In your simulation you will devise measures to try to relieve the severity of the current global recession and speed the re-emergence of global growth. Each of you will be assigned the identity of an actual person with a specific institutional role. You will be required to undertake web-based research on that person, that person’s institution, and the utility function the person would be expected to behave in accordance with, given their role.

Philosophers and statisticians have been debating on causality for a long time. However, these discussions have been led quite independently from each other. An objective of this paper is to pursue a fruitful dialogue between philosophy and statistics. As is well known, at the beginning of the 20th century, some philosophers and statisticians dismissed the concept of causality altogether. It will suffice to mention Bertrand Russell (1913) and Karl Pearson (1911). Almost a hundred years later, causality still represents a central (...) topic both in philosophy and statistics. In the social sciences, including research on public health, most studies are concerned with the possible causes, determinants, factors, etc. of a set of observations. In particular, for planning or policy reasons, it is important to know what causes which effects. In order to attain causal knowledge, many social scientists appeal to statistical modelling to confirm or disconfirm their hypotheses about possible causal relations among the variables they consider, taking care of controlling for relevant covariates and especially for possible confounding factors. To what extent can a statistical model say something about causal relations among variables? In this paper, we will attempt an answer by examining a special class of statistical models, i.e. structural models. The discussion, however, will not be confined to a mere examination of statistical methods, since a considerable effort will be made to consider causality from an epistemological perspective. To put it otherwise, this paper does not address the nature of causation itself, nor the analysis of various causal structures, nor the elaboration of complex causal structures; rather, we will be concerned with the question of how we come to uncover causal relations by means of statistical modelling. The practice of statistical modelling raises substantial issues of ontological nature.. (shrink)

Summary: The evolution of complex societies began when agricultural subsistence systems raised human population densities to levels that would support large scale cooperation, and division of labor. All agricultural origins sequences postdate 11,500 years ago probably because late Pleistocene climates we extremely variable, dry, and the atmosphere was low in carbon dioxide. Under such conditions, agriculture was likely impossible. However, the tribal scale societies of the Pleistocene did acquire, by geneculture coevolution, tribal social instincts that simultaneously enable and constrain the (...) evolution of complex societies. Once agriculture became possible, a competitive ratchet drove further improvements in subsistence and in scale of social organization . Those societies that grew and became better organized were advantaged in individual wealth and economic and military power, and tended to conquer, absorb, or be imitated by smaller and less well organized societies. Internal competitors for power espousing useful social innovations could deliver improved returns when their quest was successful. Notwithstanding the ratchet, social complexity increased only slowly in the first half of the Holocene and even afterwards few periods except the past two centuries saw changes that were dramatic on the scale of individual lifetimes. We attempt a taxonomy of the processes that regulate rates of institutional evolution, cause reversals of complexity against the ratchet, and impose historical contingency on institutional evolution. (shrink)

There is at least one immediate sense in which legal discourse is perspectival: it qualifies acts and facts in the world on the basis of rules. Legal concepts are for the most part constituted by rules, both in the sense that rules define these concepts’ semantic content and that, in order to engage with legal practice, we must act according to those rules, not necessarily complying with them but at least having them in mind. This is the distinctive perspective of (...) law: however, it would be misleading to think that this is the only perspective we can have in legal discourse. That of rule-constituted legal concepts is the fundamental perspective -- the inevitable presupposition of most legal assertions -- but other perspectives are possible on top of this fundamental background: perspectives on law, stemming from the basic perspective of law. -/- In this paper, I will try to argue that some different perspectives regarding law can be accounted for by analyzing different kinds of concepts that emerge in connection with legal institutions. My argument will consist of three steps as follows. First, I will explain how legal concepts are constituted by rules, referring in this regard to John Searle’s analysis of institutional concepts as it emerges in his Making the Social World, of 2010, and amending this analysis according to some criticisms that in 1986 Neil MacCormick had raised against Searle with specific reference to the legal domain. -/- Second, I will show that there are some kinds of concepts relevant for an institution which are not captured by Searle’s analysis in terms of constitutive rules, even if this is amended according to MacCormick’s criticisms. This I will do by considering the game of chess as a simple system of rule-constituted concepts (concepts such as 'checkmate,' 'bishop,' 'king'). I will consider four examples of perfectly legitimate assertions regarding a match of chess -- these being (1) ‘I won’; (2) 'you made a good attack'; (3) 'you are cheating'; (4) 'you made good use of the first-move advantage,' and I will show that, while the first three assertions can be analyzed in terms of concepts (those of 'victory,' 'attack,' and 'cheating') which are not constituted by the rules of chess but are rather common to several different competitive games, being typical of the broader practice of competitive game-playing of which chess is an instance, the fourth assertion includes a concept (that of 'first-move advantage') which is peculiar to chess, just like a rule-constituted element, but is not constituted by the rules of chess. This analysis will lead to a new categorization of institutional concepts. Apart from rule-constituted institutional concepts, which are the only ones recognized by Searle, in order to account for cases (1), (2), and (3) I will distinguish between three kinds of meta-institutional concepts, namely, goal-oriented, mode-oriented, and value-oriented meta-institutional concepts, and then I will introduce the category of para-institutional concepts to account for case (4). -/- Finally -- and this is the third step of my argument -- I will explain how these different kinds of institutional concepts appear when we adopt different perspectives on the institutional frameworks we deal with. This will lead us to a categorization of possible perspectives regarding law that corresponds to the previous one regarding concepts. There is first a structural perspective regarding the instantiation of institutional elements which clearly involves rule-constituted institutional concepts -- as when we say 'I am making a will.' There is then a teleological perspective regarding the goal of our institutional acts which calls into question goal-oriented meta-institutional concepts -- as when we say 'I wrote that will in order for you to have a distinctive right to my property.' Then, we can adopt a strategical perspective regarding some peculiar ways in which institutional acts can be performed, and this has often to do with mode-oriented meta-institutional concepts -- as when we say 'the Labour Party is making parliamentary obstructionism so that the Government will fall before the enactment of the labour reform,' or 'workers start today a work-to-rule action.' Clearly, we can also adopt an evaluative perspective over institutional facts or acts, and here typically value oriented meta-institutional concepts emerge -- as when we say 'that rule is clearly unjust' or 'that contract is unfair.' Finally, we can limit ourselves to a descriptive perspective on phenomena which are peculiar to a given institutional setting, and here para-institutional concepts are often useful -- as when we say 'the Italian electoral system before 1990 led to a sort of reform paralysis' or 'a strict use of the criterion requiring proof beyond any reasonable doubt can be expected to entail a low conviction rate.'. (shrink)

This paper examines how institutions for managing environmental resources change over time with economic development and the seriousness of various environmental problems. Different problems tend to be more serious at different levels of development requiring different approaches. Traditional systems of management in poorer countries were often effective at managing common good resources, and institutions that replicate their advantages may work at higher levels of economic development as well. Problems of inter-level relations are also be considered.

An Aristotelian conception of practical ethics can be derived from the account of practical reasoning that Aristotle articulates in his Rhetoric and this has important implications for the way we understand the nature and limits of practical ethics. An important feature of this conception of practical ethics is its responsiveness to the complex ways in which agents form and maintain moral commitments, and this has important implications for the debate concerning methods of ethics in applied ethics. In particular, this feature (...) enables us to understand casuistry, narrative, and principlism as mutually supportive modes of moral inquiry, rather than divergent and mutually exclusive methods of ethics. As a result, an Aristotelian conception of practical ethics clears the conceptual common ground upon which practical ethicists can forge a stable and realistic self-understanding. (shrink)

With the exception of the occasional Damn-you-to-Hell types such as Mr Owen Burke of Timaru (ODT, 7/7/04), most opponents of the Civil Unions Bill like to pretend that they are not doing it out of hostility to homosexuals (who they sometimes, rather patronizingly, claim to love as people) but out of zeal for the institution of marriage. If civil unions are allowed, marriage will be damaged, and that is why they are against the Bill. The problem with this rationale is (...) that it is obviously false. Civil unions won’t damage marriage. And this so very obvious that it calls into question either the good sense or the good faith of those (like the Catholic Bishops and the members of the United Party) who proclaim that it is a zeal for holy matrimony rather than a dislike of a deviant minority that dictates their political conduct. (shrink)

Facts such as the fact that Donald Trump is the US president or the fact that Germany won the 2014 world cup final are commonly referred to as “institutional facts” (“IFF”). I advocate the view that the nature of these facts is comparatively simple: they are facts that exist by virtue of collective recognition (CR), where CR can be direct or indirect. The leading account of IFF, that of John Searle, basically conforms with this definition. However, in his writings Searle (...) has considered or defended several other conditions as potentially necessary for the existence of IFF. In particular, he has considered whether (a) IFF necessarily involve deontic powers, (b) IFF are necessarily so-called “status functions”, (c) IFF require speech acts of Declaring for their existence, (d) IFF require language for their existence. Each of these considerations, if valid, would seem to render the nature of IFF less simple. In this paper, I argue that none of these considerations stand up to scrutiny. Being unaware of any other serious considerations of this kind, I conclude that the nature of IFF is simple as captured by my definition. There is a respect, however, in which my view is possibly less simple than Searle’s, for he suggests that CR is always direct, and never indirect. I reject this suggestion. Indeed, I think that most of the facts existing by virtue of CR exist by virtue of indirect CR. Some authors have (or at least might be construed as having) objected that CR is not even necessary for the existence of IFF. I argue that the account defended here is immune to these objections. (shrink)

This chapter is about micro-inequities and their connection to the problem of implicit bias. It begins by defining micro-inequities, goes on to discuss what makes them wrong and what solutions might be appropriate given the institutional context in which they occur.

he first institutional theory of art is outlined in a 1964 essay by Arthur Danto, “The Artworld,” which ruminates on the paradox that Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes is art though any of its perceptually indistinguishable twins—any stack of Brillo boxes in a grocery store—is not. Danto’s offers this solution to the paradox: “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.” Ultimately, though, it is “art (...) theory” that makes Warhol’s stack of silk screened plywood boxes into art. (shrink)

How should international law’s role in determining international distributive outcomes, economic and otherwise, affect how we think about its legitimate authority? Domestic institutions’ legitimate authority in respect of distribution derives in large part from their concurrent roles in enabling security and coordination. Internationally, by contrast, functional disaggregation means that distribution must be legitimised in its own right. I begin by distinguishing the phenomenon of Distributive International Law, on which my argument focuses. I next introduce a number of wide instrumental accounts (...) of legitimate authority, including Rawls’ Natural Duty account, Buchanan’s metacoordination view, and Williams’ political realism, showing how each understands legitimacy as an institution-level characteristic, allowing an institution’s success in one area to support its legitimacy in another where it may be less successful. This poses the question of how we distinguish amongst distinct institutions, which I answer by reference to the causal and constitutive (in)dependence amongst activities. This approach explains why distributive legitimacy does not arise as a separate question domestically: we cannot distinguish the state’s security and coordination activities from its distributive activities, so if the former are legitimate then so, ipso facto, are the latter. Internationally, by contrast, these mutual dependencies are limited, requiring that the legitimacy of distribution be established independently of other roles that international law plays. (shrink)

An invited talk delivered at the Logos Institute of Analytic Theology at the University of St Andrews. The topic was on the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation. I sought to introduce my solution to the logical challenge against the doctrine of the incarnation and also my own metaphysical model of the incarnation (called the transformational model). This talk summarises my article on this topic published previously in IJPR (termed 'On the metaphysics of the incarnation'). Handouts for the (...) talk are included in the file. (shrink)

The institutional theory of property is that view that property rights are entirely and essentially conventional and are the creatures of states and coercively backed legal systems. In this paper, I argue that, although states and legal systems have a valuable role in defining property rights, the institutional story is not the whole story. Rather, the property rights hat we have reason to recognize as part of justice are partly conventional in character and partly rooted in universal human interests and (...) dispositions. (shrink)

Presented at Amer Agri. Econ Assoc. annual meetings, Long Beach, CA, July 28 – 31, 2002..

The study aimed to look into the organizational performance of Higher Education Institutions in the Philippines particularly in Zamboanga del Norte. The descriptive method of research was used. There were 95 respondents to the survey. Frequency count, percentage, and Mean were used as a statistical tool. The investigation revealed that organizational performance of the Higher Education Institutions involved was found to be very good along the areas of VMGO, faculty, curriculum and instruction, support to students, research, extension, library, physical plant (...) and facilities, laboratories and administration. The Higher Education Institutions met the standards of quality over and above the minimum requirement of government under Article XIV Accreditation, Section 60. There were areas need to focus such as congruent to the needs of the people in the community, monitoring of faculty adequacy and loading, sourcing out funds and other resources, and maintaining safety and security inside the campuses, even though all areas in organizational performance found very good, Further, the administration continuously requires planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. (shrink)

I’d like to begin, if I may, by repeating myself. When I spoke at the Institute’s official launch last June, I quoted W.V. Quine’s remark that logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one; and I commented that whatever the truth of this, it is undeniably true that philosophy is an old subject and has been a great one since the 5th century BC. The foundation of an institute of philosophy in the (...) University of London has been, in my opinion, a great thing for philosophy and for the University. Our mission is to promote and support philosophy of the highest quality in all its forms, inside and outside the university. With our programmes of events, fellowships and research facilitation, I think we have been carrying out this mission pretty well since our foundation in 2005. But I have already said enough in public about the Institute. Given the occasion, it is appropriate for me to say something instead about philosophy itself. (shrink)

The expression ‘a university without research is a dignified high school’ is becoming a both local and global concern in the academia. The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent to which collaborative research methodologies can enhance integration of faculties of arts and humanities in the universities in Malawi for knowledge development and transfer. It has been argued over and over that universities are spotlighted by their outstanding work in research, developing and sharing ideas, new inventions and creativity (...) within the spectrum of partnership development. While striving for partnership through collaborative research approaches, research activities still remain an area of concern in institutions that offer diverse tertiary education in Malawi. The question of how can these institutions or faculties engage each other in collaborative research methodologies in the quest of knowledge development and transfer remains crucial and relevant The study analyzed strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of the existing research methods in Arts and Humanities and how the two disciplines can create a space for amalgamation so that research findings can benefit both disciplines. The study reveals that collaboration in various disciplines is a challenge owing to variations of conceptual analyses and the deficiency of technical no-how of both teaching staff and students as well as tools for data collection and analysis as may be emphasized in each of the areas of study; Arts and Humanities. Furthermore, while other institutions of higher learning have research ethics committees for checks and balances as a collaborative tool, some institutions do not know that this committee plays a crucial role in the field of research. Within this backdrop, there is need to develop research collaborations within an institution or with other institutions of higher learning that have a well-defined research profile for mutual benefits as far as collaborative research methodologies are concerned. (shrink)

A sceptical response to the idea that wisdom may be turned into a new academic subject or science, and to the idea that to do so would be in any way be wise. .

Social institutions are the laws, informal rules, and conventions that give durable structure to social interactions within a population. Such institutions are typically not designed consciously, are heritable at the population level, are frequently but not always group benefi cial, and are often symbolically marked. Conceptualizing social institutions as one of multiple possible stable cultural equilibrium allows a straightforward explanation of their properties. The evolution of institutions is partly driven by both the deliberate and intuitive decisions of individuals and collectivities. (...) The innate components of human psychology coevolved in response to a culturally evolved, institutional environment and refl ect a prosocial tendency of choices we make about institutional forms. (shrink)

Notice #1 (UIU Special Distribution & Readers List) - 1992-97 Notice #2 (Santa Fe Institute letter confirming rcpt of UIU) - 1992 Notice #3 URGENT Machavellian "Gene-Control" (Nov,1998) GLOBAL POPULATION and the NITROGEN CYCLE - The financial environment cannot sustain without the partnership of a healthy biosphere. Revered Images Some lessons are too valuable to be so casually misplaced..

In this paper I take it for granted that legal institutions are artifacts. In general, this can very well be considered a trivial thesis in legal philosophy. As trivial as this thesis may be, however, to my knowledge no legal philosopher has attempted an analysis of the peculiar reality of legal phenomena in terms of the reality of artifacts, and this is particularly striking because there has been much discussion about artifacts in general philosophy (specifically analytic metaphysics) over the last (...) twenty years. In particular, the concepts of intention, function, plan of action, and history are in competition to explain the ontology of artifacts, and a similar competition can be found at the core of legal theory. Such a striking parallelism between the domain of artifacts and that of legal institutions is a clue for legal ontology that deserves further attention: I will offer my own interpretation of this parallelism in the first part of this paper (Sections 2 and 3). In providing a theory of legal institutions as artifacts, one could be led to the conclusion that law is essentially an artificial phenomenon, something which does not bear any significant relationship to the natural domain. However, I think that such a conclusion would be mistaken. In fact, this is the second thesis I want to explore in this paper: not only that legal institutions are artifacts, but also that they can be artifacts which in some sense "mirror," or imitate, some descriptions of the natural, pre-social reality we live in. What I would like to show is not that legal institutions are "natural" in the sense that they have some feature which is not human-dependent, as some natural law theorists would say, but rather that their conceptual content can depend on our conceptualization of the natural domain despite being entirely artifactual. This is what I will call the "institutional mimesis" behind several important instances of legal artifacts, and I will deal with it in the second part of this paper (Sections 4 and 5). (shrink)

The production of a number of vaccines involves the use of cell-lines originally derived from fetuses directly aborted in the 1960s and 1970s. Such cell-lines, indeed sometimes the very same ones, are important to on-going research, including at Catholic institutions. The cells currently used are removed by a number of decades and by a significant number of cellular generations from the original cells. Moreover, the original cells extracted from the bodies of the aborted fetuses were transformed to produce the cell (...) lines, since otherwise they would be incapable of the kind of culturing that is required. (shrink)

I would be scandalously remiss were I not to preface my remarks on translation with two expressions of gratitude to the Franciscan Institute. First of all, I am very pleased to have been invited to participate in this celebration of Ockham, not merely for professional reasons but also because I have thereby been afforded the opportunity to return to the Southerntier, as this part of New York State is known to those of us who trace our roots to the (...) Buffalo area. In my all too distant youth I worked for several years as a camp counsel lor down the road in Allegany State Park, and yesterday's drive through the Allegany River valley rekindled my love for this enchanting region and occasioned many fond memories as well. Second, I feel obligated to acknowledge publicly my own deep personal debt to those who have labored so diligently to produce the critical edition of Ockham's works. It is remarkable, indeed well-nigh astonishing, that the critical edition of Ockham's.. (shrink)

Perhaps we should change our focus from constitutionalized practices of democracy to democratized practices of constitutionalism. Dworkin and Perry both seek to respond to democratic objections to judicial review by relying on a theory of the legitimacy constraints of democracy itself. According to this view, on some matters, legitimate democracy requires getting the right moral answers. Thus democratic processes must be constitutionalized to ensure such right outcomes on fundamental moral matters. To the extent that judges are better positioned to engage (...) in principled moral reasoning, the arguments continue, we ought to entrust them with ensuring the constitutionalized legitimacy conditions of democracy. I argued that this latter institutional move, however, threatened to simply revive the paternalist worries forcefully articulated by Learned Hand. Waldron’s rights-based objection to rightsbased judicial review, although not dispositive, provided further warning of the moral costs of treating fellow citizens as incapable of reasoning together about the content and proper scope of the legal rights required for democracy. An alternative strategy for justifying judicial review that this chapter investigates is to understand a constitution itself as a product of true democracy, of real popular sovereignty. It is then up to the people, exercising their constituent power at the level of a constitutional assembly, to decide what particular institutional arrangements will best carry forward their collective ideals and decisions. The specific character and structure of those arrangements—whether they are populist or elitist, deliberative or aggregative, sensitive or insulated, electorally accountable or politically independent, and so on—is then a secondary matter. What is central is that the constitutional arrangements the people decide on are, first and foremost, democratically legitimated by the fact that they are the result of authentic popular sovereignty.. (shrink)

What does it mean to have a "Christian Higher Education"? Does it mean "getting a degree from a college which calls itself 'Christian'"? I think not. For many gradu­ates of so called "Christian colleges" come away with an education which, in many re­spects, is less authentically Christian than the education they would get at some secular institutions!

This is not a general essay on the craft and institution of translation, though some of the claims and arguments I proffer here might generalize. I am concerned in particular with the activity of the translation of Asian Buddhist texts into English in the context of the current extensive transmission of Buddhism to the West, in the context of the absorption of cultural influences of the West by Asian Buddhist cultures, and in the context of the increased interaction between Buddhist (...) practitioner communities and academics in Buddhist Studies. These three phenomena and their synergy are very much a phenomenon of the late Twentieth and early Twenty−first Centuries, so I am talking about a particular scholarly activity engaging with a particular literature and extended community at a very particular time. (shrink)

The question at hand is whether or not a liberal arts education can be politically neutral, but the very fact that this question is phrased in the curious manner that it is, which is to say that we place emphasis on "can" as opposed to "is" or "how we might better ensure," speaks to the nature of a problem that much more deeply rooted than the mere question of scholarly polarization. Borrowing from Christopher Schlect of New Saint Andrews College, we (...) might say that the "liberal arts teach us how to learn—how to freely gain knowledge and understanding," and that the manner in which they do this is by teaching students not only methodologies for solving problems that are presented to them, but also how to identify problems of their own accord (79). That would mean, by definition, that a political neutral liberal arts curriculum would necessitate not only an active awareness of one's ethical orientation, but also an active tempering of the biases that accompany that orientation out of respect for the spirit of liberalism and in recognition of one's own fallible nature. Unfortunately, since, as I intend to illustrate, our moral and therefore political senses are similar to aesthetic taste as described by Kant in his third critique, they carry with them the paradoxicality of pure subjectivity tethered to the expectation of universality, making the possibility of political neutrality in the liberal arts a grim proposition, to put it at its absolute mildest. In order to determine whether this problem is in any way manageable, it is necessary to analyze of the nature of moral and political taste in a general sense, the rhetoric that educator use toward members of opposing moral frameworks, how that rhetoric is buttressed by institutional teloi, and finally, how different systems of normative ethics might contribute to neutrality in the liberal arts. (shrink)

Liberal ideas, institutions, and orders are being challenged globally and in diverse ways. Based on cluster analysis, this paper identifies four clusters of contestants challenging the liberal script: “Fundamentalists“, „Authoritarian Populists“, „Market-Sceptic Egalitarians“, and „Identity-Focused Contestants“. These clusters group diverse actors based on their critiques of liberal principles, epistemological standpoints, intensity of their contestation, identities and emotions. The Fundamentalists pose the greatest challenge to the liberal script, rejecting most liberal principles and endorsing alternative scripts. The Authoritarian Populists instead predominantly contest (...) equal moral weight and civil rights. The Market- Sceptic Egalitarians critique the capitalist market economy for producing material inequalities. Lastly, the Identity-Focused Contestants focus on either constructing national identities or challenging the oppression of minority groups, often criticising liberal authorities for being “hypocritical”. The paper contributes to a nuanced understanding of the diversity of contestants that is useful for researching the causes and consequences of contestations within liberal societies. (shrink)

This chapter continues the institutional design process started in the previous, turning to four different types of modification in the system of constitutional review. I consider, in turn, the establishment of self-review panels in the legislative and executive branches of national governments (A), various mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal concerning constitutional elaboration (B), easing constitutional amendability requirements in overly obdurate systems (C), and finally establishing civic constitutional fora as replacements of traditional amendment procedures (D). In each case the (...) proposals are motivated by the problems of judicial review I identified in the previous chapter, and their design is oriented to the fullest realization of the six assessment values I specified there. I assume throughout that some form of judicial review is extant in the political system, and for the most part I assume the concentrated system with specialized constitutional courts that I argued for there. Where something important hangs on the difference between a concentrated and diffuse system of constitutional courts for the design of these other mechanisms for constitutional elaboration, I take that up in the discussion. (shrink)

In his analysis of the logic of history and social sciences Mill was much influenced by French writers of the Saint Simonian school and especially Auguste Comte. This school divided history into 'organic' and 'transitional' periods. In organic periods human personalities and institutions are coherently organized in a stable system, the workings of each part complementing and reinforcing the workings of the others. But this cannot last forever, stability is never absolute: the system starts to come apart, there follows a (...) period of more or less disorder and confusion, in which the parts of society pull against or collide with one another, personalities and institutions do not suit one another, people are dissatisfied and disappointed and change becomes rapid - until out of the struggle another stable organization develops, another 'organic' period. So on this view it is possible to draw non-arbitrary lines across history, to recognise distinct 'periods', though some of these will be periods of transition or revolutionary periods without any high degree of coherence. (shrink)

The early abolition of serfdom in England, the early growth of relatively free institutions, and the greater recognition of popular claims after the decay of feudalism had divorced the masses from the soil, were traits of English life which may be looked back upon with pride. When it was decided that any slave who set foot in England became free; when the importation of slaves into the Colonies was stopped; when twenty millions were paid for the emancipation of slaves in (...) the West Indies; and when, however unadvisedly, a fleet was maintained to stop the slave trade; our countrymen did things worthy to be admired. And when England gave a home to political refugees and took up the causes of small states struggling for freedom, it again exhibited noble traits which excite affection. But there are traits, unhappily of late more frequently displayed, which do the reverse. Contemplation of the acts by which England has acquired over eighty possessions – settlements, colonies, protectorates, &c. – does not arouse feelings of satisfaction. The transitions from missionaries to resident agents, then to officials having armed forces, then to punishments of those who resist their rule, ending in so called “pacification” – these processes of annexation, now gradual and now sudden, as that of the new Indian province and that of Barotziland, which was declared a British colony with no more regard for the wills of the inhabiting people than for those of the inhabiting beasts – do not excite sympathy with their perpetrators. Love of country is not fostered in me on remembering that when, after our Prime Minister had declared that we were bound in honour to the Khedive to reconquer the Soudan, we, after the re conquest, forthwith began to administer it in the name of the Queen and the Khedive – practically annexing it; nor when, after promising through the mouths of two Colonial Ministers not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, we proceeded to insist on certain electoral arrangements, and made resistance the excuse for a desolating war.. (shrink)

The "groupie" tendency of bosons has recently been demonstrated in a breakthrough experiment by Carl Wieman of the University of Colorado and Eric Cornell of the National Institute for Standards and Technology and their group. They were able to cool a gas of rubidium-87 atoms to a temperature so low that thousands of atoms coalesced into the same quantum state, forming a new state of matter called a Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC). This column is about that work.

In the aftermath of the Aum case, various suggestions as to the causes of dangerous cult mentality, and possible measures for its prevention have been offered in the Japanese media, but it seems that a much more penetrating diagnosis is necessary than that thus far proffered. To merely lay blame to the person of Shoko Asahara, or the phenomenon of mind control, or an insensitivity, ineptitude, or lack of resources on the part of the Japanese police, is to grossly oversimplify (...) and objectify a problem which has complex roots within the structure of the very institutions and values which Japanese society regards as its greatest assets. (shrink)

I will argue that there is a better position which is more religiously inclusive than "political liberalism" as conceived by Rawls or Audi, but which maintains a principled distance from Quinn's radical inclusivism. (2) In section I, I analyze Quinn's argument for radical inclusivism and pose an initial objection to it. In section II, I turn to the question of how democratic legitimation is to be conceived. After outlining the `civic virtue' or `deliberative' interpretation of democratic institutions now proposed by (...) a large group of writers, I argue that this approach implies a sphere of public reason wider than in Rawls's or Audi's conceptions, and yet not as all-inclusive as Quinn's. In particular, any cogent deliberative theory of democracy implies certain conditions of public accessibility for political argument which exclude religious bases for political positions if these are grounded purely on revelation. The deliberative or `civic virtue' conception thus gives us a basis for an intermediate position between Rawlsian public reason and radical inclusivism. This intermediate revelation-excluding (RE) model of deliberative democracy depends on certain epistemic presuppositions, which help distinguish democracy from theocracy. (shrink)

Nevertheless, explicitly or implicitly, the university has always taught (by which I mean examined, evaluated, posited, reinforced) values, and I should think will always follow or circle the track of its origins. When higher education leapt or strutted out of the doors of the church (whether by license from the crown, permission of the diocese, or charters from guilds) it was extricating itself from the church's charge, where monastic schools and libraries were centers of learning and most students were expected (...) to take (and did take) orders--ecclesiastical orders, that is--but it did not slam the cathedral doors or the Calvinist parish gates behind itself. The faculty-cum-clergy carried the same religious principles and preoccupations with them. Like other institutions of higher learning, Princeton was founded by a collection of laymen and clergy exiting a college founded by other clergy and laymen who made that move because of a dispute concerning religious belief and the dissemination of those beliefs to its student body. The founding of the university was never understood to be a severance from ecclesiastical scholarship, but rather a segue into the more exciting and demanding realm of the conjunction of faith and reason--applying reason to faith, faith to the worldly, and abjuring the shadow of Scholasticism which tainted both. The history of moral philosophy and its transformation into humanistic studies can be seen as an argument with and among definitions of reason, its status in spiritual life, and its impact not on faith, but on moral orientation. (shrink)

'Public reason' in Rawls's stipulated usage signifies propositions that can legitimately be used in deliberating on and deciding fundamental issues of political life and legislation because they are propositions which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse: their use is therefore fair (respects the moral principle of reciprocity) and preserves the public peace which is at risk from contests between comprehensive doctrines, contests exemplified by wars of religion. This attractive set of suggestions is ruined by irresoluable ambiguities, truncation of (...) reason's resources and of public discourse just when they are most needed, and incipient capitulation to some radical injustices. But public reason may nonetheless be an opportune phrase for conveying the gist of four permanently valid theses in the classical political thought that develops from Socrates/Plato to Aquinas and beyond. That tradition has been significantly modified by recognition that a human right to immunity of religious beliefs and acts from coercion extends – precisely by reason of the importance of finding and adhering to the truth about the divine source of reality and value – to mistaken as well as correct religious beliefs and practices. That immunity is subject to limitations necessary to preserve public order; likewise, a religion's legitimacy as a source of reasons for public actions is dependent on its willingness to foster genuine public discourse. Analogously, a political or legal philosophy's rational warrant is dependent on the compatibility of its theses with the worth of authentic discourse and the support they give to institutions, including the rule of law, which favour such discourse. Habermas's account of discourse ethics fails by overlooking some truths about discourse, truth and friendship that Plato made clear in Gorgias. And (the rule of) law, too, is most adequately understood as a product and articulation of public reason. (shrink)

This study investigates the dynamic relationship between knowledge management systems, particularly emphasizing knowledge acquisition and dissemination, and their impact on academic staff's teaching motivation. By employing the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF), data from 676 academic staff at higher education institutions in Vietnam was analyzed, revealing a complex interplay of factors. Notably, positive associations were found between knowledge acquisition, knowledge dissemination, and teaching motivation. However, the interaction effect of knowledge acquisition and knowledge dissemination appeared to be negatively associated with teaching motivation. (...) This suggests the possible existence of a resource curse of knowledge in improving staff’s teaching motivation. It is recommended that the knowledge systems are refined to reduce complexity and that staff are trained with better knowledge processing methods for reducing resource curse risks. (shrink)

The most notorious and celebrated forger of the twentieth century, Han van Meegeren (1889-1947), was born in the Dutch town of Deventer. He was fascinated by drawing as a child, and pursued it despite his father’s disapproval, sometimes spending all his pocket money on art supplies. In high school he was able finally to receive professional instruction, and went on to study architecture, according to his father’s wishes. In 1911 he married Anna de Voogt. His artistic talents were recognized when (...) he soon after won first prize and a gold medal from the General Sciences Section of the Delft Institute of Technology for a drawing of a church interior. He agreed to sell this drawing, but was discovered by his wife making a copy of it to sell as the original. She dissuaded him from carrying out this small swindle, but the incident is the first evidence of an interest in faking, even if in this case the artist was merely forging his own prize-winning work. (shrink)

My purpose in this book is to reach a more general audience than I have been able to reach through my publications in academic journals, such as Environmental Ethics. The strategy of the book is to use a lyrical personal narrative to motivate chapters advancing the case for the intelligence of all living things, our kinship with, similarities to, and dependency upon other life forms, and an ethic of respect for life. It includes a critique of biocidal aspects of our (...) culture, especially as it pertains to land use. The narrative chapters describe the process through which I became aware of the depth and pervasiveness of the environmental crisis and what I have learned through three decades of effort at ecological restoration of twenty-one acres of ruined land. The narrative chapters are used to motivate scientific descriptions of, and philosophical reflection on, various domains of life: the intelligence of insects, the analogy between soil ecosystems and the human microbiome, the inner lives of animals, and the intelligence of plants, as well as the human dependency upon healthy ecosystems—both material (through ecosystem services) and spiritual. The book calls for a radical reorientation of our attitudes and reforms in the institutions governing land use. (shrink)

It is the nature of powerful ideas that they can summarize a ground-breaking concept in a plain and simple message. In this sense, the concept of sustainability is a very powerful idea. However, although the sustainability debate has already brought about considerable conceptual progress, a pivotal dimension to sustainable development has so far been widely neglected. This article argues that in addition to the ecological, economic, and social dimension, sustainability critically depends on the moral dimension of institutional legitimacy. Against the (...) backdrop of globalization, conventional models of creating and legitimizing institutions are increasingly challenged. Therefore, it is also business that is to play an ever more important role in contributing to fair and functioning institutions. The article discusses “corporate citizenship” as an economic concept as a useful starting point for this new understanding of the business of business. In effect, the underlying objective of this paper is to present a theoretical link between the concepts of sustainability and corporate citizenship. The central thesis is that private enterprises who cooperatively take responsibility for their institutional environment strengthen the moral dimension of institutional legitimacy: They actively contribute to empowering sustainability by corporate citizenship. (shrink)

Justice requires that high consumption in affluent societies be slowed down for the sake of eradicating extreme poverty in the developing world and improving the condition of its very moderate consumers. A slowdown of high consumption for the sake of ending worldwide poverty can be realized through a social regulation of the global economy. This social regulation should include labor standards, environmental measures, rules for global capital investments, and a distributive schema that shifts some of the wealth obtained from globalization (...) from the rich countries to the developing world. To avoid that the social regulation of the global economy would have a regressive impact on lower-income groups in the affluent societies, a progressive consumption tax should be adopted with a standard deduction large enough so that these groups would not have to pay any tax at all. Attempts to slow down high consumption through a social regulation of the global economy will meet two institutional limits, the sovereign state and capitalism. In the final instance, justice and joyful simplicity for all humans may require cosmopolitan democracy and socialism. (shrink)

Cultural evolutionary theory, like other evolutionary theories, links individual-level and population or society-level phenomena. It provides numerous bridges between social psychology and other disciplines and sub-disciplines. The theory uses mathematical models to understand the population-level consequences of the individual-level processes of individual and social learning. The theory has been used to explain group-level behavior such as cooperation, altruism, and the cross-cultural variation associated with social institutions. The empirical study of social psychological assumptions of such models and experimental tests of cultural-evolutionary (...) hypotheses are in their infancy. (shrink)

For a long time I have been fascinated by the thought how wonderful it would be if at last, in public opinion on the succession of political and social institutions, the fateful term "one after another" would be replaced through the very simple and self evident "simultaneously." "Down with the State!" and "Only upon the ruins of the State. . ." express emotions and wishes of many but it seems that only the cool "Opt out of the State" (No. 2 (...) of "The Socialist") can help them towards their realization. (shrink)

The idea of deliberative democracy, together with its associated norm of public reason, forms a model of the legitimacy of constitutional regimes in pluralist societies. Where there are great and fundamental differences in value commitments, and coercive institutions are called upon to regulate the basic forms of social life, democratic deliberation both respects the diversity of commitment and produces policies that can command the assent of free persons. This in turn supports a shared political culture based on equality and respect.

This paper argues that the contemporary treatment within moral, political and legal philosophy of the issue of the effective and proper constraint (and, ultimately, also, direction) of power suffers from an absence of engagement with the following question: what picture of behavior - of those in power - should we adopt in order to consider how it might be constrained and directed? It is argued that the absence of engagement with this question can be explained by the dominance of the (...) rationalization of behavior, and the concomitant methodology of scrutinizing the role of rules in excerpts of short-term reasoning. The paper offers an overview of sources that can assist in providing an alternative picture of behavior. The paper is organized into three parts: the first considers the long-term development of perceptual and kinetic know-how; the second examines the social, institutional and community-based location of that know-how; and the third considers how the sources of the first two parts can help us in the necessary transition from an over-emphasis on legal language, to an emphasis on legal work. Combining all the elements together, legal work is defined as the institutional emergence of perceptual and kinetic know-how that necessarily accompanies the constraint - amassing and guidance - giving use of legal language. The emphasis on this picture of legal work can provide us with the tools that will not only allow us to design institutions and the resources used by legal officials to constrain the power exercised by them more effectively, but it will also allow us to consider what moral capacities we would like legal work to be informed by, and, equally, what kind moral institutional ways of life we might strive for. Those moral capacities and moral institutional ways of life, in turn, will have to be supplemented by a theory of social justice, the appropriate beginning of which is an understanding of how we can learn to see the great variety and pervasiveness of suffering and vulnerability. Only once we understand how we come to see suffering and vulnerability, can we consider how it will be appropriate to respond to it, i.e. to respond by considering what moral capacities are required to be exercised by officials, and how we might design our institutions so that they enhance moral institutional ways of life. (shrink)

Talk abounds regarding the loss of public trust in such institutions as science or mainstream news media, but there is little clarity about the nature of public trust. Public trust, as this paper explains, is a correlate of a certain type of power in the sphere of communication—one enjoyed by a broadcast source (such as a scientific publication or a news outlet) in proportion to a number of recipients in its broadcast area who adopt its messages, or at least are (...) open to receiving them. This essay proposes new language and ontological tools for the analysis of this sort of power, because the present crop of concepts currently in circulation for handling questions around power broadly construed, and communicative power specifically, are inadequate. The possibilities of communication, and therefore of power in and through communication, differ—as the paper will also explain—according to whether the network through which they flow is governed by an authoritarian regime or instead a western-style democracy. Communicative power is the fundament of what will be referred to here as “people power”, consonant with its usage by Chenoweth et al. (2019), a nonviolent power that constitutes a natural and enormously potent check on the power of tyrants, and thereby forms one natural limit on tyranny. Communicative power has in recent memory been associated with Science and with the free press. The concepts about power articulated here will also contribute to clear formulation of numerous research questions in connection with the internet. (shrink)

The concept of the vacuum in quantum field theory is a subtle one. Vacuum states have a rich and complex set of properties that produce distinctive, though usually exceedingly small, physical effects. Quantum vacuum noise is familiar in optical and electronic devices, but in this paper I wish to consider extending the discussion to systems in which gravitation, or large accelerations, are important. This leads to the prediction of vacuum friction: The quantum vacuum can act in a manner reminiscent of (...) a viscous fluid. One result is that rapidly changing gravitational fields can create particles from the vacuum, and in turn the backreaction on the gravitational dynamics operates like a damping force. I consider such effects in early universe cosmology and the theory of quantum black holes, including the possibility that the large-scale structure of the universe might be produced by quantum vacuum noise in an early inflationary phase. I also discuss the curious phenomenon that an observer who accelerates through a quantum vacuum perceives a bath of thermal radiation closely analogous to Hawking radiation from black holes, even though an inertial observer registers no particles. The effects predicted raise very deep and unresolved issues about the nature of quantum particles, the role of the observer, and the relationship between the quantum vacuum and the concepts of information and entropy. © 2001 American Institute of Physics. (shrink)

There may not be many points of consensus over what best promotes economic development, but here is one that has formed over the past decade: the institutional context matters a lot. This represents the single greatest shift in economic thinking about development since World War II, for there once was an almost equally clear consensus that institutions..

Ontology is one of today’s buzzwords. It is back in fashion in analytical philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, and major projects and research centres get funding around the world (cf. e.g. the Buffalo Centre for Ontological Research, the Laboratory for Ontology in Turin, the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science in Saarland). In the philosophy of science ontology has arguably always been a key area of research, under the guise of ‘The foundations of __’ (physics, biology, chemistry, etc.). (...) Economics however is an exception. Because of economics’ hybrid status, philosophers’ interest in its foundations has traditionally focused on normative issues – typically the theory of rationality that lies at the core of the neoclassical paradigm. What is relatively new, then, 1 is the current growth of interest for the metaphysics of economics as a descriptive scientific discipline (see e.g. Mäki, ed. 2001). (shrink)

Arthur Diamond comments that "it is not clear how a donor distributes money through Hanson's market". Let me try again to be clear. Imagine David Levy were to seek funding for the regression he suggests in his comments, on the relative impact of sports versus science spending on aggregate productivity. Consider what might happen under three different funding institutions.