English summary: Friedrich Schleiermacher's work as a theologian and Plato scholar marked the start of a new epoch: as a system-forming philosopher, he claimed independent validity, and as church politician, educational policy-maker, and academic theorist, he was one of the most important figures during the Prussian reforms, whose contributions to pedagogy remain influential to this day. This volume provides a clear-sighted overview of the various stages in Schleiermacher's life (1768-1834), with each contribution portraying his fields of work and their contexts, (...) placing his literary work and conceptions in the framework of the respective contemporary debates. Important stages in Schleiermacher reception and impact history are likewise considered. The authors' diverse approaches to interpreting and understanding his output mean that the Guide to Schleiermacher offers concentrated insight into the consensus on and controversies in current Schleiermacher research. German description: Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) hat als Theologe, aber auch als Plato-Forscher Epoche gemacht; als systembildender Philosoph erhob er selbstandigen Geltungsanspruch, als Kirchen- und Bildungspolitiker sowie als Theoretiker der Universitat gehorte er zu den wichtigsten Akteuren der preussischen Reformen, und seine Beitrage zur Padagogik wirken bis heute nach. Die Gliederung des Handbuchs folgt grob Schleiermachers Lebensstationen. Die einzelnen Beitrage schildern seine Arbeitsfelder und -kontexte und stellen seine literarischen Arbeiten und Entwurfe in den jeweiligen zeitgeschichtlichen Debattenlagen dar. Auch wichtige Stationen seiner Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte werden thematisiert.Die Autorinnen und Autoren der Beitrage verfolgen ganz unterschiedliche Interpretations- und Deutungsansatze. Deshalb bietet das Handbuch auch einen konzentrierten Einblick in den gegenwartigen Stand der Schleiermacher-Forschung mit ihren Konsensen und ihren Kontroversen. Mit Beitragen von: Christian Albrecht, Andreas Arndt, Bernd Auerochs, Ulrich Barth, Albrecht Beutel, Georg Eckert, Hermann Fischer+, Ursula Frost, Albrecht Geck, Simon Gerber, Wilhelm Grab, Peter Grove, Matthias Heesch, Eilert Herms, Kirsten Huxel, Walter Jaeschke, Lutz Kappel, Hans-Martin Kirn, Dietz Lange, Inken Madler, Helmut Merkel, Martin Ohst, Claus-Dieter Osthovener, Hermann Patsch, Reiner Preul, Andreas Reich, Joachim Ringleben, Jan Rohls, Martin Rossler, Dirk Schmid, Friedemann Voigt, Folkart Wittekind, Matthias Wolfes. (shrink)

Early in February 1978, we received the following letter from Lowry Nelson, Jr., professor of comparative literature at Yale University: Regarding the exchange between Professors Martin and Hartman in Critical Inquiry 4 : 397-416, I would like to comment on the use of the institutional adjective "Yale." Labels are naturally sticky and attaching them is a habit and for a time a convenience. It would be unfortunate if the label that reads "the Yale group" or "the Yale critics" were (...) to gain unchallenged currency. So far as I can see, there is nothing that could be called a "school" of criticism here and certainly there is no indoctrination of students of some touted orthodoxy. In literary criticism there is still, and I am confident there will continue to be, a great range of views and interests discussed generally with amicable forthrightness. Versions of Hegel and Freud, revivals of rhetoric, criticism as "literature," and etymological dabbling are not so very new or so very local. This still enlightened academic grove has not and will not become a lucus a non lucendo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 137-141 [Access article in PDF] Qvomodo Stemma Gladiatoris Pellicvlae More Philologico Sit Constitvendvm Martin M. Winklersive Martinvs Satiricvs Philocinematographicvs [Figures]Poetae rervmqve scriptores et antiqui et recentiores lectoribus fabulas suas sententiis vel versibus bene textis soliti sunt adferre. Sed hodie novum exstat narrandi genus, quod fabulas hominibus adfert praecipue picturis eo modo compositis et inter se coniunctis ut oculi humani imagines singulares celerrime (...) et sine ulla motus intermissione ipsas moveri percipiant, personarum dialogis et arte musica sonisque diversis comitantibus et iuvantibus. Adeo enim progressa est ars magna lucis et umbrae, quam primum photographiam deinde cinematographiam nominare consuevimus, ut fabulae cuiusvis modi—breves longae, novae antiquae, laetificae tragicae—imitatione veri paene perfecta spectatoribus persuadeant tempora iam praeterita in vitam novam esse recreata.In ipsa arte narrandi non multum interest inter eos qui verbis utuntur, ut poetae ac scriptores, et eos qui imaginibus, ut cinematographi. Praeclare Horatium in arte poetica exponenda dixisse recordemur ut picturam poesin esse. Qua in re Simonidem illum Ceum aliosque poetas Graecos secutus est Flaccus noster. Utroque enim modo, et verbis et picturis, auctores antiqui atque hodierni homines docent delectant movent. 1 Facillime ergo intellegimus fabulam cinematographicam genus quoddam esse textus, sed textus non tantum legendi aut audiendi sed imprimis videndi vel spectandi. Peritissimus quisque talium fabularum [End Page 137] auctor omne tulit punctum, nam miscuit utile dulci. Is quoque non aliter ac poeta antiquus aut prodesse vult aut delectare.Sed editiones nonnullarum fabularum cinematographicarum inter se differunt et lacunas corruptelas vitia alia exhibent. Non enim raro pelliculas adfectas esse constat eius generis damno quod textuum antiquorum docti in editionibus suis obelis indicare solent. Itemque quomodo fabulae cinematographicae originem suam trahant ab antiquioribus quaerere et explicare haud absurdum est. 2Ergo editorum usum secutus his paginis originem pelliculae Gladiatoris anno MM editae exempli gratia stemmate quasi philologico explicabo. Deinde stemmatis sigla brevibus adnotationibus percurram. 3 Hoc modo me demonstraturum spero principia artis philologicae, quae litterarum Graecarum Romanarumque docti adhuc solum soliti sunt textibus adhibere, fabulis quoque cinematographicis magno cum fructu admoveri posse. In stemmate infra dato titulos fabularum cinematographicarum et auctorum eorum nomina Latine reddidi.Ridlius Scotus, pelliculae Gladiatoris auctor, magna cum acclamatione publica, minore criticorum, narrare studet quae imp. Caes. M. Aurelii Commodi Antonini Aug. aetate in imperio Romano gesta sunt. Sed stemmate monstrabo Gladiatorem imprimis ortum esse a nonnullis fabulis cinematographicis prioribus, quibus sons aut insons copiosissime usus sit ille Scotus. Qua de causa pellicula eius nobis indicat quemadmodum res Romanae temporibus nostris undique floreant. Cum ipsa et ceterae huius modi fabulae falsa inventione abundare soleant, tamen rerum et linguarum Romanarum Graecarumque magistri hodie hoc artis popularis genere in scholis saepius niti consueverunt, ut discipulos a falsa ad veram adducant rerum gestarum scientiam et rebus antiquis accuratius instruant. Quibus igitur magistris hoc offero stemma, nam amicus Scotus, sed magis amica veritas. 4 [End Page 138] [Begin Page 140] Conspectvs Siglorvm WPellicularum res antiquas tractantium archetypus, qui est summa rerum Romanarum a scriptoribus antiquis et recentioribus expositarum.AConsensus fabularum quae vel litteris vel ludis scaenicis vel picturis cinematographicis praecipue Italicis Americanisque res Romanas narrant depinguntque.TTriumphus Animi Helena Riefenstahle auctore anno MDCCCCXXXV editus. 5SSpartacus Antonio Viro—nomine suppresso—et Stanlio Cubrico auctoribus anno MDCCCCLX editus.CCasus Imperii Romani Antonio Viro auctore anno MDCCCCLXIIII editus. 6B1-3Triga Georgii Lucae Bella Galactica inscripta et annis MDCCCCLXXVII MDCCCCLXXX MDCCCCLXXXIII primum edita, quae his picturis cinematographicis constat: Pars Quarta: "Spes Nova" (B1), Pars Quinta: "Imperium Referit" (B2), Pars Sexta: "Iedi Reversi" (B3). 7 Editio trigae altera anno MDCCCCLXXXXVII edita itemque Bellorum Galacticorum trigae novae Pars Prima: "Simulacri Minae" anni MDCCCCLXXXXVIIII nihil ad rem.M1-3Triga Georgii Molitoris Maximus Furens inscripta, annis MDCCCCLXXVIIII MDCCCCLXXXI MDCCCCLXXXV edita et his picturis cinematographicis constans: Maximus Furens (M1), Maximi Furentis Pars Altera vel Bellator Peregrinans (M2), Maximus Furens Vltra Tonitrus Tholum (M3). 8GGladiator Ridlio Scoto auctore anno MM editus. 9 [End Page 140]His alias poteram et plures subnectere causas vel philologicas vel cinematographicas. Qui de Scoti Gladiatore plurima cognoscere velint... (shrink)

In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis.

In what may seem like an uncharacteristic passage by someone who otherwise described himself as the typical example of the Victorian Englishman, Alfred North Whitehead once wrote that “[t]he notion of pure thought in abstraction from all expression is a figment of the learned world. A thought is a tremendous form of excitement”. It is the patterned signature of its expression that not only gives thought its own distinct character, but also propels it out into the world, exciting its environment (...) with a new variation of interests. Without this ability to repattern, even if just slightly, the atmosphere of feeling in which they are immersed, to make a difference by shifting the way in which a situation may... (shrink)

Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that irreducibility is due (...) not to the normative character of intentional concepts, but to holism and the flexibility of interpretative principles. I then consider three arguments that Davidson has put forth to support the irreducibility of intentional properties on the basis of their normative character, and show that none of them goes through. (shrink)

Finding Your Ethical Research Self introduces novice researchers to the need for ethical reflection in practice and gives them the confidence to use their knowledge and skill when, later as researchers, they are confronted by big ethical moments in the field. -/- The 12 chapters build on each other, but not in a linear way. Core ethical concepts like consent and confidentiality once established in the early chapters are later challenged. The new focus becomes how to address qualitative research ethics (...) when confidentiality and consent take on a limited form. This approach helps students understand that the application of concepts always requires thoughtful adaptation in different contexts and the book provides guidance on how to do this. Classroom/workbook exercises develop alternative solutions to create process consent, internal confidentiality, and engage reference groups, as examples. The first eight chapters allow students to develop their ethical research self before thinking through how they might address formal ethics review. Formal ethics review is deliberately not introduced until Chapter 9. Chapter 10 offers practical help to elements of review, before Chapter 11 emphasises the key message by providing examples of researchers' dilemmas in the field using vignettes and discussion. By providing these examples, students become aware that these can arise, explore how they might arise, and recognise how they might deal with them in the moment when they are unavoidable. -/- With numerous examples of ethical dilemmas and issues and questions and exercises to encourage self-reflection, this reflexive, learn-by-doing model of research ethics will be highly useful to the novice researcher, undergraduate, and postgraduate research student. (shrink)

Tres modelos de sensibilidad ecológico-social son visibles hoy en relación con la naturaleza. El primero, el más atávico, consiste en la indiferencia instintiva. El segundo, algo más elaborado, en su conservación utilitaria. Y el tercero, el más consistente, en el respeto esencial por ella. Y ahí, en el vértice de la jerarquía humana pensante; aislados, pocos, románticos e iluminados, encontramos a unos cuantos personajes que tratan, machaconamente, de expandir un «extraño» mensaje entre el amasijo tecnocientífico actual; el del ecologismo comprometido. (...) Su imperativo es inapelable: somos el único ser vivo del planeta dotado de suficiente autoconsciencia y, por eso mismo, de exigible responsabilidad. Sobre todo, en el caso de que existieran argumentos suficientes que enlacen nuestra estirpe con el resto de los seres vivos de la Tierra. Y ese es el objetivo de este artículo. Teilhard de Chardin, Arne Naess y el papa Francisco son tres de los mejores ejemplos de quienes han contribuido a la justificación científica y filosófica del respeto debido a la Naturaleza. En ellos, centraremos nuestro análisis. (shrink)

Given a Mahlo cardinal κ and a regular ε such that $\omega_1 we show that $\diamond_\kappa (cf = \epsilon)$ holds in V provided that there are only non-stationarily many $\beta , with o(β) ≥ ε in K.

Schlesinger's argument for the confirmation of Theism over Naturalism fails. Principle E on which it is based is unacceptable. But even if Principle E were acceptable the argument would not succeed, for other evidence, not considered by Schlesinger, pulls in the other direction cancelling out the confirmatory effect of the evidence he does cite. Further, granted Principle E, it is not clear that theism as it is usually understood makes the evidence he cites more probable than naturalism; consequently he is (...) not justified in concluding that the evidence he cites confirms theism more than naturalism. Finally, Schlesinger fails to take into account the possibility that the initial credibility of theism may be less than naturalism since theism may be incoherent and naturalism may not be; he also fails to take into account the total available evidence relevant to the confirmation of theism and naturalism. (shrink)

How might we begin to think about deconstruction in relation to the formulation of political policy? Once we begin to ask this question the whole idea of policy as such is put in question and conversely the limitations of philosophy as the basis for political decision making quickly become apparent. Through a consideration of this problem and by reference to a number of key tropes in Derrida's later writings, this essay begins the task of thinking about the deconstruction of policy (...) and of asking what the future role of deconstructive thought might be. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter (...) topic are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)

Originally published in 1983, Martin Stanton has written an intriguing and original guide to French styles of psychoanalysis. He describes the development of psychoanalytic technique and shows how it has transformed the contemporary French literary and philosophical thought and writing, as well as making inroads in the English-speaking cultural world. He argues that psychoanalysis has outgrown the individual setting and needs to evolve new methods of group work – in this respect, he believes, it has a special role to (...) play in educational institutions. The book examines the grounds on which analysis has evolved subversive and deconstructive strategies and created radical alternatives. It relates the ‘Lacan effect’ on the psychoanalytic movement to long-standing debates on patriarchy and authoritarianism, and considers, in a clinical section, variant diagnoses of paranoia and schizophrenia. It also discusses the future direction of psychoanalysis in the light of contemporary French research. (shrink)

This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account (...) does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat. (shrink)

Analyses of preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution usually assumes all uncertainty to resolve in one point in time. More realistically, uncertainty should be modelled to resolve gradually over time. Kreps and Porteus (1978) have introduced an axiomatically based model of time preference which can explain preferences for gradual uncertainty resolution. This paper presents an experimental test of the Kreps-Porteus model. We derive implications of the model relating preferences for gradual and one-time resolving lotteries. Our data do not support (...) the Kreps-Porteus model but show that some of the behaviour observed may be explained by similarity heuristics. (shrink)

The author shows that the beliefs of Catholics and other Christians are reasonable, not based on blind faith. Drawing on Catholic and Christian theological traditions, the book links traditional teaching with contemporary issues to illustrate the relevance of faith to modern cultural, ethical, and scientific issues.--From publisher's description.

Der theoretische Kontext, aus dem die frühromantische, vor allem von Friedrich Schlegel und Friedrich von Hardenberg repräsentierte Denkform hervorgeht, ist bekanntlich die Philosophie des sogenannten deutschen Idealismus, namentlich die Transzendentalphilosophie Kants und Fichtes. Die Forschung vertritt nicht selten die These einer stringenten Kritik Fichtes durch die Frühromantik, welche schließlich zur Verabschiedung des Begriffs vom »Ich« im Sinne eines Fundaments aller Philosophie geführt habe. Der frühromantische Ansatz, so wird oftmals angenommen, gewinne sein Profil dadurch, daß er einen dem Denken unzugänglichen Bewußtseinsgrund (...) postuliere, während Fichte den Status der Absolutheit letztlich für das Selbstbewußtsein beanspruche. Fichte unterscheidet jedoch sehr wohl zwischen dem »empirischen Ich« und einer nur mittels methodischer Reflexion erschließbaren Instanz, die das empirische Ich begründet und der deshalb keinerlei Form von Bewußtsein zukommen kann. Die Romantiker entwickeln vielmehr aus der mit Fichte weitgehend geteilten transzendentalen Theorie des Absoluten Konsequenzen für das Philosophieren, die dann zwar eklatant von Fichte abweichen, aber auch dabei noch Einsichten der Wissenschaftslehre treu bleiben. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 57 Heft: 2 Seiten: 155-178.

“El Árbol de Gernika es símbolo del bienestar de nuestro pueblo: no de ningún otro. Ni dentro de nuestro solar puede coexistir con ningún otro árbol”, escribía Sabino Arana en Euzkadi en septiembre de 1901. Esta concepción aranista del “nosaltres sols!” es el suelo interpretativo de la cosmovisión vasca, también de su historia negra de violencia. “No hay lugar en el mismo espacio geográfico para dos violencias legítimas, para dos soberanías, y el espacio geográfico de Euskal Herria es vasco por (...) definición en el caso de ETA, y ETA es la cristalización definitiva del pueblo vasco”, enlaza Joseba Arregi en el primero de los libros reseñados. La dialéctica entre el uno y el dos es la clave de bóveda de la construcción discursiva del tribalismo identitario. (shrink)