In this paper I explicate a technique which can be used to make subtle relational features of experience more evident to awareness. Results of this method could be employed to diffuse one intuition that drives the common critique of functionalist-information theoretic accounts of mind that "qualia" cannot be exhaustively characterized in information theoretic-functional terms. An intuition that commonly grounds this critique is that the qualitative aspects of experience do not entirely appear in consciousness as informational-functional structures. The first section of (...) the paper is a schematic overview of nature of the qualitative and the problem that qualia are taken to create for information theoretic-functionalist theories of mind. §2 contains a précis of the concept of different levels of functional scale in mental activity that was developed by Armstrong and the Churchlands and that is needed to interpret (possible) results of the proposed experiment. In §3, I outline a method whereby analogies would be generated between purely relational forms, structures, configurations, etc. and purely qualitative aspects of experience. These analogies would be created by subjects through forced choice selection of presented images of structures that "most resembled" a pure quality. Repeated choices would then be shaped by a genetic program into the structural configuration that "most resembled" the pure quality. The final section of the paper explores how consistent, reliable results from the experiment would make information-theoretic functionalism more intuitively plausible in spite of the "fact" that the qualitative aspects of experience do not immediately appear as entirely relational/structural. (shrink)

This paper is an explanation of how the intentionality of perception is due to specific associations of sensations. It describes the intentionality of the mental and the problem that intentionality poses for accounts of the mind. The concept of "direction of fit" or "fulfillment of the act" is central to this description. An amalgamation of various recent interpretations of intentionality into a unified theory is presented along with an account of why even such a unified theory fails to account for (...) direction of fit. The direction of fit of perceptual intentionality is then elucidated as a function of patterns of association of sensations. Objections to this associational manner of conceiving of intentionality are responded to and evidence in support of the overall conception is provided. The paper concludes with a brief explanation of how this characterization of direction of fit applies to other domains of mental activity that exhibit intentionality. (shrink)

It has been claimed that quantum mechanics, unlike classical mechanics, allows for free will. In this paper I articulate that claim and explain how a complex physical system possessing fractal-like self similarity could exhibitboth self consciousness and self determination. I use complexity theory to show how quantum mechanical indeterminacies at the neural level could “percolate up” to the levels of scale within the brain at which sensory-motor information transformations occur. Finally, I explain how macro level indeterminacy could be coupled with (...) self determination to provide a physical system with the capacity for radically free willing. (shrink)

In the two parts of this paper I explain how enslavement to sinful action occurs. In this explanation, critical use is made of the fact that pride is at the root of all sin. In Part One of the paper, I develop an account of pride as moral subjectivism and then explicate the concept of addiction, especially its iatrogenic nature. Equipped with these two analyses, in Part Two of the paper I explain precisely how the aspect of moral subjectivism, inherent (...) in all sinning, leads the sinner into bondage. Finally, I amplify the account by showing how this compulsive condition is further compounded through a three-stage confirmation of one's own will in and to sin. (shrink)

In the two parts of this paper I explain how enslavement to sinful action occurs. In this explanation, critical use is made of the fact that pride is at the root of all sin. In Part One of the paper, I developed an account of pride as moral subjectivism and then explicate the concept of addiction, especially its iatrogenic nature. Equipped with these two analyses, in Part Two of the paper I explain precisely how the aspect of moral subjectivism, inherent (...) in all sinning, leads the sinner into bondage. Finally, I amplify the account by showing how this compulsive condition is further compounded through a three-stage confirmation of one's own will in and to sin. (shrink)