The aim of this article is to look at the historiographical phenomenon of Scotism in the light of its diffusion in Puglia region from the period following the death of John Duns Scotus (1308) to the 18th century. The intellectual link between Scotist thought and Puglia already arose in the time immediately following Scotus’ death, with the figure of William of Alnwick (bishop of Giovinazzo in 1329/1330), and it is further confirmed and fostered by the widespread presence of Franciscan convents (...) in the region. These convents constitute study centres (schools, Studia, libraries, etc.) promoting cultural debates and the formation of a substantial number of intellectuals who adhere to the Scotist magisterium. These are authors who, seemingly from a peripherical area with respect to the major centres of Scotism, as a matter of fact participate dynamically, through their works and teaching, in the most important theological and philosophical debates of the time relating to the doctrine of Duns Scotus. (shrink)

In Giles of Rome, moral responsibility and human freedom are articulated taking into account the relation of will and intellect. For Giles, this topic appears to be particularly crucial and often recurs in his texts over the course of his career. According to some scholars, reacting to the academic and ecclesiastic circumstances, Giles increasingly favored the autonomy of the will in his ethics. That is to say, taking its starting point from an “intellectualistic interpretation” of the relation of the faculties (...) of the soul, the Augustinian magister changed his mind after his rehabilitation, placing more importance on the volitional faculty. To the contrary, I shall point out that in his ethics certain consistencies can be observed that emerge in all his works. The aim of the article is to investigate whether Giles reconsidered his earlier opinion regarding moral responsibility. Keywords: Will/Intellect; Condemnation of 1277; Human. (shrink)

Quaestio, Volume 20, Issue, Page 519-523, January 2020.

Between the 1970s and the 1990s, women’s studies research and theoretical confrontations became common both inside and outside Italian universities, producing a substantial cultural and scientific inheritance. However, the teaching of such content had to follow an accidental path deprived of any institutional visibility. Women’s studies was forced to adapt itself to existing didactic structures, ‘hidden’ inside single courses and single disciplines, without being evident itself in the university. Only in the late 1990s did such studies become institutionally formalized. Nowadays, (...) there is a rapid growth in women’s studies in Italy, thanks particularly to the course,Women Politics and Institutions, created in 2004. In this Open forum, the authors try to suggest what future scenarios might look like, anticipating a not yet realized horizon. (shrink)

This study traces the fundamental stages of Benedetto Croce’s moral thought, focusing on the concept of ‘ethical-utility’ (etico-utile). In his texts, Croce understands utility as inseparable from morality. Moral action is good precisely because it is first and foremost useful. He distinguishes between a merely personal utility (which is the basis of all economic and moral action) and a utility that may develop into universal-utility (ethical- utility). Compared to the economic individual who aims at private profit, the moral person would (...) instead tend to privilege the profit that concerns the ‘greater number’, going so far as to make his own individual interest coincide with interest in the universal good. The pursuit of common utility thus seems to be the distinctive attitude of morality (and also of politics). This utility, in favour of the interest of the community does not mean altruism; rather, the moral act requires to be put before any personal interest and the interest of others, in order to favour, ultimately, only that of the Spirit. This concept of ‘ethical-utility’, theorised by the Neapolitan thinker, seems to have been materialised in the only political-legislative act, promoted by Croce himself: the law for the protection of the Italian landscape heritage (no. 778 of 11 May 1922). Croce’s law is in fact characterised by a defence of the national cultural and environmental heritage motivated precisely by the concept of the latter’s ‘public interest’. (shrink)

RESUMO:A hipótese desenvolvida nos leva a confrontar três textos do corpusrousseauísta: o Segundo Discurso, Júlia ou A Nova Heloísa e o extrato do Primeiro Diálogo, em que há a ficção do mundo ideal, textos que, apesar do seu estatuto genérico diferente, estão em coerência e convergência teórica. Desejamos evidenciar um aspecto da unidade problemática do pensamento de Rousseau concernente à abordagem crítica da sociedade de seus contemporâneos e sua concepção do papel das Letras e dos Espetáculos. A preocupação do filósofo (...) é de refundar a natureza humana, a fim de lançar as bases de uma nova organização social. Nessa empreitada, a ficção desempenha um papel crucial, o prefácio do Segundo Discurso o comprova: para bem conhecer o homem atual, deve-se supor o que ele não é mais. O homem do estado de natureza, ser de ficção, cujas paixões são retas e naturais, é o modelo teórico que reativa a sociedade dos seres ideais de Júlia. Dessa forma, a ficção é chamada a desempenhar um papel referencial fundamental para o pensamento social e político de Rousseau, aparecendo como um poderoso meio de ação sobre o público. O romance pode reeducar os povos corrompidos, pois, assim como o teatro, como denuncia a Carta a d’Alembert, possui os meios para perverter uma sociedade tida como virtuosa. ABSTRACT:The hypothesis that we will develop leads us to confront three texts of Rousseau’s corpus: the Second Discourse, Julie, and the extract of the First Dialogue that speaks of the pedagogical fiction of the ideal world. These three texts, despite their different types, are theoretically coherent and convergent. We intend to highlight an aspect of the problematic unity of Rousseau’s thought, an aspect which concerns his contemporaries’ critical approach to society and Rousseau’s conception of the role of letters and spectacles. Rousseau’s concern is to refound human nature in order to lay the basis of a new social organization. In this effort, fiction plays a decisive role, as the preface to the Second Discourse affirms: in order to know modern man, we must consider a hypothesis about what he no longer is. Man in the state of nature, a fictional being whose passions are right and natural, is the theoretical model that reactivates the society of ideal beings in Julie. For Rousseau, fiction is called upon to play a fundamental referential role for social and political thought, and it appears as a powerful means of action on the public. The novel can reeducate depraved peoples, because, like the theater, it also has the means to pervert a so-called virtuous society. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas seems to suggest, though implicitly, that in their ethical conduct the majority of women is much more conditioned by the movements of the stars than men. Although he frequently maintains that the stars solely move the body of all human beings (men and women alike), not the rational powers of their souls, they may have an impact on the human soul indirectly and occasionally ( indirecte et occasionaliter ). Only a few, to wit, the wise (i.e., those who (...) exercise reason properly and are able to govern righteously) are independent of the influence of the celestial bodies. Even if women and men are both the image of God according to Aquinas, from an Aristotelian perspective, the female is considered a 'deficient man' ( mas occasionatus ). Therefore, the physical and psychic constitution of women is in principle much more susceptible to be governed by passions, and thus to be subject to a form of astral determinism. This, I argue, may compromise the freedom of choice and moral responsibility of most women. (shrink)