Lexical semantics has become a major research area within computational linguistics, drawing from psycholinguistics, knowledge representation, computer algorithms and architecture. Research programmes whose goal is the definition of large lexicons are asking what the appropriate representation structure is for different facets of lexical information. Among these facets, semantic information is probably the most complex and the least explored.Computational Lexical Semantics is one of the first volumes to provide models for the creation of various kinds of computerised lexicons (...) for the automatic treatment of natural language, with applications to machine translation, automatic indexing, and database front-ends, knowledge extraction, among other things. It focuses on semantic issues, as seen by linguists, psychologists, and computer scientists. Besides describing academic research, it also covers ongoing industrial projects. (shrink)

We revisit a typological puzzle due to Horn (Doctoral Dissertation, UCLA, 1972) regarding the lexicalization of logical operators: in instantiations of the traditional square of opposition across categories and languages, the O corner, corresponding to ‘nand’ (= not and), ‘nevery’ (= not every), etc., is never lexicalized. We discuss Horn’s proposal, which involves the interaction of two economy conditions, one that relies on scalar implicatures and one that relies on markedness. We observe that in order to express markedness and to (...) account for a bigger typological puzzle, namely the absence of lexicalizations of ‘XOR’ (= exclusive or), ‘all-or-none’, and many other imaginable logical operators, one must restrict the basic lexicalizable elements to a small set of primitives. We suggest that an ordering based perspective, following Keenan and Faltz (Boolean semantics for natural language, 1985), makes the stipulated primitives that we arrive at more natural. We also propose a modification to Horn’s proposal, based on recent work on implicatures, in which only the implicature condition is operative and in which markedness is part of the definition of the alternatives for scalar implicatures rather than an independent condition. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes between definiteness and determinacy. Definiteness is seen as a morphological category which, in English, marks a uniqueness presupposition, while determinacy consists in denoting an individual. Definite descriptions are argued to be fundamentally predicative, presupposing uniqueness but not existence, and to acquire existential import through general type-shifting operations that apply not only to definites, but also indefinites and possessives. Through these shifts, argumental definite descriptions may become either determinate or indeterminate. The latter option is observed in examples like (...) ‘Anna didn’t give the only invited talk at the conference’, which, on its indeterminate reading, implies that there is nothing in the extension of ‘only invited talk at the conference’. The paper also offers a resolution of the issue of whether possessives are inherently indefinite or definite, suggesting that, like indefinites, they do not mark definiteness lexically, but like definites, they typically yield determinate readings due to a general preference for the shifting operation that produces them. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the results of two experiments, one off-line (acceptability judgment) and the other on-line (eye-tracking), targeting Object Cleft (OC) constructions. In both experiments, we used the same materials presenting a manipulation on person features: second person plural pronouns and plural definite determiners alternate in introducing a full NP (“it was [ DP1 the/you [ NP bankers]] i that [ DP2 the/you [ NP lawyers]] have avoided _ i at the party”) in a language, Italian, with overt (...) person (and number) subject-verb agreement. As results, we first observed that the advantage of the bare pronominal forms reported in previous experiments (Gordon et al., 2001 ; Warren and Gibson, 2005, a.o.) is lost when the full NP (the “lexical restriction” in Belletti and Rizzi, 2013 ) is present. Second, an advantage for the mismatch condition, Art 1 -Pro 2, in which the focalized subject is introduced by the determiner and the OC subject by the pronoun, as opposed to the matching Pro 1 -Pro 2 condition, is observed, both off-line (higher acceptability and accuracy in answering comprehension questions after eyetracking) and on-line (e.g., smaller number of regressions from the subject region); third, we found a relevant difference between acceptability and accuracy in comprehension questions: despite similar numerical patterns in both off-line measures, the difference across conditions in accuracy is mostly not significant, while it is significant in acceptability. Moreover, while the matching condition Pro 1 -Pro 2 is perceived as nearly ungrammatical (far below the mean acceptability across-conditions), the accuracy in comprehension is still high (close to 80%). To account for these facts, we compare different formal competence and processing models that predict difficulties in OC constructions: similarity-based (Gordon et al., 2001, a.o.), memory load (Gibson, 1998 ), and intervention-based (Friedmann et al., 2009 ) accounts are compared to processing oriented ACT-R-based predictions (Lewis and Vasishth, 2005 ) and to top-down Minimalist derivations (Chesi, 2015 ). We conclude that most of these approaches fail in making predictions able to reconcile the competence and the performance perspective in a coherent way to the exception of the top-down model that is able to predict correctly both the on-line and the off-line main effects obtained. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor (Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) famously argued that lexical concepts are unstructured. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of both the classical approach to concepts and Fodor's conceptual atomism, I argue that some lexical concepts are, in fact, structured. Roughly stated, I argue that structured lexical concepts bear a necessary biconditional entailment relation to their structural constituents. I develop this account of the structure of lexical concepts within (...) the framework of Pavel Tichy's (The foundations of Frege's logic. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1988) theory of constructions. I argue that concepts are constructions which can be combined by way of Tichy's construction-forming operations of composition and closure and an additional operation, simplification, which I propose in section 6. The last of these construction-forming operations plays a central role in my account of lexical concept structure. Stated generally, structured lexical concepts are a result of simplifying their structural constituents. (shrink)

The sounds that make up spoken words are heard in a series and must be mapped rapidly onto words in memory because their elements, unlike those of visual words, cannot simultaneously exist or persist in time. Although theories agree that the dynamics of spoken word recognition are important, they differ in how they treat the nature of the competitor set—precisely which words are activated as an auditory word form unfolds in real time. This study used eye tracking to measure the (...) impact over time of word frequency and 2 partially overlapping competitor set definitions: onset density and neighborhood density. Time course measures revealed early and continuous effects of frequency (facilitatory) and on set based similarity (inhibitory). Neighborhood density appears to have early facilitatory effects and late inhibitory effects. The late inhibitory effects are due to differences in the temporal distribution of similarity within neighborhoods. The early facilitatory effects are due to subphonemic cues that inform the listener about word length before the entire word is heard. The results support a new conception of lexical competition neighborhoods in which recognition occurs against a background of activated competitors that changes over time based on fine-grained goodness-of-fit and competition dynamics. (shrink)

Natural language does not express all connectives definable in classical logic as simple lexical items. Coordination in English is expressed by conjunction and, disjunction or, and negated disjunction nor. Other languages pattern similarly. Non-lexicalized connectives are typically expressed compositionally: in English, negated conjunction is typically expressed by combining negation and conjunction (not both). This is surprising: if $$\wedge $$ ∧ and $$\vee $$ ∨ are duals, and the negation of the latter can be expressed lexically (nor), why not the (...) negation of the former? I present a two-tiered model of the semantics of the binary connectives. The first tier captures the expressive power of the lexicon: it is a bilateral state-based semantics that, under a restriction, can express all and only the distinctions that can be expressed by the lexicon of natural language (and, or, nor). This first tier is characterized by rejection as non-assertion and a Neglect Zero assumption. The second tier is obtained by dropping the Neglect Zero assumption and enforcing a stronger notion of rejection, thereby recovering classical logic and thus definitions for all Boolean connectives. On the two-tiered model, we distinguish the limited expressive resources of the lexicon and the greater combinatorial expressive power of the language as a whole. This gives us a logic-based account of compositionality for the Boolean fragment of the language. (shrink)

Definition is viewed in this paper as a cohesive element of theory, providing links between scientific constructs. The problem is approached first in terms of three orders--the historical, the logical, and the heuristic--in which the structure of science may be put together; a study of these is necessary if difficulties about priority of definition are to be resolved. The main part of the paper is devoted to an exercise in theory-construction which illustrates the five principal functions of definition--the grounding of (...) constructs in observation, their descriptive interrelation, the development of logico-mathematical calculi, the interpretation of these calculi, and the provision of precise, quasi-mathematical relations between the constructs themselves. Reference is made throughout to the many names for the defining process found in earlier works, and problems of contextual definition, reduction, stipulative and lexical definition, etc., are dealt with briefly. The theory thus constructed is represented diagrammatically. It is shown that the analysis may be simplified, in general terms, by the use of two new categories, "internal" and "external" definition; and that this innovation may prove helpful in clarifying some traditional obscurities, and in preserving a necessary balance between a purely logical and a purely empirical approach to the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Following the formation of disciplines/sciences in different fields of Islamic thought, the specific concepts and terminologies of these disciplines/sciences began to emerge. Then the special meaning and the area of utilization for every concept in each discipline/science were further clarified by compiling specific epistles of definition (ḥudūd), which would contribute to this process of conceptualization. For the terminological meaning of the used concept to be determined primarily and thus for the followed theological/sectarian affiliation to be supported, works belonging to this (...) genre have been written specifically for the field of theology. Especially, the Muʿtazilī theologians undoubtedly made the greatest contribution. Thusly, specific treatises containing theological concepts were compiled by names such as al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), and his students Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (d. after 420/1029) and Ibn Sharwīn (fl. first half of the Vth/XIth century). Zaydī theologian and jurist Abū’l-Qāsim al-Bustī’s (d. 420/1029) Tahdhīb al-ḥudūd, which has no available copy, is also contemporary to the mentioned works. This tradition found its reflection in the Imāmī-Muʿtazilī line in Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 460/1067) al-Muqaddimah fī l-madkhal ilá ṣināʿat ʿilm al-kalām, which could be seen as a concise theological work in terms of its construct and the explanations which it comprises, and in the work called al-Ḥudūd wa-l-ḥaqāʾiq, which is attributed to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍá (d. 436/1044). Abū Jaʿfar al-Muqrī al-Nīsābūrī’s (d. mid-VIth/XIIth century [?]) al-Ḥudūd stands out as the most voluminous example in this tradition. The most important work belonging to this genre in the Muʿtazilī tradition, as it is the first among the available works, is the Ḥudūd al-alfāẓ of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, which is found together with some other important Zaydī-Muʿtazilī works in a compilation discovered by us and thought to be lost until recently. In this treatise, which generally includes theological concepts and partially includes the concepts of Islamic law and the history of sects, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār has put forward a language-based definition theory. His approach here is in line with the views he put forward on definition in his al-Mughnī. Accordingly, instead of definition (ḥadd) and description (rasm) carried out over five universals in classical logic, he adopted a method of lexical definition based on wording that agrees with the meaning of the concept in question and is clearer than it, and consequently gave a brief definition and explanation of the concept he deals with. This clearly shows that the previous Muʿtazilī theologians’ approach of language-based definition, which was used as an alternative to the conception of Aristotelian definition due to their distanced stance to philosophy was also inherited by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. The approach seen in some sources in the period following al-Qāḍī, such as Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī’s al-Ḥudūd, also indicates his influence. (shrink)

Definitions may seem marginal to the sociological enterprise but can be very useful; however, they can also lead to serious errors. Examples of both are given in this article. Different types of definitions are presented, and their relevance for sociology is highlighted. A stipulative definition, for example, is very useful in sociology, as opposed to lexical and ostensive definitions. The definition of a concept that is used in a sociological analysis has to be sociological in nature, (...) and the concept cannot have the same meaning as it has in everyday language. Additional items to bear in mind when a definition is put together are discussed, including some tips on how to proceed that come from political science (Sartori, Collier, Goertz). A definition can also be very helpful in the research process itself by indicating which are the important aspects of some phenomenon to focus on (Weber, Blumer). On the negative side, a term that is not properly defined may lead to misunderstandings as well as to a false sense of agreement with other uses of the term. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that the progressive interpretation in Ga is an effect of the interaction between the imperfective aspect and a definite description of events. Crucially, the data from Ga point to the consequences of the view that definite descriptions of events encode the familiarity of the discourse referent and its uniqueness in bearing the property in question. Namely, they yield direct evidentiality and the necessary ongoingness of the event at the topic time. Thus, the paper identifies previously unattested variation (...) in the semantics of the progressive in a cross-linguistic perspective and shows that not only lexical but also grammatical aspect exhibits striking parallelisms with the nominal domain. (shrink)

Estonian doesn't have a definite article. Instead, bare singular noun phrases can unambiguously bear either a definite interpretation or an indefinite interpretation. This paper argues that the pragmatic principles governing the felicitous use of three English articles ("a", "the" and "another"), described by A Grønn and KJ Sæbø (2012, 'A, the, another: A game of same and different' Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21, 75-95) can also account for the conditions under which a bare singular noun phrase in Estonian (...) bears a definite or instead an indefinite interpretation. The two languages use the same pragmatic principles to determine the definiteness interpretation of a noun phrase. The difference is just that in English (where definiteness meanings have been lexicalized) these pragmatic principles govern the felicity of article use, whereas in Estonian they govern the interpretation of a bare singular noun phrase. (shrink)

In this paper we reconsider the issue of free choice and the role of the wh-morphology employed in it. We show that the property of being an interrogative wh-word alone is not sufficient for free choice, and that semantic and sometimes even morphological definiteness is a pre-requisite for some free choice items (FCIs) in certain languages, e.g. in Greek and Mandarin Chinese. We propose a theory that explains the polarity behaviour of FCIs cross-linguistically, and allows indefinite (Giannakidou 2001) as well (...) as definite-like FCIs. The difference is manifested as a lexical distinction in English between any (indefinite) and wh-ever (definite); in Greek it appears as a choice between a FCI nominal modifier (taking an NP argument), which illustrates the indefinite option, and a FC free relative illustrating the definite one. We provide a compositional analysis of Greek FCIs in both incarnations, and derive in a parallel manner the Chinese FCIs. Here the definite versus indefinite alternation is manifested in the presence or absence of dōu, which we take to express the maximality operator. It is thus shown that what we see in the morphology of FCIs in Greek is reflected in syntax in Chinese. Our analysis has important consequences for the class of so-called wh-indeterminates. In the context of current proposals, free choiceness is taken to come routinely from interrogative semantics, and wh-indeterminates are treated as question words which can freely become FCIs (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002). Our results from Mandarin and Greek emphasize that wh-indeterminates do not form a uniform class in this respect, and that interrogative semantics alone cannot predict either sensitivity of free choice to definiteness, or the polarity behaviour of FCIs. (shrink)

This article examines several answers to the question, can lexical definitions be true or false.

Associé à l’instabilité et à l’insaisissable, mais aussi aux liens et contacts multiples, le concept d’entre-deux semble échapper à toute définition construite sur des oppositions binaires. Il figure parmi les notions à la mode. Nous semblons innover « entre ». L’« entre-deux » nous intéresse comme image heuristique. Parce que le lexique est source de questionnement, laboratoire ou observatoire de nos imaginaires, nous proposons ici une exploration lexicale de cet « entre-deux ». Elusive, associated to the instability, but also to (...) multiple relationship and contacts, the concept of in-between seems to decline any definition built on binary oppositions. This notion is in fashion. It seems that we innovate “between”. The in-between interests us greatly as metaphor and heuristic image. Because the vocabulary originates questions, and appears as a laboratory or an observatory of ours imaginaries, we want to explore the vocabulary of the in-between. (shrink)

This paper explores the distribution and semantics of the reversative affix _un-_ and the restitutive affix _re-_, and overall makes a new proposal about the lexical semantics of verbs. I argue that these affixes tell a story of derivational morphology that is based not on categorization of verbs into neat aspectual and decompositional classes, but on the result of the verb’s action on the object and whether or not such a result state permits reversal and restitution. The argument structure (...) of these affixes shows us that morphology interacts with semantics in a true compositional sense, whereby the affectedness of the object is a crucial factor in determining compatibility and composition. I propose an approach to verb meaning that encodes this important information as outcomes: the lifespan properties of the object after the action occurs on it. I propose, formulating the Verb-Root-Outcomes framework, that all verb roots come equipped with sets of outcomes. A wide array of verbs that have been classified as ‘change-of-state’ are shown to have different sub-classes based on the shape of the outcome set, and this also allows a formal definition of what ‘potential’ change could mean. The affixes _un-_ and _re-_ are modeled as result-state modifiers, which are sensitive to the outcomes of the action of the verb stem they attach to, and only attach when their presuppositions about the state of the object are met. Apart from directly comparing reversal and restitution with the same formal notion of equivalence, this approach also allows a transparent representation of event decomposition, whereby change in the object is able to be tracked at a granular level and its importance in determining the success of morphological derivations highlighted. This theory argues for compositional semantic interpretation at a sub-lexical level, while also showing how sentential and pragmatic factors affect verb meaning and derivational affixation. (shrink)

The arguments of Fodor, Garret, Walker and Parkes [(1980) Against definitions, Cognition, 8, 263-367] are the source of widespread skepticism in cognitive science about lexical semantic structure. Whereas the thesis that lexical items, and the concepts they express, have decompositional structure (i.e. have significant constituents) was at one time "one of those ideas that hardly anybody [in the cognitive sciences] ever considers giving up" (p. 264), most researchers now believe that "[a]ll the evidence suggests that the classical (...) [(decompositional)] view is wrong as a general theory of concepts" [Smith, Medin & Rips (1984) A psychological approach to concepts: comments on Rey, Cognition, 17, 272], and cite Fodor et al. (1980) as "sounding the death knell for decompositional theories" [MacNamara & Miller (1989) Attributes of theories of meaning, Psychological Bulletin, 106, 360]. I argue that the prevailing skepticism is unmotivated by the arguments in Fodor et al. Fodor et al. misrepresent the form, function and scope of the decompositional hypothesis, and the procedures they employ to test for the psychological reality of definitions are flawed. I argue, further, that decompositional explanations of the phenomena they consider are preferable to their primitivist alternatives, and, hence, that there is prima facie reason to accept them as evidence for the existence of decompositional structure. Cognitive scientists would, therefore, do well to revert to their former commitment to the decompositional hypothesis. (shrink)

The reflections recorded in this paper arise from three moments in the theory of definition and of conceptual analysis. The moments are: Frege’s review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic, the discussion there of the paradox of analysis, and the division that Frege marks, ensuing upon his distinction of Sinn/sense from Bedeutung/reference, between two different conceptions of definition; Leibniz’s still serviceable account of a distinction between the clarity and the distinctness of ideas---a distinction that prompts the suggestion that the guiding purpose (...) of lexical definition is Leibnizian clarity whereas that of real definition is inseparable from the pursuit of Leibnizian distinctness; Leibniz’s speculations concerning the limit or terminus of analysis. The apparent failure of these speculations, casting doubt as it does upon the aspirations that give rise to them, points to the long-standing need to reconfigure the philosophical business of enquiry into concepts. (shrink)

The idea that quotidian, middle-level concepts typically have internal structure -- definitional, statistical, or whatever -- plays a central role in practically every current approach to cognition. Correspondingly, the idea that words that express quotidian, middle-level concepts have complex representations "at the semantic level" is recurrent in linguistics; it's the defining thesis of what is often called "lexical semantics," and it unites the generative and interpretive traditions of grammatical analysis. Recently, Hale and Keyser (1993) have provided a budget of (...) sophisticated and persuasive arguments for the claim that `denominal' verbs are typically derived from phrases containing the corresponding nouns: `singvtr' is supposed to come from something like DO A SONG; `saddlevtr' is supposed to come from something like PUT A SADDLE ON; `shelvevtr' is supposed to come from something like PUT ON A SHELF, and so forth.1 We think these are among the most persuasive arguments for lexical decomposition in the linguistics literature. Still, this paper is going to claim that they are finally unconvincing. In Part 1, we will show that there are quite serious arguments of a familiar kind against the decompositional analyses that Hale and Keyser (henceforth, HK) propose; in Part 2 we'll show that the arguments that HK offer in favor of their analyses are flawed. (shrink)

This paper explores the link between number marking and(in)definiteness in nominals and their interpretation. Differencesbetween bare singulars and plurals in languages without determinersare explained by treating bare nominals as kind terms. Differencesarise, it is argued, because singular and plural kinds relatedifferently to their instantiations. In languages with determiners,singular kinds typically occur with the definite determiner, butplural/mass kinds can be bare in some languages and definite inothers. An account of singular kinds in terms of taxonomic readingsis proposed, with number marking playing (...) a crucial role inexplaining the obligatory presence of the determiner. The variationbetween languages with respect to plural/mass kinds is explained bypositing a universal scale of definiteness, with individual languageschoosing different cut-off points for lexicalization of the definitedeterminer. The possibility of further cross-linguistic variation isalso considered. (shrink)

In recent years, the definition of mole, the unit of the amount of substance, has changed to have the base units of the International System defined by “explicit-constant” formulations. The old definition, by referring explicitly to both mass and elementary units, suggests that the mole is a bridge between the macroscopic and microscopic registers. Conversely, the new definition emphasizes the aspect of counting, referred to any kind of elementary unit. Paradoxically, this results in the disappearance of the notion of substance (...) from the very unit of the quantity amount of substance. This change of definition elicited both positive and negative remarks from various authors, in relation to its epistemological, disciplinary, lexical and educational implications. In the present paper, we analyze some of these issues, highlighting the (conflicting) motivations of metrologists and chemists. We argue that the new definition of mole reflects a view of chemistry according to which the microscopic perspective prevails, possibly entailing the loss of reference to the macroscopic register; this could be related with the profound change undergone by the cognitive practices of chemistry along this last century. (shrink)

"Meaning, the complex phenomenon of individuation and the definition of identity are the core theme of this work. Grounded on a theoretical framework that gives particular emphasis to the semiotic process common to all forms of cognition, human cognitionis conceived here as specific of organisms that, in the course of their interactions, produce symbolic forms, defining the specific physical, social and cultural environments in which they evolve. Individuation, inherent to that semiotic process, is complex and double-sided. It involves, on one (...) hand, the definition of semantic identities and their acknowledgment as world objects naming; on the other hand, it comprehends the specific lexical and morphosyntactic strategies different languages have found todesignate particular entities referring. The definition of world objects and its symbolic translation presents variations from language to language. In the second part of the book, we define what we have called a 'structure-motivated ontology' to represent how this symbolic translation is accomplished in English and European Portuguese. Plus, we try to show how the nature of this symbolic translation affects structural realisation, namely the individuation of reference and the construal of 'one-off referring' expressions."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Ontologies play a major role in life sciences, enabling a number of applications, from new data integration to knowledge verification. SNOMED CT is a large medical ontology that is formally defined so that it ensures global consistency and support of complex reasoning tasks. Most biomedical ontologies and taxonomies on the other hand define concepts only textually, without the use of logic. Here, we investigate how to automatically generate formal concept definitions from textual ones. We develop a method that (...) uses machine learning in combination with several types of lexical and semantic features and outputs formal definitions that follow the structure of SNOMED CT concept definitions. RESULTS: We evaluate our method on three benchmarks and test both the underlying relation extraction component as well as the overall quality of output concept definitions. In addition, we provide an analysis on the following aspects: How do definitions mined from the Web and literature differ from the ones mined from manually created definitions, e.g., MeSH? How do different feature representations, e.g., the restrictions of relations' domain and range, impact on the generated definition quality?, How do different machine learning algorithms compare to each other for the task of formal definition generation?, and, What is the influence of the learning data size to the task? We discuss all of these settings in detail and show that the suggested approach can achieve success rates of over 90%. In addition, the results show that the choice of corpora, lexical features, learning algorithm and data size do not impact the performance as strongly as semantic types do. Semantic types limit the domain and range of a predicted relation, and as long as relations' domain and range pairs do not overlap, this information is most valuable in formalizing textual definitions. CONCLUSIONS: The analysis presented in this manuscript implies that automated methods can provide a valuable contribution to the formalization of biomedical knowledge, thus paving the way for future applications that go beyond retrieval and into complex reasoning. The method is implemented and accessible to the public from: https://github.com/alifahsyamsiyah/learningDL. (shrink)

The Objective Threshold/Strategic Model proposes that strong, qualitative inferences of unconscious perception can be made if the relationship between perceptual sensitivity and stimulus visibility is nonlinear and nonmonotonic. The model proposes a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold . These predictions were tested with masked semantic priming and repetition priming of a lexical decision task. The visibility of the prime stimuli was systematically varied above and below the objective identification threshold. The obtained relationship between prime visibility (...) and priming facilitation was nonlinear, but the results failed to confirm a nadir in priming effects at the objective identification threshold. We conclude that the objective identification threshold does not necessarily indicate the point where presumably unconscious priming effects might be inhibited by conscious cognitive processes. (shrink)

The current investigation assessed linguistic and narrative abilities in a cohort of children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The linguistic assessment was performed with both traditional tests and a multilevel procedure for discourse analysis. The results showed difficulties at different stages of message planning, organization, and microlinguistic processing (i.e., lexical selection and grammatical processing). Their macrolinguistic impairments were likely related to more general difficulties in the prelinguistic conceptual phase of message planning and mental model generation. Such weaknesses included a (...) difficulty in the non-verbal conceptualization of the story and the generation of an internal representation of the addressee’s mental model. (shrink)

In Figuig Berber, like in many other Berber languages, it is possible to express the indirect object by a lexical expression and by a pronominal clitic in the same sentence. This construction, called “dative doubling” in the literature, is in variation with constructions that do not have a pronominal clitic. In this article, dative doubling is studied in two corpora, one written corpus (Benamara 2011), and one spoken corpus, collected by the author. It is shown that dative doubling is (...) all but absent in the written corpus, while it is quite frequent in the spoken corpus. In the spoken corpus, there is a clear correlation with information structure. Dative doubling is only rarely found with indirect objects that express new information, while it appears more than half of the times when indirect objects express old information. In addition, it is obligatory when expressing old information with the verb ini ‘to say’. (shrink)

RESUMEN. “Justicia ambiental” es un binomio léxico complejo formado por un sustantivo (justicia) y un adjetivo (ambiental), lo cual no significa ni supone la prioridad o consecuente sumisión semántica de un té????????entescciado por un sustantivo (justicia) y un adjetivo (ambiental) que no supone la sumisiérmino sobre el otro, sino al contrario: la interacción e interdependencia de los componentes lingüísticos de la expresión refleja una predisposición del estado de ánimo e incluso una intención favorable u optimista hacia su aceptación incondicionada por (...) parte de todos, sin tener en cuenta la conveniencia de incidir en su contenido, equívoco o difuso en muchas ocasiones, bajo la necesaria observación de la evolución histórica del concepto desde un planteamiento político, social y jurídico. ABSTRACT. “Environmental justice” is a lexical binomial complex formed by a noun (justice) and a adjective (environmental), which neither means does not even suppose the priority or consistent semantic submission of a term to other one, but on the contrary: the interaction and interdependence of the linguistic components of the expression reflects a predisposition of the state of mind and even a favorable or optimistic intention towards his acceptance undetermined on the part of all, without bearing in mind the convenience of affecting in his content, pun or fuzzy in many occasions, under the necessary observation of the historical evolution of the concept from a political, social and juridical exposition. (shrink)

In his Populist Democracy: A Defence (1993), Torbjörn Tännsjö suggests, roughly, the following necessary and sufficient conditions for a democratic collective choice: If the majority of a given group of voters prefer A to B, then the collective choice is A rather than B; and if the majority of voters had preferred B to A, then the collective choice would have been B rather than A. Moreover, the preference of a voter is equated with the one she is showing by (...) the act of voting (e.g., by putting a ballot in a box). Tännsjö’s definition has the advantage of being simple, naturalistic, and, to the best of my knowledge, more exact that most other definitions proposed in the literature. As such, I think it is a useful starting point for a discussion of how to define democratic decision making. As we will see below, such a discussion can be quite illuminating and generate interesting and fruitful questions regarding how to understand democracy. Tännsjö claims that his definition is in line with common language use, i.e., that it is a lexical definition. Pace Tännsjö, I shall show that it departs from common language use since it has a number of counterintuitive implications in regards to which decisions and methods that are classified as democratic or undemocratic. I shall suggest a number of amendments to avoid these drawbacks and incorporate these amendments in a definition of a democratic collective choice. The result is a definition of a democratic decision that is superior to Tännsjö’s, or so we will argue. It will be acknowledged, however, that it still has some shortcomings that future efforts need to rectify, or that it might not be possible to give a 1 simple and naturalistic definition of democracy that is sufficiently in line with common language use. To avoid a possible misunderstanding, let me add that I don’t think there is necessarily one correct way of defining a democratic decision (although there might be a common kernel) and I certainly don’t suggest that the definition proposed here is the only way of explicating the ordinary language use of the term “democracy”.. (shrink)

Since the middle of the 20th century, philosophers and legal scholars have debated the precise definition of punishment. This chapter surveys the debate, identifies six potential conditions of punishment, and critically reviews each of them: 1) the response condition, which holds that punishment must be in response to wrongdoing, 2) the culpability condition, which holds that punishment must be of a person morally responsible for wrongdoing, 3) the authority condition, which holds that punishment must be imposed by a relevant authority, (...) 4) the hard treatment condition, which holds that punishment must impose hard consequences on the punishee, 5) the intentionality condition, which holds that punishment must be intentional, and 6) the censure condition, which holds that punishment must communicate disapproval. The article argues that it is often unclear that there is a version of the condition that provides optimal lexical fit. It discusses the implications of this analysis, and concludes that there may be less reason to worry about the lack of an authoritative definition than has sometimes been assumed, but that definitional clarity remains an objective worth pursuing. (shrink)

I give an analysis of how empirical terms do their work in communication and the gathering of knowledge that is fully externalist and that covers the full range of empirical terms. It rests on claims about ontology. A result is that armchair analysis fails as a tool for examining meanings of ‘basic’ empirical terms because their meanings are not determined by common methods or criteria of application passed from old to new users, by conventionally determined ‘intensions’. Nor do methods of (...) application used by individual speakers constitute definitive reference-determining intensions for their idiolect terms or associated concepts. Conventional intensions of non-basic empirical terms ultimately rest on basic empirical concepts, so no empirical meaning is found merely ‘in the head’. I discuss the nature of lexical definition, why empirical meanings cannot ultimately be modelled as functions from possible worlds to extensions, and traps into which armchair analysis of meaning can lead us. A coda explains how ‘Swampman’ examples, as used against teleosemantic theories of content, illustrate such traps. (shrink)

“What is a word?”1 The question was not asked in the expectation of a definitive answer, for words of their nature—as he saw—cannot readily provide one. It is of course a truism that all definitions are made of words, but Leavis was apt to point out that the meanings of many important words resist full lexical definition. Their being thus resistant is often a mark of their importance.2 By a very different route, Wittgenstein arrived at an “answer” akin (...) to that which Leavis himself tacitly proposed: “Die Bedeutung des Wortes is das, was die Erklärung der Bedeutung erklärt.”4The meaning of a word is what the... (shrink)

There are various ways of achieving an enlarged understanding of a concept of interest. One way is by giving its proper definition. Another is by giving something else a proper definition and then using it to model or formally represent the original concept. Between the two we find varying shades of grey. We might open up a concept by a direct lexical definition of the predicate that expresses it, or by a theory whose theorems define it implicitly. At the (...) other end of the spectrum, the modelling-this-as-that option also admits of like variation, ranging from models rooted in formal representability theorems to models conceived of as having only heuristic value. There exist on both sides of this divide further differences still. In one of them, both the definiendum and definiens of a definition are words or phrases of some common natural language. In others, the item of interest is a natural language expression and its representation is furnished by the artificial linguistic system that models it. The modern history of these approaches is both very large and growing. Much of this evolution has given too short a shrift to the history of the demotion of ‘intuitive’ concepts in favour of the artificially contrived ones intended to model them. A working assumption of this article is that in the absence of a good understanding of what motivated the modelling-turn in the foundations of mathematics and the intuitive theory of truth, the whole notion of formal representability will have been inadequately understood. In the interests of space, I will concentrate on seminal issues in set theory as dealt with by Russell and Frege, and in the theory of truth in natural languages as dealt with by Tarski. The nub of the present focus is the representational role of model theory in the logics of formalized languages. (shrink)

How many words—and which ones—are sufficient to define all other words? When dictionaries are analyzed as directed graphs with links from defining words to defined words, they reveal a latent structure. Recursively removing all words that are reachable by definition but that do not define any further words reduces the dictionary to a Kernel of about 10% of its size. This is still not the smallest number of words that can define all the rest. About 75% of the Kernel turns (...) out to be its Core, a “Strongly Connected Subset” of words with a definitional path to and from any pair of its words and no word's definition depending on a word outside the set. But the Core cannot define all the rest of the dictionary. The 25% of the Kernel surrounding the Core consists of small strongly connected subsets of words: the Satellites. The size of the smallest set of words that can define all the rest—the graph's “minimum feedback vertex set” or MinSet—is about 1% of the dictionary, about 15% of the Kernel, and part-Core/part-Satellite. But every dictionary has a huge number of MinSets. The Core words are learned earlier, more frequent, and less concrete than the Satellites, which are in turn learned earlier, more frequent, but more concrete than the rest of the Dictionary. In principle, only one MinSet's words would need to be grounded through the sensorimotor capacity to recognize and categorize their referents. In a dual-code sensorimotor/symbolic model of the mental lexicon, the symbolic code could do all the rest through recombinatory definition. (shrink)

The current study represents an integrated model of explicit and implicit offensive language taxonomy. First, it focuses on a definitional revision and enrichment of the explicit offensive language taxonomy by reviewing the collection of available corpora and comparing tagging schemas applied there. The study relies mainly on the categories originally proposed by Zampieri et al. (2019) in terms of offensive language categorization schemata. After the explanation of semantic differences between particular concepts used in the tagging systems and the analysis of (...) theoretical frameworks, a finite set of classes is presented, which cover aspects of offensive language representation along with linguistically sound explanations (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk et al. 2021). In the analytic procedure, offensive from non-offensive discourse is first distinguished, with the question of offence Target and the following categorization levels and sublevels. Based on the relevant data generated from Sketch Engine (https://www.sketchengine.eu/ententen-english-corpus/), we propose the concept of offensive language as a superordinate category in our system with a number of hierarchically arranged 17 subcategories. The categories are taxonomically structured into 4 levels and verified with the use of neural-based (lexical) embeddings. Together with a taxonomy of implicit offensive language and its subcategorization levels which has received little scholarly attention until now, the categorization is exemplified in samples of offensive discourses in selected English social media materials, i.e., publicly available 25 web-based hate speech datasets (consult Appendix 1 for a complete list). The offensive category levels (types of offence, targets, etc.) and aspects (offensive language property clusters) as well as the categories of explicitness and implicitness are discussed in the study and the computationally verified integrated explicit and implicit offensive language taxonomy proposed in the study. (shrink)

The argument from convention contends that the regular use of definite descriptions as referential devices strongly implies that a referential semantic convention underlies such usage. On the presumption that definite descriptions also participate in a quantificational semantic convention, the argument from convention has served as an argument for the thesis that the English definite article is ambiguous. Here, I revisit this relatively new argument. First, I address two recurring criticisms of the argument from convention: its alleged tendency to overgenerate and (...) its apparent evidential inadequacy. These criticisms are found wanting. Second, following Zacharska, I argue that while the argument from convention does alter the landscape of logical possibilities insofar as it provides good grounds for treating Donnellan’s referential–attributive distinction as having truth-conditional consequences, the argument from convention nonetheless fails to demonstrate that ‘the’ requires two lexical entries. (shrink)

The paper investigates various definitions of the concept of opinion as opposed to factual or evidence-based statements and proposes a taxonomy of opinions expressed in English as identified in selected social media. A discussion situates opinions in the realm of pragmatics and reaches to philosophy of language and cognitive science. The research methodology combines a thorough linguistic analysis of opinions, proposing their multifaceted taxonomy with the automatically generated lexical embeddings of positive and negative lexicon acquired from the analysed (...) opinionated texts. As proposed, the definition of the concept of opinion is best apprehended when looked upon in terms of an opinion event, with a number of necessary conditions on the one hand, and those that are characteristic of an explicit opinion prototype on the other. Lists of opinion discourse markers show their preferential uses either in positive or negative opinionated texts; however, no sets of necessary and/or sufficient opinion markers properties have been acquired from the analysed texts. The conclusions indicate a polysemous understanding of naturally occurring social media opinionated texts and a definitional flexibility of the boundaries around lexical positive and negative types of opinion markers. (shrink)

In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or an act/object ambigu-ity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argu-ment’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?

The contribution of action-perception systems of the brain to lexical semantics remains controversial. Here, we used high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) in healthy adults to examine the role of primary (left hand motor area; HMA) and higher-order (left anterior inferior parietal lobe; aIPL) action areas in action-related word processing (action verbs and manipulable nouns) compared to non-action-related control words (non-action verbs and non-manipulable nouns). We investigated stimulation-related effects at three levels of semantic processing: subliminal, implicit, and explicit. Broadly, (...) we found that stimulation of HMA and aIPL resulted in relative facilitation of action-related language processing compared to non-action. HMA stimulation facilitated action verb processing in subliminal and implicit task contexts, suggesting that HMA helps represent action verbs even in semantically shallow tasks. HMA stimulation also facilitated manipulable noun comprehension in an explicit semantic task, suggesting that HMA contributes to manipulable noun comprehension when semantic demands are high. aIPL stimulation facilitated both manipulable noun and action verb processing during an implicit task. We suggest that both HMA and aIPL play a functional role in action semantics. HMA plays a general role in the semantics of actions and manipulable objects, while aIPL is important only when visuo-motor coordination is required for the action. (shrink)

This article examines the lexical emergence of salafiyya in the Algerian press between 1925 and 1927, which currently constitutes the earliest known use of this abstract noun in Arabic. An attentive reading of the sources reveals that, since it was a new category, it had not yet an established meaning. The task of outlining its definition and features fell to the reformers who first used it. One of them, Abū Yaʿlā al-Zawāwī, did so in a way that defies today’s (...) conventional thinking: he laid claim to Salafism while disparaging the Sunna and attempting to reduce the authority of hadith literature. The article shows that the core intellectual features we routinely associate with Salafism were not necessarily embraced by the historical actors who used this term at its inception in the mid-1920s. This has implications for the proper historicization of Salafism as a category. (shrink)

A classical definition of automaticity establishes that automatic processing occurs without attention or consciousness, and cannot be controlled. Previous studies have demonstrated that semantic priming can be reduced if attention is directed to a low-level of analysis. This finding suggests that semantic processing is not automatic since it can be controlled. In this paper, we present two experiments that demonstrate that semantic processing may occur in the absence of attention and consciousness. A negative semantic priming effect was found when a (...) low-level prime-task was required and when a masked lexical decision prime-task was performed . This paper also discusses the limitations of the inhibitory mechanism involved in negative semantic priming effect. (shrink)

It is generally thought that definite determiners exclusively mark nouns as definite. In several languages, however, definite determiners may modify both nouns and verbs. As I will argue, the existence of these “multi‐functional” elements suggests that determiners are in fact phrases. This syntactic move has a philosophical payoff. Among other things, it allows us to cast Donnellan's distinction as an ordinary consequence of the context‐invariant compositional semantics of natural language, not as a matter of contextual manipulation or lexical ambiguity. (...) Multi‐functional determiners show us that Donnellan's distinction is,contraDonnellan, a matter of grammar. (shrink)

This paper offers a semantically-based solution to the problem of predicting whether a verb will display the subjective conjugation or the objective conjugation in Hungarian. This alternation correlates with the definiteness of the object, but definiteness is not a completely reliable indicator of the subjective/objective alternation, nor is specificity. A prominent view is that the subjective/objective alternation is conditioned by the syntactic category of the object, but this view has also been shown to be untenable. This paper offers a semantic (...) solution: If the referential argument of a phrase is lexically specified as familiar/new, then the phrase bears the feature [+DEF]/[−DEF], and this feature governs the conjugations. The notions of novelty and familiarity are made precise using a compositional version of DRT in the context of a suitably large fragment of Hungarian, including local and non-local personal pronouns, demonstratives, definite and indefinite articles, quantifiers, wh-words, numerals, and possessives. (shrink)

This paper argues that lexical and operator-based analyses of distributivity are not in conflict, but are both necessary components of any theory of distributivity that aims to account for all the relevant data. I use several contrasts between plural definites and group NPs to show that we need an operator-based analysis of distributivity; this kind of distributivity is available with plural definites but not with group subjects, which can be explained under the common assumption that group NPs denote atoms (...) rather than sums and hence do not allow quantification over their individual parts. At the same time, we need a lexical theory of distributivity to account for the various distributive interpretations that we do find with groups; a formalisation of such a theory is outlined in the final section of this paper. (shrink)

Animation is by definition the basis of animate life. Movement is thus of prime significance and its dynamics warrant close study in terms of the tactile-kinaesthetic body, its relation to cognition and affectivity, and its anchorage in ontogeny and phylogeny. Riveted attention on the brain deflects attention from animate movement, as does the degeneration of movement into a motorology and the extensive and broadly indiscriminate use of the lexical band-aid of embodiment and its derivatives. Critical attention is paid to (...) just such present-day practices in neuroscience, and in cognitive science and philosophy, practices that, by impeding investigations of the tactilekinaesthetic body, impede understandings of how kinaesthetic experience is at the core of those synergies of meaningful movement that constitute animate life. (shrink)

The idea that quotidian, middle-level concepts typically have internal structure-definitional, statistical, or whatever—plays a central role in practically every current approach to cognition. Correspondingly, the idea that words that express quotidian, middle-level concepts have complex representations "at the semantic level" is recurrent in linguistics; it is the defining thesis of what is often called "lexical semantics," and it unites the generative and interpretive traditions of grammatical analysis. Hale and Keyser (HK) (1993) have endorsed a version of lexical decomposition (...) according to which "denominal" verbs are typically derived from phrases containing the corresponding nouns: ‘singvtr’ is supposed to come from something like DO A SONG; ‘saddlevtr’ is supposed to come from something like PUT A SADDLE ON; ‘shelvevtr’ is supposed to come from something like PUT ON A SHELF; and so forth.1 Their case for these claims revives a form of argument, the "impossible-word" argument, which has for some time been in eclipse. In this article we will claim that, whatever the right account of lexical decomposition eventually turns out to be, impossible-word arguments are infirm and should be discounted. We will use HK's paper as a text for this critique. (shrink)

According to the contemporary consensus, when reaching in the lexicon grammar looks for items like nouns, verbs, and prepositions while logic sees items like predicates, connectives, and quantifiers. In fact, there doesn’t seem to be a single lexical category contemporary grammar and logic both make use of. I hope to show that while a perfect match between the lexical categories of grammar and logic is impossible there can be a substantial overlap. I propose semantic definitions for all (...) the major parts of speech . I argue that the differences among these categories can be captured in terms of distinctions recognized in logic. (shrink)