S'approprier un lieu pour l'habiter est un acte fondamental de l'homme. Mais ce que nous sommes, il nous faut aussi apprendre à le faire nôtre, en découvrant, exerçant et habitant nos possibilités. Cet espace intérieur est-il essentiellement celui de ma solitude, où nul autre ne peut pénétrer, ou peut-il être celui d'une hospitalité, un vide central où Dieu vient demeurer? Dans la continuité d'une tradition qui remonte à la Bible, nos diverses demeures (chambre, appartement, maison, temple, château...) ont permis de (...) figurer et de décrire l'intériorité humaine. Il s'agit de schèmes variés, tantôt pour explorer, tantôt pour construire notre personnalité, et par là pour penser le jeu de nos forces et de nos désirs, le déploiement de nos pensées et de nos actes, et en dégager des lois, selon une topique, du mot qui signifie la disposition des lieux. Une rupture et un renversement marquent cette histoire. La topique chrétienne, largement méconnue, forme un modèle diversifié et approfondi au long des siècles, lequel pose l'identité humaine comme habitable par une autre présence que la nôtre. A partir de la Renaissance, et depuis Montaigne jusqu'à Rousseau et Kant, tout comme dans la poésie et le roman, elle tend à s'effacer, avec son horizon mystique, au profit d'un face-à-face avec moi-même, tout en usant des mêmes schèmes. Ainsi se fondent l'identité moderne et la subjectivité. A travers la pensée de nombreux auteurs, de saint Augustin à sainte Thérèse d'Avila, d'Origène à Dante, de Baudelaire à Freud, ce livre décrit et médite, selon une généalogie, un axe oublié de la pensée de l'identité, lourd de questions toujours aiguës. (shrink)

Two essays, one by Althusser, the other by Balibar which were presented as papers at a seminar on Marx's "Capital" at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1965, and included al.

Introduction: Between Crisis and Closure One of the truisms of the history of French philosophy is that it was the importation of German philosophy, ...

Covering the major issues of the field succinctly and lucidly, this text takes an analytically rigorous approach and makes it accessible in presentation. Pojman writes from an impartial perspective, presenting various options and points of view while guiding students in their own search for truth over these often emotion-laden, crucial issues.

Among his own posthumously released drafts, one, at least, is incontestably neither mistake nor out-take: the text of his lecture course on Machiavelli, ...

In How to Be a Marxist in Philosophy one of the most famous Marxist philosophers of the 20th century shares his concept of what it means to function fruitfully as a political thinker within the discipline and environs of philosophy. This is the first English translation to Althusser's provocative and, often, controversial guide to being a true Marxist philosopher. Althusser argues that philosophy needs Marxism. It can't exist fully without it. Similarly, Marxism requires the rigour and structures of philosophy to (...) give it form and focus. He calls all thinking people to, 'Remember: a philosopher is a man who fights in theory, and when he understands the reasons for this fight, he joined the ranks of the struggle of workers and popular classes.' In short, this book comprises Althusser's elucidation of what praxis means and why it continues to matter. With a superb introduction from translator and Althusser archivist G.M. Goshgarian, this is a book that will re-inspire contemporary Marxist thought and reinvigorate our notions of what political activism can be. (shrink)

Empathy remains poorly understood, under-theorized, and subject to conflicting and opportunistic uses. Its systematic role in human experience has not been analyzed and interpreted from top to bottom. In this book, the author attempts to provide such an analysis in the philosophical traditions of hermeneutics, phenomenology, analytic philosophy of language, and psychoanalysis. applying his interpretation of empathy to the philosophical issues of intentionality, the emotions, and the checkered transformations of empathy itself. In doing so the author aims to rescue empathy (...) from the margins of intelligibility and reveal its central role in our understanding of the emotions, the integrity of our relations with others, and human community (“intersubjectivity”). -/- The work draws on both the Anglo-American (“analytic”) tradition of ordinary language philosophy and the continental ones of phenomenology and hermeneutics. This work follows the movement of empathy from the periphery of ethics, aesthetics, and theory of mind to a key place in establishing and maintaining the integrity and emotional equilibrium of dynamic interrelations with other individuals. Beginning with the philosophical infrastructure of the hermeneutics of empathy, this work thoroughly explains the complex architecture of empathy, tracing it downward through the levels of authentic human interrelations, empathy with unexpressed emotions, the empathic penetrability of cognitively impenetrable affect, the first-ever intentional analysis of both the empathizer and the “empathasand” in interrelation, and the hermeneutic infrastructure. The consequences of empathy are exposed in the context of the emotions, cognitive impenetrability, empathy and altruism, and the intentionality of empathy as accessed through language and story telling. Drawing on the multi-method approach of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and story telling, this work demonstrates that empathy forms the foundation for community in ways not clearly appreciated in the on-going debate. In a bootstrap operation that is guided by Heidegger’s call for a “special hermeneutic of empathy,” this work achieves a delicate balancing act of unpacking the rich intellectual traditions from which empathy - the phenomenon itself, not the concept - emerged historically. The result is an exposure of the deep structure of empathy as a fundamentally human capability for creating possibilities of community and human relations. (shrink)

Louis Dupré analyzes Romanticism as a unique cultural phenomenon and a spiritual revolution. This study completes his trilogy on European culture during the modern epoch.

The concept of desert, which once enjoyed a central place in political and ethical theory, has been relegated to the margins of much of contemporary theory, if not excluded altogether. Recently a renewed interest in the topic has emerged, and several philosophers have argued that the notion merits a more central place in political and ethical theory. Some of these philosophers contend that justice exists to the extent that people receive exactly what they deserve, while others argue that desert should (...) replace such considerations as rights, need, and equality as the basis for distributions. Still others argue that morality involves a fitting match between one's moral character and a degree of happiness. All of these positions have encountered opposition from egalitarians, libertarians, and those who are skeptical about the coherence of the concept of desert. The first anthology of its kind, What Do We Deserve? is a balanced collection of readings that brings sharply opposing positions and arguments together and stimulates debate over the meaning and significance of desert in current thought. The book begins with eight classical readings on desert (by Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Smith, Kant, Mill, Sidgwick, and Ross), and later turns to contemporary interpretations of the issue. The selections examine the concept itself, analyze its relationship to the ideas of freedom and responsibility, engage in the debate between John Rawls and his critics on the merits of desert, and, finally, study the wider role and significance of desert in political and ethical theory. (shrink)

The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The author states that brain and neurochemical systems are involved in addiction. He also suggests that neuroscience can link the diseased brain processes in addiction to the moral struggles of the addicts.

Purpose of review This review considers the literature on ethical and conceptual issues in eating disorders from the last 18 months. Some reference to earlier work is necessary in order to provide context for the recent findings from research that is ongoing. -/- Recent findings Empirical ethics research on anorexia nervosa includes novel ethical and conceptual findings on the role of authenticity and personal identity in individuals’ reports of their experience, as well as new evidence on the role of affective (...) states and values in decision making at later stages of the illness. Evidence points to the hypothesis that anorexia nervosa may be a distinct affective syndrome that organizes feelings and emotions in accordance with a fixed idea. -/- Summary There has been impressive progress in empirical ethics research on anorexia nervosa, with important implications for ethical and conceptual issues that surround decision-making capacity and our understanding of the illness. (shrink)

Dans la perspective ouverte par Schopenhauer, la représentation tient son sens et sa limite, d’être la visibilité de la volonté. Mais, ce qui s’ouvre avec lui, est désormais pris dans la perspective de la logique de la déconsidération de toute transcendance, et s’inscrit dans la perspective de l’immanence absolue. Jean Baudrillard interroge ce moment du décrochage de la représentation d’avec son essence porteuse, qui ne laisse plus cours qu’à une représentation réduite à n’être qu’un simulacr...

The fact that Greek ζ = Indo-European j in the words ζειαί, ζέω, ζxs22EFλος, ζόρξ, ζυγόν, S0009838800022941_inline1, and ζωρός may be regarded as fairly well established , despite the counter-arguments of Sommer.

The York Retreat is famous in the histor y of nineteenth-centur y psychiatr y because of its association with moral treatment. Although there exists a substantial historical literature on the evolution of moral treatment at the Retreat, several interpretive problems continue to obscure its unique therapeutic legacy. The nature of moral treatment as practised at the Retreat will be clarified and discussed in a historical perspective. It will be argued that moral treatment at the Retreat was pr imar ily a (...) matter of affective conditioning guided by `benevolent theory'. (shrink)