In his article Banicki proposes a universal model for all forms of philosophical therapy. He is guided by works of Martha Nussbaum, who in turn makes recourse to Aristotle. As compared to Nussbaum’s approach, Banicki’s model is more medical and less based on ethical argument. He mentions Foucault’s vision to apply the same theoretical analysis for the ailments of the body and the soul and to use the same kind of approach in treating and curing them. In his interpretation of (...) philosophical therapy, there are, however, some controversial issues, to which we would like to call attention: -/- Is restoring health by a philosophical method of treatment – health understood as a person’s ability to reach his/her vital goals – a convincing explication of philosophical therapy in general? In order to answer this question, it may be useful to look at Plato. It is not only Platonism (and especially Neo-platonism since Plotinus) that questions the idea that therapy is necessarily connected with „vital goals“. Buddhist and Gnostic philosophies are questioning „the vital“ in general. The immense effort in the history of philosophy to liberate the mind from the body casts doubt on the project to explain philosophical therapy solely in analogy to medical therapy. -/- According to Banicki a therapeutic philosophy has to identify the diseases it attempts at curing. There are, however, reasons for associating the term therapy with suffering/risk rather than disease. If a therapy aims at reducing the fear of death, as for example many classical philosophical therapies do, then there is no disease to be cured. A model based on chances and risks also has the advantage that the Buddhist and Stoic reinterpretation of desires/emotions as “diseases” can be dropped in contemporary philosophical therapy. -/- Banicki mentions the comparison of therapies as one of the primary goals of modelling. Methods should be verified by a statistical correlation between method and therapeutic success and/or by a theory which justifies the method. Some forms of therapies, however, avoid theory-specific terms and concepts in favor of an unprejudiced interpretation of the patient’s statements. Others share the (Nietzschean) aspiration to explore and change measures of value. If the therapeutic process is seen as a unique phenomenon, then there can be no theory and no statistics with co-occurrences. -/- According to Banicki philosophical therapy has to describe techniques which qualify as genuinely philosophical. Techniques like maieutics and hermeneutics, however, are antique philosophical “inventions”, which were later adopted by psychotherapy. If meditation is accepted as a therapeutic tool – as it was in ancient times – then there is not only a methodical but also an emotional relation to religion. If finally, the Socratic search for a good life is seen as one of the characteristics of philosophical therapy, then delimitation even turns into a criterion for non-philosophical therapies. The search for a good life requires an interdisciplinary approach. -/- For the concretization of the formal structure, we suggest a typology of therapies, which is based on chances and risks. Such a typology has the advantage, that it can model conflicting (and even opposing) forms of therapies. The variety of therapeutic goals and methods is a consequence of the historical development towards conceptual freedom. (shrink)

Since Plato’s massive critique of the Sophists rhetoric’s ill repute runs through the history of western philosophy denunciating methods of rhetoric as in large part dishonest persuasion strategies which are at most marginally interested in dealing with truths. This judgement falls way too short insofar as it distorts the historically grown stock labeled “rhetoric” not only in the Aristotelian work. With reference to Olaf Müller’s philosophical book addressing the “controversy” between Goethe and Newton about the nature of light, I will (...) study the different rhetorical models and methods used by Newton and Goethe and also Müller himself. It becomes apparent that even works attempting to decide who was right in the long run do far more than trying to evoke true “representations” of facts or truths in the reader. The specific use of language patterns provides deeper insight into an author’s mindset towards the subject area discussed in his work and generally speaking the investigation of the rhetoric of science and philosophy leads to a better understanding of different epistemic cultures both in philosophy and science. (shrink)

This essay examines Charles S. Pierce’s critique of nominalism against the background of the debate about natural kinds at the time of the first reception of Darwin's _Origin of Species_. In the history of the so-called dispute over universals in Western philosophy, the phenomenon of species constancy has always been of central importance (since Plato). Darwin's historicization of species was seen by some of Peirce's contemporaries, including Chauncey Wright, as support for Mill's nominalism. Peirce believed the opposite, that Darwin's history (...) of the origin of species supports realism about universals. This is so because for Darwin species arise independently of the human mind. Just as a history of science does not have to cast doubt on the reality of scientific disciplines, a history of species does not have to make their reality appear questionable. However, a concept of modifiable species is needed to understand this history. Peirce develops such a concept by understanding species, ahead of his time, as variable clusters. (shrink)

Contemplative and explanatory theories are distinguished. The corpus of European philosophy includes many sorts of texts. Only a few have explanatory value. Some are contemplative. But there are also therapeutic and sceptical texts. It was an old ideal of philosophy to lead a theoretical life. What could that mean? What does “life” mean in this context? We cannot choose forms of life, because all choices and preferences come up in life. Nevertheless a theoretical life is possible. What kind of life (...) is it – one spent in contemplation, in explanation, or a sceptical one? (shrink)

Spinoza has been interpreted as a rationalist and a monist. This article tries to show that these views are to be specified. The intuitive knowledge of God plays a constitutive role in Spinoza's "Ethics". To reach it, one has to run through long chains of inferences. But the inferential mode of cognition will not lead to an understanding of the definition of God given in the first part of the "Ethics". This understanding can only be gained in the fifth part. (...) Thus, there is circular epistemic structure hidden in Spinoza's opus magnum, which has not been sufficiently described in the literature yet. (shrink)

The Rediscovery of the mind By John Searle MIT Press, 1992. Pp. xv + 270. ISBN 0–262–19321–3 £19.95 hbk.The Ethics of Authenticity By Charles Taylor Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. 152. ISBN 0–674–26863–6. $17.95Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition’ By Charles Taylor Princeton University Press, 1992. p. 112. ISBN 0–691–0878–65. $14.95New books on feminismAbjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva By John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin Routledge, 1990. Pp. 224. ISBN 0–415–04155–4. £35 hbk.Feminist Literary Studies: An Introduction By (...) K. K. Ruthven Canto, 1991 (first published 1984). Pp. 152 ISBN 0–521–398525. £4.95 pbk.Socialism, Feminism and Philosophy: A Radical Philosophy Reader Edited by Sean Sayers and Peter Sayers Routledge, 1990. Pp. 256. ISBN 0–415–05627–6. £35 hbk.Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine By Margaret Whitford Routledge, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0–415–05968–2. £35 hbk.New books on wittgensteinWittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Text and Context Edited by Robert C. Arrington and Hans‐Johann Glock Routledge, 1992. Pp. 256. ISBN 0415–07035‐X. £35.00 hbk.Wittgenstein on Words as Instruments. Lessons in Philosophical Psychology By J. M. F. Hunter Savage, Barnes and Noble Books, 1990. Pp. 192. ISBN 0–389–20920–1. $42.00Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief By Cyrill Barrett Blackwell, 1991. Pp. 304. ISBN 0–631–16815‐X. £45.00. (shrink)

The expression >the end of nature nature culture technology<. Following Latour and Haraway, the essay shows how the ecological crisis is related to the categorical distinctions in which the concept of nature was bound. The removal of the corresponding conceptual contrasts can lead to a more concise perception of the human situation.

Eine Person, die zu anderen etwas sagt oder einen Text schreibt, der vielen zugänglich ist, sollte antizipieren, welche Effekte ihre Rede haben könnte. Sie sollte sich in ihre möglichen Rezipienten einzufühlen versuchen. Umgekehrt sollte sich eine Person, die sich anderen zuhörend oder lesend zuwendet, bemühen, zu verstehen, was ihr gesagt worden ist und was die Autorin, die sie gerade liest, gemeint haben könnte. Mündliche und schriftliche Kommunikation funktioniert nur bei gegenseitiger Empathie von ›Sender‹ und ›Empfänger‹. Gegenwärtig wird vor allem Redenden (...) und Schreibenden die Verantwortung aufgebürdet, sich in diejenigen, an die sie sich richten, einzufühlen. Bei toten Autoren ist dies absurd. Sie konnten sich nicht in uns heute einfühlen. Haben wir nicht die Pflicht zu verstehen, wie sie es gemeint haben könnten? Haben wir nicht die Pflicht, die Eigendynamik der Entwicklungsprozesse der Sprache zu berücksichtigen, wenn wir anderen, vor allem toten Autoren, vorwerfen, sie würden uns mit ihren Äußerungen verletzen? Sollte, bevor ein solcher Vorwurf erhoben wird, nicht erforscht werden, mit welcher Intention eine Äußerung gemacht wurde? A person who says something to others, or writes a text that is accessible to many, should try to anticipate what effects her speech or writing might have. She should try to empathize with her potential audience. Conversely, a person who directs her attention to a speaker or an author should try to understand what was said, and what the author she is reading might have meant. Oral and written communication work only if there is mutual empathy between ›sender‹ and ›receiver‹. In today’s world, however, the responsibility to empathize is mainly demanded from those who speak and write. They are expected to anticipate how those who listen and read may feel. As applied to dead authors this demand is absurd. They could not anticipate how ›we‹ may feel today when reading their words. Is it not ›our‹ responsibility today to try and understand what they might have meant? Is it not ›our‹ duty to think about the ways language develops when we accuse deceased authors of hurting our feelings? Should ›we‹ not investigate those authors’ intentions before we make such accusations? (shrink)

Selflessness can be considered on an epistemic, on a moral, and on a historical level. The article follows recent thoughts by Jay L. Garfield on the idea that conceiving of oneself as a substantive self means following an illusion. It investigates the different senses of “illusion” and asks what it could mean for individuals and societies tobe transformed in such a way that this illusion would not play a role anymore.

The article investigates the relevance of the concepts of truth and truthfulness in culturalistic, psychoanalytical and neuro-biological theories of trauma from a philosophical point of view. The background for this is the recent claim of some brain scientists to produce an overall view of the human situation. This claim is shown to be false. The article comes to the conclusion that the subjective perception of a traumatic event is indispensable in order to understand the phenomena of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (...) History and other moral sciences are always concerned with the reconstruction of past internal perspectives. The example of trauma shows that this work is indispensable wherever brain research might lead us to. (shrink)

Metaphysik und Pragmatismus scheinen sich seit den Arbeiten von Richard Rorty auszuschließen. Deweys „Erfahrung und Natur“ ist der Versuch eines der bedeutendsten Pragmatisten, eine naturalistische und humanistische Metaphysik zu entwickeln, indem er die klassische europäische Metaphysik transformiert und ihr ihre Fixierung auf ewige Notwendigkeiten und absolute Gewissheiten austreibt. Er versucht, eine Metaphysik für eine in seinen Augen „gemischte“ Welt zu schreiben, in der es Zufall und Notwendigkeit, Gefahren und Ungewissheiten, aber auch für bestimmte Zeiträume verlässliche Ordnungen gibt. Dieser „Klassiker Auslegen“-Band (...) verfolgt dieses Projekt nach, indem die zehn Kapitel von Deweys Buch in zehn interpretierenden Essays historisch eingeordnet und systematisch analysiert werden. Dabei wird der ganze Themenhorizont der klassischen Metaphysik abgeschritten: Von dem Problem der Ordnung und Unordnung der Wirklichkeit über das Leib-Seele-Problem bis zu den Themen Wert und Kritik. Das Buch soll Studierenden den Zugang zu Deweys Metaphysik erleichtern und Forschenden in der Philosophie die Aktualität des Deweyschen Denkens wieder ins Gedächtnis zurückrufen. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Prozess, Gefühl und Raum-Zeit -- Bd. 2. Die Gifford Lectures und ihre Deutung.

Under the term »cosmology« different projects are hidden. Following Hans Blumenberg it is shown that in thinking about the world one can distinguish between producing meaning and giving explanations. Both projects make monopolistic demands and are often not distinguished clearly enough from another even by their authors. That leads to confusions like the one in which the biblical story about the creation of the world is confronted with the big bang theory of physics. In this essay I analyse the difference (...) between meaning producing and explaining thinking by looking at Poe’s ›Eureka‹ and Alexander von Humboldt’s ›Kosmos‹. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 5 Seiten: 852-863.

A given statement may be plausible, well founded or true. An individual action may be judged courageous, useful or good. Human beings are judged as well, for statements or actions that invite such evaluations, though the terms used may be different: a person may be described as truthful and virtuous, clever and happy. Epistemology and ethics – the theories that justify theoretical and practical judgements – may address not only the criteria used to assess states of belief, assertions, knowledge and (...) the like, actions, omissions and feelings, but also thepeoplethat give rise to them. Nowadays, the issue of when and how ahuman beingbecomes clever, truthful, good or happy is less a matter of philosophy and more a question for religion, psychology and pedagogy. This has not always been the case. There has been a perceptible shift in moral philosophy: in antiquity, inquiries as to when alifeis to be classified as good or happy were prevalent; in the modern era, the focus is primarily on when anindividual actionis to be regarded as right or good, wrong or bad. (shrink)

Yvonne Hütter-Almerigi und Dirk Jörke haben wichtige Einwände zu meinem Essay über eine mögliche Dritte Aufklärung vorgetragen. Ich danke ihnen sehr für die Aufmerksamkeit, die sie meinem Text haben zukommen lassen und für die Mühe, die sie sich mit der Entwicklung ihrer wertvollen Kritik gemacht haben. Ich weiss nicht, ob ich auf ihre Kritiken angemessen regieren kann, weil mir Kompetenzen in den Bereichen der empirischen Sozialforschung und der Ökonomie fehlen, die für die Beantwortung manc...