We are each the product of our development. The nature of the developmental process by which each of us was formed is described from gametogenesis to neonatality. The varied influences upon that process and their relative balance and patterns of interaction are then considered. In particular, the relative importance of epigenetic and genetic factors is discussed. It is concluded that development is a continuous process involving epigenetic/genetic interactions throughout. The contemporary emphasis on the genetic basis for human individuality is reviewed (...) critically. (shrink)

As its title implies, this collection of previously published popular essays and lectures by Hare attempts to bridge the gap between analytic ethics and moral and political issues. It succeeds in that endeavor only in so far as it, on the whole, provides some concrete illustrations for students of Hare’s theoretical positions; but the professional philosopher will seek in vain here for anything that is either new or incisive regarding the topics discussed. Worse still is the fact that a few (...) of the essays are so old and out of date that they are misleading to students as regards Hare’s views; for they reflect an obstinateness, and even superficiality, that typifies an earlier period of analytic philosophy but which is not evident in his major and later writings. Thus, for example, in the essay entitled "Nothing Matters," a critique of Camus’ nihilism, Hare argues that people become persuaded that "nothing matters" because of a misunderstanding of the function of the word "matters." Taking it to be the name of some process that things did, rather than seeing that it is used to express the speaker’s concern, they soon begin to wonder what this activity is called "mattering," and, failing to find anything corresponding to it, become easily convinced of the meaninglessness of life! (shrink)

This book is a development of ideas originally set out in the author’s well known articles "Basic Actions" and "What We can Do." The announced aim of the book is to isolate a class of actions that are basic in the sense that we do not do them by doing some other action. As Danto expresses it in the preface, he wants to "wash away the contextual features which convert movements into gestures and vest the disposition of limbs with high (...) spiritual significance." Danto compares doing this to eliminating the conceptual or interpretative component of perception so as to leave a purely sensory component. Indeed, the main strategy of this book is to exploit the analogies he sees between knowings and doings: as there are basic actions, so there are basic cognitions, things we know without having to know something else; and as there are things we know only by knowing other things which are evidence for them, so there are things we do only by doing other things which are adequate to cause them. There is also analogy in that descriptions of actions, like ascriptions of knowledge, are intensional—in Danto’s phrase, they have a complex logical structure arising from the fact that they are at once about the world and about somebody’s representation of the world. The things in the world which the descriptions of basic actions are about are physical movements subject to the causal order and identified by their place in this order, but the fact that descriptions of them as actions are intensional means that they also somehow transcend the causal order, and are free. So man, by acting, as by knowing, has a foot in both the physical and spiritual realms.—M.H. (shrink)

This book consists of a series of papers "read and discussed at the first Symposium of Exact Philosophy" at Montreal in 1971. "Exact philosophy," the editor says, means "mathematical philosophy, i.e., philosophy done with the explicit help of mathematical logic and mathematics." Judging from the contents, a more accurate statement would be that "exact philosophy" means formal semantics and modal logic. Two thirds of the papers are on these topics. The others include an essay on "Concepts of Randomness" by Peter (...) Kirschenmann; a characteristically difficult paper on "Plato’s Phaedo Theory of Relations" by Hector Castañeda; a somewhat inexact discursus on "Foundations as a Branch of Mathematics" by William Hatcher with a reply by Charles Castonguay; and a paper by Raimo Tuomela on "Deductive Explanation of Scientific Laws", or, more exactly, on Ohmer’s discussion of that topic. The subject’s are highly specialized and their treatment is complex. In addition to those mentioned, other essays are "Matters of Relevance" by Hugues Leblanc, with an answer by Brian Chellas; "Translation and Reduction" by Lars Svenonius; "A Program for the Semantics of Science" by Mario Bunge; "S-P Interrogatives" by Nuel Belnap; "The Logic of Conditional Obligation" by Bas C. Van Frassen with commentary by Harry Beaty; and "The Intuitive Background of Normative Legal Discourse and Its Formalization" by Carlos E. Alchourron.—M.H. (shrink)

In this bold and impressive book Veatch undertakes a formidable task of attacking not only the whole tradition of analytic and existential ethics, but with equal determination their "forerunners" in modern philosophy—utilitarianism and de-ontological ethics. Despite the apparent diversity of all of these movements, Veatch finds in them a common, basic tenet proclaiming the possibility of ethics without ontology, i.e., an ethics which denies that moral distinctions are grounded in the nature of things in themselves, but rather are to be (...) justified in terms of our human, subjective responses to them. In this fashion all modern moral philosophies subscribe to the dichotomy between fact and value. (shrink)