It is often said that television series are nowadays as good as films, or even better than them, but the philosophical inquiry into the former remains much less developed than the philosophy of film. A handful of recent books (e.g., Nannicelli 2016, Shuster 2017, Andrzejewski and Salwa 2018, Bandirali and Terrone 2021) have tried to fill the gap, but there is much work still to be done. Significant contributions to the aesthetics of television series are coming from television studies and (...) fil... (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the existing arguments for narrow aesthetic cognitivism are not valid. The reason is that the proponents of the view have mostly focused on theoretical debates rather than on empirical studies of the matter. I make my argument in five steps. First, I distinguish narrow from broad aesthetic cognitivism. Second, I specify the scope of the narrow claim and suggest that narrow aesthetic cognitivism is not about art in general but about narrative fictional works. Third, (...) I point out that arguments in favor of the possibility of such works expressing truth do not discuss how truth is justified. Fourth, I concede that justification of truths in fictional and nonfictional works in the end rests on the experiences outside of the work but argue that it is an empirical matter whether belief has been acquired or not. Fifth, I demonstrate that the most recentanalysis on belief-acquisition evinces that fiction is a not an effective vehicle for imparting beliefs. I conclude with a discussionof what would count as evidence in favor of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

The paper offers a twofold intervention in the debates about the paradox of fiction. First, it argues that too much emphasis has been placed on the paradox’ epistemological aspect. This has led to a neglect of its ethical dimension. Specifically, little has been said about the ethical issues of regularly caring for fictional entities while exhibiting comparatively far less concern for real­life fellow men and women. Second, the essay argues that it is often the case that it is real­life structures (...) rather than fictional entities that cause emotions. In the case of horror, for example, we are not afraid of the fictional monster but of an off possibility that something like this might exist in the real world. Importantly, the proposal differs from the counterfactualist approaches because it allows that fictional entities may cause emotions. Specifically, emotions which do not have clearly defined accompanying typical actions, such as sympathy and antipathy. (shrink)