Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible (...) reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. (shrink)

Why do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: It must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “purity” concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of (...) moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind. (shrink)

En su obra Mil mesetas, Deleuze y Guattari ofrecen una perspectiva singular sobre el lenguaje, concebido como un sistema de signos interconectados y fluidos, donde el significado surge de las relaciones intrincadas dentro de este sistema. Este artículo evalúa la influencia de Deleuze y Guattari en la lingüística contemporánea y explora las diferencias entre su enfoque y la lingüística estructural propuesta por Saussure. Deleuze y Guattari introducen la noción de máquina como un quiebre radical con los enfoques estructurales tradicionales, al (...) concebir el lenguaje como un sistema dinámico y en constante transformación. Este enfoque contrasta con la lingüística estructural, que concibe el lenguaje como un sistema estático y autónomo. (shrink)

Language has a rich typology of inferential types. It was recently shown that subjects are able to divide the informational content of new visual stimuli among the various slots of the inferential typology: when gestures or visual animations are used in lieu of specific words in a sentence, they can trigger the very same inferential types as language alone (Tieu et al., 2019 ). How general are the relevant triggering algorithms? We show that they extend to the auditory modality and (...) to music cognition. We tested whether pro-speech musical gestures, i.e. musical excerpts that replace words in sentences, can give rise to the same inferences. We show that it is possible to replicate the same typology of inferences using pro-speech music. Minimal and complex musical excerpts can behave just like language, gestures, and visual animations with respect to the logical behavior of their content when embedded in sentences. Specifically, we found that pro-speech music can generate scalar implicatures, presuppositions, supplements, and homogeneity inferences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Translating Care for the Voiceless PatientLeo AlmazanUndocumented immigrants do not have the luxury of having a professional interpreter by their bedside to help them navigate the complexities of their often-dire situation. Most of the time, they have to rely on the kindness of volunteers or untrained medical personnel to help them. In 2001, I was a non-clinical student in training at a level 1 trauma hospital in the Midwest. (...) The night in question, one of the residents asked me to go to the infectious diseases unit to translate for a newly admitted undocumented patient. [End Page 152]The patient was in his early twenties. This was the second time he had arrived in the US after walking through the desert. His diagnosis was dire—he drank stagnant water during his journey, and he had acquired an aggressive type of infection whose origin (viral? bacterial?) the specialists could not as yet determine. After initial testing, the doctors discovered that he was also suffering from full-blown AIDS.When I entered the room where the young man was lying, shaking violently due to a high fever, I felt deep anger and profound sadness. People looked at the young man with a mixture of disdain and anger. He was, after all, "wasting" the hospital's precious resources. At the same time, his immediate reaction after hearing me speak to him in his native language and sensing that I understood him, that is, that I could empathize with his fears, made me decide that I would do whatever I could to help him.After a brief initial conversation, it became painfully clear that he neither had any formal education nor did he understand the gravity of his medical condition, aggravated by AIDS. Besides that, he did not comprehend what was being done to him, which included the use of experimental drugs that he had not consented to take.My task then morphed from an untrained translator trying to help someone understand a foreign language to a new ally trying to help someone navigate the short-, mid-, and long-term life-altering decisions he would have to make without full knowledge or understanding of his actual circumstances. In short, I quickly transition from interpreter to advocate.It was probably the result of the stress and pressure I suddenly found myself experiencing, but I remember thinking back to my high school etymologies class and realizing that the verb "to advocate," from ad-vocare, means to support, defend, or protect someone. "When did I commit to any of those things?" I thought to myself. And then I immediately remember thinking, "Not at all! I did not commit to any of those things! All I said "yes" to was to lend my voice for a couple of minutes so that a doctor and a patient could understand each other. I surely did not intend to lend my voice to someone who has no voice!"A second and even bigger surprise for me, however, was that, in the process of translating, I could hear what the young man and the physician were truly saying to each other. In other words, as my mouth moved to speak, now in Spanish and now in English, I was able to capture and translate not only the words being said but also the feelings and emotions and the deeper meaning of what was being communicated. For example, when the young man asked, "¿Voy a estar bien?" ["Am I going to be OK?"] I could "hear" his real question, "Am I dying?" When the doctor said, "Your CD4+ cell count is less than 200," I heard him say, "Couldn't you have chosen another place to die?" Conscious of my role, however, I limited myself to performing my duties as professionally and precisely as possible.The following day, I consulted with a professional interpreter who worked at the same hospital, and I asked her how I could be more helpful to the young man. As she advised me how to proceed, I could tell she was truly torn.On the one hand, she wanted me to proceed with the outmost professionalism, to remain "neutral," "objective," and to avoid, at all... (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Philosophical theology is the systematic inquiry about God's existence and being. We find it in Aristotle's Metaphysics, in Cicero's De natura ...

In his private life, as well as in his work and political attitudes, Michel Foucault often stood in contradiction to himself, especially when his expansive ideas collided with the institutions in which he worked. In Francois Caillat's provocative collection of essays and interviews based on his French documentary of the same name, leading contemporary critics and philosophers reframe Foucault's legacy in an effort to build new ways of thinking about his struggle against society's mechanisms of domination, demonstrating how conflict within (...) the self lies at the heart of Foucault's life and work. (shrink)