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  1. The Form is Not a Proper Part in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33.Liva Rotkale - 2018 - Metaphysics 1 (1):75-87.
    When Aristotle argues at the Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33 that a whole, which is not a heap, contains ‘something else’, i.e. the form, besides the elements, it is not clear whether or not the form is a proper part of the whole. I defend the claim that the form is not a proper part within the context of the relevant passage, since the whole is divided into elements, not into elements and the form. Different divisions determine different senses of ‘part’, and (...)
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  2. Species and Genus as Mutual Parts in Aristotle: a Hylomorphic Account.Līva Rotkale - 2024 - Méthexis 36 (1):7-31.
    A genus contains its species, and the species implies its genus. Does it mean that the species is a part of the genus and also the genus is a part of the species? But how can they be part of each other without being identical? In the context of kinds, in what sense is ‘part’ applicable? We argue that for Aristotle, a species and its genus are mutual parts, standing in different parthood relations to each other, viz. the genus is (...)
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