Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Queer Ethics and the Face of the Other In this paper I critically engage with Levinas’ ethical theory in order to formulate a queer ethics that is based on non-identity. Queer phenomenology shows us how our public space excludes bodies that do not fit within the heterosexual and cisgender norms and categorizes these bodies as disruptive forces to an orientated, stable space. In this paper I will develop an queer ethics that can offer a moral basis to queer phenomenology. I (...) will use Levinas’ ethical relation to conceptualize an ethics of non-identity in which the other remains wholly other. I will show how Levinas’ sexualized phenomenology can particularly serve queer phenomenology. In his early work, Levinas describes the becoming of the self as a movement away from absurd, meaningless being (il y a). The movement away from meaningless being is seen by Levinas as the desire to usurp the world. The self wants to continue its own enjoyment and tries to secure its position in the world. It is in the end the Face of the Other that can peacefully resist the self’s tendency to usurp the world. I will show how the Face differs from the feminine Other and will show how the Face who falls outside of the heterosexual cisgender norms, can be seen as queer. In the end I will outline a queer ethics as a being questioned by the otherness or queerness of the other in which we are willing to give up our privileged position in the world. (shrink)

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In this article I compare the linguistic skepticism of Levinas to that of the early Daoist skepticism of the Zhuangzi. I will argue that both Levinas as the Zhuangzi use skepticism as a therapeutic tool to question the rigid use of language and to create an openness in the self in which the self is inspired by something more than itself. For Levinas, language is primarily a response-ability; language ultimately refers to the absolute responsibility to the Other. For the Zhuangzi, (...) words are simply too rigid to attune to the subtle differences and changes in the world. Through carefree wandering, the self becomes more receptive to the unfolding of the way (Dao). Both the Zhuangzi as Levinas see language not only as a system of references that is able to convey the world, but also see language as communication; as a response to the outside world. For Levinas, this response-ability is aimed at the Other and is primarily an ethical demand. For the Zhuangzi, genuine language is more a spontaneous receptivity; a wandering with words in which words are open to different interpretations and perspectives. In the end of this article I will argue that Levinas and the Zhuangzi see language as a communicative praxis that mirrors receptivity and passivity. (shrink)