Este artículo plantea el socioanálisis de un agente representativo, en algunos aspectos, del campo filosófico de la posguerra: Manuel Mindán Manero. Representativo por su posición institucional y académica, por su conexión con el periodo republicano, por la influencia ejercida sobre muchos filósofos, y por su condición de sacerdote-filósofo. Pretendemos hacer una lectura filosófica y política de su vida y de su obra a través de los distintos enclaves institucionales por los que evolucionó su trayectoria social e intelectual.

In the first part of the paper the authors analyze how the distinction between mandatory rules, principles in the strict sense and policies can be understood in structural terms and in terms of reason for action. In the second part, they attempt to clarify which kind of legal provisions embrace constitutional statements recognizing liberty rights are.

Las personas somos absolutamente diferentes de las cosas, no cabe ninguna duda al respecto. No obstante, sí debemos diferenciar nítidamente entre los individuos y el concepto de “persona”. Así pues, la persona posee un “horizonte interior”, absolutamente novedoso y que le caracteriza como ser en aproximación a la Verdad y a la Libertad, las cuales no sólo son específicas del propio humano, sino que le son necesarias en cuanto remedios contra la desolación y la tiranía. Asimismo, una sociedad puede ser (...) tiránica en varios sentidos, pero Manuel Mindán sostiene que, para que no lo sea, el individuo entendido como “persona” debe primar siempre sobre el grupo gregario y cerrado. (shrink)

Era imprescindible una edición de aquellos textos que José Gaos escribiera sobre su gran maestro, Ortega, máxime desde que se ha comenzado a estudiar con un interés inusitado la obra del filósofo asturiano exiliado en México, tal y como se deduce del gran número de trabajos, investigaciones, publicaciones, jornadas, etc., que se han venido realizado, en la última década, mediante el esfuerzo de centros de investigación y universidades españolas como la Universidad de Valencia, la UNED, el CSIC, la U. de (...) Zaragoza, la Fundación Manuel Mindán y la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, así como en México, tanto en la UNAM como en El Colegio de México. (shrink)

Many prominent accounts of free will and moral responsibility make use of the idea that agents can be responsive to reasons. Call such theories Reasons accounts. In what follows, I consider the tenability of Reasons accounts in light of situationist social psychology and, to a lesser extent, the automaticity literature. In the first half of this chapter, I argue that Reasons accounts are genuinely threatened by contemporary psychology. In the second half of the paper I consider whether such threats can (...) be met, and at what cost. Ultimately, I argue that Reasons accounts can abandon some familiar assumptions, and that doing so permits us to build a more empirically plausible picture of our agency. (shrink)

I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics.Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on anunnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about whatit means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken (...) in their failure to understand the nature of intentional causality and of “as-if” intentionality. In exposing these mistakes I set out my own view in the form oftwo theses, the first of which states that individual members of an organization are always causally responsible for any corporate act,and the second of which states that attributions of intentions to corporations are always either descriptive or prescriptive attributionsof “as if” intentionality. (shrink)

This is a topically organized introduction to the traditional problems of philosophy. It aims to introduce readers to traditional philosophical problems and to expose readers to philosophical argumentation in such a way that they will feel confident in handling abstract concepts.

This article summarizes the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (3) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about (...) moral responsibility. (shrink)

This text offers both a clear and thorough introduction to normative ethical theory and an extensive survey of moral issues that show how ethical theory is applied in practice. The first section presents a survey of the main methods of ethical reasoning, introducing four normative theories in four separate chapters. A case study introduces each chapter to provide a background for further explanations and to illustrate relevant features of the theory. The second section of the text presents separate chapters on (...) ten ethical issues-including such subjects as nuclear war, euthanasia, sexual ethics and capital punishment. (shrink)

The author sets out a realist defense of the claim that in the absence of an international enforcement agency, multinational corporations operating in a competitive international environment cannot be said to have a moral obligation to contribute to the international common good, provided that interactions are nonrepetitive and provided effective signals of agent reliability are not possible. Examples of international common goods that meet these conditions are support of the global ozone layer and avoidance of the global greenhouse effect. Pointing (...) out that the conclusion that multinationals have no moral obligations in these areas is deplorable, the author urges the establishment of an international enforcement agency. (shrink)

As the 21st century breaks upon us, no ethical issues in business appear as significant as those being created by the rapidglobalization of business. Globalization has created numerous ethical problems for the manager of the multinational corporation. What does justice demand, for example, in the relations between a multinational and its host country, particularly when that country is less developed? Should human rights principles govern the relations between a multinational and the workers of a host country, and if so, which (...) principles are the correct ones? How should a multinational deal with a government in which corruption is rife? What are the ethical considerations involved in determining whether and how to transfer a risky technology to a country whose people may not be able to safely absorb that technology? What kind of labor and environmental standards should a multinational adopt when operating in a country whose government legislates only very low standards? (shrink)

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action (...) and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti-individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. (shrink)

I evaluate the adequacy of the three models of international business ethics that have been recently proposed by Thomas Donald son, Gerard Elfstrom and Richard De George. Using the example of the conduct of the aluminum companies in Jamaica, I argue that these three models fail to address the most important of the ethical issues encountered by multinationals because they focus too narrowly on human rights issues and on utilitarian considerations. In addition I argue that these models also evidence an (...) inadequate understanding of microeconomic theory. I end by proposing that these defects can be remedied by a model of ethics that incorporates a theory of moral rights, a utilitarian-based theory of the market, and a theory of justice. (shrink)

There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the (...) property does not exist, and true to say with revisionists that the property does exist. This article explores the viability of discretionism, and argues that it faces serious difficulties. Even if the difficulties faced by discretionism can be overcome, it is unclear that discretionism secures anything beyond what is already available to standard revisionist views. The article concludes with some reflections about Nichols’ account of the bare retributive norm. (shrink)

This paper outlines one way of thinking about the problem of free will, some general reasons for dissatisfactions with traditional approaches to solving it, and some considerations in favor of pursuing a broadly revisionist solution to it. If you are looking for a student-friendly introduction to revisionist theorizing about free will, this is probably the thing to look at.

The present chapter is concerned with revisionism about free will. It begins by offering a new characterization of revisionist accounts and the way such accounts fit (or do not) in the familiar framework of compatibilism and incompatibilism. It then traces some of the recent history of the development of revisionist accounts, and concludes by remarking on some challenges for them.

There is very little study of Latin American Philosophy in the English-speaking philosophical world. This can sometimes lead to the impression that there is nothing of philosophical worth in Latin American philosophy or its history. The present article offers some reasons for thinking that this impression is mistaken, and indeed, that we ought to have more study of Latin American philosophy than currently exists in the English-speaking philosophical world. In particular, the article argues for three things: (1) an account of (...) cultural resources that is useful for illuminating the fact of cultural differences and variations in cultural complexity, (2) a framework for understanding the value of philosophy, and (3) the conclusion that there is demonstrable value to Latin American philosophy and its study. (shrink)

Although commitment is one of the attributes of family firms of continuing interest to researchers, they almost always study it from the perspective of the owning family. In the current work, we analyze the commitment of the non-family employees. We propose a model of commitment, with the aim of studying the implications that this variable may have for family businesses. We study both the aspects on the basis of the approaches of Meyer and Allen's three-component model of organizational commitment and (...) stewardship theory. Results show that the identification level of non-family employees positively and significantly influences the profitability and the survival or continuity of familyowned businesses. At the same time that their involvement level positively and significantly influences the survival or continuity of family-owned businesses. (shrink)

This article describes Catholic natural law tradition by examining its origins in the medieval penitentials, the papal decretals, the writings of Thomas Aquinas, and seventeenth-century casuistry. Catholic natural law emerges as a flexible ethic that conceives of human nature as rational and as oriented to certain basic goods that ought to be pursued and whose pursuit is made possible by the virtues. Four approaches to natural law that have evolved within the United States during the twentieth century are then identified, (...) including the traditionalist, proportionalist, right reason, and historicist approaches. The normative implications of these approaches are discussed in relation to ethical issues in the tobacco industry, ITT under Geneen, the marketing of pharmaceuticals, affirmative action, and bribery. It is argued that Alasdair MacIntyre is correct in claiming that the natural law tradition issuperior to the liberal ethics of modern deontology and utilitarianism. (shrink)

I examine the extent to which Dennett’s account in Freedom Evolves might be construed as revisionist about free will or should instead be understood as a more traditional kind of compatibilism. I also consider Dennett’s views about philosophical work on free agency and its relationship to scientific inquiry, and I argue that extant philosophical work is more relevant to scientific inquiry than Dennett’s remarks may suggest.

Bernardo de Monteagudo en su texto: Diálogo entre Atahualpa y Fernando VII en los Campos Eliseos, parte de una crítica a las atrocidades llevadas a cabo por los españoles contra los americanos en la Conquista –atrocidades que sobrepasan las llevadas a cabo por Napoleón contra Fernando VII–, para proponer una integración social y cultural que movilice a los pueblos latinoamericanos a la independencia del colonialismo español. Sin embargo, su propuesta no reivindica al indígena, sino que su imagen es usada por (...) el escritor como símbolo de una Latinoamérica que se limita a los criollos. Es decir, el indígena quedará, luego de las independencias latinoamericanas, en una situación similar a la colonial, sólo que ahora bajo el dominio de los criollos. De igual manera, esto nos puede suceder en nuestra realidad bogotana: pensar que Latinoamérica, y especialmente Colombia, se reduce a los Andes, a las ciudades del interior, excluyendo así al Caribe. (shrink)

I’ve been told that in the good old days of the 1970s, when Quine’s desert landscapes were regarded as ideal real estate and David Lewis and John Rawls had not yet left a legion of influential students rewriting the terrain of metaphysics and ethics respectively, compatibilism was still compatibilism about free will. And, of course, incompatibilism was still incompatibilism about free will. That is, compatibilism was the view that free will was compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism was the view that free (...) will was incompatible with determinism.1 What philosophers argued about was whether free will was compatible with determinism. Mostly, this was an argument about how to understand claims that one could do otherwise. You needn’t have bothered to talk about moral responsibility, because it was just obvious that you couldn’t have moral responsibility without free will. The literature was a temple of clarity. Then, somehow, things began to go horribly wrong. To be sure, there had been some activity in the 1960s that would have struck some observers as ominous. Still, it was not until the 1980s that those initial warning signs gave way to real trouble. The meanings of terms twisted. (shrink)

This study examines the effects of socializing activity of the owned family in family firms in order to find out if the special characteristics of the socializing processes in this type of firm can contribute to defining a climate that favors employees' commitment to the organization.For this purpose, this study uses the main arguments of the sociological approach known as moral economy. The data required for this analysis was collected using a self-administered postal questionnaire and the results show that the (...) special type of socialization that takes place in the family firm, and particularly the emotional mediation that this type of socialization tends to entail, favors the appearance of noneconomic links between employers and employees. Thus, in family firms the climate favors the management of the affective, normative, and symbolic aspects. The authors consider that this provides an explanation for the higher levels of identification, involvement, and loyalty — and consequently organizational commitment — that they find empirically among the employees of such firms. (shrink)

At least some serial killers are psychopathic serial killers. Psychopathic serial killers raise interesting questions about the nature of evil and moral responsibility. On the one hand, serial killers seem to be obviously evil, if anything is. On the other hand, psychopathy is a diagnosable disorder that, among other things, involves a diminished ability to understand and use basic moral distinctions. This feature of psychopathy suggests that psychopathic serial killers have at least diminished responsibility for what they do. In this (...) chapter I consider whether psychopathic serial killers might be properly said to be both evil and morally responsible for their actions. I argue that psychopathic serial killers are plausibly evil in at least one recognizable sense of the term, but that they are nevertheless not likely to be responsible for many of the evils they perpetuate. (shrink)