In all the Alien films, the environments are gloomy settings originally inspired by Gothic architecture, but it's the creature design, which leaves the most profound mark on us. The interaction between these art‐horror monsters and the sterileturned‐ grotesque environments of the Alien films can produce disgust or revulsion in the viewer. In Alien a fair amount of time is spent on the relationships between the crew members. One of the most horrific moments of the series is the cry of (...) “kill me” that emerges from the half‐conscious hosts as the space Marines explore the former colony of Hadley's Hope. Central to Carroll's theory on art‐horror is revulsion at the suggestion of physical contact with the fusion‐figures. At the end of Alien: Resurrection, Ripley lies in the middle of the Queen's huge mass. It is the most striking image in an otherwise cartoonish film. (shrink)

Nursing has a considerable history of theory development but has consistently struggled to reconcile theoretical reality and practice realities. Many authors have attempted to reconcile what has been called the “theory–practice gap,” but the space where these two realities enmesh has remained problematic and contentious (Aimei, Macau Journal of Nursing, 14, 2015, 13; Factor, Matienzo, & de Guzman, Nurse Education Today, 57, 2017, 82). The idea of the theory–practice gap has a significant history in nursing, but also continues to have (...) a significant presence within nursing literature and mythology up to the present (Aimei, Macau Journal of Nursing, 14, 2015, 13). In this paper, the space between theoretic reality and practice reality, as evidenced by the theory–practice gap, will be examined. A Heideggerian perspective of “dwelling” (Heidegger, 1971, Poetry, language, thought, New York, NY: Harper Colophon) will be used as a guiding discourse to move nursing away from this classic tension between theory and practice, towards a perspective where theory and practice are woven together as part of one reality. (shrink)

In a provocative 1974 article entitled “Harvesting the Dead,” Willard Gaylin explored potential uses of “neomorts,” or what are currently referred to as “heart-beating cadavers”—that is, humans determined to be dead by neurological criteria and whose cardiopulmonary function is medically maintained by ventilators, vasopressors, and so forth. Medical research was one of the potential uses Gaylin identified. He pointed out that tests of drugs and medical procedures that would have unacceptable health risks if performed on living human subjects could be (...) performed on neomorts without any health risks. According to Gaylin, the potential benefits of such research could be enormous, including not subjecting patients to ineffective or harmful medical procedures and eliminating delays in providing effective therapies to dying patients. (shrink)

Post-Liberalism: Studies in Political Thought, by John Gray. New York and London: Routledge, 1993. 358 pp. $45Beyond the New Right: Markets, Government and the Common Environment, by John Gray.New York and London: Routledge, 1993. 195 pp. $34.50.

The integrity of a practice requires critical self-reflection. Such critical self-reflection, it can be argued, requires for its objectivity the participation of reasonable individuals constituting a community whose members present their reasoned analyses for inter-subjective interpretation and assessment. Philosophy for Children, therefore, must demand of its participants an on-going consideration of its theory and its practice. This paper is a call for such continued and reasonable critical self-reflection.

In this analysis, I address the recent debate over the functional characteristics of mental imagery, in which the question is whether the format for imagistic representation is pictorial or sentential. I offer an account of imagery and cognition as an important aspect of the theory of mental representation, one which serves as a test for prevalent views of the nature of explanation in cognitive science. ;The first chapter articulates a functionalist theory of internal states. I argue for the need to (...) individuate mental states by virtue of their formal features, but in a way which is consistent with the fact that natural representational systems are self-interpreting. To that end, I describe a basic capacity for imaging which underlies any mental representation. ;In the second chapter, I discuss recent experiments and argue that a correct interpretation of the data cannot be determined on methodological grounds. The substantive argument against mental pictures is set forth and shown to rest upon two distinct assumptions. ;The third chapter aims to show that the argument that mental pictures are inherently ambiguous fails as an argument for an exclusively sentential format. I argue further that sentential states alone are insufficient to account for all rational behavior. The conclusion is that conceptual considerations do not preclude nondiscursive images, and a view of cognition as broader than computation favors them. I propose a logical foundation for an account of access to mental images-under-descriptions. ;The fourth chapter sets forth principles governing operations in which images might occur naturally. I argue that such an account depends upon the possibility of pictorial attitudes, mental features which are theoretically important for the notion of representational competence. ;In the fifth chapter, I show the relevance of the general account described in the previous chapter by applying it to diverse contexts: animal representation, hypothesis in perception, and self-representation. (shrink)

Workplace exposure to SARS-CoV-2 has sickened workers and, subsequently, their family members. Family members might be able to recover from the employer in a negligence action using “take-home” liability theory.

This paper explores certain facets of Christine Korsgaard’s paper, ‘Prospects for a Naturalistic Explanation of the Good’. Korsgaard’s account requires that an animal be able to experience ‘herself trying to get or avoid something’. The claim that animals possess such self-awareness is regarded by many as problematic and, if this is correct, it would jeopardize Korsgaard’s account. This paper argues that animals can, in fact, be aware of themselves in the way required by Korsgaard’s account.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 2, Page 488-498, September 2021.

I argue that, for Heidegger, to be a self is to be a particular way of making some environmental affordances stand out as more salient than other, and of aligning affordances into coherent trajectories to be followed in pursuing our projects. When Heidegger argues that the self of everyday existence is “the anyone-self,” he means that we tend to polarize situations into affordances that solicit us to act in such a way as to reinforce public, average, and levelled down ways (...) of engaging with the world. (shrink)

When Heidegger insists that each of us is distinctive because “the most radical individuation” is both possible and necessary for us, he might mean: it is possible and necessary to be an individual in the most radical way; or it is possible and necessary to engage in the project of becoming a distinct individual in the most radical way; or it is possible and necessary to see the distinct individual that I am, and to do so in the most radical (...) way. Although all three readings are possible and defensible, I’d like to explore in this paper a -type reading of Heidegger’s claim. What would it mean to see the distinct individual that I am in the most radical way? (shrink)

The Beauty of Souls dialogues with scriptural, theological, and philosophical interlocutors to illuminate Marilynne Robinson's unique vision. It shows that Robinson's fiction does more than simply display and evoke beauty; it offers a philosophical-theological framework to discover and express the beauty of our own souls.

criticism defend the idea that an individual reader's understanding of a text can be a factor in determining the meaning of what is written in that text, and hence must play a part in determining the very identity conditions of works of literary art. We examine some accounts that have been given of the type of readerly ‘competence’ that a reader must have in order for her responses to a text to play this sort of constitutive role. We argue that (...) the analogy drawn by Stanley Fish and Jonathan Culler between literary and linguistic competence is philosophically flawed and explanatorily unfruitful, and that a better way of understanding the notion of literary competence can be constructed by appeal to some limitation results in formal logic and computability theory. (shrink)

Was treibt seine Gegenspieler an? Ist Batman in seiner Menschlichkeit besser als Superman? Die Philosophie bei Batman bietet unterhaltsame Antworten und Einblicke in Batmans Welt.

Contemporary work on the links between geography and morality tends to focus on the spatial aspects of moral conduct. This paper argues that in addition to geographical space, geographical scale also plays a crucial role in the construction and maintenance of moral frameworks. Focusing on the emergence of the sustainable region in the UK, this paper argues that purportedly sustainable spaces, like the region, contain distinctive moral codes of socio-ecological conduct which are designed to guide actions and locational decisions within (...) regional space. Drawing on the case of regional development in the West Midlands, however, analysis shows that sustainable regions are characterised by not only a moral geography of space, but also a morality of scale. Combining recent work on moral geography with analyses of the political construction of geographical scale, this paper uses the case of post-war regional development in the West Midlands to show how the construction of moral landscapes is intimately tied to the production of particular moralities of scale and scales of morality. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 2, Page 462-465, September 2021.

Many authors, including Oswaldo Chateaubriand, maintain that “properties” should be structured in logical grades, where the least abstract quantities comprise the lowest ranks of a hierarchy that embraces more abstract and mathematized qualities only at higher levels. But applied mathematicians warns that no quantities can be expected to possess crisp, real world extensions unless they have already been processed with a fair amount of set theoretic machinery beforehand.Muitos autores, incluindo Oswaldo Chateaubriand, sustentam que "propriedades" deveriam ser estruturadas em uma gradação (...) lógica, onde as quantidades menos abstratas ficariam num nível mais baixo de uma hierarquia que abarca qualidades mais matematizadas e abstratas somente em níveis mais elevados. Mas matemáticos aplicados advertem que não se pode esperar de nenhuma quantidade que elas possuam extensões precisas, como do mundo real, a menos que já tenham sido tratados de antemão com uma boa dose de maquinaria conjuntista. (shrink)

This paper develops a modification of the notion of incommensurable worlds upon which Dreyfus and Spinosa base their robust realism. In particular, I argue that we cannot make sense of a conception of incommensurability according to which incommensurable worlds entail cognitively incompatible claims. Instead, as Dreyfus and Spinosa sometimes suggest, incommensurable worlds should be understood as being practically incompatible, meaning that the inhabitants of one world cannot, given their practices for dealing with some things, engage in practices central to the (...) other world. Practical incompatibility grounds a defensible account of incommensurability while securing a necessary step in Dreyfus and Spinosa's argument for robust realism. At the same time, it shows how their idea of incommensurability is immune to the sorts of objections Donald Davidson makes to the idea of a plurality of conceptual schemes, without at the same time refuting Davidson's argument. Finally, an appreciation of the failings of cognitive accounts of incommensurability demonstrates that Dreyfus and Spinosa are not entitled to deny that all true descriptions of the universe are compatible. (shrink)

The paper surveys a number of approaches to the idea that the world represents God, drawing on the work of Aquinas, Alston, and Teilhard de Chardin. After noting some of the difficulties which these accounts may pose, a further model is advanced for consideration. The paper argues for the view that the world represents God not so much by resembling God, but rather by pointing towards the divine reality as the pre-requisite of its completion in aesthetic and other terms.