This paper aims to investigate the differences between the concepts of libel and slander as understood by the Polish statutory and English common law. As it turns out, the above terms are not only divergent with regard to language but also with regard to corresponding acts in the real world. Western cultures cherish such values as dignity, honour and self-fulfillment as the underlying rights of a citizen in democratic countries. The above terms are being constantly referred to in (...) international treaties and conventions but the question which should be asked is whether they receive due attention in legal practice. As regards interpretation, not only in theory, but also in practice the important issue is not how the defamatory statement makes the person referred to feel, but the impression it is likely to make on those reading it. The subsequent analysis of particular cases in the practical part supports the above claim. Although it is reiterated by the Polish legal academics that civil regulations are not sufficient to guarantee legal protection of dignity, there is an equal or even greater amount of supporters of the broadly conceived “freedom of speech”. The discussion might be summarized as involving the proponents of liberal and democratic policies on the one hand, and those who wish to avoid complete decriminalization of libel and slander and deem them necessary components of balance in a democratic state. (shrink)

Ḥeleḳ 1. Hilkhot kibud av ṿa-em u-khevod rabo -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hilkhot lashon ha-raʻ u-rekhilut ʻal ha-Ḥ. ḥ. ṿe-ʻinyene emet ṿe-sheḳer.

Ḥeleḳ 1. Hilkhot kibud av ṿa-em u-khevod rabo -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hilkhot lashon ha-raʻ u-rekhilut ʻal ha-Ḥ. ḥ. ṿe-ʻinyene emet ṿe-sheḳer.

H.L.A. Hart objects to John Rawls’s liberty principle by drawing attention to how our legal system accepts the restriction of liberty to protect against other harms than liberty-deprivation, such as by laws against slander, libel, and publications which grossly infringe privacy. What is the solution for John Rawls, faced with this criticism? One solution is, by the reflective equilibrium method, to justify abandoning the judgment that these actions are immoral.

On countering slander, religious hate speech, and blasphemy from Islamic perspectives to build religious harmony in Indonesia.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools produce hallucinations exposing developers and users to a myriad of liabilities in courts. Given the absence of strict laws and regulations structuring how Generative AI content interact with potential allegations of defamation, libel, and slander, judges and attorneys are left with the semiotics of the fragmented articles and rules in each system attempting to settle such cases. The endless interpretations of written and non-verbal signs in the law across the world constitutes a new (...) realm for legal semiotics in the area of Generative AI and defamation. The present analysis examines existing civil liability articles in the Jordanian code to shed light on the litigation and defenses afforded in the defamation realm with respect to Generative AI content. The key finding is that like other countries, civil codes in Jordan are outdated concerning Generative AI content opening a plethora of liability scenarios in libel or slander cases. More importantly, the exercise of semiotic interpretation generates several defenses salvaging users and developers under strict sets of conditions. In sum, new amendments and updated legislative frameworks are needed to protect the healthy development of Generative AI while preserving citizens from damaging defamation, libel, and slander. (shrink)

We are accustomed to the claim that appropriate backing must be available if criticism is to be justifiable. For example, if someone criticises a film he must be prepared to cite the criteria he is using and to show how they are or are not satisfied by the film. Such processes of evaluation have frequently been investigated: what has been less thoroughly sexplored is the right to criticise itself. Certainly, questions of the appropriate backing for critical utterances have bearing on (...) the right to criticise , for one way of denying that a person has that right is to deny that he can provide the appropriate backing for his criticism. But the question of his right is a wider one, since the attempt to criticise may be blocked before the question of backing can arise at all. It is therefore worthwhile to explore the right to criticise with a view to discovering in what circum-stances it is defeasible. I shall be concerned mainly with the moral right to criticise as investigation of the legal right would raise issues for specialists in the laws of libel and slander. (shrink)

Mahloket [dispute] has been part of the human experience since time immemorial. Upon departure from the Garden of Eden the first mahloket arose between Cain and Abel - a conflict that ultimately led to bloodshed. Ever since, the phenomenon of mahloket has been a fact of life¿ The state of mahloket nowadays is lamentable. Debates on the internet are aggressive, even violent, seemingly governed solely by the law of the jungle. A terrible litany of personal attacks, lies, distortions, slander, (...) invasion of privacy, and an overall lack of civility abound¿ We are facing a critical threat to humanity in general, and to the State of Israel, the Jewish nation, and the Torah in particular.After years of exploring the topic of mahloket - recognizing its importance, its benefits, and its destructive potential - Rabbi Yuval Cherlow presents LeShem Shamayim, an ambitious and groundbreaking work on the ethics of public discourse. Drawing upon both the culture of debate embodied by generations of Jewish Sages and upon principles of postmodernism, Rabbi Cherlow has written a comprehensive code of ethics for conducting fair, productive discourse. (shrink)

Libel played an important and extraordinary role in early modern conflict culture. The article discusses their functions and the way they were assessed in court. The case study illustrates argumentative spaces and different levels of normative references in libel trials in 16th century electoral Saxony. In 1569, Andreas Langener – in consequence of a long stagnating private conflict – posted several libels against the nobleman Tham Pflugk in different public places in the city of Dresden. Consequently, he was (...) arrested and charged with ‘libelling’. Depending on the reference to conflicting social and legal norms, he had therefore been either threatened with corporal punishment including his execution, or rewarded with laudations. In this case, the act of libelling could be seen as slander, but also as a service to the community, which Langener had informed about potentially harmful transgression of norms. While the common good was the highest maxim, different and sometimes conflicting legally protected interests had to be discussed. The situational decision depended on whether the articulated charges where true and relevant for the public, on the invective language, and especially on the quality and size of the public sphere reached by the libel. (shrink)

?Negative? and ?positive? liberty are not distinct types of freedom. They represent distinct points of stress within the one logical matrix. The abstract logical formula for liberty is taken to be ?A is free from x to do y?, where ?from x? is taken to implicate ?to do y?, and vice versa. By contrast, concrete cases of freedom ('rights'), such as ?from hunger? or ?to speak?, are taken always to contradict other concrete cases, such as property rights or defences against (...) libel, slander, or ?hate speech? more generally. As all rights are expressions of liberty, however mutually contradictory, we cannot appeal to liberty per se as a principle enabling us to mediate between them. Liberty pre?eminent, or indeed alone, seems too brittle to contain the alienation or anomie of modernity. It may now be necessary, philosophically, to decoct the glue of empathy, of friendship and, by extension, equality. (shrink)

The first comprehensive account of Nietzsche's views of Jews and Judaism For more than a century, Nietzsche's views about Jews and Judaism have been subject to countless polemics. The Nazis infamously fashioned the philosopher as their anti-Semitic precursor, while in the past thirty years the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. The increasingly popular view today is that Nietzsche was not only completely free of racist tendencies but also was a principled adversary of anti-Jewish thought. Nietzsche’s Jewish (...) Problem offers a definitive reappraisal of the controversy, taking the full historical, intellectual, and biographical context into account. As Robert Holub shows, a careful consideration of all the evidence from Nietzsche’s published and unpublished writings and letters reveals that he harbored anti-Jewish prejudices throughout his life. Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem demonstrates how this is so despite the apparent paradox of the philosopher’s well-documented opposition to the crude political anti-Semitism of the Germany of his day. As Holub explains, Nietzsche’s "anti-anti-Semitism" was motivated more by distaste for vulgar nationalism than by any objection to anti-Jewish prejudice. A richly detailed account of a controversy that goes to the heart of Nietzsche’s reputation and reception, Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem will fascinate anyone interested in philosophy, intellectual history, or the history of anti-Semitism. (shrink)

Any thoughtful reading of Levinas must grapple with what is implied by his notion that the Other is “higher” than the self — that the Other is “one for whom I can do all and to whom I owe all”? (EI 89). At least two evident issues arise when we wonder what it would mean to live with and by this notion. Without fail, newcomers to Levinas’s ideas raise these two issues. The first centers on the question: What is my (...) responsibility to strangers? That is, if I “owe all” to a stranger in need to the point where his or her welfare and life come before mine, how can I possibly address the interests of my loved ones, friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens, not to mention my own needs? Moreover, is Levinas suggesting that we have a moral duty to be saints? The second issue revolves around the question: What is the responsibility of a victim toward her persecutor? This can easily lead to asking, is Levinas implying that a Jew being herded off to Auschwitz “owes everything” tohis Nazi captor? Also, what can it mean for a victim to encounter the face of a rapist and to “substitute” herself for him? And should she? I shall approach these persistent issues by first explaining how Levinas grounds his claims that the face-to-face-relationship is asymmetrical and that “I am responsible for the Other, without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it” (EI 98). (shrink)

Scholars have long acknowledged the cultural and political significance attached to the fashioning of Israelite identity in Ethiopia. Insufficiently appreciated, however, is the extent to which the claim of descent from Jacob’s seed turned on its head the supersessionist paradigm that had come to prevail everywhere else in the Christian ecumene. Ethiopia invented for itself a biological Israelite genealogy, assuming the mantle of chosen peoplehood literally to become carnal Israel. How to reconcile the prestige of Israelite ancestry according to the (...) flesh with the Christian doctrine of spiritual inheritance according to the promise? How to channel Old Testament ritual into a national religious consciousness while at the same time repelling even the intimation of tainted kinship with the Jews? Visual evidence from late thirteenth-century wall paintings and fifteenth-century manuscripts demonstrates that the greater the investment in Solomonic succession, the translocation of Zion, and the embrace of Old Testament practices, the sharper the antithesis between becoming “Israel” and becoming “Jewish”. (shrink)

Robert Holub’s book, Nietzsche’s Jewish Problem: Between Anti-Semitism and Anti-Judaism, fundamentally concerns two topics: Was Nietzsche the man anti-Jewish? Was he somehow responsible for inspiring anti-Semites and particularly fascists and Nazis? These are different issues—one of biography, the other of reception—and Holub would have been advised not to link them in a single volume. Nonetheless, one reason for the connection is immediately evident. Holub distinguishes between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism, separating them before discussing their interplay. He conceives the first (...) as a nationalist political movement opposed to Jews, and the second as prejudices against Jews at a personal level.... (shrink)

In 1848, the _Götheborgs Dagblad _newspaper was revived after a ten-year gap, and launched the anonymous submission column entitled ‘Anonyma Lådan’ (the Anonymous Box). In January and February 1849, many antisemitic letters and articles were published in the Swedish newspapers. Some letters defending Jews and Judaism were published in both ‘Anonyma Lådan’ and _Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning_. Short of blood libel, the antisemitic side accused Jews of typical anti-Jewish stereotypes: for example, greed, hypocrisy and Jewish hatred of Christianity. (...) Anti-antisemitic writers proclaimed a Christian identity that was based on humanism, stating that one could not be a true Christian if one attacked and hated Jews and Judaism. The Jewish congregation in Gothenburg and the society Judiska Intresset (The Jewish Cause) both chose a non-engaged approach to the antisemitic attacks in the newspaper, since it was not respectable to engage in such debates and, in their view, it would only cause more anti-Jewish sentiments if they did so. In this art­icle, it is argued that the reasons behind the attacks were societal changes, but also, more importantly, that with ‘Anonyma Lådan’, antisemitic sentiments found a platform where such sentiments could be freely expressed. (shrink)