leadership theory, would be beneficial for practice too and would help prevent Theranos-like scandals. The lacuna lies in what some call a Machiavellian view of leadership and rhetoric: both are regarded as amoral tools to achieve given ends. Aristotle would bristle at that idea. Both, leadership and rhetoric, to be good, must aim at the noble. The noble is not dictated by a heroic despot nor by a selfless saint but is understood by a leader because s/he is a socially embedded individual. We argue that leadership should be understood as personal development, that organisational rules must not inhibit virtue, that leadership is more about listening than talking, that synthesising that which is heard is central, and finally, that the common, not the collective, good is the goal of leadership. (shrink)

After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions computation and implementation for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a state-to-state correspondence view of implementation cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion realization of a function, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement (...) for the notional pair computation-implementation. After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion digital system which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built. (shrink)

The core feature that distinguishes moods from emotions is that moods, in contrast to emotions, are diffuse and global. This article outlines a dispositional theory of moods (DTM) that accounts for this and other features of mood experience. DTM holds that moods are temporary dispositions to have or to generate particular kinds of emotion-relevant appraisals. Furthermore, DTM assumes that the cognitions and appraisals one is disposed to have in a given mood partly constitute the experience of mood. This article outlines (...) a number of implications of DTM (e.g., regarding the noncognitive causation and rationality of moods) and summarizes empirical results supporting the theory. (shrink)

Defeaters can prevent a perceptual belief from being justified. For example, when you know that red light is shining at the table before you, you would typically not be justified in believing that the table is red. However, can defeaters also destroy a perceptual experience as a source of justification? If the answer is ‘no’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification without destroying propositional justification. You have some-things-considered, but not all-things-considered, justification for believing that the table is red. If (...) the answer is ‘yes’, the red light defeater blocks doxastic justification by destroying propositional justification. You have neither all-things-considered nor some-things-considered justification for believing that the table is red. According to dogmatism, the justificational force of perceptual experiences is indestructible. According to conservatism about sense experience, a perceptual experience ceases to have justificational force if there is evidence against its reliability. Finally, according to meta-evidentialism, a perceptual experience is blocked from being a source of justification is there is no evidence of its reliability. I argue that, of these three theories, meta-evidentialism is the most plausible. (shrink)

Anosognosia for visual deficits—cases where significant visual deficits go unnoticed—challenges the view that our own conscious experiences are what we know best. We review these widespread and striking failures of awareness. Anosognosia can occur with total blindness, visual abnormalities induced by brain lesions, and eye diseases. We show that anosognosia for visual deficits is surprisingly widespread. Building on previous accounts, we introduce a framework showing how apparently disparate forms of anosognosia fit together. The central idea is that, to notice a (...) deficit, individuals need to form expectations about normal vision, compare expectations and visual input, and judge any mismatch at the metacognitive level. A failure in any of these three steps may lead to unawareness of visual deficits. (shrink)

Psychiatric research is in crisis because of repeated failures to discover new drugs for mental disorders. Lack of measurement validity could partly account for these failures. If researchers do not actually measure the effects of drugs on the disorders they aim to investigate, one should expect suboptimal treatment outcomes. I argue that this is the case, focusing on depression, and fear & anxiety disorders. In doing so, I show how psychiatric research illustrates a more general phenomenon that I call “validity (...) drift.” A validity drift occurs when, in the course of developing new measurement procedures, researchers end up studying something different from what they originally aimed to study. I analyze the different ways in which scientists attempt to validate procedures for measuring mental disorders for the purpose of testing drugs in animal models. I show how those validation efforts might fail, thereby leading to validity drifts. Overall, this analysis highlights the complex interplay between the development of new measurement procedures, their calibration, and scientific theories of the target phenomena. (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was probably also (...) intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. (...) Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed. (shrink)

This paper examines Ralph Barton Perry's analysis of the ‘ego-centric predicament’. It will be shown that Perry convincingly argued against prevailing contemporary versions of idealism and that it makes perfectly good sense to consider him a precursor of subsequent trends in American analytic philosophy. Perry's appraisal and promotion of the contemporary logic of relations in the framework of early twentieth-century American neorealism provides further evidence of his being a proto-analytic philosopher. His personal acquaintance with Bertrand Russell proved instructive in this (...) regard. On the whole, Perry's distinctive approach to philosophy was instrumental in establishing the analytic style of reasoning in the United States. This paper is devoted to substantiating this claim. It is thus hoped that a clearer picture of early twentieth-century American philosophy will begin to emerge. (shrink)

According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Time Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for (...) any form of meta-justification, non-dogmatic foundationalism merely rejects Laurence BonJour's claim that meta-justification must come from beliefs. Unlike its dogmatic counterpart, non-dogmatic foundationalism can allow for basic beliefs to receive meta-justification from non-doxastic sources such as experiences and memories. Construed thus, non-dogmatic foundationalism is compatible with Klein's principle that there is no justification without meta-justification. I conclude that Klein's rejection of foundationalism. fails. Nevertheless, I agree with Klein that when in response to a skeptical challenge we engage in the activity of defending our beliefs, the number of reasons we can give is at least in principle infinite. I argue that this type of infinity is benign because, when we continue to give reasons, we will eventually merely repeat previously stated reasons. Consequently, I reject Klein's claim that the more reasons we give the more we increase the justification of our beliefs. (shrink)

The concept of quantity (Größe) plays a key role in Frege's theory of real numbers. Typically enough, he refers to this theory as ?theory of quantity? (?Größenlehre?) in the second volume of his opus magnum Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (Frege 1903). In this essay, I deal, in a critical way, with Frege's treatment of the concept of quantity and his approach to analysis from the beginning of his academic career until Frege 1903. I begin with a few introductory remarks. In Section (...) 2, I first analyze Frege's use of the term ?source of knowledge? (?Erkenntnisquelle?) with particular emphasis on the logical source of knowledge. The analysis includes a brief comparison between Frege and Kant's conceptions of logic and the logical source of knowledge. In a second step, I examine Frege's theory of quantity in Rechnungsmethoden, die sich auf eine Erweiterung des Größenbegriffes gründen (Frege 1874). Section 3 contains a couple of critical observations on Frege's comments on Hankel's theory of real numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Frege 1884). In Section 4, I consider Frege's discussion of the concept of quantity in Frege 1903. Section 5 is devoted to Cantor's theory of irrational numbers and the critique deployed by Frege. In Section 6, I return to Frege's own constructive treatment of analysis in Frege 1903 and succinctly describe what I take to be the quintessence of his account. (shrink)

In the article ‘Represent Me: Please! Towards an Ethics of Digital Twins in Medicine’, I analysed and tried to better understand the main ethical challenges associated with Digital Twins. For those who are just entering the debate with this article: DT is a metaphor for a bundle of artificial intelligence driven simulation technologies that constantly, in real time and ad personam simulate single or multiple parts of the body and make predictions about future health states based on these simulations. My (...) argument addresses the need to look at the breadth of challenges through a perspective of representation. From such a take, key consequences can be drawn for the further development of such technologies, the required means of control and not least the way to think about the interaction between humans and ‘their’ simulations. I am very grateful for the subsequent suggestions, criticisms and further arguments, which have helped me to elaborate my arguments more clearly and have led to a substantial advancement of the debate and the discussion about ethical questions in dealing with DT. Jenny Blumenthal-Barby,1 Deborah Lupton,2 Jenny Krutzinna,3 Janina Loh,4 Brent Mittelstadt,5 Sven Nyholm,6 Daniel Tigard7 and Max Tretter8 have made excellent points, which, in the following, I will not be able to reply to individually and in detail. In this response, I will try to bundle the open points and questions along the comments and considerations mentioned above and attempt to outline their significance for an ethics of DT. Four challenges seem to be central. A first point addresses anthropological issues. It is concerned …. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Importance and Legacy".

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren damit den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

The question of how people represent emotions is eminently important for a number of different domains of psychological research. The present study tested the assumption that emotion concepts are represented similar to theories in that they are comprised of a set of causally interrelated features. Using emotional scenarios and investigating the emotion concepts of anger, anxiety, and sadness it was found that people's representations of emotion concepts essentially involved the representation of the causal relation of emotion features and that the (...) causal status of a feature determined the feature's centrality in the concept. Moreover, people's representations of emotion concepts corresponded to basic assumptions of cognitive emotion theories, namely that cognitive appraisals cause other surface features of emotion, like expression and behaviour. By providing evidence for a theory-based representation, the present results show that the classical and the prototype approach are insufficient to model the representation of emotion concepts. (shrink)

Time has often been understood as either linear or cyclical, sometimes in Eurocentric ways that enclose Indigenous peoples in natural cycles with little or no historical development. This article explores an alternative to the line and the circle. In the context of environmental destruction, Indigenous scholars have suggested that traditional Indigenous accounts of spiraling time, from the Anishinaabe and Māori to the Aztecs and Muskoke, better connect nature with human history as well as more appropriately link human generations, including ancestors (...) and descendants. Exploring its connection with the hermeneutic circle and other notions, I will propose the spiral as indeed a promising way to grasp these important connections. In conclusion, I will discuss the question of whether Indigenous spiral ontologies can be proposed for all of humanity beyond knowledge extractivism. (shrink)

Two claims are essential to foundationalist theories of knowledge. First, that there are directly evident propositions; secondly, that, in justifying a particular knowledge claim, one ultimately arrives at a directly evident proposition making another proposition evident. In this dissertation, both claims are being defended. ;In defense of the first claim, a week definition of a proposition's being directly evident is suggested. Any attack against foundationalism rejecting the first claim must show that there are no contingent directly evident propositions in the (...) sense of this definition. According to the thesis of privileged access, what a man believes about his mental states is directly evident, or, according to different versions of this thesis, self-presenting, infallible, self-evident, indubitable, or incorrigible. Rejecting a number of objections to it, the thesis of privileged access in all of its versions is being defended. In defense of the second claim, an account of prima facie evidence is set forth, incorporating definitions of the concepts "e tends to make h evident," "i defeats the evidence e provides for h," and "e makes h prima facie evident for S." It is claimed that, if a proposition p is made prima facie evident for a person S, then there is no ground on which it is reasonable for S to doubt that p is true. ;Furthermore, two epistemic principles are being offered. The first lays down the conditions under which evidence is generated, asserting that evidence is generated in virtue of a person's being in a psychological state. The second lays down the conditions under which evidence is transmitted from a directly to an indirectly evident proposition, asserting that evidence is transmitted from a directly to an indirectly evident proposition if the former bears to the latter the relation of "e making h prima facie evident.". (shrink)

This is a review of: God's Rational Warriors: The Rationality of Faith Considered.

Was verbindet Hammer, Pinsel und Geige? Werkzeuge und Instrumente vermitteln zwischen menschlichem Körper und Materie. So genießen diese Objekte eine genuine Gemeinsamkeit, und doch gründet gerade in der Differenz beider Begriffe die abendländische Unterscheidung zwischen handwerklichen und künstlerischen bzw. musikalischen oder wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeiten. Die Beiträge des achten Bandes der Hamburger Forschungen zur Kunstgeschichte nehmen Werkzeuge und Instrumente aus einer kunsthistorischen Perspektive und im interdisziplinären Dialog in den Blick. Das Augenmerk liegt gleichermaßen auf den Techniken ihrer Handhabung, ihrer Diskursivierung in Kritik (...) und Theorie sowie ihrer Darstellung im Bild. Mit Beiträgen von: Gotlind Birkle, Martine Clouzot, Philippe Cordez, Gottfried Korff, Matthias Krüger, François Lamy, Katja Müller-Helle, Ulrich Pfisterer, Albrecht Pohlmann, François Poplin, Julia Ann Saviello, Monika Wagner. (shrink)

How can we understand the intensifying interactions of science and society? The answers are found in part in the interdisciplinary field called science studies. This field provides us with a rich inventory of analytical approaches. It helps us explore science as a practice, a subsystem, a culture, and an institution. Its observation is that science today is part and parcel of what has come to be known as "knowledge society." Nine exemplary studies that inquire into, or are themselves examples of (...) the dynamics of scientific knowledge are included in this book. They cover issues as diverse as eugenics, climate research, and the role of historiography, and make use of different tools such as evolutionary reasoning, metaphor, and bibliometrics. Finally, they ponder the need for science to go public as well as for society to regulate knowledge and restructure universities as the building blocks of our science system. The message is that science studies can and should assume an active role in observing, reflecting, and communicating the intricate encounters of science and society today. Sabine Maasen teaches sociology at Basel University, Switzerland. Matthias Winterhager is senior researcher and coordinator of bibliometric studies at the Institute for Science and Technology Studies, University of Bielefeld, Germany. (shrink)

John Hyman’s Action, Knowledge, and Will achieves what is increasingly rare in academic philosophy. It is both ambitious and controlled, wide-ranging and pointe.

Whether deconstruction is relevant to environmental philosophy, and if so, in what ways and with what transformations, has been subject to considerable debate in recent years. I will begin by discussing some reservations regarding deconstruction’s relevance to environmental thought, and argue that they stem from an older misreading of Derrida’s work in particular as hostile to the natural sciences, and as a cultural textualism of relevance only to the interiority of a traditional canon, but unable to reach the materiality of (...) the outside environment. This attempt at refutation will permit a better understanding of the deconstructive argument for what has been called an ‘originary environmentality’ of life. On this basis, I seek to argue that deconstruction tends to be most promising to environmental questions when it shows responses to the call, not primarily for a new ethics, but for far-ranging analyses of our conception of politics. The reason for this lies in the overall deconstructive goal of exposing political and legal sovereignty, including its modern democratic understanding, to what I will elaborate as contextual or environmental finitude. (shrink)

In this interview, Boris Groys discusses his key cultural-theoretical ideas, positions his thought in relation to debates on the cultural economy and clarifies questions emerging from his work. The conversation focuses on his untranslated cultural-theoretical contributions, notably Über das Neue [On the New] and Topologie der Kunst [Topology of Art], but also touches on his writings available in English, for example Art Power. The interview contains three sections. The first revisits Groys’s challenge to the postmodern claim about the end of (...) cultural innovation. He problematizes this claim with reference to the current rise of digital archives and the loss of individual and collective memory. Groys goes on to elucidate the centrality of the ready-made method to cultural innovation. Cultural activity, he argues, constitutes a ritual which promises immortality in a world of perpetual change. Finally, Groys clarifies and illustrates the questions guiding his phenomenological investigation of the ‘scene of evidence’ and the ‘mode of suspicion’. The second section is dedicated to the topology of culture in 21st-century capitalism. Groys sets out from his observation of the privatization and fragmentation of archival space. Humanity is entering a ‘new virtual Middle Age’, where individuals are engaged in a series of self-installations, travelling through a string of heterogeneous valorizing spaces. The ‘chance’ of genuine art in these conditions lies in its withdrawal from exchange. As inexchangeable ‘commodity corpses’ demanding eternal preservation, artworks can provocatively indicate the possibility of a ‘life after capitalism’. His considerations also lead Groys to discuss his notion of Soviet Communism as an installation in pursuit of the wish to ‘step out of time’. The third section centres on the problems of politics and critique. Responding to a question about the political potential of art, Groys proposes consideration of the increasing intensity — presently illustrated by the conflict in the Middle East — with which politics acts in the realm of aesthetics. The interview closes with reflections on the possibility of intellectual resistance. Referring to Nietzsche and Adorno, Groys locates the potential of opposition in a resentful critique of time: a ‘rejection of everything’ and the insistence upon the possibility that what is will vanish. (shrink)

The generalization properties of algebraically closed fields $ACF_p$ of characteristic $p > 0$ and $ACF_0$ of characteristic 0 are investigated in the sequent calculus with blocks of quantifiers. It is shown that $ACF_p$ admits finite term bases, and $ACF_0$ admits term bases with primality constraints. From these results the analogs of Kreisel's Conjecture for these theories follow: If for some $k$ , $A(1 + \cdots + 1)$ ( $n$ 1's) is provable in $k$ steps, then $(\forall x)A(x)$ is provable.

Zusammenfassung Trinitätstheologische Prioritäten und Engführungen, die sich in ekklesiologischen Gewichtungen widerspiegeln, resultieren aus unterschiedlichen hermeneutischen Prioritäten. Das betrifft nicht nur offenbarungstheologische und philosophisch-theologische Prägungen, sondern auch mentalitätsbedingte Orientierungen. Anhand der Theologiegeschichte in Ost- und Westkirche und am Beispiel aktueller theologischer Konzeptionen der großen konfessionellen Strömungen wird aufgezeigt, wie sich unterschiedliche hermeneutische Schwerpunkte entwickelt haben und welchen Einfluss sie auf trinitätstheologische Konzeptionen nehmen, die wiederum nachweislich ekklesiologische Ansätze prägen. Es wird erörtert, wie die neunizänisch-kappadozische Trinitätslehre, die sich im Ökumenischen Bekenntnis von (...) Nizäa-Konstantinopel niederschlug, eine gemeinsame hermeneutisch-offenbarungstheologische, trinitätstheologische und ekklesiologische Basis bietet. Von ihr lassen sich Differenzierungen ableiten, die zur Lösung des Filioque-Problems ebenso beitragen wie zur Eröffnung gemeinsamer trinitätstheologischer Perspektiven, welche die Überwindung der grundlegenden Differenzen im Amts- und Kirchenverständnis ermöglichen. (shrink)

This essay consists of two parts. In the first part, I focus my attention on the remarks that Frege makes on consistency when he sets about criticizing the method of creating new numbers through definition or abstraction. This gives me the opportunity to comment also a little on H. Hankel, J. Thomae—Frege’s main targets when he comes to criticize “formal theories of arithmetic” in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and the second volume of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1903)—G. Cantor, L. E. (...) J. Brouwer and D. Hilbert (1899). Part 2 is mainly devoted to Hilbert’s proof theory of the 1920s (1922–1931). I begin with an account of his early attempt to prove directly, and thus not by reduction or by constructing a model, the consistency of (a fragment of) arithmetic. In subsequent sections, I give a kind of overview of Hilbert’s metamathematics of the 1920s and try to shed light on a number of difficulties to which it gives rise. One serious difficulty that I discuss is the fact, widely ignored in the pertinent literature on Hilbert’s programme, that his language of finitist metamathematics fails to supply the conceptual resources for formulating a consistency statement qua unbounded quantification. Along the way, I shall comment on W. W. Tait’s objection to an interpretation of Hilbert’s finitism by Niebergall and Schirn, on G. Gentzen’s allegedly finitist consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic as well as his ideas on the provability and unprovability of initial cases of transfinite induction in pure number theory. Another topic I deal with is what has come to be known as partial realizations of Hilbert’s programme, chiefly advocated by S. G. Simpson. Towards the end of this essay, I take a critical look at Wittgenstein’s views about (in)consistency and consistency proofs in the period 1929–1933. I argue that both his insouciant attitude towards the emergence of a contradiction in a calculus and his outright repudiation of metamathematical consistency proofs are unwarranted. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein falls short of making a convincing case against Hilbert’s programme. I conclude with some philosophical remarks on consistency proofs and soundness and raise a question concerning the consistency of analysis. (shrink)

The existence of DNA methylation in insects has been a controversial subject over a long period of time. The recently completed genome sequence of the honeybee Apis mellifera has revealed the first insect with a full complement of DNA methyltransferases.1 A parallel study demonstrated that these enzymes are catalytically active and that Apis genes can be methylated in specific patterns.2 These findings establish bees as a model to analyze the function of DNA methylation systems in invertebrate organisms and might also (...) be important to understand evolutionary aspects of DNA methylation in higher eukaryotes. BioEssays 29: 208–211, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

By a counter-example, we show that the set of the three spin components Sx, Sy, Sz of spin-1 systems is not informationally complete.

Verfassungsgerichtliche Institutionen- und Kompetenzprofile finden sich gegenwärtig in vielen politischen Gemeinwesen. Dort, wo nicht nur die Prozeduren, sondern sogar die Inhalte des politischen Prozesses dem letztverbindlichen Richterspruch unterliegen, entfaltet die Verfassungsrechtsprechung eine besonders nachhaltige und weitreichende Wirkung. Höchstrichterliche Entscheidungen prägen politisches System und Rechtskultur in diesem Fall derart, dass der Jurisdiktion der Status einer souveränen Instanz zukommt. Mit der Legitimität dieser Version von Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit befasst sich das vorliegende Werk. Es behandelt das Thema Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit als Abstraktum, bringt die Mannigfaltigkeit der Erscheinungsformen (...) von (Verfassungs-)Gerichtsbarkeit in eine gedankliche Ordnung, konzipiert Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit als die institutionell verankerte gerichtliche Überprüfbarkeit sämtlicher staatlicher Akte und erörtert das "Ob und Überhaupt" von Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat. Der Studie zufolge sprechen pragmatische Gründe sowohl für die Rechtfertigbarkeit einer solchen gerichtlichen Aufsicht als auch für die Geeignetheit der Gerichtsbarkeit hierzu. Prinzipientheoretische Eindeutigkeit hingegen lasse sich weder für noch gegen die Institution der umfassenden Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit anführen. Aktuelle Bedeutung besitzt die Problematik des legitimen verfassungsgerichtlichen Wirkens insbesondere im Blick auf die Rechts- und Herrschaftsordnung der Europäischen Union. (shrink)

This book offers a critical discussion of Joseph Carens’s main works in migration ethics covering themes such as migration, naturalization, citizenship, culture, religion and economic equality. The volume is published on the occasion of the annual Münster Lectures in Philosophy held by Joseph Carens in the fall of 2018. It documents the intellectual exchange with the well-known philosopher Joseph Carens by offering critical contributions on Carens’s work and commentaries of Carens as a reply to these critical contributions. With his various (...) works on migration ethics, Joseph Carens must be seen as one of the leading academics in the political and ethical discourse of migration in the last years. The topic of migration raises questions not only regarding naturalization and citizenship but also cultural, economic and religious differences between aliens, citizens and persons whose status lies in between and calls for further determination. Such questions gain more and more importance in our globalized world as can be seen for example in the context of the refugee crisis in the European Union and the U.S. The book covers different systematic topics of Carens’s work as can be found in his widely read book “The Ethics of Immigration” but also in further publications. It provides papers with critical discussions of Carens’s work as well as his responses to these, thus enabling and documenting the fruitful dialogue between the contributors and Carens himself. The aim of this book is to sharpen and shed light on Carens’s arguments concerning migration by offering new and critical perspectives and fine-grained analyses. (shrink)