In this paper we will argue that the categories of physical individuals and chemical stuff are not sufficient to face the chemical ontology if nanomaterials are taken into account. From a perspective that considers ontological questions and wonders which the items involved in science are, we will argue that the domain of nanoscience must be considered as populated by entities that are neither individuals, as those of physics, nor stuff, as those items of macro-chemistry. This discussion, in virtue of the (...) analysis of the nature of nanomaterials, leads to propose a proper ontological category for nanoparticles: nanoindividuals. Nanomaterials are sorts of individuals, but they are different from physical individuals and from chemical stuff. We will also claim to contribute to the growing field of the philosophy of chemistry, especially regarding discussions that manifest not only epistemological but also ontological issues. In this scenario, the field on nanoscience is particularly challenging. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to discuss which relation can be established between molecular chemistry, on the one hand, and macrochemistry and nanochemistry, on the other hand. In order to do this, we will consider molecular chemistry as an underlying level, and macrochemistry and nanochemistry as emergent levels. Emergence is characterized in very different ways in the philosophical literature; we will not discuss those differences. We will address a distinction between inter-domain emergence and intra-domain emergence. It is our purpose (...) to argue that, from a basal micro-molecular level, macrochemistry and nanochemistry emerge in parallel. The emergence of macrochemistry is an inter-domain emergence, while the emergence of the nanolevel is an intra-domain one. If this is the case, therefore macrochemistry and nanochemistry are not “successive” levels, but parallel ones. This discussion will be held from an ontological point of view, instead of the classical characterization in terms of scale. (shrink)

Resumen Como resultado de las luchas de las disidencias sexogenéricas se han aprobado leyes en todo el mundo que garantizan el reconocimiento de las identidades generizadas. La Ley de Identidad de Género argentina ofrece una definición de “identidad de género” opuesta a los enfoques biológicos y a la patologización y que respeta la voluntad individual y niega todo lugar a los refrendos de terceros “autorizados”. Esta ley regula el acceso a prácticas médicas para intervenir libremente los cuerpos. Ahora bien, los (...) principios científicos del dimorfismo sexual sobre los cuales descansan esos procedimientos suelen denunciarse por reprimir, normativizar y patologizar en especial los cuerpos intersex. Analizaré la cuestión de las identidades de género a la luz de esta tensión; por último, argumentaré que la identidad es transformativa, relacional y biotecnológicamente producida.As a result of the struggles of sex and gender dissidents, laws that guarantee the recognition of gender-identities have been passed all around the world. The Argentinian Gender Identity Law offers a definition of “gender identity” as opposed to biological anchorages and pathologization, respecting personal will and leaving no room for endorsement by “authorised” third parties. This law regulates the access to medical practices to freely intervene bodies. However, the theoretical scientific principles of sexual dimorphism on which these procedures are based on are usually denounced for repressing, normalizing and pathologizing especially intersex bodies. I will analyse the issue of gender identities in the light of this tension and, finally, I will argue that identity is transformative, relational and biotechnologically produced. (shrink)

Se cuestiona que la restitución de hijos/as de desaparecidos/as durante la última dictadura argentina exalta una concepción biológica, conservadora de la identidad personal. Argumentaré que el problema de esta noción no radica en la apelación a lo biológico, sino en la adopción de dos supuestos metafísicos: una ontología de individuos sustanciales y un esencialismo actualista. Propondré una concepción de la identidad relacional y como potencia o locus de poder, que permitirá re-significar lo biológico de la identidad y apoyar el fenómeno (...) de la restitución. (shrink)

In this paper we will argue that the identity of the entities that inhabit the nanoworld is a contextual identity. To defend that, we will analyse the so-called “biological” identity and the “synthetic” identity of nanomaterials. From this analysis, we will claim that nano-individuals (entities that show an intermediate nature between individuals and stuff), can be adequately understood from the perspective of a processual ontology. With that, we intend to contribute to the philosophical understanding of the ontology of the nano-domain.

In this paper, it is our purpose to argue for a processual conception of ill-person- identity. To do so, we will review some of the main answers that philosophy has given to the question of personal identity. We will review certain proposals on how to conceive illness and ill-person-identity, as well. Within the frame of a processual approach to ontology, we will focus on a non-dualistic processual-relational interpretation of biological organisms.

El propósito del presente trabajo consiste en analizar la conexión existente entre feminismo, fenomenología y marxismo, por medio de la exploración de las prácticas de autoconciencia y la teoría del punto de vista feminista. Sostenemos que las prácticas de autoconciencia feminista y su sucedánea teoría del punto de vista feminista se apartaron de sus raíces fenomenológicas y marxistas. Esto contribuyó a la reapropiación de cierta retórica perteneciente a estas prácticas por parte de la ideología capitalista dominante, con un contenido y (...) un propósito sustantivamente diferentes. Afirmamos que para producir teoría situada desde Latinoamérica es necesario partir de la materialidad de la propia experiencia. Para esto, reivindicamos las raíces fenomenológicas y marxistas de las prácticas de autoconciencia y las teorías del punto de vista feminista. Finalmente, argumentamos que es posible recuperar la impronta revolucionaria de estas prácticas, en el marco del paradigma del feminismo post-identitario e interseccional actual, en especial, en su expresión latinoamericana. (shrink)

Scientific pluralism has gained supporters in philosophy of science during the last decades, since it seems to accurately account for the plural and varied development of science. Arguments in defense of robust, non-merely epistemic pluralistic positions can be found in several contemporary philosophical works. According to these positions, to hold pluralism does not suppose to assume an epistemic position regarding truth and a non-realistic view on scientific theories. Monism can be thought as the “natural” opponent of scientific pluralism. In this (...) paper, we will evaluate the alleged rivalry between the two positions, paying special attention to those riskier, ontologically more robust, pluralistic proposals. We will argue that these strongest versions of pluralism fail to offer an alternative to monism: they either changes the topic or hold a weak skepticism that Hegel develops in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. (shrink)

The analysis of the concept of orbital allows us to argue that—in opposition to a recent position in philosophy of science—it is impossible to defend the autonomy of the chemical reality in regard to physical reality, appealing to the idea that there is a conceptual rupture among a chemical interpretation and a quantuminterpretation of the concept. This is the case because there are not two different interpretations of the concept of orbital. On the contrary, the concept involved in structural chemistry (...) and in quantum chemistry comes from quantum mechanics.El análisis del concepto de orbital permite argumentar—en oposición a una propuesta reciente en filosofía de la química—que no es posible defender la autonomía ontológica de la realidad química respecto de la física, sobre la base de una ruptura conceptual entre una interpretación química del concepto y otra propia de la mecánica cuántica. Esto es así porque no existen tales interpretaciones distintas del concepto de orbital, sino que, por el contrario, este concepto en química cuántica y en química estructural proviene de la mecánica cuántica. (shrink)

Resumo O propósito deste trabalho consiste em analisar criticamente uma recente proposta formulada por Needham no âmbito da Filosofia da Química. Este autor toma como essencialmente apropriado o modelo clássico de redução Nageliano. O objetivo fundamental deste trabalho consiste em avaliar certas implicações ontológicas desta tese neorreducionista. Em particular, a autora argumentará que a tese da redução interteórica formulada por Needham apresenta certas limitações, que advêm de uma atenção insuficiente a problemas ontológicos fundamentais. Sendo que estes emergem de uma análise (...) cuidada a algumas alegadas relações redutoras entre teorias. Palavras-chave : modelo nageliano, redução entre teorias, redução ontológica, reducionismo eliminativista, referenciaThe purpose of this paper is to analyse Needham’s recent proposal in the field of philosophy of chemistry. According to this proposal, Nagelian model of reduction is essentially appropriate. The primary aim of this paper is to evaluate certain ontological implications of this neo-reductionist thesis. Specifically, I will argue that Needham’s thesis of intertheoretic reduction has some limitations: the proposal does not pay attention to some fundamental ontological problems that emerge from a watchful analysis of some allegedly reductive relations between theories. Keywords: eliminative reductionism, Nagelian model, ontological reduction, reduction among theories, reference. (shrink)

In this paper I will analyze some philosophically relevant aspects involved in the dissolution of Benacerraf’s problem of fixing the identity of natural numbers by Shapiro’s structuralism. My fundamental aim is to present three criticisms to Shapiro’s position –to his conception of language, to his characterization of structures as ante rem, and to his dramatic conception of ontology. Some of these criticisms will also be directed to Benacerraf’s identification problem.

En el presente artículo abordaremos la cuestión del determinismo ontológico en física. Proponemos una elucidación del concepto de posibilidad que resulte útil para tratar el problema del determinismo ontológico en física, y mediante la cual pueda interpretarse el concepto de probabilidad de un modo signifi cativo para la práctica de la física teórica. Finalmente, los conceptos previamente elucidados se aplican a un caso paradigmático de la física, el de los sistemas altamente inestables, argumentando que en este ámbito determinismo e indeterminismo (...) ontológicos pueden coexistir en un único sistema clásico. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the idea that, throughout the history of science, there are some cases of theory change that would show how science develops with no referential continuity. For this purpose, I analyze Psillos’ proposal of a theory of reference used to account for referential continuity in conceptual transitions. This kind of continuity is requested by Psillos —as by other philosophers— in his defense of scientific realism. By means of a historical case, the theory of germplasm of (...) August Weismann, I intend to demonstrate that Psillos’ demand for reference continuity can be found to be inadequate. (shrink)

The philosophical problem of personal identity has been widely discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. The disputes over identity throughout time abound in references to thought experiments, excluding any connection to practical problems or to scientific knowledge and biotechnological practices. Nevertheless, some real cases challenge the pure metaphysical formulation of the problem and also show how science has an indubitable impact on the issue of identity. I will discuss the case of approximately 500 children who were appropriated during the most recent (...) Argentinian dictatorship (1976–1983), as well as their restitution thanks to Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo’s fight and certain genetics outcomes. I will examine an alleged notion of genetic identity thought to have stemmed from the restitution phenomenon; and I will argue against some criticisms to that notion departing from contemporary philosophy of biology and philosophy of science. Particularly, I will discuss if a genetic stance of personal individual identity can be considered as supported by contemporary biological knowledge; and if a pluralistic perspective on scientific practice that appraises the role of values allows us to maintain the reference to DNA regarding identity but overcoming aforementioned criticisms. (shrink)