The relation between leibniz's logical and his metaphysical views is the subject of much modern scholarship. Some commentators have argued that his metaphysics is based on his logic; others have taken the opposite position. However, Both sides pose the question in terms of 'priority'. On the contrary, I argue that it is likely that leibniz means the psr to play "both" a logical and a metaphysical role. The ambiguity of leibniz's psr indicates that he equates the metaphysical notion of causation (...) with the logical notion of deduction. The psr's ambiguity results less from any confusion on leibniz's part between the notions of cause and reason, Than from his desire to identify logic and metaphysics. That identity is achieved not by reducing one to the other, But by incorporating them on an equal basis into a single discipline. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz möchte zeigen, daß Leibniz Freiheit nur in dem Sinne Kontingenz voraussetzt, daß andere Handlungsweisen als absolut möglich denkbar sein müssen. Freiheit besteht nicht in der bloßen Illusion, daß unsere Handlungen nicht durch unseren vollständigen Begriff verursacht und bestimmt sind, sondern in der epistemischen Möglichkeit des Handelnden, anders zu handeln. Für endliche Wesen impliziert diese epistemische Möglichkeit die Unkenntnis des göttlichen Plans. Für Gott ist sie begründet in dem intellektuellen Bewußtsein, daß die Handlungen von seinem Willen, der aufgrund der (...) göttlichen Vollkommenheit stets das Beste wählt, abhängen. Daher wählt Gott die beste der möglichen Welten. Gott ist sich bewußt, daß er eine andere mögliche Welt erschaffen könnte, wenn er wollte, aber gleichzeitig ist er sich bewußt, daß er das niemals wollen wird. (shrink)

La plupart des commentateurs interprète le principe de l'identité des indiscernables comme principe purement logique, mais avec des implications métaphysiques, et donc, selon l'interprétation commune, comme fausseté ou vérité contingente ou triviale. Je soutiens, au contraire, que le principe, selon Leibniz, est vrai, mais que cette vérité n'est triviale ni contingente, mais nécessaire dans un sens métaphysique. Leibniz tent à démontrer la nécessité du principe dans deux manières : une manière logique et une manière métaphysique . Je soutiens que seule (...) la manière métaphysique peut réussir, et que la négligeance de cette manière aboutit au malentendu de ce principe. (shrink)

The daughter of Ralph Cudworth, and friend of John Locke, Damaris Masham was also a philosopher in her own right. She published two, philosophical books, A Discourse Concerning the Love of God and Occasional Thoughts In Reference to a Virtuous and Christian Life. Her primary purpose was to refute John Norris' Malebranchian doctrine that we ought to love only God because only God can give us pleasure, and his criticism of Locke. In addition, she argues for greater educational opportunities for (...) women, and an end to the double standard in sexual morality. Recent feminist literature has suggested that women and men may take different ethical and epistemological stands based on differences between the 'female experience', and the 'male experience'. While leaving aside questions pertaining to the accuracy of these suggestions, this paper discusses some aspects of Masham's thought which might be considered representative of the 'female experience.'. (shrink)

This is a unique, groundbreaking study in the history of philosophy, combining leading men and women philosophers across 2600 years of Western philosophy, covering key foundational topics, including epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Introductory essays, primary source readings, and commentaries comprise each chapter to offer a rich and accessible introduction to and evaluation of these vital philosophical contributions. A helpful appendix canvasses an extraordinary number of women philosophers throughout history for further discovery and study.

This chapter begins with a brief examination of the life of Damaris Cudworth Masham. Section II focuses on her philosophical writing including her correspondence, her ideas on the relationship of faith and reason, her views on reason and women’s education and possible feminist aspects of her views on morality and epistemology.

I conclude that it is more accurate to say that, rather than trying to make logic metaphysical, Leibniz tries, in the context of a theistic system, to make metaphysics logical. ;I begin with a study of the principle of identity of indiscernibles, and show how it is best thought of as a principle which follows from a metaphysical interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason. It has been traditional to interpret the principle of identity of indiscernibles as primarily a merely (...) logical principle, and thus as either trivially true, if Leibniz succeeds in proving it, or else false or contingently true. I argue that it is instead necessarily true in a non-trivial or metaphysical sense, because the principles on which it is based are themselves of this metaphysical character, contrary to what is often assumed. ;In the second chapter, I show how God's activity and a metaphysical interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason underlie Leibniz's account of space and time. ;In the third chapter, I discuss the principle of sufficient reason in detail, showing that it actually consists of three separate principles: the principle of grounds, that every true proposition has a proof a priori; the principle of reason, that God does nothing without a sufficient reason; and the principle of causation, that every event has a cause. That each of these is considered a principle of sufficient reason is explained by Leibniz's equivocal use of the term 'reason.' I show that, of the various versions of the principle of sufficient reason, only the principle of reasons provides an adequate foundation for Leibniz's principle of identity of indiscernibles and theory of space and time. Furthermore, since chapters one and two show how the activity of God is presupposed by Leibniz's metaphysics, for Leibniz to derive his metaphysics from his logic, as some would have us suppose, he would have to provide a satisfactory a priori demonstration of God's existence. But this, I argue, he cannot do. Thus God's existence and rationality, rather than subject-predicate logic, are the foundations of Leibniz's metaphysics. ;It is commonplace, when writing about Leibniz, to give primacy to his logic over his metaphysics, and indeed to try to assimilate the latter to the former. In this essay, however, I give priority to Leibniz's metaphysical pronouncements, apart, as much as possible, from logical and linguistic considerations. (shrink)