The aim of this paper is to introduce Wittgenstein’s concept of the form of a language into geometry and to show how it can be used to achieve a better understanding of the development of geometry, from Desargues, Lobachevsky and Beltrami to Cayley, Klein and Poincaré. Thus this essay can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate the Picture Theory of Meaning, from the Tractatus. Its basic idea is to use Picture Theory to understand the pictures of geometry. I will (...) try to show, that the historical evolution of geometry can be interpreted as the development of the form of its language. This confrontation of the Picture Theory with history of geometry sheds new light also on the ideas of Wittgenstein. (shrink)

For a decade, we have admired the incisive and broadly informed works of Ladislav Tondl on the foundations of science. Now it is indeed a pleasure to include this book among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. We hope that it will help to deepen the collaborative scholar ship of scientists and philosophers in Czechoslovakia with the English reading scholars of the world. Professor Ladislav Tondl was born in 1924, and completed his higher education at the (...) Charles University iIi Prague. His doctorate was granted by the Institute of Information Theory and Automation. He was a professor and scientific research worker at the Institute for the Theory and Methodology of Science, which was a component part of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Tondl's principal fields of interest are the methodology of the empirical and experimental sciences, logical semantics, and cybernetics. For many years, he collaborated with Professor Albert Perez and others at the Institute of Information Theory and Automation in Prague, and he has undertaken fruitful collaboration with logicians in the Soviet and Polish schools, and been influenced by the Finnish logicians as well, among them Jaakko Hintikka. We list below a selection of his main publications. Perhaps the most accessible in presenting his central conception of the relationship between modem information theory and the methodology of the sciences is his 1965 paper with Perez, 'On the Role of Information Theory in Certain Scientific Procedures'. (shrink)

This book offers new insights into the nature of human rational capacities by engaging inferentialism with empirical research in the cognitive sciences. Inferentialism advocates that humans' unique kind of intelligence is discursive and rooted in competencies to make, assess and justify claims. This approach provides a rich source of valuable insights into the nature of our rational capacities, but it is underdeveloped in important respects. For example, little attempt has been made to assess inferentialism considering relevant scientific research on human (...) communication, cognition or reasoning. By engaging philosophical and scientific approaches in a productive dialogue, this book shows how we can better understand human rational capacities by comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses. In this vein, the author critically revisits and constructively develops central themes from the work of Robert Brandom and other language rationalists: the nature of the assertoric practice and its connection to reasoned discourse, the linguistic constitution of the shared space of reasons, the social nature and function of reasoning, the intersubjective roots of social-normative practices and the nature of objective thought. Practices of Reason will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. (shrink)

We characterize, by easily verifiable properties, abstract ternary relations isomorphic to the causal betweenness introduced by Hans Reichenbach.

The aim of the paper is to present a theoretical framework which would make it possible to embed the conflict between the natural and human sciences into a broader historical context. With the help of categories such as paradigmatic disciplines, mixed discipline of the paradigm, metaphorical realm of the paradigm, and elusive realm of the paradigm we describe the dynamics of changes in the classification of scientific disciplines which accompany a scientific revolution. Our approach is thus an alternative to T. (...) S. Kuhn’s sociological theory of scientific revolutions. Instead by a social conflict between the proponents and opponents of the new paradigm we interpret the scientific revolution as a cognitive conflict between the mixed disciplines and the metaphorical realm of the old paradigm. (shrink)

Over the last decade, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have elaborated an influential naturalistic account of human reasoning. Their distinctive hypothesis is that its adaptive rationale – and primary function – is to produce and assess reasons in interpersonal justification and argumentation. In this paper I argue, first, that their characterisation of reasoning as based on metarepresentations threatens to oversophisticate reasoning and faces the problem of vicious regress. Second, I argue that they owe us a coherent account of the cognitive (...) role of reasons in reasoning. (shrink)

The paper analyses the model as an artefact sui generis establishing the role of semiosis, as a homomorphic representation, as an artefact securing the function of an interface between the author and the receiver. The receiver's ability of accepting the model and its interpretation possibility and/or quality depends on the receiver's competence including the linquistic competence, his knowledge of the represented sphere and the knowledge of the applied sign system and its rules.

Coming from a mathematical background, I was always puzzled by Popper’s view, according to which, after the falsification of a scientific theory its degree of corroboration becomes zero. Most of the scientific theories taught in the physics departments have already been falsified, and what is the point of teaching theories, whose degree of corroboration is zero? The first important observation to make is that not all cases of falsification are the same. In some cases, as for instance in the case (...) of the theory of phlogiston, the falsification happened in agreement with the Popperian picture. Scientists discarded the falsified theory and opted for its alternative. Therefore, nowadays nobody tries to make a scientific contribution to the theory of phlogiston. Nevertheless, there are cases, and Newtonian mechanics is surely the most important among them, when the behaviour of the scientists after the falsification of the theory is from the Popperian point of view incomprehensible. Many scientists were not ready to discard the falsified theory, and not for irrational reasons. Some of the deepest discoveries in Newtonian mechanics as for instance the famous Kolmogorov, Arnold, Moser theorem were made many years after this theory was falsified. I think that Andrej Kolmogorov, Vladimir Arnold or Jürgen Moser cannot be compared to an Aristotelian philosopher, who adheres to his pet theory after its falsification. What these three mathematicians did was a fundamental contribution to modern science. (shrink)

In contemporary global knowledge based society there are scorching needs for new knowledge and unprecedented vision of future development. Author is focuses attention to new possibilities of fostering creative abilities and gaining new socio-economic knowledge by the assistance of ICT, Internet and mainly by using products and services of computational intelligence. His method used is prevailingly new knowledge creation by experimentation in virtual laboratories. In using conventional methods, he combines inductive and deductive methods as set up for developing mental models (...) from up to down and bottom to up. Because in socio-economic branches it is very difficult and even almost wholly impossible to do experiments in objective reality the experimentation by the assistance of computational intelligence is promising advance in gaining new socioeconomic knowledge in contemporary complex world. Using such new approaches, methods and tools is the main scientific aim of the author. He uses convictive demonstration of successful using these unprecedented possibilities in gaining deeper knowledge about complex evolutionary phenomena. The distinction of such knowledge is against conventional one is consisting in very deep understanding of complex socio-economic dynamics. Using meant knowledge acquisition approaches is promising in quality and in abiding knowledge and skill of single individuals but the extraordinary progress of creative knowledge based society fostered by using them in advanced webs is useful for whole society. (shrink)

There are several ontological and consequently also methodological mistakes in contemporary mainstream economics. Among them, the so-called ergodic axiom is play significant role. It is understandable that the real economy elaborated as formalized mental model looks like dynamic system on first sight. However, that is right only of dynamical systems in mathematical formalism. Economy that is in our understanding societal and/or collective economy is complex evolving organism. If we imagine such organism in the form of dynamical system that is as (...) clear mathematical formalism, we are losing their crucial authentic character. The significant irredeemable attribute of societal economy is lying in his complex evolving network process character created by large population of people with different decision-making and complex realizing among them. Going from these imaginations the two entities in a question that is dynamical system with their ergodicity and societal economic organism as complex evolving network are qualitative very different ones. That is the reason why we cannot accede with endeavours to draw on living economy straitjacket of ergodic axiom. To articulate that cause by other words ergodic dynamical systems are applicable for physical and partly for chemical entities and only scarcely are fit for living organisms. On the other hand however, as clear method the ergodic dynamical system have good applying for didactical approaches in economics where helping in better understanding some types of complexities in dynamics. The purpose of that essay is to discuss problems around usability of ergodic dynamical system theory and methods in economics in the age of advanced ICT knowledge based society. (shrink)

The paper presents the analysis of the philosophical roots of cybernetic thinking and its links to the important scientific trends. The programs launched by cybernetics have justified the accents placed on ‘intentionality’, ‘teleological worlds’, ‘worlds of the artificial’. The founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, emphasized what he called ‘human use’ or ‘human dimensions’ of cybernetics and its applications.

The essay investigates the possibility of a closer connection of Husserlian phenomenology and that tradition in semiotics of art which originates mainly withSchelling and Goethe. The affinity between semiotically approached tropology and phenomenology is supported if a symbol is conceived not only as an analogy of the designated, but also as its direct grasping. This grasping shows some features of rational contemplation as understood by phenomenology. Modelling symbol as a synthetic trope enables us to proceed to the model of an (...) "artistic situation" as a square generated by a decomposition of the triangle of reference. The complexity of the processes within the "square" results from a fusion of the effects of the linear, natural circuit and the feedback, culturally historical circuit. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse relations between China and Russia over the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the context of deepening Sino-Russian relations and the general rise of Eurasia. China and Russia are pivotal non-Western Eurasian powers in political, economic and military terms and the key motors of Eurasian multi-faceted integration. Both countries pursue their own interests and present their own projects and initiatives. Nevertheless, over the last few years, Sino-Russian cooperation has become strategic and is (...) starting to pursue a new model of globalisation and international order. In the article, I refer to this approach as the “New Eurasian Paradigm” (NEP). I follow Axel Honneth’s Hegelian-based theory of threefold-level recognition Hrubec (2011, p. 267). which I extend and employ at the interstate level to interpret the behaviour of China and Russia and their integration projects in terms of a struggle for political recognition as full, equal members of the global community determining global processes. Both countries thus aim to reform the global order and boost the integration of Eurasia in order to achieve successful development. These common interests are the main reasons behind their mutual strategic collaboration. (shrink)

The nature of changes in mathematics was discussed recently in Revolutions in Mathematics. The discussion was dominated by historical and sociological arguments. An obstacle to a philosophical analysis of this question lies in a discrepancy between our approach to formulas and to pictures. While formulas are understood as constituents of mathematical theories, pictures are viewed only as heuristic tools. Our idea is to consider the pictures contained in mathematical text, as expressions of a specific language. Thus we get formulas and (...) pictures into one linguistic framework, and so we are able to analyse their interplay in the course of history. (shrink)

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions (...) which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. (shrink)

The paper deals with M. Henry’s interpretation of Marxian philosophy in the frame of his phenomenology of life. Its aim is to show the relevance of Henry’s interpretation for the global crisis of capitalism in our times. Henry argues that economic questions in Marx’s Capital, first of all his theory of surplus value, is closely connected with the historical issues in his German ideology. Attention is also paid to Marx’s thesis about the science becoming a direct production force. In the (...) era of automatization, when most of common work is reliably done by the highly developed technological devices, such as artificial intelligence, Marx’s idea of a free development of every individual as a condition of a free development of all is not a utopian one any more. It becomes a normative claim concerning economic and political reality. Thus Marx’s idea of a classless society could be interpreted as a system of global justice, in which the extreme global inequality has been overcome. (shrink)

This paper is a polemic response to the essay “The Semantics of Proper Names and Identity Theory of Predication” by L. Novák (SN 1–2/2004). In the first part of the article, the so-called descriptive theories of proper names and Kripke’s challenge to these views are briefly presented. It is pointed out that Novák’s exposition rests upon certain presuppositions in the theories of meaning and mind, which are controversial and which – without further argument – can hardly cast doubt on the (...) so-called New Theory of Reference. Furthermore, it is argued that Novák’s “minimal sense” of a proper name is too minimalistic and cannot be of service to the original idea of descripitivism. In the second part of the paper, an attempt is made to show that Novák’s extensional-intensional identity theory of predication is not based on identity, insofar as it is characterised by the axioms of the theory of identity. (shrink)

The frequently used term "certainty" plays in the human life an important role, especially in specifying the goals of human activities. The presented study distinguishes two different meanings of this term: the certainty as a state of the mind and the certainty of anything, i.e. the certainty connected with a set of specific conditions. A certainty in the former meaning is usually presented as an important component of some ideologies. As an explanatory model of the certainty of anything, there could (...) be applied the approaches developed in the sphere of intensional or modal logics, especially the concept of epistemic attitudes. The contemporary scientific and technological thinking usually justifies an acceptable model od epistemic attitudes by means of various measures based on the scheme of decreasing uncertainty or, as it is typical for information models, by means of decreasing entropy level. (shrink)

The new topics in the spheres of science and/or technology policy, i. e. the knowledge management, was influenced by problems connected with great and complicated technological projects. The paper presents the main motives and sources of knowledge management, of qualified use and application of knowledge, especially the selection and integration of adequate data and knowledge, the selection of relevant knowledge sets and their integration.

The presented paper substantiates the principle that values are an immanent component of science and any rational cognitive activity. This principle belongs to the European cultural tradition starting from the book of Genesis of the Old Testament, the values of certainty in the antique Greek philosophy and Francis Bacon's coincidence of knowledge and power. Values in science form complicated structures inconnection with different types of knowledge including “the knowledge that”, empirical evidence, various types of generalizations or rules, methods, directions, algorithms, (...) “the knowledge how”, “the knowledge why” or other types of knowledge. Since the assignments of different types of values are the products of a decision-making, it is useful to distinguish many types of decision-making, especially semantic decision-making, information decision-making and decision-making with distinctly pragmatic dimensions. The values assignable to scientific activities and their results also include their social recognition, respect and prestige granted to knowledge and bearers of knowledge by society and social groups or communities. Knowledge generation and the rational and justified application of the achieved and acceptable impacts are also connected with decision-making procedures, values and criteria of social acceptance. (shrink)

The author deems it expedient to single out the specific framework of the following reflections. A considerable portion of human beings who live, move, work and create around us, at least most of those who regard themselves as active members of the human society, view the realm that results from their own aspirations, requirements and preferences, hence the world we can describe as the “teleological world”, as more important than the actual world around them. Nothing is changed in this finding (...) even by the fact that such a teleological world is just an alternative to the world which people know, in which they live, where they pursue their activities and experience their destiny. Moreover, they are convinced – often succumbing to an illusion – that this teleological world is or can be better and more perfect, that it can help them make their wishes and requirements come true and meet their goals. Also many personal and especially social problems are caused by a discordance in the interpretation of what is or what should be the objective of our action, by the profound differences in the notion of what is or what should be a desirable or required state or, generally speaking, by the conflicts of different teleological worlds. The system of notions, objectives and visions of what we call a “teleological world” is not only a product of our own knowledge but is invariably influenced by the system of values or rather by specific integration of values and knowledge. (shrink)