The Internet is an important focus of attention for the philosophy of mind and cognitive science communities. This is partly because the Internet serves as an important part of the material environment in which a broad array of human cognitive and epistemic activities are situated. The Internet can thus be seen as an important part of the ‘cognitive ecology’ that helps to shape, support and realize aspects of human cognizing. Much of the previous philosophical work in this area has sought (...) to analyze the cognitive significance of the Internet from the perspective of human cognition. There has, as such, been little effort to assess the cognitive significance of the Internet from the perspective of ‘machine cognition’. This is unfortunate, because the Internet is likely to exert a significant influence on the shape of machine intelligence. The present paper attempts to evaluate the extent to which the Internet serves as a form of cognitive ecology for synthetic forms of intelligence. In particular, the phenomenon of Internet-situated machine intelligence is analyzed from the perspective of a number of approaches that are typically subsumed under the heading of situated cognition. These include extended, embedded, scaffolded and embodied approaches to cognition. For each of these approaches, the Internet is shown to be of potential relevance to the development and operation of machine-based cognitive capabilities. Such insights help us to appreciate the role of the Internet in advancing the current state-of-the-art in machine intelligence. (shrink)

The World Wide Web (Web) provides access to a global space of information assets and computational services. It also, however, serves as a platform for social interaction (e.g., Facebook) and participatory involvement in all manner of online tasks and activities (e.g., Wikipedia). There is a sense, therefore, that the advent of the Social Web has transformed our understanding of the Web. In addition to viewing the Web as a form of information repository, we are now able to view the Web (...) in more social terms. In particular, it has become possible to see the Web as providing access to the human social environment. This is important, because issues of social embedding and social interaction have been seen to contribute to the emergence of human cognitive capabilities. The ability of the Web to provide access to the human social environment thus raises an important question: Can humanity play a productive role in the emergence of advanced forms of machine intelligence by virtue of their interactions and engagements with the online realm? The present paper attempts to show why this question is worth asking. It also attempts to highlight some of the ways in which Web-based forms of contact with the human social environment may be relevant to research into machine intelligence. (shrink)

Intelligence is not a property unique to the human brain; rather it represents a spectrum of phenomena. An understanding of the evolution of intelligence makes it clear that the evolution of machine intelligence has no theoretical limits — unlike the evolution of the human brain. Machine intelligence will outpace human intelligence and very likely will do so during the lifetime of our children. The mix of advanced machine intelligence with human individual (...) and communal intelligence will create an evolutionary discontinuity as profound as the origin of life. It will presage the end of the human species as we know it. The question, in the author's view, is not whether this will happen, but when, and what should be our response. (shrink)

In mid-twentieth century, the hypothesis, ‘a machine can think’ became very popular after, Alan Turing’s article on ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’. This hypothesis, ‘a machine can think’ established the foundations of machine intelligence (MI), and claimed that machines have consciousness and creativity, with the power to compete with human beings. In the first section, I shall show how consciousness and creativity is conceptualized in the domain of MI. The main aim of MI is not only (...) to construct difficult programs to solve our day-to-day problems, but also to reproduce mentality in machines. It was claimed that all the mental qualities are ascribable to machines. My intention in this paper is to clarify consciousness and creativity from a subjective point of view. My claim is that consciousness and creativity cannot be fully represented in a mechanistic domain. There are subjective mental or conscious states, which can be seen in a first-person perspective of their proper understanding. (shrink)

The notion of computation has changed the world more than any previous expressions of knowledge. However, as know-how in its particular algorithmic embodiment, computation is closed to meaning. Therefore, computer-based data processing can only mimic life’s creative aspects, without being creative itself. AI’s current record of accomplishments shows that it automates tasks associated with intelligence, without being intelligent itself. Mistaking the abstract for the concrete has led to the religion of “everything is an output of computation”—even the humankind that (...) conceived the computer. The hypostatized role of computers explains the increased dependence on them. The convergence machine called deep learning is only the most recent form through which the deterministic theology of the machine claims more than what it actually is: extremely effective data processing. A proper understanding of complexity, as well as the need to distinguish between the reactive nature of the artificial and the anticipatory nature of the living are suggested as practical responses to the challenges posed by machine theology. (shrink)

Donald Michie was many things; a computing pioneer in machine intelligence, a cryptographer who made key breakthroughs at Bletchley Park, and a geneticist. Tragically, two years ago he died in a car crash. Here, Ashwin Srinivasan presents an engaging collection of lively essays from Michie's writings, on thinking computers, mice, and much more.

This volume traces the modern critical and performance history of this play, one of Shakespeare's most-loved and most-performed comedies. The essay focus on such modern concerns as feminism, deconstruction, textual theory, and queer theory.

Despite there being little consensus on what intelligence is or how to measure it, the media and the public have become increasingly preoccupied with the concept owing to recent accomplishments in machine learning and research on artificial intelligence (AI). Governments and corporations are investing billions of dollars to fund researchers who are keen to produce an ever‐expanding range of artificial intelligent systems. More than 30 countries have announced such research initiatives over the past 3 years 1. For (...) example, the EU Commission pledged to increase the investment in AI research to €1.5 billion by 2020 (from €500 million in 2017), while China has committed $2.1 billion towards an AI technology park in Beijing alone 1. This global investment in AI is astonishing and prompts several questions: What are the true possibilities and limitations of AI? What do AI researchers and developers mean by “intelligence”? How does this compare to the everyday concept of intelligence and how the term is other branches of cognitive science? And can machine learning produce anything that is truly “intelligent”? (shrink)

The Internet provides access to a global space of information assets and computational services. It also, however, serves as a platform for social interaction (e.g., Facebook) and participatory involvement in all manner of online tasks and activities (e.g., Wikipedia). There is a sense, therefore, that the Internet yields an unprecedented form of access to the human social environment: it provides insight into the dynamics of human behavior (both individual and collective), and it additionally provides access to the digital products of (...) human cognitive labor (again, both individual and collective). Such access is interesting from the standpoint of research into machine intelligence, for the human social environment looks to be of crucial importance when it comes to the evolutionary and developmental origins of the human mind. In the present paper, we develop a theoretical account that sees the Internet as providing opportunities for online systems to function as socially-situated agents. The result is a vision of machine intelligence in which advanced forms of cognitive competence are seen to arise from the creation of a new kind of digital socio-ecological niche. The present paper attempts to detail this vision with respect to the notion of socially-scaffolded cognition. It also describes some of the forms of machine learning that may be required to enable online systems to press maximal cognitive benefit from their new-found informational contact with the human social world. (shrink)

A simple exogenous growth model gives conservative estimates of the economic implications of machine intelligence. Machines complement human labor when they become more productive at the jobs they perform, but machines also substitute for human labor by taking over human jobs. At first, expensive hardware and software does only the few jobs where computers have the strongest advantage over humans. Eventually, computers do most jobs. At first, complementary effects dominate, and human wages rise with computer productivity. But eventually (...) substitution can dominate, making wages fall as fast as computer prices now do. An intelligence population explosion makes per-intelligence consumption fall this fast, while economic growth rates rise by an order of magnitude or more. These results are robust to automating incrementally, and to distinguishing hardware, software, and human capital from other forms of capital. (shrink)

Descartes’s uncompromising rejection of the possibility of animal intelligence was among his most controversial theses. That rejection is based on (1) his commitment to the doctrine of animal automatism and (2) two tests that he takes to be sufficient indicators of thought (the action and language tests). Of these two tests, only the language test is truly definitive, and Descartes is firmly of the view that no animal could demonstrate the capacity to use signs to convey meaning in “all (...) the circumstances of life.” The topic is fascinating for forcing us to ponder what exactly reason is for Descartes and the role it plays in everyday life. This article explores the tensions in Descartes’s arguments produced by an over reliance on the analogy between animals and clocks, including the question of what to make of Descartes’s recognition of the need to posit representational and information-processing subsystems in the brain. (shrink)

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. It posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other a machine agent. These agents exhibit different information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. Providing a conceptual modeling of their difference, this paper resolves what it calls “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to justify an omniscient perspective through which a determinist asserts determinism from (...) within the supposedly deterministic universe. (shrink)

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need to consider artificial systems which are significantly different to humans. In this paper we approach this problem in the following way: we take a number of well known informal definitions of human intelligence that have been given by experts, and extract their essential features. These are then mathematically formalised to produce a general measure of (...) class='Hi'>intelligence for arbitrary machines. We believe that this equation formally captures the concept of machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense. We then show how this formal definition is related to the theory of universal optimal learning agents. Finally, we survey the many other tests and definitions of intelligence that have been proposed for machines. (shrink)

Gödel's Theorem is often used in arguments against machine intelligence, suggesting humans are not bound by the rules of any formal system. However, Gödelian arguments can be used to support AI, provided we extend our notion of computation to include devices incorporating random number generators. A complete description scheme can be given for integer functions, by which nonalgorithmic functions are shown to be partly random. Not being restricted to algorithms can be accounted for by the availability of an (...) arbitrary random function. Humans, then, might not be rule-bound, but Gödelian arguments also suggest how the relevant sort of nonalgorithmicity may be trivially made available to machines. (shrink)

With 500+ papers and 20+ books spanning many scientific disciplines, Mark Burgin has left an indelible mark and legacy for future explorers of human thought and information technology professionals. In this paper, I discuss his contribution to the evolution of machine intelligence using his general theory of information (GTI) based on my discussions with him and various papers I co-authored during the past eight years. His construction of a new class of digital automata to overcome the barrier posed (...) by the Church–Turing Thesis, and his contribution to super-symbolic computing with knowledge structures, cognizing oracles, and structural machines are leading to practical applications changing the future landscape of information systems. GTI provides a model for the operational knowledge of biological systems to build, operate, and manage life processes using 30+ trillion cells capable of replication and metabolism. The schema and associated operations derived from GTI are also used to model a digital genome specifying the operational knowledge of algorithms executing the software life processes with specific purposes using replication and metabolism. The result is a digital software system with a super-symbolic computing structure exhibiting autopoietic and cognitive behaviors that biological systems also exhibit. We discuss here one of these applications. (shrink)

The Turing Machine presents itself as the very landmark and initial design of digital automata present in all modern general-purpose digital computers and whose design on computable numbers implies deeply ontological as well as epistemological foundations for today’s computers. These lines of work attempt to briefly analyze the fundamental epistemological problem that rose in the late 19th and early 20th century whereby “machine cognition” emerges. The epistemological roots addressed in the TM and notably in its “Halting Problem” uncovers (...) the tension between determinism and uncertainty, regarded here as the primal and inherent features of machine cognition. Resumen La Máquina de Turing se presenta como el hito y el diseño inicial de un autómata digital presente en todas las computadoras digitales modernas de propósito general y cuyo diseño en números computables establece bases profundamente ontológicas y epistemológicas para las computadoras de hoy. Estas líneas de trabajo intentan analizar brevemente el problema epistemológico fundamental que surgió a finales del siglo XIX y principios del XX mediante el cual emerge la “cognición de la máquina”. Las raíces epistemológicas que se abordan en la TM y, en particular, en su “Problema de detención” ponen al descubierto la tensión entre el determinismo y la incertidumbre, consideradas aquí, como las características primordiales e inherentes de la cognición de la máquina. (shrink)

In recent years, we have experienced rapid development of advanced technology, machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI), intended to interact with and augment the abilities of humans in practically every area of life. With the rapid growth of new capabilities, such as those enabled by generative AI (e.g., ChatGPT), AI is increasingly at the center of human communication and collaboration, resulting in a growing recognition of the need to understand how humans and AI can integrate their inputs in (...) collaborative teams. However, there are many unanswered questions regarding how human–AI collective intelligence will emerge and what the barriers might be. Truly integrated collaboration between humans and intelligent agents may result in a different way of working that looks nothing like what we know now, and it is important to keep the essential goal of human societal well-being and prosperity a priority. In this special issue, we begin to scope out the underpinnings of a socio-cognitive architecture for Collective HUman-MAchine INtelligence (COHUMAIN), which is the study of the capability of an integrated human and machine (i.e., intelligent technology) system to achieve goals in a wide range of environments. This topic consists of nine papers including a description of the conceptual foundation for a socio-cognitive architecture for COHUMAIN, empirical tests of some aspects of this architecture, research on proposed representations of intelligent agents that can jointly interact with humans, empirical tests of human–human and human–machine interactions, and philosophical and ethical issues to consider as we develop these systems. (shrink)

With the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and the desire to ensure that such machines work well with humans, it is essential for AI systems to actively model their human teammates, a capability referred to as Machine Theory of Mind (MToM). In this paper, we introduce the inner loop of human–machine teaming expressed as communication with MToM capability. We present three different approaches to MToM: (1) constructing models of human inference with well-validated psychological theories and empirical measurements; (...) (2) modeling human as a copy of the AI; and (3) incorporating well-documented domain knowledge about human behavior into the above two approaches. We offer a formal language for machine communication and MToM, where each term has a clear mechanistic interpretation. We exemplify the overarching formalism and the specific approaches in two concrete example scenarios. Related work that demonstrates these approaches is highlighted along the way. The formalism, examples, and empirical support provide a holistic picture of the inner loop of human–machine teaming as a foundational building block of collective human–machine intelligence. (shrink)

In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his iconic imitation game, calling it a ‘test’, an ‘experiment’, and the ‘the only really satisfactory support’ for his view that machines can think. Following Turing’s rhetoric, the ‘Turing test’ has been widely received as a kind of crucial experiment to determine machine intelligence. In later sources, however, Turing showed a milder attitude towards what he called his ‘imitation tests’. In 1948, Turing referred to the persuasive power of ‘the actual production of machines’ (...) rather than that of a controlled experiment. Observing this, I propose to distinguish the logical structure from the rhetoric of Turing’s argument. I argue that Turing’s proposal of a crucial experiment may have been a concession to meet the standards of his interlocutors more than his own, while his construction of machine intelligence rather reveals a method of successive idealizations and exploratory experiments. I will draw a parallel with Galileo’s construction of idealized fall in a void and the historiographical controversies over the role of experiment in Galilean science. I suggest that Turing, like Galileo, relied on certain kinds of experiment, but also on rhetoric and propaganda to inspire further research that could lead to convincing scientific and technological progress. (shrink)

Two critical questions spun the web of the Turing test debate. First, can an appropriately programmed machine pass the Turing test? Second, is passing the test by such a machine, ipso facto, considered proof that it is intelligent and hence “minded”? While the first question is technological, the second is purely philosophical. Focusing on the second question, this article interrogates the implication of John Searle’s Chinese room denial of machine intelligence. The thrust of Searle’s argument is (...) that a machine lacks intentionality, so it can only simulate intelligence, not duplicate it. In his thinking, whatever a machine inputs to generate an intelligent output has no bearing on humanlike intelligence. Incidentally, Searle did not classify such a machine’s output as simulated and non-intelligent, nor did he explain how this output is actualised with mere simulation. The connection between “unintelligent machine’s input” and “intelligent machine’s output” is at this point shrouded in mystery. Consequently, the more Searle attempts a denial of machine intelligence in the Chinese room, the more he mystifies it. Using the method of critical analysis, this article advances three fundamental arguments to prove a machines’ obscurity in the Chinese room thought experiment. On the ground of Searle’s conviction, the first argument queries the absurdity in bypassing intentionality to produce intelligence; the second points out the obfuscation in generating intelligence with mere computation, and the third draws attention to the dilemma of classifying a machine’s output either as real-life intelligent behaviour or simulated intelligent behaviour. (shrink)

The presence of intelligence and rationality in Artificial Intelligence and the Internet requires a new context of analysis in which Herbert Simon’s approach to the sciences of the artificial is surpassed in order to grasp the role of information in our contemporary setting. This new framework requires taking into account some relevant aspects. In the historical endeavor of building up AI and the Internet, minds and machines have interacted over the years and in many ways through the interrelation (...) between scientific creativity and technological innovation. Philosophically, minds and machines can have epistemological, methodological and ontological differences, which are based on the distinct configuration of human intelligence and artificial intelligence. Their comparison with rationality and its various forms is particularly relevant. Scientifically, AI and the Internet belong to the sciences of the artificial, because they work on designs that search for specific aims, following selected processes in order to achieve expected results. Technologically, AI and the Internet require the support of information and communication technologies. These have an instrumental role regarding the existence of AI and the Internet. Also ICT shape their diverse forms of configuration over the years.Within this framework, this paper offers a new context of analysis that goes beyond Simon’s and follows four main steps: the interaction between scientific creativity and technological innovation as the philosophico-methodological setting for Artificial Intelligence and the Internet; artificial intelligence and human intelligence as epistemological basis for machines and minds, where the differences between artificial intelligence and human intelligence are made explicit and the analysis of minds and machines is made from the perspective of rationality ; intention and its difference with design of machine learning are considered to distinguish human intelligence from artificial intelligence; and the internal and external aspects of artificial designs in contemporary society are considered through the perspective of rationality, which leads to the transition from intelligence to rationality in the Internet as well as to the historicity of information. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of Alan Turing’s writings on intelligence has mostly revolved around a single point made in a paper published in the journal Mind in 1950. This is unfortunate, for Turing’s reflections on machine (artificial) intelligence, human intelligence, and the relation between them were more extensive and sophisticated. They are seen to be extremely well-considered and sound in retrospect. Recently, IBM developed a question-answering computer (Watson) that could compete against humans on the game show Jeopardy! There (...) are hopes it can be adapted to other contexts besides that game show, in the role of a collaborator of, rather than a competitor to, humans. Another, different, research project—an artificial intelligence program put into operation in 2010—is the machine learning program NELL (Never Ending Language Learning), which continuously ‘learns’ by ‘reading’ massive amounts of material on millions of web pages. Both of these recent endeavors in artificial intelligence rely to some extent on the integration of human guidance and feedback at various points in the machine’s learning process. In this paper, I examine Turing’s remarks on the development of intelligence used in various kinds of search, in light of the experience gained to date on these projects. (shrink)

In this article I will address the issue of the meaning of human-machine interaction as it is configured today in the light of substantial results achieved in the design and the manufacture of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. My starting point is a refined solution for meaningful AI recently suggested by Froese and Taguchi from the perspective of so-called augmented intelligence. Interpreted as a kind of human-machine interaction, augmented intelligence distinguishes itself by the fact that it (...) merges the interacting poles into a new hybrid entity. After having clarified the technical and the methodological background of my proposal, I will discuss a case of study of so-called bio-synthetic augmentation, where hybridisation overlaps with the cyborgisation of the human body. (shrink)

Since the noun phrase `artificial intelligence' (AI) was coined, it has been debated whether humans are able to create intelligence using technology. We shed new light on this question from the point of view of themodynamics and mathematics. First, we define what it is to be an agent (device) that could be the bearer of AI. Then we show that the mainstream definitions of `intelligence' proposed by Hutter and others and still accepted by the AI community are (...) too weak even to capture what is involved when we ascribe intelligence to an insect. We then summarise the highly useful definition of basic (arthropod) intelligence proposed by Rodney Brooks, and we identify the properties that an AI agent would need to possess in order to be the bearer of intelligence by this definition. Finally, we show that, from the perspective of the disciplines needed to create such an agent, namely mathematics and physics, these properties are realisable by neither implicit nor explicit mathematical design nor by setting up an environment in which an AI could evolve spontaneously. (shrink)

In the agriculture development and growth, the efficient machinery and equipment plays an important role. Various research studies are involved in the implementation of the research and patents to aid the smart agriculture and authors and reviewers that machine leaning technologies are providing the best support for this growth. To explore machine learning technology and machine learning algorithms, the most of the applications are studied based on the swarm intelligence optimization. An optimized V3CFOA-RF model is built (...) through V3CFOA. The algorithm is tested in the data set collected concerning rice pests, later analyzed and compared in detail with other existing algorithms. The research result shows that the model and algorithm proposed are not only more accurate in recognition and prediction, but also solve the time lagging problem to a degree. The model and algorithm helped realize a higher accuracy in crop pest prediction, which ensures a more stable and higher output of rice. Thus they can be employed as an important decision-making instrument in the agricultural production sector. (shrink)

In an earlier paper in this journal[1], I sought to defend the claims that (1) substantial probability should be assigned to the hypothesis that machines will outsmart humans within 50 years, (2) such an event would have immense ramifications for many important areas of human concern, and that consequently (3) serious attention should be given to this scenario. Here, I will address a number of points made by several commentators.

Since there isn't a computer that seems conscious at this time, the idea of machine consciousness is supported by thought experiments. Here's one old chestnut: "What if you replaced your neurons one by one with neuron sized and shaped substitutes made of silicon chips that perfectly mimicked the chemical and electric functions of the originals? If you just replaced one single neuron, surely you'd feel the same. As you proceed, as more and more neurons are replaced, you'd stay conscious. (...) Why wouldn't you still be conscious at the end of the process, when you'd reside in a brain shaped glob of silicon? And why couldn't the resulting replacement brain have been manufactured by some other means?". (shrink)

The advent of the cinema radically altered our comprehension of time, space, and reality. With his experience as a pioneering avant-garde filmmaker, Jean Epstein uses the universes created by the cinematograph to deconstruct our understanding of how time and space, reality and unreality, continuity and discontinuity, determinism and randomness function both inside and outside the cinema. Time, he says, should be regarded as the first, not the fourth, dimension—and the cinematograph allows us, for the first time, to manipulate it in (...) directions and speeds of our choosing. The theoretical work of Jean Epstein greatly influenced later generations of cinema philosophers, notably Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Rancière, but the bulk of his work remains unpublished. _The Intelligence of a Machine_, his first major title published in English, is one of the earliest philosophies of cinema. (shrink)

According to the conventional wisdom, Turing said that computing machines can be intelligent. I don't believe it. I think that what Turing really said was that computing machines –- computers limited to computing –- can only fake intelligence. If we want computers to become genuinelyintelligent, we will have to give them enough “initiative” to do more than compute. In this paper, I want to try to develop this idea. I want to explain how giving computers more ``initiative'' can allow (...) them to do more than compute. And I want to say why I believe that they will have to go beyond computation before they can become genuinely intelligent. (shrink)

서비스 로봇이나 자율주행자동차처럼 현실의 공간에서 작동하는 기계가 임무를 성공적으로 수행하기 위하여 갖추어야 할 조건은 그것이 처한 환경의 상태를 파악하는 능력, 곧 지각의 능력이다. 이 논문은 이런 기계 지각, 특히 인간을 대행하도록 의도된 기계의 지각이 충족해야 할 조건들을 검토한다. 이러한 시도는 오늘의 사회가 집단적으로 추진하고 있는 공학 프로젝트에서 기술의 지향점을 환기시키면서 그것을 향한 실천을 구체화하는 논의라는 의미를 지닌다. 공학윤리의 원칙에 명시된 최우선의 가치를 고려할 때, 인간을 대행할 인공물은 우리가 아는 범위에서 가장 안전한 방식으로 구성되어야 하고, 이를 위하여 기계 시각을 비롯한 인공물의 (...) 지각은 일차적으로 그것이 대행할 인간의 지각을 닮은 결과를 산출하도록 설계, 제작되어야 한다. 인간의 지각은 자연의 역사가 부여한 여러 흥미로운 속성들을 가지고 있다. 특히 이 논문은 지각의 대상을 개념적 범주들을 적용해 판별하는 방식, 지각에 나타나는 다양한 항등성의 측면들, 인간의 지각에 나타나는 행지주의적 특성에 주목한다. 이 세 요소는 자율주행자동차를 비롯하여 이 논문이 고려한 적용의 영역들에서 모두 뚜렷한 유관성을 드러낸다. 이로부터, 이런 똑똑한 인공물을 설계, 제작하는 과정에서 인간 지각의 이러한 속성들이 실현되거나 아니면 적어도 실질적인 손실 없이 대체되는지를 살펴야 한다는 당위가 도출된다. (shrink)

Recent philosophy of mind has increasingly focused on the role of technology in shaping, influencing, and extending our mental faculties. Technology extends the mind in two basic ways: through the creative design of artifacts and the purposive use of instruments. If the meaningful activity of technological artifacts were exhaustively described in these mind-dependent terms, then a philosophy of technology would depend entirely on our theory of mind. In this dissertation, I argue that a mind-dependent approach to technology is mistaken. Instead, (...) some machines are best understood as independent participants in their own right, contributing to and augmenting a variety of social practices as active, though often unrecognized, community members. Beginning with Turing’s call for “fair play for machines”, I trace an argument concerning the social autonomy of nonhuman agents through the artificial intelligence debates of the 20th century. I’ll argue that undue focus on the mind has obscured the force of Turing’s proposal, leaving the debates in an unfortunate stalemate. I will then examine a network theoretic alternative to the study of multi-agent complex systems that can avoid anthropocentric, mind-dependent ways of framing human-machine interactions. I argue that this approach allows for both scientific and philosophical treatment of large and complicated sociotechnical systems, and suggests novel methods for designing, managing, and maintaining such systems. Rethinking machines in mind-independent terms will illuminate the nature, scope, and evolution of our social and technological practices, and will help clarify the relationships between minds, machines, and the environments we share. (shrink)

The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and (...) Barry Smith, marshal evidence from mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, and biology, setting up their book around three central questions: What are the essential marks of human intelligence? What is it that researchers try to do when they attempt to achieve "artificial intelligence" (AI)? And why, after more than 50 years, are our most common interactions with AI, for example with our bank’s computers, still so unsatisfactory? Landgrebe and Smith show how a widespread fear about AI’s potential to bring about radical changes in the nature of human beings and in the human social order is founded on an error. There is still, as they demonstrate in a final chapter, a great deal that AI can achieve which will benefit humanity. But these benefits will be achieved without the aid of systems that are more powerful than humans, which are as impossible as AI systems that are intrinsically "evil" or able to "will" a takeover of human society. (shrink)

Looking back on the development of computer technology, particularly in the context of manufacturing, we can distinguish three big waves of technological exuberance with a wave length of roughly 30 years: In the first wave, during the 1950s, mainframe computers at that time were conceptualized as “electronic brains” and envisaged as central control unit of an “automatic factory”. Thirty years later, during the 1980s, knowledge-based systems in computer-integrated manufacturing were adored as the computational core of the “unmanned factory”. Both waves (...) dismally stranded on the contumacies of reality. Nevertheless, again thirty years later, we now experience the departure of the “smart factory” based on networks of “artificially intelligent” multi-agent or “cyber-physical systems”. From the very beginning, these technological exuberances rooted in mistaken metaphors describing the artifacts and, hence, in delusions about the true nature of computer systems. The behaviour of computers is, as computing science teaches us, strictly restrained to executing computable functions by means of algorithms, it thus neither resembles the performance of a brain as part of a complex sensitive living body nor is it in any meaningful sense “knowledgeable” or “intelligent”. When the delusion of being able to implement “smart factories”, despite the countless accomplishment failures before, gains momentum anew, it appears absolutely essential to reflect on underlying misconceptions. (shrink)

This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue that intelligent (...) machines are no different from traditional artifacts in this respect. To make this argument, I examine the feature of AIs that enables them to improve their intelligence, i.e., machine learning. I argue that there is no reason to believe that future advances in machine learning will take AIs closer to having a good of their own. I thus argue that concerns about the moral status of future AIs are unwarranted. Nothing about the nature of intelligent machines makes them a better candidate for acquiring moral patiency than the traditional artifacts whose moral status does not concern us. (shrink)

Intelligent machines (IMs), which have demonstrated remarkable innovations over time, require adequate attention concerning the issue of their duty–rights split in our current society. Although we can remain optimistic about IMs’ societal role, we must still determine their legal-philosophical sense of accountability, as living data bits have begun to pervade our lives. At the heart of IMs are human characteristics used to self-optimize their practical abilities and broaden their societal impact. We used Kant’s philosophical requirements to investigate IMs’ moral dispositions, (...) as the merging of humans with technology has overwhelmingly shaped psychological and corporeal agential capacities. In recognizing the continuous burden of human needs, important features regarding the inalienability of rights have increased the individuality of intelligent, nonliving beings, leading them to transition from questioning to defending their own rights. This issue has been recognized by paying attention to the rational capacities of humans and IMs, which have been connected in order to achieve a common goal. Through this teleological scheme, we formulate the concept of virtual dignity to determine the transition of inalienable rights from humans to machines, wherein the evolution of IMs is essentially imbued through consensuses and virtuous traits associated with human dignity. (shrink)

Background: The debate over the ethical implications of care robots has raised a range of concerns, including the possibility that such technologies could disrupt caregiving as a core human moral activity. At the same time, academics in information ethics have argued that we should extend our ideas of moral agency and rights to include intelligent machines. Research objectives: This article explores issues of the moral status and limitations of machines in the context of care. Design: A conceptual argument is developed, (...) through a four-part scheme derived from the work of Alasdair MacIntyre. No empirical data are used. Ethical consideration: No primary data were gathered for this study. Secondary sources and authorship have been acknowledged throughout. Findings / discussion: Certain kinds of social experience, including the narrative unity of a life, and the giving and receiving of care, are essential for moral development. Machines, no matter how advanced, cannot participate in such experiences in key respects, and thus cannot develop as practical reasoners. Conclusion: It follows that they cannot be moral agents and that they cannot care. There are, it seems, no such things as care robots. In view of the institutional power of tech companies and commissioning bodies, care practitioners need to take more of a lead in developing new assistive technologies which are appropriate to their practice. (shrink)