This chapter argues that the conditions under the umbrella “personality disorders” actually constitute two very different kinds of theoretical entities. In particular, several core personality disorders are actually moral, and not medical, conditions. Thus, the categories that are held to represent them are really moral, and not medical, theoretical kinds. The chapter works back from the possibility of treatment to the nature of the kinds that are allegedly treated, revisiting 18th-century ideas of moral treatment along the way. The discussion closes (...) with a reflection on how the ambiguous medical status of personality disorders and their treatment today is reminiscent of the ideological tug of war that pits alienist “mad doctors” like Pinel against their lay counterparts such as Tuke as they battled over who should be in charge of treating the mad. (shrink)

Reply to John Lewis: Note on "The critique of the personality cult". Remark on the category "Process without a subject or goal(s)"--Elements of self-criticism: On the evolution of the young Marx.--Is it simple to be a Marxist in philosophy? "Something new".

This volume will thus appeal to advanced students and scholars not just in the history of early modern philosophy but in epistemology and other core areas of ...

The distinguished philosopher Louis Loeb examines the epistemological framework of Scottish philosopher David Hume, as employed in his celebrated work A Treatise of Human Nature. Loeb's project is to advance an integrated interpretation of Hume's accounts of belief and justification. His thesis is that Hume, in his Treatise, has a "stability-based" theory of justification which posits that his belief is justified if it is the result of a belief producing mechanism that engenders stable beliefs. But Loeb argues that the (...) striking corollary to this theory is that no belief generating mechanism is fully stable - or fully justified - for a fully reflective person. This carefully argued and original interpretation of Hume makes sense of seemingly contradictory ideas and will provoke serious discussion among Hume scholars. (shrink)

An impressive variety of new forms of money has aroused in recent decades from various groups of people and various kinds of institutions. These currencies are at the heart of intense debates, which raise important, but often neglected, normative issues. The diversity of their goals, uses and charac-teristics is so large that it makes some preliminary distinctions necessary. This paper aims at provid-ing a proper background for the discussion of the possible merits and drawbacks of different kinds of currencies. It (...) proposes a classification that demarcates currencies according to how they relate to several crucial normative issues. Its aim is to show, for every type of currency, and as unambiguously as possible, to which side of these controversies it lies. (shrink)

Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) is often said to be the father of modern clinical psychiatry. He is most famous for being a committed pioneer and advocate of humanitarian methods in the treatment of the mentally ill, and for the development of a mode of psychological therapy known as moral treatment. Pinel also made important contributions to nosology and the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorder, especially the psychopathology of affectivity, stressing the role of the passions in mental disorder. Pinel also conducted (...) what may be considered one of the first large‐scale clinical trials in psychiatry and was also arguably the first to introduce the new statistical methods of the time to that domain. (shrink)

Bell’s theorem admits several interpretations or ‘solutions’, the standard interpretation being ‘indeterminism’, a next one ‘nonlocality’. In this article two further solutions are investigated, termed here ‘superdeterminism’ and ‘supercorrelation’. The former is especially interesting for philosophical reasons, if only because it is always rejected on the basis of extra-physical arguments. The latter, supercorrelation, will be studied here by investigating model systems that can mimic it, namely spin lattices. It is shown that in these systems the Bell inequality can be violated, (...) even if they are local according to usual definitions. Violation of the Bell inequality is retraced to violation of ‘measurement independence’. These results emphasize the importance of studying the premises of the Bell inequality in realistic systems. (shrink)

Dans cet article nous proposons une analyse d’un aspect peu évoqué du parcours de Genette, son séminaire de l’EHESS-Paris. Genette n’a pas explicité sa méthode, mais il avait constaté dans les années 1960 que l’enseignement universitaire était considéré comme une pratique neutre, et même un tabou, qui demandait à être historicisée et comprise dans sa portée idéologique. À partir d’une description des rituels et des modalités de son enseignement, nous analyserons le caractère spécifique de sa méthode de formation à la (...) recherche, en soulignant sa relation avec la tradition de l’EHESS. (shrink)

The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitive factors in emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical (...) framework for reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories is proposed. This is the Representational Theory of Emotion (RTE). A detailed case study of Antonio Damasio's important new contribution to emotion theory is presented in defense of the RTE. The paper is intended for readers interested in the foundations of emotion theory and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.

The rationale of patents on transgenic organisms leads to the startling notion of the human qua infringement. The moral reasons by which we may tenably reject such notion are not conclusive as to human life forms outside the body. A close look at recombinant DNA experimentation reveals ingenious processes, but not entities that the body lacks. Except for artificial genes, the genes of biotechnology are found on chromosomes, albeit nonconsecutively, and their uninterrupted transcripts appear in messenger RNA. An enhanced form (...) of protection for ingenious processes, the human methods patent, is proposed and defended as a replacement for product patents. The proposed patent would pertain to biotechnology manufacturing and genetic intervention in somatic and germ cells. A counterpart could govern nonhuman life forms. It is argued that compulsory licensing protections should be a condition of such patent. Contrary to the conservative assumption that statutory sobriquets suffice, the reckoning of what qualifies as a patentable ingenious process will continue to require systematic scientific guidance. (shrink)

Bertrand's random-chord paradox purports to illustrate the inconsistency of the principle of indifference when applied to problems in which the number of possible cases is infinite. This paper shows that Bertrand's original problem is vaguely posed, but demonstrates that clearly stated variations lead to different, but theoretically and empirically self-consistent solutions. The resolution of the paradox lies in appreciating how different geometric entities, represented by uniformly distributed random variables, give rise to respectively different nonuniform distributions of random chords, and hence (...) to different probabilities. The principle of indifference appears consistently applicable to infinite sets provided that problems can be formulated unambiguously. (shrink)

Purpose of review This review considers the literature on ethical and conceptual issues in eating disorders from the last 18 months. Some reference to earlier work is necessary in order to provide context for the recent findings from research that is ongoing. -/- Recent findings Empirical ethics research on anorexia nervosa includes novel ethical and conceptual findings on the role of authenticity and personal identity in individuals’ reports of their experience, as well as new evidence on the role of affective (...) states and values in decision making at later stages of the illness. Evidence points to the hypothesis that anorexia nervosa may be a distinct affective syndrome that organizes feelings and emotions in accordance with a fixed idea. -/- Summary There has been impressive progress in empirical ethics research on anorexia nervosa, with important implications for ethical and conceptual issues that surround decision-making capacity and our understanding of the illness. (shrink)

Ce texte a pour but de mettre en confrontation la conception ruyérienne de la philosophie avec la conception wittgensteinienne. L’opposition majeure consiste dans l’idée défendue par Ruyer selon laquelle on ne saurait concevoir ce qu’est l’esprit sans définir un domaine, intérieur au sujet, qu’on peut identifier avec sa subjectivité. Une telle idée est comprise par Ryle comme un mythe, celui de l’intériorité. Il y a en revanche une volonté commune à Ruyer et Wittgenstein de s’émanciper de la science. Deux thèmes (...) permettent alors de comparer les objectifs de Ruyer et ceux des philosophes wittgensteiniens : le thème des mythes en philosophie et celui de la traduction. (shrink)

Louis Dupré analyzes Romanticism as a unique cultural phenomenon and a spiritual revolution. This study completes his trilogy on European culture during the modern epoch.

Louis Charland's ‘Technological reason and the regulation of emotion’ focuses on a specific area, that of the emotions, in which he sees a problematic dominance of the technical attitude. He argues that our technologically oriented psychiatry has taken an instrumentalist approach to regulation of emotion that severely limits and distorts the role of emotion in psychiatric practice. A prominent example is the exclusion of moral judgments and values, emotion-laden aspects of experience, from psychotherapy because they do not fit the (...) technical model. To illustrate his point, Charland both contrasts the modern notion of emotion with the traditional notion of passion, and our contemporary practice of technically regulated emotion with the ‘moral treatment’ of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

The prevailing conception of language is often called "the received view." Though ubiquitous, Louis S. Berger demonstrates its flaws and the difficulties it raises for other disciplines, such as philosophy and physics. In Language and the Ineffable, Berger develops an unconventional model of human development: ontogenesis. A radical and generative feature of the model is the premise that the neonate's world is holistic, boundary-less, unimaginable, and impossible to describe; in other words, ineffable. This study unsettles the foundations of sacrosanct (...) beliefs about language and a host of other disciplines in the process. (shrink)

This study of the Jewish legal system (the Halakhah) demonstrates that the law embraces every corner of life.

How should moral sanctions and moral rewards - the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue - be employed to govern individuals' behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare? In the model that we examine, guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility. We also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their (...) use. We show that the moral sentiments should be used chiefly to control externalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a few individuals can be induced to behave well. We also contrast the optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal Pigouvian taxation and discuss extensions of our analysis. (shrink)

L'exposé cartésien de l'argument ontologique s'écarte radicalement de l'esprit originaire de la preuve, chez Saint Anselme. Le Dieu de Descartes, parfait parce que tout-puissant, est bien différent du Dieu du Proslogion, Celui qui est tel que rien de plus grand ne puisse être pensé, fin de la pensée et du désir humains. La preuve d'Anselme conceptualise une expérience humaine qui se pense comme l'expérience chrétienne orthodoxe, décrivant, de ce fait, l'homme en sa vérité. Mais on n'entrera pleinement dans la pensée (...) spéculative que si l'aspiration à Dieu en l'homme est considérée comme l'envers dialectique de l'amour, créateur de l'homme, en Dieu. Chez Hegel, ce n'est pas l'esprit fini qui accomplit la preuve ontologique, mais l'Esprit dans sa totalité. Ce mouvement de l'Esprit vers soi à travers sa division d'avec soi n'est pas un simple processus logique; en sa profondeur, il est le mouvement de réconciliation de la liberté humaine avec la liberté divine, créatrice et rédemptrice. La vérité de la Totalité, et donc, aussi, de l'histoire, dans le Concept, dit également la libre unification de l'homme et de Dieu dans et par la figure historique du Christ. Hegel pense le christianisme sans le réduire, parce qu'il le pense à partir de l'acte préalable de la foi, par lequel la liberté humaine s'ouvre à l'amour divin, posant ainsi l'unité dialectique du Tout. Que la foi puisse être rationnellement exposée ne l'empêche pas d'être la foi, c'est-à-dire la vie en union au Christ, Logos éternel et homme crucifié. On a dit: Un Dieu compris n'est plus un Dieu. Cela n'est vrai que des faux dieux. (shrink)